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1. Introduction 
The institutional design of central banks and monetary policy are of great interest in 
academic literature. Japan is of particular interest for economists, because Japan has 
been confronted with the problem of deflation since the late 1990s. In response to this 
problem, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) introduced unconventional tools of monetary policy 
such as zero interest rates and quantitative easing. The BOJ did so as a legally 
independent central bank, for the Japanese Diet enacted a new Bank of Japan Law 
(BJL) in June 1997, which came into effect on 1 April 1998.  This new law granted the 
BOJ independence, and ended the era of a central bank which was legally dependent on 
the Government and the Ministry of Finance for over half a century.  
 
Section 1.1 examines this thesis’ research questions further. The organisation of this 
thesis is presented in Section 1.2. 
 
1.1 Research Questions 
The question of how to design central banks has been the subject of substantial political 
and economic disputes for a long time. There is a worldwide trend of governments to 
grant independence to their central banks. However, central bank independence is a 
complex and multifaceted institutional design. As a result, central banks have been 
analysed by numerous academics from different fields, first and foremost, by 
economists. Later, studies were complemented by (comparative) political economists, 
political scientists and even sociologists. However, despite the large amount of literature 
about central banking and monetary policy, central bank independence has been 
dominated by an English or Anglo Saxon viewpoint (Toniolo 2010: 28), neglecting 
peculiar characteristics of specific countries. This thesis adds a viewpoint from Japan 
and tries to contribute to the discussion of central bank independence by means of an in-
depth analysis of the institutional issues of the Bank of Japan.  
 
Most papers about the Bank of Japan have focused on the subject of monetary policy, in 
particular the zero rate interest policy and the quantitative easing policy, and which 
effect these policy measures had on the Japanese economy. One set of studies provides 
advice about the optimal monetary policy in a deflationary environment. This 
dissertation will not investigate the issue of optimal monetary policy – there are dozens 
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of studies which have already concentrated on this subject.1 Rather, this study focuses 
on central bank reform and the institutional design of the Bank of Japan, analysing and 
interpreting both its de iure and de facto central bank independence. In other words, this 
thesis is a positive analysis as to how the central bank is designed, and which effect the 
Bank of Japan law revision had on the BOJ. This must be kept strictly separated from a 
normative analysis of how the central bank should be designed, or which effect a 
change should have.  
 
Regardless of the law revision and the Bank of Japan’s higher de iure independence 
since 1998, one important question is whether the BOJ really is independent in a de 
facto sense. One might argue that the Bank of Japan is independent only by statute in a 
legal sense. For instance, assuming that the Bank of Japan is independent, why has the 
Bank of Japan Governor had to be a permanent member in the 2001 government 
established CEFP (Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy)? Or, why did politicians 
from the LDP’s “Committee for Investigation of Financial Problems” (jimintô kinyû 
mondai chôsa kai) decide to establish a working group that investigates issues of central 
bank independence and inflation targeting, and even submitted a bill to the Diet to re-
revise the Bank of Japan Law? In this context, it is essential to understand what 
Japanese politicians aimed at when revising the BJL and what their perception of what 
an independent central bank is or should be. This dissertation will investigate the 
delegation to an independent Bank of Japan, and provide case studies in order to 
understand the resulting relationship of the Bank of Japan with the government and 
politicians.  
 
This thesis has three pillars: The first deals with the question of political delegation and 
answers the question why the BOJ was granted independence. The existing literature on 
central bank reform does not fully explain why the Bank of Japan Law was revised in 
1998. Although there was no persistently high inflation in Japan, and the reduction of 
inflation was viewed as the main merit of an independent central bank, politicians 
decided to grant independence to the Bank of Japan. Finding alternative explanations 
for central bank law revision in Japan is a primary objective of the thesis.  
 
                                                 
1 For a survey, see for instance, Bernanke et al. (2004); Eggertson and Woodford (2003); Iwamura et al. 
(2006); Oda and Ueda (2007).  
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The second subject is a de iure analysis of the new Bank of Japan Law, concentrating on 
an investigation of central bank independence. This subject includes an examination of 
central bank accountability and transparency. The third pillar presents case studies 
which analyse how the BOJ interacts with the government and politicians, and tries to 
answer the question whether the BOJ is de facto independent.2 The objective of this 
dissertation is not only to identify who and what made central bank reform possible, but 
also to find out why this reform occurred at this particular time, why it was enforced as 
it was, and why the result was like it was and not different. The overall objective of this 
dissertation is to contribute empirically to the understanding of central bank 
independence based on an analysis of the Bank of Japan. To sum up, this thesis pays 
special attention to following questions: 
 
1. Why was the Bank of Japan Law revised in 1998? 
2. What exactly was changed in the Bank of Japan Law? How did central bank 
reform affect the Bank of Japan’s independence? (de iure analysis) 
3. How did the new law change the Bank of Japan’s independence and its 
relationship to the government and Diet politicians in reality? Did the BOJ 
decide over monetary policy independently? (de facto analysis)  
 
According to Yin (2009: 9), “why” and “how” questions are explanatory, and lead to 
the use of case studies as the primary research method. Taylor (2009) argues that “[a] 
case study approach appears to be the most appropriate means of identifying the “causal 
paths and variables leading to the dependent variable of interest”, in this dissertation the 
central bank independence of the Bank of Japan. In other words, the case study method 
is a useful tool in this thesis to provide answers concerning the process of choosing, 
designing, and implementing a fundamental institutional change (BOJ Law revision) in 
a complex organisation such as the Bank of Japan. In addition, how both the BOJ and 
political actors interpreted the new institutional design of the BOJ will be demonstrated. 
The methods used in this thesis and the framework of how to answer these research 
questions will be provided in Chapter 2.  
 
                                                 
2 This thesis focuses on the time period since the beginning of the “new” Bank of Japan in 1998 until 
2012, which means most recent developments of the BOJ under Kuroda Haruhiko, who was appointed by 
Prime Minister Abe Shinzô in 2013, will not be considered. 
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1.2 Organisation of the Dissertation 
This dissertation contains 9 chapters, which are organised as follows. This introduction 
includes the background and purpose of the study, research questions, and the 
organisation of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework for the analysis and interpretation of the 
central bank independence of the Bank of Japan in the following chapters. This study 
adopts a mixture of two analytical methods of the new institutional economics, namely 
that of principal-agent theory and a historical institutionalism approach. This 
dissertation analyses the delegation to an independent Bank of Japan, the appointment 
of BOJ Governors, and monetary policy decisions of the BOJ by means of a principal-
agent model with multiple principals.  
 
Chapter 3 analyses the process of the Bank of Japan law reform. First, the 
establishment of the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Japan Law of 1942 will be briefly 
elaborated. Afterwards, an analysis of why previous attempts of law reform failed will 
be of interest. The most crucial part of this chapter is the process of law reform between 
1996 and 1998, which will be discussed in detail. Subsequently, the role of the most 
important actors will be elaborated in order to draw conclusions about incentives and 
motivations of central bank reform in Japan. This chapter distinguishes the actors 
between the Bank of Japan, state actors, and private actors. State actors are the Ministry 
of Finance and political parties, including the Liberal Democratic Party, the New Party 
Sakigake and the Social Democratic Party. Private actors are interest groups such as the 
financial sector.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the decision made by politicians which aimed to yield authority 
over monetary policy to an independent central bank. A primary goal of this study is to 
empirically find out which factors explain central bank reform in Japan. That is, this 
thesis aims to examine the theoretical understanding of the delegation of regulatory 
competencies to independent agencies, here the independent Japanese central bank. This 
chapter seeks to explain the origins of central bank reform in Japan by utilizing a 
principal-agent perspective that focuses on the incentives of political actors. In order to 
identify why central bank reform in Japan happened in 1998, it is essential to 
concentrate on the question of who brought about the Bank of Japan Law revision. 
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Finding answers to this research problem involves an analysis of the institutional design 
of central bank independence.  
 
This chapter tries to form a link between theory and empirics. First, this chapter lists 
and analyses existing delegation theories. After that, these theories are applied to Japan. 
Additionally, some alternate explanations, such as a bureaucratic approach and the 
concept of ideas, are added. The examination of various factors on the national level 
aims to explain the timing and the Bank of Japan’s path to central bank independence. 
In other words, Japan was selected a crucial case study to test contending explanations 
of central bank reform. The Japanese case is an exceptional paradigm for studying the 
delegation of central bank independence.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the de iure outcome of the Bank of Japan Law revision. The issue 
of central bank independence on the basis of the Bank of Japan Law will be investigated. 
This chapter includes a description of the Bank of Japan Act from 1942, followed by a 
more detailed investigation of the new 1998 Bank of Japan Law. The second main area 
of focus contains a summary of the most essential contents, and an examination of 
various features of central bank independence. On the basis of this analysis, this thesis 
aims to demonstrate that the Bank of Japan Law includes various weaknesses in regards 
of central bank independence. In a following section, the most important central bank 
independence indices are introduced, including an evaluation of the Bank of Japan’s 
independence. 
 
Chapter 6 investigates the issue of central bank transparency and accountability. The 
development towards greater central bank independence is directly related and 
complementary to the subject of accountability and transparency. This thesis elaborates 
definitions and features of both concepts. After this general investigation, characteristics 
of the Bank of Japan’s accountability and transparency are analysed. In a final section 
of this chapter, indices of central bank accountability and transparency are investigated, 
and critically applied for the Bank of Japan.  
 
Chapter 7 turns to a de facto analysis of the Bank of Japan and provides details of the 
BOJ regarding its strategic relationship with the government. The focus in this chapter 
is the “old” Bank of Japan law, and elaborates the system of alternating BOJ governors, 
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temporary assignment of MOF staff in the BOJ, and the role of the MOF as a safeguard 
for the BOJ. 
 
Chapter 8 will analyse the de facto central bank independence of the new Bank of 
Japan, focusing particularly on governmental and political pressure exerted on the 
central bank. Basically, there are two sets of political influence exercised by the 
government and politicians on a central bank. The first one is via the appointment 
procedure of the central bank’s key staff, and the second one is via the interference in 
the monetary policy decision-making process. This chapter presents a detailed analysis 
of the Bank of Japan for both subjects. The appointment process will be elaborated, and 
hereby concentrate on the three Governors of the newly independent central bank, 
namely Hayami Masaru, Fukui Toshihiko and Shirakawa Masaaki. In addition, the 
appointment of Deputy Governors and deliberative Policy Board members will also be 
considered. The second channel of interference is the subject of monetary policy. This 
thesis works out the main events of monetary policy decisions since 1998. Pressure 
from the government and Diet politicians on the Bank of Japan will be analysed in 
detail in order to gain insights of the BOJ’s de facto independence.  
 
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter and provides a summary of the empirical findings 
of this dissertation. This chapter also discusses recent developments and future 
implications for the Bank of Japan.  
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2. Methodological Approach and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds the theoretical framework which will be used to analyse and 
interpret the central bank independence of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) in the following 
chapters. This dissertation is based on empirical research, and it is an in-depth case 
study of the Bank of Japan which contributes to the discussion of the institutional 
design and independence of the Japanese central bank. Contrary to most studies on 
central bank independence, this thesis adopts a qualitative methodology. Based on 
qualitative methods, the political economy of delegation and central bank independence 
of the Bank of Japan will be investigated. This thesis follows a methodology which 
focuses on choices and strategies of politicians in order to explain delegation to an 
independent central bank. In subsequent chapters, case studies are presented in the 
following two dimensions: the appointment procedure of BOJ Governors and that of 
monetary policy decisions. These case studies aim to understand the de facto 
relationship between the BOJ, the Japanese government, and politicians. This thesis 
employs a two-layer analytical framework, namely a principal-agent model and a 
historical institutionalism approach which will be discussed in the following. 
 
2.2 Principal-Agent Theory 
Principal-agent theory can be classified as a branch of rational choice theory. The 
general aim is to explore issues of “institutional design under conditions of imperfect 
information” (Pollack 1997: 101). Regarding delegation, the principal-agent theory 
argues that rational actors delegate power to agents in order to reduce the transaction 
costs of policy-making (Pollack 2007: 3). Most generally, principal-agent relationships 
start “whenever one individual depends on the action of another” (Pratt and Zeckhauser 
1985: 2). This means that principal-agent theory can be employed in many different 
fields which are characterised by a hierarchical relationship between actors. Principal-
agent theory became very popular and influential. Moe (1984: 757) stresses the strength 
of this framework and argue that principal-agent theory “cuts through the inherent 
complexity of organisational relationships by identifying distinct aspects of individuals 
and their environments that are most worthy of investigation, and it integrates these 
elements into a logically coherent whole”. In short, principal-agent framework is useful 
for investigating real world problems, such as relationships between doctor and patient, 
employer and employee, depositor and bank, or government and bureaucracy. This 
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means that principal-agent models can also be employed to understand complex issues 
such as central banks and governments in regards of delegation and monetary policy 
decisions.3  
 
2.2.1 Principal-Agent Theory of Central Banks and Monetary Policy  
Rational choice theory dominates the literature on the politics of central banks (Bell 
2002; Cukierman 1992), and principal-agent theory has become a common tool to 
investigate the strategic relationship between central banks and the government, or 
politicians (see, for instance, Fratianni et al. 1997), or optimal contracting for central 
banks (Walsh 1995a, 1995b, 1995c).  
 
The ultimate principal is the society, or the voting public, which prefers low inflation 
rates in the long run, and stable macroeconomic conditions on whole. The existing 
literature assumes that there is no conflict of interest between the government and the 
public. As a consequence, most models of central bank independence replace the 
general public with the government as principal. The society, via the government, 
provides the central bank – the agent – with the task to achieve its preferred target of 
low inflation. The details of the arrangement are manifested in a contract, the central 
bank statute.4 However, there is an important point which describes the relationship 
between the principal and the agent. Due to the central bank’s expertise and direct 
contacts with financial institutions, the relationship is characterized by asymmetric 
information. This opens the possibility for the central bank to implement new strategies 
and to seek own policy goals that are incoherent with the principal’s goals (Bofinger et 
al. 2001: 168-169; Fratianni et al. 1997; Illing 1997: 224-225).  
 
In sum, principal-agent theory is a useful tool to analyse both the delegation of 
monetary policy to an independent central bank and the relationship of central banks 
and the government.5 However, it is possible for a principal-agent framework to be 
                                                 
3  In this regard, “the principal-agent approach is also useful for heuristic purposes. It establishes a 
framework to clarify particular issues. […] By focusing on the exercise of control within institutional 
arrangements, principal-agent theory forces attention to focus on positive rather than normative analysis” 
(Elgie 2002: 198). 
4 Principal-agent models have been applied to find the optimal mechanism of a central bank contract. 
With a delegation the principal (government) designed a “sophisticated incentive structure” (a contract) to 
accomplish optimal outcomes of monetary policy (Walsh 1995c).  
5 See, for instance, Elgie (2002).  
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characterized by multiple principals, and exactly this case is the subject of the following 
section.  
 
2.2.2 Multiple Principals of a Central Bank  
Many authors, who apply a principal-agent framework in models of central bank 
independence, work with one principal. For instance, Hüpkes et al (2005: 18) argue that 
“a central bank performing its monetary policy function usually does so under a 
delegation of authority from either the executive or legislative branch” [italics added]. 
However, there are two things wrong with the assumption of only one principal. First, it 
is problematic to apply models with a single principal to presidential systems. Second, 
case studies demonstrate that the power of the government (or president) and the Diet 
(legislative) differs between nations. As a result, delegation is usually made by multiple 
principals (Bendor, Glazer and Hammond 2001: 244-245; Shugart and Carey 1992).  
 
In regards of the appointment procedure and monetary policy decisions, the central bank 
statute defines the fundament of the strategic interaction between the government and 
politicians with the central bank. A legally dependent central bank is accountable to 
only one principal, the Cabinet. The Cabinet is wholly responsible for the appointment 
of the central bank’s key staff. In contrast, an independent central bank usually must 
answer to more than one principal. The legislature can be seen as a second principal.6 
Usually, both principals share the power to appoint members of the central bank’s 
monetary policy governing council. In addition, sanctions typically require the 
cooperation of both principals. For instance, changes made to the institutional design of 
the central bank – used as a threat by principals – require “the cooperation of both the 
Cabinet and a legislative majority” (Bernhard 2002: 29).  
 
An independent central bank can be considered an independent agency, and it is useful 
to characterize the principal-agent relationship of central banks as having multiple 
principals. Unfortunately, up until now, there are only few authors, who apply a 
                                                 
6 In this context, the central bank of Russia is an interesting case. According to various central bank 
independence measures (see, Chapter 5), the Russian central bank is evaluated as independent, because it 
is relatively independent from the government. However, de facto the Russian central bank is very 
dependent to the Parliament (Banain, Burdekin and Willett 1995). In conclusion, it is not enough to solely 
analyse central banks in their relationship to the executive branch.  
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multiple principal framework to central banks, including Bernhard (1998, 2002)7 and 
Oritani (2010). A principal-agent framework with multiple principals has already been 
applied to the US Federal Reserve. Morris and Munger (1998) investigate the politics of 
the Federal Reserve with multiple principals, the Congress and the President. Similarly, 
Havrilesky (1995) distinguishes between the pressure upon the US Federal Reserve by 
the executive branch (chap. 2, pp. 28-82) and the legislative branch (chap. 3, pp. 83-
117). In a similar vein, Morris (2002) analyses the policymaking of the Federal Reserve 
in interaction with Congress and the President by means of a multi-institutional 
approach. Figure 2-1 offers a simple model of a principal-agent framework with 
multiple principals.  
 
Figure 2-1:  Principal-Agent Model with Multiple Principals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
 
However, there are considerable disadvantages for multiple principals which result in 
higher costs, e.g., the cost of monitoring and coordination is considerably higher 
(Kassim and Menon 2003: 124-125). A similar argument is made by Dixit (1996), who 
argues that the agent may suffer from a low-incentive problem due to multiple 
principals, or slightly different‚ the agent has “low-powered incentives”. In this case, 
the agent can “challenge the Cabinet’s policy choices” (Bernhard 2002: 17), or needs to 
                                                 
7 Bernhard (2002: 45-55) develops a game theory model of the monetary policy process build of three 
players: the government, the central bank, and the legislator. The model is characterized by asymmetric 
information. In contrast to backbench legislators, the central bank and the Cabinet ministers have 
expertise in monetary policy. 
 
Principal 1 
 
Principal 2 
 
Agent 
 11 
satisfy only one principal, making it easier for the agent to follow own policy goals. 
This has consequences for the central bank and its strategic behaviour. The central bank 
can increase its independence by playing off the two principals. 
 
For example, regarding sanction measures, in case of misconduct by the central bank, 
the Cabinet can punish the central bank only by collaborating with the legislature. As a 
result, central banks need to appeal only to one principal, either the Cabinet or the 
legislature, to resist pressure from the government, or to avoid changes to their 
institutional design (Keefer and Stasavage 2000; Morris 2002). This fact provides the 
central bank with more room to manoeuvre in the monetary policy making process 
(McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989). When confronted with political pressure, 
central banks can make use of enhanced transparency and publications (Chapter 6). For 
example, they can publish disputes with the principals, particularly with the Cabinet, in 
order to disregard politicians, or to explain their policy decisions. In addition, central 
banks may direct attention towards policy mistakes made by the Cabinet, or to 
politicians, in case they are exerting too much influence on the central bank (Bernhard 
2002: 29-30, 57). 
 
Having taken the above mentioned information into account, this thesis employs a 
principal-agent framework with multiple principals, namely one which includes the 
legislative and the executive branches of the government. In comparison to those 
models which employ only a single principal, this framework is seen as a more accurate 
methodological approach to analyse the political economy of the Bank of Japan in 
regards of delegation, the appointment procedure, and governmental influence in 
monetary policy decisions.  
 
2.2.3 A Principal-Agent Framework of the Bank of Japan 
Figure 2-2 presents a simple model of the Bank of Japan and two principals: the 
executive (Government/Cabinet) and the legislative (Diet politicians) branch of the 
government.8 In Chapter 8, a more detailed principal-agent model is presented. 
 
                                                 
8 For a first application of a principal-agent framework and the BOJ, see Pascha (2005a). Pascha (2005a) 
develops a three-stage principal-agent framework to explain delegation and monetary policy of the newly 
independent BOJ. Bebenroth and Vollmer (2007) compare the BOJ with the ECB referring to a principal-
agent model.  
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Figure 2-2: Principal-Agent Model with Multiple Principals and the Bank of Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
 
This theoretical set-up offers a good foundation when trying to understand the 
motivation of the actors, and provides insights into the relationship between the Bank of 
Japan and the government, or politicians. Furthermore, it provides information suitable 
for assessing the extent to which the Bank of Japan has developed own goals and 
interests. This thesis applies a principal-agent framework to the following three areas of 
interest:  
1.) Delegation of power to an independent Bank of Japan  
2.) An analysis of case studies, concerning the appointment procedure of the 
Bank of Japan’s key staff 
3.) An analysis of case studies, concerning governmental pressure and 
monetary policy decisions  
 
1. Delegation 
In a principal-agent framework, delegation of decision-making powers means that the 
principal (government) chooses to delegate power to an agent (central bank). Pollack 
(2007:8) argues that principal-agent theory “provide a useful starting point for 
theorizing about both delegation decisions and subsequent relations between principals 
and agents – including the possibility that agents like courts or central banks enjoy 
extensive discretion from their principals.” However, there are two crucial conditions 
 
Principal 1: 
Executive 
 
Principal 2: 
Legislative 
 
Agent: 
Bank of Japan 
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for the principal to delegate power to an agent. First, there is the expectation that the 
actions of the agent will coincide with the preferences of the principal (the ally 
principle). Second, there is the belief that there are benefits for the principal. In short, 
the principal-agent framework identifies the rationale why principals choose to delegate 
(McNamara 2002: 50; Gilardi 2007: 304-307).  
 
2. The Appointment Procedure 
This section analyses the appointment procedure of the Bank of Japan’s key staff, in 
particular the Governor. In this analysis, the government plays the main role, as, 
according to the Bank of Japan Law, the government is in the position to appoint the 
central bank Governor. However, the appointment is subject to the consent of both 
houses of the Diet, i.e. the second principal has veto rights. The analysis of politicians’ 
choice of a particular Governor is the key question in this section. It is impertinent to 
note that the right of appointment of the Governor, Deputy Governor, and Policy Board 
deliberative members is an important factor of influence, and represents a possible form 
of pressure exerted by politicians on the central bank (Chang 2003; Capie et al. 1994: 
55).  
 
3. Monetary Policy Decisions 
The third aspect focuses on the conduct of monetary policy decisions, and, here, the 
agent – the Bank of Japan – is legally in the position to decide monetary policy. This 
means that the agent makes the first move, and the principals can only respond 
afterwards, e.g., with sanctions and threats. In this analysis, confrontations between the 
BOJ and the government or politicians are a frequent phenomenon. In case studies, a 
principal-agent framework is a powerful tool to illustrate that both the Bank of Japan 
and the government have intrinsically sound positions. First, from the perspective of the 
government, principal-agent theory can demonstrate that the agent (the BOJ) is shirking, 
and, thus, acting in an undemocratic manner. It can be argued that the BOJ has taken its 
secondary objective of monetary policy insufficiently into consideration, namely to 
support the general economic policies, and to continue “contributing to the sound 
development of the national economy” (Article 2 and 4 of the new Bank of Japan Law). 
In contrast, principal-agent theory can also be applied to show the viewpoints of the 
agent. BOJ officials claim that the Bank is independent (Article 3) and may argue that 
the preferences of the principal have changed, and some politicians would prefer a 
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dependent central bank. 9  In fact, this thesis demonstrates that politicians and BOJ 
officials have different preferences. Comparing the government’s position with actions 
of the BOJ using a principal-agent framework helps to clarify the conflicting logics that 
support the positions held by the both actors. In short, principal-agent theory helps to 
gain an understanding of the debate surrounding the institutional design of the BOJ, and 
helps to explain BOJ’s actions regarding monetary policy decisions. 
 
In order to understand the path towards central bank reform and institutional issues of 
central bank independence in Japan in detail this dissertation employs a second 
analytical tool, namely a historical institutionalism approach.   
 
2.3 Historical Institutionalism Approach 
Originally, the historical institutionalism approach 10  was derived from political 
sociology and political science, by authors such as Peter A. Hall and Kathryn Sikkink 
(Blyth 1997). Later, this approach was identified as an analytic tool and area of the new 
institutional economics (see, e.g., Richter and Furubotn 2003: 40-43). One important 
agenda of research is the theory of constraint, that is, “its explanation of how ideas and 
institutions limit the range of possible solutions that policy makers are likely to consider 
when trying to resolve policy problems” (Campbell 1998: 378). Steinmo (2008) argues 
that the historical institutionalism approach is characterized by a focus on “real-world 
empirical questions” and contributes to explanations to which “institutions structure and 
shape behaviour and outcomes.” Therefore, this approach is well-suited to analyse the 
political economy of delegation and central bank independence.  
 
Many studies about central banks focus on quantitative methods. This has the advantage 
to allow large-scale comparisons, in particular in the construction of measures of central 
bank independence. However, a concentration on quantitative methodologies leads to a 
lack of accuracy. For instance, such methodologies cannot encompass peculiar 
characteristics of countries and fail to explain how institutions are embedded in different 
countries. Therefore, an alternative strand of literature argues that the determinants of 
central bank independence are too historically dynamic, complex, and multifaceted to 
                                                 
9 This methodology follows Elgie (2002), who analyses the politics of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
with a principal-agent framework.  
10 For a general review of historical institutionalism, see for instance, Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 
(1992) or Campbell (1998).  
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be completely obtained in static quantitative studies. Significant results are better to be 
expected from detailed country-based research “based on an inductive, historically 
grounded political economy approach” that is helpful to explain the complexity of 
multiple causation (Bell 2001: 460).  
 
Japanese politicians, the MOF and the BOJ debated over central bank law revision on 
two occasions (1957 and 1964) before central bank reform finally took place between 
1996 and 1998. This development offers the opportunity to apply a process-tracing 
analysis about the timing of central bank reform, for the Ministry of Finance (MOF) had 
resisted all reform attempts before 1996. A process-tracing analysis can be used for each 
attempt in order to understand why central bank reform was rejected or finally 
implemented. Process-tracing involves considering the government’s motivations 
towards reform, and perceptions of the respective circumstances, 11  including the 
relationship between the central bank and the government. 
 
Since the 1990s, an increasing number of scholars have employed qualitative methods 
based on empirical research to the research field of central banks. This research includes, 
the Bundesbank (Goodman 1991, 1992; Heisenberg 1999; Kennedy 1991; Marsh 1992), 
the European Central Bank (Howarth and Loedel 2003; Loedel 1999), the US Federal 
Reserve (Woolley 1984; Morris 2002), the Bank of England (Elgie and Thompson 
1998; King 2005), the Bank of France (Elgie and Thompson 1998), the Bank of Brazil 
(Taylor 2009), and the Reserve Bank of Australia (Bell 2001, 2002). This dissertation 
aims to add the Bank of Japan to the list.  
 
The data collection upon which this dissertation is based consists of several sources: the 
relevant economic and political science literature, central bank documents, minutes of 
Monetary Policy Board Meetings, official statistics, and a variety of newspaper articles 
(e.g., Asahi Shinbun, Nihon Keizai Shinbun [short: Nikkei], and Yomiuri Shinbun). The 
data gathered on the Bank of Japan, including complete transcripts12 of Monetary Policy 
Meetings (MPM) (gijiroku), offers insights into a central bank, more precisely, as how 
central bank officials view their role under the new institutional framework of a 
reformed central bank. Additional sources are interviews. Between 2007 and 2009, 23 
                                                 
11 See, e.g. King (2005) and Yee (1996).  
12 Available only in Japanese language.  
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expert interviews were conducted with Bank of Japan officials, Ministry of Finance 
officials, and monetary experts in the academic and business sectors. 
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3. CENTRAL BANK REFORM IN JAPAN  
3.1 Introduction 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, “a veritable wave of independence flushed over the world 
of central banking” (Marcussen 2005: 905) and the term of central bank independence 
has developed into a “universal catchphrase” (Bernhard 2002: 19). Numerous 
governments (the delegating authority) all over the world reformed the legislative 
framework of their central bank institutions with the purpose of insuring independence 
of the central bank insulating them from direct political control. Japan is no exception 
and the Bank of Japan was granted independence in 1998.  
 
This chapter analyses the process of Bank of Japan Law reform. After a short 
introduction about the establishment of the BOJ, it will be investigated in a process-
tracing analysis why previous attempts of central bank reform failed and why in 1998 
BOJ Law revision was successful. In the subsequent part, the role of main actors will be 
analysed in detail. 
 
3.2 The Establishment of the BOJ 
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) was established in October 1882, and was modelled after the 
National Bank of Belgium. The most pressing objective of the BOJ foundation was to 
fight hyper inflation triggered by nonconvertible currencies (inconvertible paper money) 
issued by the government and private banks. After the establishment of the Bank of 
Japan, Japan’s national banks lost their power to print bank notes. The central bank’s 
mission was to create a national market, and to provide a stable and reliable currency 
(Yoshino 1977: 398; Cargill 1989: 21; Iwata 1994: 147; Kanegae 1999: 72-74; Nakakita 
2001: 48-49).13  
 
The Bank of Japan Act (nippon ginkô jôrei)14 of 1882 privileged the government with 
immense control over the central bank (Iwata 1994: 145; Kanegae 1999: 72-78; 
Nakakita 2001: 48-49).15 This should come as no surprise, because the Ministry of 
Finance “was heavily involved in the creation of the BOJ”, and the Bank of Japan was 
                                                 
13 The government has printed a huge amount of money in order to deal with a vast deficit. This 
nonconvertible money was not backed by gold, silver or government bonds. 
14 The functions and operations of the BOJ were formulated in “The Regulation of the Bank of Japan”. 
15 The control of the Belgian government over the central bank was stronger than in other European 
countries such as the U.K., France or Austrian-Hungary (Iwata 1994: 145).   
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set up owing to the initiative of the then Administrative Vice Minister of the MOF, 
Matsukata Masayoshi.16 Both of the BOJ’s first two Governors (Yoshihara and Tomita) 
and its first Deputy Governor were former MOF officials. Due to these institutional 
arrangements and practices, the MOF dominated the central bank, and, from the very 
beginning on, the BOJ was treated as part of the government system (Yoshino 1977: 
399; van Rixtel 2002: 124; Iwata 1994: 145). 
 
3.3 The Bank of Japan Law Revision 1942 
Japan’s military government reorganised the BOJ in February 1942 under the Bank of 
Japan Law (nippon ginkô hô).17 The Bank of Japan Law of 1942 was modelled after the 
German Reichsbank Law of 1939, which imposed unconditional government authority 
over the central bank. Due to strong government control, the BOJ acted as a subservient 
to the government. The BOJ’s central role was to support the government by financing 
the war economy through monetizing government debt and an unlimited supply of 
credit. The Governor of the BOJ enjoyed complete power over the board of directors 
regarding monetary policy, while the government had responsibility over the 
appointment of the Governor. The organisational body of the BOJ changed from a stock 
company (kabushiki gaisha) to a special government corporation (tokushu hôjin) with 
the government holding 55 per cent of the outstanding BOJ shares of 100 million Yen18 
(Bebenroth and Vollmer 2007: 46; Bank of Japan 2004: 3; Cargill 1989: 21-24; Iwata 
1994: 147-148; Kanegae 1995, 1999: 71-78; Kawakita 1995: 12-14; Madsen 2004; 
Mikitani and Kuwayama 1998: 1-2; Nakakita 2001: 48-49; Ôshima and Ide 2006; van 
Rixtel 2002: 124-126).  
 
Before analysing the BOJ reform of 1998, the following chapters will identify why 
previous attempts of central bank reform failed. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Matsukata acted as Finance Minister from 1885 to 1892 and with several discontinuations from 1896 to 
1890. He has visited France and other European countries in February 1878 and studied European finance 
and monetary systems and policies. Since then Matsukata considered Western central banks as a role 
model for a Japanese central bank (Iwata 1994: 145-147; Yoshino 1977: 382-383).  
17 Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (2000: 86) argue that the 1882 Law and the wartime law from 1942 exposes 
only little variations and that the differences were often exaggerated in the literature. 
18 When the BOJ was established the government possessed half of the shares. In 1942 the contingent was 
increased to 55 per cent (Iwata 1994: 145; 173). 
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3.4 Political Debates over BOJ Independence – Failures of Bank of Japan Law 
Reform 
3.4.1 Bank of Japan Law Reform during the Occupation Era19 
After World War II, the Allied Powers tried to alter the Bank of Japan Law towards 
more democratisation of the monetary policy process. The Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, put his focus on the revision of the 
Bank of Japan Law, aiming to democratise the BOJ. This complex subject was seen as 
so important that in August 1945 the US War Department already issued guidelines for 
the ‘Control and Use of the Bank of Japan’ even before the war has ended. These 
guidelines included dismissing members of the executive board, proposals for issuing 
new Yen, and suspending the use of foreign exchange reserves. In response to the US 
American initiative, the Japanese government set up an own committee for reforming 
the BOJ in October 1945. The incentive was to keep the SCAP out of the important 
issue of financial reform.20 At the same time, Bank of Japan officials took the chance to 
claim more independency from the government. However, the MOF refused the 
requests of the BOJ and issued their own concept of a BOJ reform instead. In the end, 
the reform plans of the Japanese government failed and the Economic Scientific Section 
(ESS) of the SCAP presented an ‘informal memorandum’ to the Japanese government.21 
The ESS planned to organize the BOJ, and implement a strong and independent 
Banking Board, similar to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(Mabuchi 1995). The Japanese side concentrated all their efforts on resisting the US 
American suggestions. The MOF, the powerful BOJ Governor Ichimada Hisato, and the 
Economic Stabilization Agency (ESA; Keizai antei honbu) argued that an independent 
Banking Board would be unnecessary and does not fit the Japanese-style of economic 
policy. Eventually, the American War Department put an end to the idea of 
implementing a Banking Board.22 This means that the MOF and the BOJ successfully 
collaborated to resist pressure from the U.S.23 (Holtfrerich and Iwami 1999; Iwata 1994: 
                                                 
19 This section is based mainly on Holtfrerich and Iwami (1999).  
20 Certain scholars observed that in comparison to the German government the Japanese government was 
able to maintain some degree of freedom to resist orders from the SCAP (Holtfrerich and Iwami 1999: 87; 
Mikitani and Kuwayama 1998: 2).   
21 It should be noted that this ‘informal memorandum’ has not been authorized by the War Department. 
22 According to Holtfrerich and Iwami (1999: 99), Washington preferred to concentrate its reform plans 
on the stabilization rather than to reform Japan, as William H. Draper, Undersecretary of the US Army, 
repeatedly stated. In this way, it was argued that an implementation of a Banking Board conceivable 
could harm a recovery of the Japanese economy.  
23 Mabuchi (1995) wonders why the BOJ worked against the implementation of a Banking Board since 
this would have made the BOJ more independent from the MOF.  
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148; Kawakita 1995: 47-50; Mabuchi 1995; Nakakita 2001: 57; Yamawaki 2002: 72-
75). 
 
However, the effort of the US has contributed to one institutional change regarding a 
new structure of the Bank of Japan. In 1948, the ESS-Finance Division sought to 
implement a Policy Control Board.24 One year later, US President Truman sent Joseph 
M. Dodge, chairman of the Detroit Bank, to Tôkyô in order to serve as MacArthur’s 
financial advisor. Dodge’s mission was to help with the stabilization of the Japanese 
economy. Between March and April 1949, Dodge and BOJ Governor Ichimada met 
several times to discuss the issue of financial reform, and, this time, the BOJ Governor 
did not oppose to the implementation of a Policy Board. Ichimada agreed to a 
compromise plan and accepted the implementation of a Policy Board as the highest 
authority on monetary policy (Bank of Japan 1986: 295-301; Kanegae 1999: 16; 75-78; 
Nakakita 2001: 57). Finally, the new Policy Board (Kinyû seisaku iin kai) was set up in 
June 1949 and was composed of seven members: the Governor plus four economists, 
each with expertise from agriculture, industry, commerce, regional or city banking. In 
addition, two government representatives from the MOF and the Economic Planning 
Agency (EPA) joined the Board, but had no voting rights.  
 
Legally, the Policy Board was the supreme decision-making body regarding monetary 
policy (Miller 1996: 5). However, some measures were implemented to limit the power 
of the Board in order to make them more suitable for the conditions of the Japanese 
political economy.25 In the end, “the operational structure of the BOJ was left unaltered” 
(Mabuchi 1995) and old mechanisms of interaction between the BOJ and MOF 
remained intact. Due to its relatively weak influence, the new Policy Board was 
commonly called ‘sleeping board’. SCAP efforts to reform the BOJ failed to weaken the 
relationship between the Bank and the government (Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 1997: 
22-23; Holtfrerich and Iwami 1999: 97-100; Ministry of Finance 1960: 32).  
 
 
                                                 
24 Some SCAP officials worried about the strong influence exerted by the first post-war BOJ Governor 
Ichimada (1946-1954) and his rather sloppy stance towards inflation. Certain scholars compared his 
power with the Pope in the Vatican (rôma no hô ô) (Kawakita 1995: 49; Yamawaki 2002: 73). 
25 For details, see Mabuchi (1995).  
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3.4.2 The Discussion of the Bank of Japan Law Revision between 1957-1960 and 
1965 
Two attempts to revise the Bank of Japan Law occurred in the late 1950s and mid 1960s. 
In 1960, members of the Financial System Research Council (FSRC; Kinyû Seido 
Chôsa Kai), an advisory panel which answered to the finance minister, called for central 
bank reform, but the committee failed to reach a conclusion. Five years later in 1965, a 
second attempt ended with the same result. After Japan became an IMF Article 8 nation 
in 1964, BOJ Governor Yamagiwa26  reopened the discussion in a testimony in the 
Upper House, but the submission of a revised Bank of Japan Law draft to the Diet was 
postponed (Kanegae 1999: 11-13; Takahashi 1997; Yamawaki 2002: 102-103). In both 
cases, the reason for the failure of central bank reform was a disagreement about the 
contents of a new law between the BOJ and the MOF. While the BOJ sought more 
independence in its financial operations, the MOF wanted to continue its wide-ranging 
control over the Bank.27  
 
After starting investigations about central bank reform in August 1957, the FSRC 
submitted a paper called “Recommendations Concerning the Bank of Japan and 
Explanatory Notes” (nippon ginkô seido ni kan suru tôshin narabi ni setsumei sho) to 
the Minister of Finance in September of 1960.28 The problem was that the FSRC did not 
reach an agreement about the most urgent subject of whether to change the relationship 
between the MOF and BOJ. The key question was whether the MOF should be 
empowered to issue direct orders to the Bank, or whether it just should have the right to 
postpone BOJ decisions (Kanegae 1999: 3-4; Miller 1996: 10, note 38; Yamawaki 
2002: 102-103).   
 
The opinions for and against more central bank independence were split in the FSRC. 
Consequently, the final draft of the committee consisted of two different opinions. The 
MOF’s view of how to basically maintain the current Bank of Japan Law was referred 
to as “Plan A”, and emphasized the importance of government control over the Bank. 
The key person of this group was Shimomura Osamu, MOF bureaucrat and former BOJ 
                                                 
26 It should be noted that BOJ Governor Yamagiwa had his origin at the MOF.  
27 Mikitani and Kuwayama (1998: 2) argue that although central bank reform was debated in a general 
sense, the focus was never on most fundamental questions, such as how to re-structure the BOJ in order to 
yield a more independent central bank or a more successful monetary policy.   
28 For details, see Kanegae (1998: 5-6). 
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Governor, who fiercely opposed all efforts to enhance central bank independence. 
According to Plan A, the government should have the responsibility to maintain the 
value of the currency, and the Bank’s operations should be closely linked and 
subordinated to the government’s economic policy. Coined differently, the policies of 
the central bank and the government should be unified under the principles of the 
government, and the Bank shall be obliged to follow the directives of the Finance 
Ministry29 (Iwata 1994: 149-150).  
 
On the contrary, the views of the Bank of Japan, which was represented by BOJ official 
Matsumoto Shigeo, were formulated in a draft labelled “Plan B”. This plan criticized 
the current Bank of Japan Law from 1942, highlighting that this law, with is similarities 
to the German Reichsbank Law, is based on the idea of totalitarianism. The BOJ 
regarded the MOF as too powerful in the subjects of supervision, its control over the 
budget, and the subordinate position of central bank key staff (Iwata 1994: 149). 
Furthermore, Plan B pointed out that an independent central bank is important in order 
to avoid excessive lending to the government, which might have detrimental impacts on 
price stability. Hence, the power of the government should be limited to the 
appointment of the Bank’s key staff, and the participation in the Policy Board. Too 
much governmental interference in the decision making of monetary policy was 
considered harmful to the central bank’s goal of price stability. As a consequence, the 
government’s direct influence on monetary policy shall be restricted to suspension at 
most and not to overruling decisions of the Policy Board (Cargill 1989: 30; Cargill, 
Hutchison and Itô 1997: 23-24; 2000: 89; Kanegae 1995: 138-139; 1999: 3-15; 
Langdon 1961; Ministry of Finance 1960: 53-56, 108-117, 205).  
 
In the end, the FSRC could not solve the conflict between “Plan A” and “Plan B”, and, 
consequently, the Bank of Japan Law remained unchanged (Kanegae 1995: 154-155; 
1999: 9-11; Yamawaki 2002: 102-103).30 Dwyer (2004: 248) argues that the strong 
alliance between the MOF and the LDP hindered a revision of the Bank of Japan Law:  
 
                                                 
29 The relevant articles regarding the Finance Ministry are Article 43 and 44 of the Bank of Japan Law.  
30 However, in the late 1960s the Finance Vice Minister Ishino Shinichi and BOJ Deputy Governor Sasaki 
Tadashi agreed to a compromise plan. Instead of a legislative revision of the Bank of Japan Law a 
“reasonable cooperation” between the Ministry of Finance and the BOJ was decided (Suzuki 1996). 
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“Although efforts to revise the law in the late 1950s and early 1960s did 
not bear fruit, they illustrate the BOJ’s longstanding interest in greater 
independence, the MOF’s longstanding opposition to it, and the former 
power of the alliance between the MOF and Japan’s long-ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) to prevent even reforms supported by the 
central bank and the major big business and banking associations.”  
 
It is remarkable that the Bank of Law from 1942, with its out-dated wartime 
implications and with its “structural weakness” (Grimes 2001: 204), withstood all 
reform movements, and remained the legal framework for the Bank of Japan for over 55 
years. It was not until 1996 that a turning point in central bank reform movement in 
Japan was reached. It will be the subject of the following chapter.  
 
3.5 The Bank of Japan Law Reform between 1996 and 1998  
3.5.1  Analysis of the Process of the Central Bank Reform 1996 
The previous section demonstrated why all former attempts to revise the Bank of Japan 
Law failed. After these failures, there was “little interest” (Cargill 1989: 30) to continue 
with the attempt to alter the institutional set up of the BOJ, i.e. that the Bank’s status as 
MOF subservient continued until the mid 1990s. The defeat of failed reform in 1960 
was regarded as a “trauma” in the BOJ (Mabuchi 1997: 149). As a result, from that time 
on, the BOJ remained in a “stance of passivity” towards reform movements,31 and the 
subjects of ‘central bank reform’ and ‘independence’ were considered as a “taboo” in 
BOJ circles (Kanegae 1999: 17). Most central bankers accepted the subordinated 
condition, and preferred to stay in this comfortable arrangement “embraced” by the 
Ministry’s protection from political intervention (Nakakita 2001: 67-68; Ogata 1998: 
27-28). Similarly, MOF officials enjoyed the benefit of control over the bank under the 
BJL from 1942. Due to this sticky situation, central bank reform has only been 
discussed in academic circles and among retired BOJ staff.32  
It was not until 1996 that the complex issue of central bank reform became a subject of 
discussion again. The Hashimoto33 government, a tripartite ruling coalition consisting of 
the Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyû Minshutô; LDP), the Social Democratic Party 
(Shakai Minshutô; SDP), and the New Party Sakigake (Shintô Sakigake, from here on 
Sakigake), set financial system reform on the Cabinet’s political agenda with the 
                                                 
31 “shôkyoku shisei” (Asahi, 12 May 1996).  
32 Interview, December 2009.  
33 Abe (1996) reports that Hashimoto already in 1989 during his position as Finance Minister argued that 
the BOJ lacks independence in comparison to other main central banks.  
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revision of the Bank of Japan Law as “most significant check on the ministry’s power” 
(Grimes 2001: 204). 
 
3.5.2  The Ruling Coalition’s Project Team for Financial Reform 
On 6 February 1996, negotiations about how to reform the Ministry of Finance started 
and Katô Kôichi, Secretary General of the LDP (kanjichô), took the initiative to call for 
MOF reforms.34 A number of influential lawmakers, including Hatoyama Yukio, the 
representative Secretary General (daihyô kanji) of the Sakigake, demanded a project 
team be set up under the ruling coalition to work out a reform plan for the Finance 
Ministry. On 16 February, the governing coalition established a six-member committee 
for the MOF reform (ôkurashô kaikaku mondai iin kai). It was chaired by Katô. This 
committee founded a sub-committee, the Project Team on the reform of the MOF, 
which was headed by Itô Shigeru, the Head of Policy Research of the SDP (seisaku 
shingi kaichô). The Project Team consisted of 21 Diet members: ten from the LDP, 
seven from SDP, and four from Sakigake.35 Yamasaki Taku (LDP) and Tokai Kisaburo 
(Sakigake) acted as co-chairmen. In March 1996, the Project Team had discussed the 
subject of central bank reform first and foremost, making it a “high-profile policy 
issue”36 (Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 2000: 91; Mabuchi 1997: 134-136; 144; 150-151; 
Kanegae 1999: 20-23; Toya 2006: 162-165; Yamawaki 2002: 98-100). 
 
3.5.3 The Intention Behind Central Bank Reform in Japan 
This section attempts to answer the question why the Project Team raised the issue of 
Bank of Japan Law reform in 1996, and declared it the most urgent subject of 
administrative reform. Here, it is crucial to note that central bank reform in Japan cannot 
be regarded as a single reform. Rather, it was accompanied by larger financial 
                                                 
34 Katô suggested shifting the BOJ and the section of MOF overseeing financial administration to Ôsaka. 
The media misinterpreted these comments for a plea to divide the MOF. The Ministry’s top officials 
asked for a clarification of Katô’s statements, but Katô deliberately decided not to take back his 
misinterpreted remarks (Tahara 1998, in Toya 2006: 162).  
35 LDP members: Yamazaki Taku, Yosano Kaoru, Mizuno Kiyoshi, Satô Shinji, Yanagisawa Hakuo, 
Machimura Nobutaka, Kaneko Kazuyoshi, Saitô Fumio, Sekine Noriyuki, Shiozaki Yasuhisa. 
SDP members: Itô Shigeru, Nagai Tetsuo, Hayakawa Masaru, Hosoya Harumichi, Yamamoto Tsutomu, 
Itô Mototaka, Kajiwara Keigi.  
Sakigake members: Tokai Kisaburô, Ozawa Sakihito, Igarashi Fumihiko, Tanaka Kô.  
36 According to Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (1997: 193), Prime Minister Hashimoto considered central 
bank reform was the most important goal in the Cabinet’s agenda. 
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administrative reform. More precisely, the revision of the Bank of Japan Law was part 
of MOF reform (Nakakita 2001: 50-51).37  
 
At the first meeting of the Project Team on 27 February 1996, a prominent guest 
speaker Tachi, the chair of the FSRC38, gave a speech. After this speech, discussions 
about central bank independence started (Dwyer 2004: 255, footnote 17). In the 
following month, the Project Team decided that the revision of the Bank of Japan Law 
should be made a top priority in order to make the BOJ independent from the MOF 
(Hori 2005: 122; Mabuchi 1997: 136-151). Itô Shigeru, the Chair of the Project Team, 
argued that the Bank of Japan Law must be revised due to its outdated war-time 
character (Kanegae 1999: 20-21). Itô’s decision to examine the independence of the 
BOJ as the first and most important step of financial reform was widely seen as turning-
point in the process. After visiting the BOJ in April 1996, one member of the Project 
Team expressed the view that “[t]he reform of the Ministry of Finance and the revision 
of the Bank of Japan Law which we are now seriously discussing are two sides of the 
same coin. […] We want to promote it as a determination of the ruling parties. The 
Bank of Japan should also cope with it positively.” (Nakakita 2001: 64).  There was still 
fierce opposition from politicians, such as Yanagisawa that had to be overcome. In 
order to realize central bank reform, Itô and Shiozaki, fierce proponents of central bank 
independence, needed to gain a majority in the Project Team. 
 
According to Kanegae (1999: 20-21), there was still room for interpretation concerning 
Itô’s decision to make the independence of the BOJ a priority in the Project Team. 
There are two alternative explanations for this decision. The first one presumes that 
influential MOF officials requested Itô to discuss central bank reform in the first place, 
so as to satisfy the public and the media and to avoid heavier attacks on the MOF. Put it 
differently, the most important purpose was to grant the BOJ independency to dispel the 
attention from the Ministry (mondai no surikae). MOF officials sought to avoid a more 
fundamental reform or a total break-up of the Ministry, even at the cost of losing control 
over monetary policy. The second hypothesis supposes that central bank reform was an 
issue that the still powerful MOF could not refuse, because of the outdated character of 
the old, war-time Bank of Japan Law of 1942. Altering the central bank law was 
                                                 
37 See, Kawakita (2000), Mabuchi (1997) or Toya (2006) for a detailed analysis of MOF reform. 
38 See, following section.  
 26 
regarded as a relatively easy task which would lead to avoiding strong interference by 
the MOF and would decrease the risk of failure. 
 
The first explanation considers the MOF as a major player in achieving an independent 
BOJ. Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (2000: 93-94) identify the agreement of the MOF as an 
important factor of central bank reform, although its concurrence was “not enthusiastic”. 
One can argue that the MOF’s partial agreement to a reform can be explained by the 
fact that organisational survival is the ultimate goal in comparison to other goals, e.g., 
the maximization of organisational power (Toya 2006: 11). In other words, a 
conceivable strategy for MOF bureaucrats was to trick the public into believing that the 
MOF was supporting reform movements when, in fact, they were just trying to preserve 
as much power as possible. One key person was Tachi, chair of the FSRC. With respect 
to Tachi’s affiliation to the Ministry, one member of the Project Team “suggested that 
MOF officials may have asked him to plant the idea of central bank reform as an 
offering to make a small cut to avoid a deeper one”39 (Dwyer 2004: 255).  
 
The second explanation indicates that lawmakers believed that the MOF would face 
difficulties to oppose central bank reform given the recent economic developments. 
That is, politicians regarded BOJ Law revision as an easy way to please the electorate 
without risking fiery disputes over MOF reform (Nakakita 2001). This hypothesis views 
the MOF as a passive player. In comparison to BOJ Law revision, a comprehensive 
reform of the MOF was regarded as a task that was too challenging and difficult to 
complete. Therefore, it can be argued that politicians choose to revise the Bank of Japan 
Law in order to have a promising start and to present some quick results of reform as a 
strategy to deflect public criticism against the ruling coalition (Asahi, 12 May 1996). As 
a result, Kuroda Akio (1996), former BOJ official and Professor at Meiji University, 
argues that politicians were driven by “impure motives” (dôki fujun) to reform the MOF 
on the back of the BOJ. 
 
Mabuchi (1997: 144-146) confirms this view, and finds that the MOF’s internal 
committee was convinced that central bank law revision is less harmful than a 
                                                 
39 An additional indicator in support of this argument is the assumption that an internal committee of the 
MOF concluded that central bank reform would cause less harm than a decrement of fiscal and financial 
responsibilities (Dwyer 2004: 255).  
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comprehensive cut in its fiscal and financial authority. Besides, opposition against Bank 
of Japan Law revision was particularly difficult. However, similar to the first 
explanation, MOF officials only agreed to reform, because they sought to prevent 
further damage to the MOF. Still, after agreeing to central bank reform, MOF officials 
tried to influence the outcome of the Bank of Japan Law revision in their favour as 
much as possible. Although this strategy is different than the first one, it also fits the 
goal of organisational survival by the Ministry. Kanegae (1999: 21) argues that although 
this hypothesis does not fully explain central bank reform in Japan, it is a logical 
approach as Bank of Japan Law reform was connected with the task of reform of the 
Ministry of Finance, as sources of the Project Team demonstrate.40   
 
Both explanations have reasonable arguments. Since they do not contradict each other 
and both cannot be falsified, an arrangement of both concepts is a conceivable 
conclusion, and it is possible to combine both explanations into one single, consistent 
hypothesis. (Dwyer 2004: 255) divides the actors into two groups, in supporters and 
opponents of central bank reform. Those who supported MOF reform considered Bank 
of Japan Law revision as a first move towards MOF reform, a move that could not be 
contested by opponents (hypothesis one). In contrast, opponents of radical MOF reform 
believed that BOJ reform would satisfy the supporter’s side and protect the Ministry 
against fundamental reform (hypothesis two). 
 
Based on these explanations, Ogata (1998) argues that Bank of Japan Law revision was 
just a form of camouflage used to avoid more urgent subjects of Japan’s financial 
system. With politicians concentrated on BOJ reform, MOF officials believed to be able 
to avoid more important issues of institutional reform which would have cut the 
Ministry’s power to a higher extent. The goal of lawmakers was to demonstrate an 
active, reform supportive stance in order to appease the public. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 “The organisation of a new monetary administration and monetary policy” (atarashii kinyû gyôsei, 
kinyû seisaku no kôchiku ni mukete), 1996, 13 June and “Report about MOF reform” (ôkurashô kaikaku 
ni tsuite hôkoku), 1996, 25 September (Kanegae 1999: 21).  
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3.5.4 The Project Team: “The Construction of New Financial Administration and 
Policies 
On 13 June 1996, the Project Team presented a basic document named “The 
Construction of New Financial Administration and Policies” (Atarashii kinyû gyôsei, 
kinyû seisaku no kôchiku). It includes a recommendation for a revision of the Bank of 
Japan Law, aiming to strengthen the Bank’s independence from the MOF (Hori 2005: 
121-126; Kanegae 1999; Mabuchi 1997: 186; Yamawaki 2002: 101). In more detail, the 
Project Team regarded the following aspects as a basis for further discussions of central 
bank reform: 
 
1) To investigate Bank of Japan Law fundamentally to reform the Law 
2) To strengthen the independence of the BOJ 
3) To strengthen the transparency and accountability of the BOJ 
4) The investigation of the functions of the Policy Board of the BOJ 
5) The reorganisation of the relationship between the BOJ and government 
 
After the submission of the Project Team’s document, further examination of the 
revision of the central bank law was conducted by the “Central Bank Study Group” 
(CBSG; Chûô ginkô kenkyû kai), the Prime Minister’s private advisory council (shiteki 
shimon kikan).  
 
3.5.5 The Central Bank Study Group (“Torii Committee”) 
In July 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto arranged a private advisory council 41  to 
investigate Bank of Japan Law revision on the basis of the projects team’s 
recommendations and to improve the central bank’s independency and the transparency 
of its policymaking. The so-called “Central Bank Study Group”, chaired by Torii 
Yasuhiko, an economist and president of the Keio University, contained financial and 
legal experts, six academics and two business people. The eight members, apart from 
Chairman Torii, included Kanda Hideki, Professor of Law at the University of Tôkyô, 
Satô Kôji, a constitutional law scholar at Kyôto University, Suda Miyako, Professor of 
                                                 
41 Ôya (1996: 15) argues critical against advisory councils in Japan: “The government’s system of 
advisory councils, a key element of the so-called Japanese system, has been described as a cloak of 
invisibility in which bureaucrats wrap themselves and as a shield politicians use to ward off 
responsibility”. [sic] In practice, it seems that political leaders choose councils in order to confirm their 
decisions and to enforce their desired policies, creating an impression of responsibility.  
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international finance at Gakushûin University, Tachi Ryûichirô, Professor Emeritus at 
the University of Tôkyô and Chairman of the Financial System Research Council, Imai 
Takashi, Vice-Chairman of the Keidanren, Fukugawa Shinji, President of the Dentsû 
Communication Institute Inc., and the chair’s assistant and special expert member 
Yoshino Naoyuki, Professor of Finance at Keio University (Kanegae 1999: 192; Miller 
1996: 15, footnote 59).  
 
In accordance with Yamawaki (2002: 109-110) and Mabuchi (1997: 259), both the BOJ 
and MOF tried to push their favourite candidates into the CBSG. Prime Minister 
Hashimoto selected Torii Yasuhiko42 as chairman, while the rest of the CBSG members 
were equally divided between candidates of the BOJ and the MOF. Among BOJ 
candidates Satô, Fukugawa and Imai were chosen, whereas Nakagawa Kôji was rejected. 
Candidates of the MOF included Tachi, Kanda and Suda. Yoshino was accepted by both 
parties.  
 
The discussions on central bank reform started on 31 July 1996, and the group met ten 
times over a period of four months in the office of the Prime Minister.43 44 There was a 
fierce discussion, mainly between Satô and Fukugawa, about Article 65 of the 
constitution. Satô argued that providing the BOJ with the power to decide over its own 
budget would be against the constitution, a point that Fukugawa fiercely opposed 
(Yamawaki 2002: 110-115). On 17 October, three days before the Lower House 
parliamentary elections, the council published a preliminary report calling for more 
central bank independence (The Central Bank Study Group 1996; Dwyer 2004: 256; 
Pascha 2005a: 9).   
 
On 12 November, the group submitted their final report titled “Reform of the Central 
Bank System – In Pursuit of Open Independence”45 to Prime Minister Hashimoto. The 
key points of this report were claims of independence of the central bank in the 
operation of financial transactions, enhanced accountability and transparency (Kanegae 
                                                 
42 It has to be noted that Torii was no monetary expert, but he was close to Prime Minister Hashimoto 
(Mabuchi 1997: 260).  
43 Governor Matsushita attended the first meeting of the study group as a witness presenting his views. He 
encouraged the panel to discuss BOJ’s independency and revise the Bank of Japan Law (The Japan Times 
1 August 1996). 
44 Mabuchi (1997: 261-284) and Kanegae (1999: 23-34) provide insightful details of all meetings.  
45 In Japanese: Chûô ginkô seido no kaikaku – hirakareta dokuritsusei wo motomete. 
 30 
1999; Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 132; Malcolm 2001: 349; Mikitani and 
Kuwayama 1998: 2-3). The MOF opposed the draft of the CBSG, because it did not 
include government representatives in the Policy Board (Volz and Fujimura 2008: 6).  
 
3.5.6 The Report of the Central Bank Study Group: Reform of the Central Bank 
System – In Pursuit of Open Independence 
This final report presented the group’s ideas on “the basic principles on which the 
central bank should be based” and considered securing central bank independence as 
most important subject (The Central Bank Study Group 1996: 5). Furthermore, it stated 
that the Policy Board should be strengthened and should have the final decision in the 
area of monetary policy (The Central Bank Study Group 1996: 5-10). In contrast, the 
necessity of policy coordination46 of the BOJ and the government was emphasized: 
“there is a growing need to maintain a close cooperative relationship between the 
government and the Bank” (The Central Bank Study Group 1996: 10). Furthermore, the 
report claims government control over the bank, including the right of the government 
to postpone a decision of the Policy Board and the government’s authority to give 
orders to the Bank in emergency (The Central Bank Study Group 1996: 11-14). The 
report was build of seven points: 
 
1. Introduction: This part stresses the fact that the Law from 1942 was outdated 
and needed to be revised. Furthermore, enhanced independence is an 
indispensable prerequisite for the conduct of monetary policy. 
2. Objectives: The report underlines two objections of the Bank of Japan: First, the 
primary goal is price stability and second, the maintenance of financial system 
with a functioning credit and payment system.  
3. Open independence: The role of the Policy Board as major decision-making 
body should be stressed. The Policy Board members should be appointed by the 
government. The government’s power to give directives to the Bank should be 
abolished. 
4. Transparency and accountability: This section consisted of measures how to 
enhance the BOJ’s transparency and accountability, i.e. the publication of the 
                                                 
46 The point of coordinated policy was criticised by several sources, for instance from the private “Study 
Group on the Independency of the Central Bank” chaired by Professor Mikitani from Kobe University 
(Mikitani 1997). 
 31 
minutes of Policy Board meetings, methods to explain monetary policy 
decisions before the Diet. 
5. Strengthening the Policy Board: The ultimate authority of the Policy Board 
needs to be restored. The Policy Board must take the responsibility for monetary 
policy and its business operations. Policy Board members should be composed 
of BOJ’s executives, the Governor and outside experts, but BOJ executives 
should not form a majority in the Board. The government should be able to sent 
representatives, but these should not have voting rights.  
6. BOJ and the relationship with the government: The recommended relationship 
with the government has three features. In regards of monetary policy, the Bank 
should act independently; financial stability should be guaranteed with the 
cooperation of the government, whereas the issue of foreign exchange 
intervention should be managed by the government alone. In case of different 
opinion between the BOJ and the government, the government should be 
equipped with the right to request a postponement of monetary policy decisions. 
7. BOJ business operations: The BOJ acts as the bank for the banks and as “fiscal 
agent for the government as bank of government”. The Bank should maintain an 
orderly credit system through on-site examinations of financial institutions. 
However, to secure the stability of financial markets and institutions the 
government has the “ultimate responsibility”. The Bank acts as lender of the last 
resort, “either under the direction of the government or on its own initiative”. 
 
3.5.7 The Report to the Minister of Finance and the Promulgation of the New Bank 
of Japan Law 
After the Prime Minister Hashimoto received the CBSG report, he requested the 
Finance Ministry to investigate the revision of the BOJ further.47 On 19 November, the 
Financial System Research Council (FSRC; Kinyû seido chôsakai), an advisory body of 
the Minister of Finance (Ôkura daijin no shimon kikan), was charged with the task of 
central bank revision based on the recommendations made by the Central Bank Study 
Group. In a general meeting, the FSRC decided to launch a subcommittee on the 
Revision of the Bank of Japan Law (Nippon ginkô hô kaisei an ni kan suru shôiin kai).48 
                                                 
47 I thank Professor Dr. Kanegae Tsuyoshi for discussing the issue via email in 2012.  
48 The members were Tachi Ryûichirô, Kaitsuka Keimei (Chûô University, Public Finance), Egashira 
Kenjirô (Tôkyô University, Business law), Nakanishi Masahiko (Vice Chairman of the Tôkyô Chamber 
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Both committees were chaired by Tachi Ryûichirô (Bank of Japan 2004: 216; Miller 
1996: 15; Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 1997; Kanegae 1995, 1999; Mikitani and 
Kuwayama 1998: 2-3; Mabuchi 1997: 296-298).  
 
This subcommittee met ten times throughout a period of approximately two and a half 
months.49 The subcommittee presented a draft report to the FSRC on 4 February 1997 
and two days later FSRC Chair Tachi presented the final report “Report on the revision 
of the Bank of Japan Law” (Nippon ginkô hô no kaisei ni kan suru tôshin) to Nishida 
Yoshihiro, parliamentary vice finance minister. The subcommittee supported the idea of 
reinforcing central bank independence, for the report concluded “[T]he current Bank of 
Japan Law, enacted in 1942, needs fundamental review, because it contains many 
provisions which are no longer consistent with today’s economy and finance […] for 
the Bank of Japan to gain credibility from the public sector and financial markets, it is 
indispensable to reform the entire policy making framework with emphasis on securing 
central bank independence […]”. Somewhat ironic seems the passage “we strongly hope 
that the Bank of Japan actively reforms itself, aiming at becoming a central bank 
suitable to be the nucleus of…Japan’s financial system in the 21st century” as the BOJ 
cannot mandate independence to itself (cited from Miller 1996: 16). In general, the 
committee argued for a continuing, but diminished role of the MOF. The report aimed 
to maintain the Ministry’s power to issue orders to the Bank and the right to be 
informed about the Bank’s activities (Miller 1996: 16-19). Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 
(2000: 96) state that the report “closely followed the November 1996 report” of the 
Project Team. 
 
On 11 March the FSRC report was finally accepted by the Cabinet and submitted to the 
Diet.50 The Diet passed the new Bank of Japan Law on 11 June 1997, and on 1 April 
1998, the Bank of Japan Law came into effect (Bank of Japan 2004: 216).  
                                                                                                                                               
of Commerce and Industry), Nishizaki Tetsurô (International management consultant), and Fujiwara 
Sakuya (Jiji Press journalist). In addition, the committee included following observing members: Okada 
Akishige (Japan Federation of Bankers Association), Kanda Hideki (Professor of law at the University of 
Tôkyô), Sakata Masahiro (Cabinet Legislation Bureau and former MOF official), Mitani Takahiro (BOJ 
official), and Yoshino Naoyuki (Professor of finance at Keio University).  
49 Mabuchi (1997: 299-334) provides insightful details of all ten meetings.  
50 Grimes (2001: 205-206) adds an interesting narrative. On 20 February 1997, the ruling coalition 
rejected the draft of the FSRC and submitted on 11 March a new version with the removal of the 
Cabinet’s right to postpone policies. This draft was accepted by the Lower House on 22 May and the 
Upper House on 11 June. 
 33 
 
3.5.8 Critique of the Reform Process 
Many observers criticised the process of the revision of the Bank of Japan Law. A 
major point of criticism focussed on the fact that central bank reform was conducted in 
committees by the very same people. Indeed, it is evident that some people were a 
member of more than one research council. This is particularly irritating in the case of 
Tachi, who as the chair of the FSRC was also a member of the CBSG.51 In addition, the 
selection of the members of the FSRC seems dubious. Mabuchi (1997: 61) criticised 
that in most cases the members were chosen on the premise not to harm the MOF any 
further. Some members have been members of other councils of the MOF, i.e. they 
were possibly biased in favour of the MOF. The observing members in the FSRC 
subcommittee were representatives from another government agency, the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau (CLB; Naikaku Hôsei Kyoku), but originally came from the MOF. 
These facts led to the conclusion that the central bank reform was conducted under the 
leadership of the MOF (Nakakita 2001: 73-74).  
 
Critique also came from important actors of the BOJ reform process. On 22 January 
1997, the chair of the ruling coalition’s Project Team Itô stated that the discussion in the 
FSRC contradicted the intention of the three party coalition towards enhanced central 
bank independence and that there had been a dramatic change in the reform process. 
With respect to Itô’s modest character, this statement was harsh criticism (Mabuchi 
1997: 313-314). Similarly, Fujiwara, member of the FSRC study group and BOJ Deputy 
Governor from 1998 to 2003, criticised the intense pressure exerted by the MOF in the 
FSRC in regards of the revision of the BOJ Law (ôkurashô no kaiaku atsuryoku) (Fujii 
2004: 30). Amyx (2000: 6-7), citing a close observer of the reform process, notes that 
the FRSC is “convened, sponsored, and guided by officials of the [MOF]. As a result, it 
generally functions as a mechanism for legitimising proposals from the ministry itself.”  
 
In sum, it can be argued that “much of the drafting was conducted in the private 
councils of the ruling LDP under the intellectual leadership of Ministry of Finance 
staff” which negatively influenced the outcome of the new Bank of Japan Law (see, 
Chapter 5). BOJ representatives and outside experts in central banking have almost been 
                                                 
51 It should be noted that Tachi was in the past for a short time at the BOJ. However, his longer 
experience and influences came from the MOF.   
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excluded from the reform process. In other words, ideas from professionals with the 
most expertise have not been taken into consideration (Mabuchi 1997: 60-61; Mikitani 
1997; Mikitani and Kuwayama 1998: 3).52 Saitô (1997: 27) remarks that “the fact that 
MOF is orchestrating the reform must seem puzzling – if not entirely misguided. […] 
The fact is that MOF simply does not want anybody else to take a hand in any of the 
design work for the twenty-first century’s financial system”. As a result, BOJ officials 
harshly criticised the new Bank of Japan Law. One central bank official said during the 
reform process: “If this is the result of the revision, the law should rather be left like it 
is” (Mabuchi 1997: 60; 309).  
 
Mikitani (1996) criticises the draft of the CBSG, especially emphasizing that not 
enough academics had been involved in the formulation of the draft. He recommends 
more neutral discussions which should include academics. Regarding the contents, his 
criticism can be summarized in nine points: 
 
1. Instead of “bukka antei” (price stability), “tsûka kachi no antei” (currency 
stability)53 should be written 
2. More power for the legislative in the appointment process 
3. There should be no government representatives in the Policy Board 
4. Foreign exchange interventions should be under authority of the BOJ 
5. No right of postponement of monetary policy decisions for government 
representatives 
6. No purchase of financing bills by the BOJ 
7. The BOJ should decide over its own budget 
8. Supervisory right of BOJ through the government should be abolished  
9. The reappointment of Policy Board members should be avoided 
 
Similarly, Mikitani (1997) criticises the draft of the FSRC. Some points are a repetition 
from his critique made in 1996. Mikitani was disappointed that the MOF had not 
released enough information about the process of the draft. In addition, he underlines 
the lack of clear opinions by BOJ officials, the involvement of academics and public 
                                                 
52 Grimes (2001: 206-207) argues similar, namely that public discussion excluded the financial world and 
was dominated by reform-orientated politicians, the media and the MOF.  
53 I thank Professor Dr. Kanegae Tsuyoshi for useful comments regarding the correct application of the 
Japanese terms. 
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discussions. Mikitani distinguishes his critique in three parts: I) Maintenance of central 
bank independence, II) Goals of the Bank of Japan, and III) Accountability: 
 
I) Maintenance of central bank independence 
1. The term “dokuritsu sei“ (independence) is preferable to the term “jishusei no 
sonchô” (value on autonomy)  
2. The relationship between the government and the BOJ is not sufficiently clear to 
secure central bank independence 
3. The right of government representatives to attend Monetary Policy Meetings 
should be abolished 
4. The right to submit a request and the right of postponement of government 
representatives should be abolished 
5. The BOJ’s budget should be decided by the Policy Board 
6. The supervisory right by the Finance Minister of the BOJ should be limited 
II) Goals of the Bank of Japan 
7. The goal of the maintenance of orderly financial system should be avoided 
8. The power over foreign exchange interventions should be under the rule of the 
BOJ 
III) Accountability 
9. The accountability of the BOJ should be strengthened  
10. The BOJ should report to the Diet on a direct channel and not through the 
Finance Minister 
 
3.6 Actors of Central Bank Reform  
3.6.1  The Bank of Japan  
There are different views with respect to the question of what role the BOJ played in the 
reform process of its own organisation. Many academic and media sources noted that 
the Bank of Japan was rather silent, considering BOJ officials as passive pawns trying 
to avoid statements that can be interpreted as active promotion of central bank 
independence (Nakakita 2001: 58-59; 66-69; Grimes 2001: 206; Yamawaki 2002: 103; 
251). Lukauskas and Shimabukuro (2006: 132) argue that the BOJ did not fight for 
reform in public, “because it feared retribution by the MOF if it fails to gain 
independence”. Although some officials within the BOJ were willing to fight for more 
independence (shusenron), this effort weakened during the reform process. For example, 
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the team surrounding Mitani Takahiro, who was an observing member in the FSRC 
subcommittee, could have pressured for more independence. However, as the only BOJ-
affiliated member in the group, Mitani’s chances to fight against the MOF’s dominance 
appeared to be hopeless from the very beginning. Altogether, the BOJ’s standpoint was 
a “poor fight” (kurushii tatakai), ending in a “declaration of defeat” (haiboku sengen) 
after the end of discussions (Mabuchi 1997: 298; Yamawaki 2002: 125-136).  
 
There are three reasons for the passivity of the BOJ. First, BOJ officials usually had 
little experience of dealing with politicians. 54  Some BOJ officials even feared the 
termination of the cooperation with the MOF, because they regarded the relationship as 
cosy and advantageous for the BOJ. Second, the outcome of the reform was rather 
ambiguous as the ruling coalition consisting of three parties was not united in their 
positions; in particular the Socialists were regarded a great uncertainty (Mabuchi 1997: 
146-150). Third, the passiveness of the BOJ can be seen as a rational strategy, because 
previous attempts to revise the Bank of Japan Law, in which the BOJ fiercely fought for 
more independence, were unsuccessful (Mabuchi 1997: 62-63). The BOJ’s position can 
be interpreted as a “sit-and-wait” strategy, or the attempt to influence the outcome of 
reform quietly behind the scenes.55 Indeed, some scholars argue that the Bank was 
involved in secret discussions with the MOF56 (Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 1997: 96), 
and find that BOJ officials made “essential contributions” to the new law (Mikitani and 
Kuwayama 1998: 3).  
 
Before the Bank of Japan Law was revised, some statements about central bank 
independence were expressed by the BOJ, in particular by Mieno Yasushi, BOJ 
Governor from 1989 to 1994. As early as 1994, Mieno expressed concerns regarding the 
1942 Bank of Japan Law, arguing that the old law was inappropriate for current times 
(Kawakita 1995: 72). Considering the concept of central bank independence as a 
reflection of “human wisdom”, Mieno already encouraged a public discussion of central 
bank independence in 1994. Criticizing the government’s wide-ranging authority over 
                                                 
54 Kawakita (1995: 67) uses the term “seiji onchi” to stress the BOJ’s inability to deal with politicians.  
55 One former Bank of Japan official stated that the political scientist Mabuchi Masaru was engaged to 
study and analyse the Bank of Japan Law (Interview, 10 August 2009).  
56 One Bank of Japan official argued that there was “close contact” between the MOF and the BOJ during 
the reform process (Interview, 25.August 2008).   
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the Bank under the BOJ Law of 1942, Mieno correctly predicted that “a suitable time 
for scrutiny [of the Bank of Japan Law] will come” soon (Mieno 1994, 1995).  
 
Governor Matsushita 
Without doubt, the key actor of a central bank is the Governor. Thus, an interesting 
question is how the BOJ Governor Matsushita Yasuo acted. Generally speaking, 
Matsushita was reluctant to demand enhanced central bank independence. However, at 
some occasions Matsushita stressed the need for a more independent central bank. For 
instance, on 5 April 1996, the Project Team on administrative reform visited the Bank 
of Japan’s head office in Nihonbashi and held a meeting with Governor Matsushita, 
Deputy Governor Fukui, and other BOJ executives. The visit of influential Diet 
members to the BOJ was an unprecedented case. In a subsequent press conference, 
Matsushita called the first time for more BOJ independence in a direct way. Before that 
Matsushita only mentioned the necessity of central bank reform in a context with the 
internationalisation of financial issues (Yomiuri, 6 April 1996). A second example was 
a press conference in December 1996 in which Matsushita surprised the audience with 
the claim of central bank independence (Nikkei, 19 December 1996; Nakakita 2001: 64; 
Yamawaki 2002: 101). 
 
However, such kinds of statements for enhanced central bank independence were very 
unusual coming from Governor Matsushita, who usually maintained a cautious stance. 
For instance, Matsushita expressed the view that “[t]he Bank of Japan Law is an old law, 
but we operate it wisely in consultation with the Ministry of Finance. So revision is a 
huge task” (Nakakita 2001: 64). As a result, most observers considered Governor 
Matsushita’s statements for more central bank independence in the media in 1996 and 
1997 as no more than “facade” (tatemae).57 It should be noted that Governor Matsushita 
was a former Vice Finance Minister (a so-called BOJ bureaucrat [nichigin kanryô])58 
and, arguably, he did not want to impede harm to his “old place” (furusu), the MOF 
(Kawakita 1995: 84). This helps to explain why Matsushita was not overly enthusiastic 
about an independent central bank. Bank of Japan officials stated about Matsushita that 
                                                 
57 See, Matsushita (1997): A New Framework of Monetary Policy under the New Bank of Japan Law. 
Speech to the Yomiuri International Economic Society in Tokyo on 27 June 1997. 
58 For details, see Tsurumi (1982).  
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the Governor was a MOF bureaucrat until the end (Yamawaki 2002: 101).59 60 In drastic 
words, it can be argued that Matsushita was just a “puppet” for central bank reform.61 
Grimes (2001: 206) notes that a secret BOJ study group, which was instructed to 
encourage the work of the coalition’s Project Team concerning central bank reform, 
purposely excluded MOF-affiliated Governor Matsushita. This is a definite indicator 
that Matsushita was not considered to belong to the inner circle of the BOJ. It is rather 
the case that discussions about central bank independence and reform were inspired by 
former Governor Mieno, Fukui Toshihiko and Yamaguchi Yutaka (Mabuchi 1997: 150).  
 
In sum, although the vast majority of BOJ officials have welcomed central bank reform, 
they were passive and did not fight much for central bank independence in public. 
Rather, they preferred to remain spectators of the institutional change, leaving the 
initiative and responsibility to other actors, in particular political actors.  
 
3.6.2  State Actors (1) – Bureaucratic Agencies – The Ministry of Finance 
The MOF is a very powerful organisation and withstood all central bank reform 
initiatives until 1996. For instance, efforts by Finance Minister Takemura since 1994 to 
cut the Ministry’s influence were blocked successfully. As a result, at the beginning of 
the Bank of Japan Law reform process, the MOF was in strong opposition against 
central bank reform and confident that a revision of the Bank of Japan Law could be 
avoided.  
 
After facing growing pressure, the Ministry of Finance established an internal project 
team under the leadership of Administrative Vice Finance Minister Ogawa Tadashi to 
examine the subject of reform in April 1996. Their explicit task was to limit the extent 
of change to the MOF as much as possible (Mabuchi 1997: 161-162; Nakakita 2001: 
65-67). It should come as no surprise that the foundation of a MOF project team was 
sharply criticised by politicians from the ruling coalition. For instance, Tanaka Shûsei 
from the Sakigake party stated that “self-reform would be unable to win public support” 
(Japan Times April 6, 1996). Fujii Yoshihiro, a Nikkei economic journalist, called the 
                                                 
59 Personal interview, 8 December 2009. 
60 However, the conclusion that all BOJ Governors with a MOF origin necessarily acted merely in favour 
of the Ministry is misleading. For instance, Morinaga Teiichirô, BOJ Governor from 1974 to 1979, is an 
often-cited example, who was regularly praised for his independent behaviour, regardless of his position 
as a former Vice Minister of Finance.  
61 Interview with former Bank of Japan official, 8 August 2008.  
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Ministry’s move to establish a committee to investigate the reform of its own institution 
“ironic” (hiniku) (Nikkei, 7 April 1996).  
 
The MOF held the view that the Bank of Japan Law from 1949 was not an obstacle for 
the operations of the BOJ (Kawakita 1995: 72-73). Vice Finance Minister Ogawa has 
repeatedly argued that the Ministry does not influence the Bank’s monetary policy. 
Thus, he stated that there is no “pressing need” to revise the Bank of Japan Law and that 
there is “no trouble with the current Bank of Japan Law”62 (Nikkei, 9 April 1996; 
Yomiuri, 9 April 1996; JT, 9 April 1996 and 23 May 1996). Ogawa justified these 
statements with the assumption that “effective policy requires united fiscal and 
monetary policy.” 63  In addition to Ogawa’s blunt announcements, MOF officials 
intensely lobbied lawmakers, preferably influential politicians in the LDP in order to 
forestall, or at least, to weaken reform. In the beginning, the MOF’s fierce lobbying had 
some success, and several LDP Diet members supported the MOF in its struggle to limit 
the degree of modifications to the ministry64 (Brown 1999: 174-190; Dwyer 2004: 256; 
Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 132-133; Toya 2006: 162-165).  
 
The MOF’s determined efforts to stop reform have led to a temporary break of reform 
movements. MOF lobbyism continued and bureaucrats, such as the above mentioned 
Ogawa have tried to influence the reform process by approaching to politicians with the 
excuse of talking about the jûsen problem (housing loan finance companies) 65 , 
deflecting attention from broader problems. In fact, MOF officials were lobbying 
politicians to their favour, warning them that “enhancing the BOJ’s independence is 
dangerous”. It needed intense intervention by influential politicians, particularly by 
Katô and Yamasaki, to convince party members that MOF reform and an independent 
central bank are necessary conditions to secure political survival, so that reform efforts 
                                                 
62 The Japanese version is even stronger: Ogawa stated that “the current Bank of Japan Law is not 
harmful for the BOJ” (“…genkôhô ni shishô ga aru to ha omowanai”) (Nikkei, 9 April 1996) or 
(“genkôhô de koremade tokudan no shishô ha naku, tadachi ni kaisei suru hitsuyô ha ijite inai”) (Yomiuri, 
9 April 1996).  
63 “zaisei, kinyû seisaku ha ittaiteki ni unei shite hajimete kôkateki na keizai unei ga dekiru” (Nikkei, 6 
April 1996.  
64 For instance, Yanagisawa Hakuo and Yosano Kaoru. In addition, Chairman of the Policy Research 
Council, Yamasaki Taku, argued that the MOF should maintain a certain amount of control over the BOJ 
(Brown 1999: 174-190; Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 132-133). 
65 See, section 4.3.6.3 about the issue of jûsen.  
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could be continued (Mabuchi 1997: 141-142; 164; Svensson, Mabuchi and Kamikawa 
2006: 62-63).   
 
The Ministry tried to exercise influence on the Bank of Japan Law making process in an 
active way. However, MOF bureaucrats lobbied not only LDP politicians, but also 
members of the Prime Minister’s advisory council, the Central Bank Study Group, and 
tried to induce them to oppose the reform process. In addition, the chairman of the 
Project Team Itô argued that the “plan for abolishing the MOF’s Banking Bureau 
caused immense resistance from the MOF. Itô complained about the attendance of MOF 
officials during the meetings, who “come so often to explain that we need to bar the 
door”, and, as a consequence, the relationship between Itô and the MOF became ill-
disposed (Mabuchi 1997: 164, 173; Volz and Fujimura 2008: 6) Thereafter, Itô 
threatened to resign, because he was extremely troubled with being subjected to 
constant pressure by the MOF. LDP’s Secretary General Katô Kôichi intervened and 
successfully avoided a political impasse by criticising the MOF for exerting such a 
strong influence on the discussion by means of “intense lobbying and waging a 
campaign of disinformation” (Malcolm 2001: 348).    
 
The MOF’s real position (honne) towards the Bank of Japan Law revision process was 
alarming. In reality, some MOF officials were quite upset about the development 
regarding the independence of the BOJ. Before the revision of the Bank of Japan Law 
was agreed upon in 1997, the MOF organized a conference (benkyôkai) with the topic 
“Which problems is the MOF facing?” (ôkurashô ha dô iu mondai ga aru?). Japanese 
banking experts were invited, but most participants of the conference were MOF 
officials. The vast majority of visiting guests were surprised how blunt and open some 
MOF bureaucrats talked about their bad feelings concerning the recent development of 
the MOF and BOJ reform process. One official from the MOF banking bureau went so 
far as to state “Regarding the independence of the Bank of Japan, the law has changed, 
but in reality nothing has changed at all” (nichgin no dokuritsu sei ni tsuite honshitsu ha 
ima to kawarimasen).66  
 
                                                 
66 Interview with former Bank official, 2008. 
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Commenting the now independent BOJ, one former MOF official argued that the “BOJ 
reform [was done] with regret“ 67 . Similarly, Finance Minister Mitsuzuka Hiroshi68 
argued that the FSRC draft on central bank reform “was a total defeat for the Finance 
Ministry bureaucrats” (Grimes 2001: 206; Yomiuri, 11 February 1997). Regardless of 
these kinds of statements, the MOF was quite successful in influencing the process of 
central bank reform in its favour. Achievements of MOF lobbying included the 
limitation of only three BOJ members in the nine-member Policy Board (Mabuchi 
1997: 70). Nakakita Toru of Toyo University believes that the MOF was involved in 
behind-the-scenes influencing, and, finally successful concerning, for example, the 
finance minister’s supervisory right and the right to approve the Bank’s annual budget 
(Brown 1999: 74; JT, 13 November 1996). 
 
3.6.3  State Actors (2) – Political Parties  
In regards of reforms, Reed and Thies (2001) argue that almost all political parties from 
both the ruling coalition and the opposition were generally supportive of reform 
movements as part of their political strategy. Regarding the issue of central bank law 
reform, the case was more ambiguous as this section will work out.   
 
3.6.3.1 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
The position of the LDP as the largest and most important party demands special 
attention in the analysis of the reform. It turned out that the opinions in the LDP were 
split concerning the subject of financial reform and an institutional change of the central 
bank. Some influential lawmakers, such as Katô Kôichi, Shiozaki Yasuhisa, a former 
BOJ official, and Mizuno Kiyoshi, fervently advocated a break-up of the MOF with an 
independent central bank (Mabuchi 1997: 136-138; Toya 2006: 162-165). However, in 
contrast, Yanagisawa, a former MOF bureaucrat, strongly opposed central bank 
independence (Mabuchi 1997), and other LDP lawmakers even considered reform plans 
as “totally impossible” (totemo muri) (Yamawaki 2002: 99). In addition, influential 
Project Team member Yosano Kaoru’s position was close to that of the MOF and many 
party members followed him in supporting the Ministry.  
 
                                                 
67 Interview with former MOF official, 14 July 2008. This narrative is known only among MOF and 
banking circles. 
68 In November 1996, Mitsuzuka succeeded Kubo as Finance Minister.  
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Due to these differing views the LDP was unable to reach a consensus concerning the 
questions of how and to what extent the reform of the Ministry should be realized. 
However, in the end, a concern for political survival guided the behaviour of the LDP 
towards reform. It integrated the reform-boosting image of its coalition partners, 
particularly the Sakigake, into its own political program. In the absence of fierce 
electoral competition, the LDP may have preferred different options, reflecting its 
privileged status within bureaupluralism; however, the electoral dynamics at the time 
motivated the majority of the LDP to follow the positions of its coalition partners (Toya 
2006: 155-163). Opportunists who sought the particular goal of election success as 
priority were in the vast majority in comparison to the group of true reformers. As a 
result, a majority of LDP lawmakers preferred a rather cosmetic reform of the MOF. 
Therefore, the party was criticised by the public and media for its “halfway measures” 
in reform (Curtis 1999: 39).  
 
Prime Minister Hashimoto 
Due to his former position as a finance minister between 1989 and 1991, Prime Minister 
Hashimoto had close ties to the Ministry of Finance and was reluctant to cut the power 
of the prestigious ministry. However, two lines of reasoning are said to have changed 
his mind to increase the effort towards reform: First, the arrogant and aggressive 
behaviour of the MOF which fuelled his irritation and frustration. Second, Hashimoto 
regarded MOF reform as a strategy which increased the possibility of success for the 
upcoming election (Mabuchi 1997: 36; Nakakita 2001: 83). That is the reason, why, for 
instance, Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (2000: 93-94) emphasize the leadership role of 
Prime Minister Hashimoto as a key person for promoting financial reform and central 
bank reform. 
 
However, according to other sources, Prime Minister Hashimoto’s effort to reform the 
MOF was half-hearted, and he tried to protect the MOF from the coalition partners’ 
efforts to disassemble the Ministry (e.g. Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 135). 
Although, by announcing the “big bang” (biggu ban) reform in November 1996, he also 
tried to weaken stronger efforts of certain reform-willing LDP politicians and the 
Sakigake to reform the Ministry. The Prime Minister countered an attempt of 
lawmakers in his own party to conduct central bank reform mainly under the 
management of the ruling coalition (Nakakita 2001: 73). Hashimoto has tried to limit 
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the influence of stronger reform-minded lawmakers by arguing that “because the BOJ is 
a neutral organisation, I do not want that central bank reform will be conducted under 
the leadership of political parties” (Asahi, 21 June 1996).  
 
Instead, as shown in this thesis, Hashimoto organised a private council to do research 
about central bank reform. There are serious doubts whether or how far this private 
council was independent as, for instance, Tachi Ryûichirô the Chairman of the FSRC 
was a member in this Study Group.69 That is, for some time, the LDP was successful in 
protecting the MOF. However, the situation changed before the general election in 
October 1996 and the Prime Minister regarded central bank reform as an important 
issue in political agenda (Amyx 2000: 7; Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 2000).  
 
Did the LDP Really Seek an Independent BOJ? 
An essential question is how serious were the efforts of leading LDP politicians to grant 
the Bank of Japan independence. This thesis provides ample empirical evidence that the 
majority of politicians did not want an independent central bank.  
 
Numerous LDP politicians seemed to distrust the BOJ, and desired to augment their 
own influence over the important tool of monetary policy. Prime Minister Hashimoto 
has emphasized the need of cooperation between the BOJ and the Diet. Additionally, he 
argued that the Bank of Japan’s monetary policies should match the government’s 
economic policy. Prime Minister Hashimoto sought to shift power away from 
bureaucracy to the Prime Minister’s Office (kantei) with the aim to strengthen his own 
power and to weaken the bureaucracy (Curtis 2002: 12). In addition, Hashimoto tried to 
increase the power of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet with the formation of the 
Council of Administrative Reform in 199670 71 (Hirashima 2004: 46; Kamikubo 2010: 
57; Köllner 2006: 291; Noble 2001: 27; University of Tôkyô 2006: 17). Thus, it can be 
argued that the central bank reform in Japan was motivated by politicians’ incentive to 
cut the power of the MOF, and to limit the Ministry’s influence on monetary policy, 
while simultaneously augmenting the power of the Diet over the BOJ (Oritani 2010: 16; 
                                                 
69 The MOF even recommended Tachi as Chair of the Study Group (Nikkei, 30 July 1996). 
70 As a result of this effort, the Cabinet Office was established in 2001, including the Council of 
Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) in order to strengthen the power of the Prime Minister regarding 
economic and fiscal policies.  
71 The LDP’s Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters (ARPH) worked on issues such as MOF 
reform and Bank of Japan Law revision (Toya 2006: 127). 
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Nakakita 2001: 65; Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 136). This argument lends 
support to the view that many LDP lawmakers did not necessarily seek an independent 
central bank, but rather sought to weaken the MOF.  
 
Another critical argument is the fact that in the past, the LDP has ceded control over 
financial matters to bureaucracy to a high extent, in particular to the MOF. This was a 
strategy to avoid responsibility for the costs of policy practices that impose harm on 
loyal interest groups (Katô and Rothstein 2006: 88). That is, the LDP had already 
delegated control over monetary policy to an agent, the MOF, a long time ago (Cargill, 
Hutchison and Itô 1997: 190; Mabuchi 1995; Svensson, Mabuchi, and Kamikawa 2006: 
62-63). It can be argued that with the central bank reform the government regained 
some of its control over monetary policy. In Japan’s case, by means of delegation to an 
independent central bank the government gained power instead of giving it away. 
 
Based on the previous arguments, it can be stated that the Japanese government never 
intended to grant the BOJ independence.72 In that case, central bank independence was 
just a form of camouflage for the intention of stronger political leadership. Wagner 
(1999) analyses central bank independence in transition countries, and points out that 
central bank independence might merely be of symbolic character. If central bank 
reform had been implemented in an indifferent manner or, if this independence had been 
jeopardized by leading politicians from the very beginning, central bank independence 
could have even been counterproductive. Of course, Japan is not a developing country, 
but Wagner’s argument bears some logic in the Japanese case. The behaviour of the 
Japanese government coincides with the new institutionalism approach by McCubbins, 
Noll, Weingast (1987), which argues that lawmakers try to limit the independence of 
newly autonomous agencies by inflicting procedural and institutional limitations. The 
government seek to maintain control over these agencies.  
 
Another empirical evidence that politicians did not seek an overly independent BOJ is 
the fact that several politicians tried to interfere in right after the BOJ was granted 
independence, which many case studies verify. For instance, Pascha (2005a: 21) argues 
                                                 
72 It can be argued that politicians did not respect central bank independence and believed that the BOJ 
should follow the instructions of politicians (Interview with former Ministry of Finance official, 14. July 
2008).  
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that “[r]ight from the beginning of the new Bank in 1998, the government made it clear 
that it still wanted to retain an influence on monetary policy-making, pressing the BOJ 
to loosen monetary policy further.”  
 
The study of transcripts of Monetary Policy Meetings of the Policy Board demonstrates 
that the representatives of the government already put high pressure on the BOJ since 
the first Monetary Policy Meeting on 9 April 1998.73 Certain lawmakers even demanded 
the law be amended again, and especially the BOJ showed signs that it did not intend to 
fully cooperate with the government.74 The second indicator is the choice of Hayami 
Masaru as Governor, who was regarded as easy to influence by the government. Third, 
certain LDP politicians complained about the draft of MOF’s FSRC. They requested 
more responsibility of the BOJ before the Diet be clearly formulated in the law, and 
desired a strengthening of the power and influence of the Diet (JT, 15 February 1997; 
22 February 1997). Furthermore, the process of Bank of Japan Law revision 
demonstrated that many LDP lawmakers were not convinced by an independent central 
bank, and simply agreed to central bank reform in order to secure political survival, and 
to retain power of the existing ruling coalition. They would have preferred a dependent 
central bank, but were convinced it was a wise strategy to sacrifice it for a higher 
political goal. In other words, only very few lawmakers, such as Katô and Shiozaki 
supported BOJ Law revision and central bank independence, and not the whole LDP. 
 
3.6.3.2 The New Party Sakigake 
The New Party Sakigake was formed in 1993 by a group of LDP defectors under the 
leadership of Takemura Masayoshi. After the collapse of the Hata Cabinet in 1994, the 
Sakigake started a coalition with the LDP and the JSP and Takemura was promoted to 
Finance Minister. Efforts to reform the Ministry of Finance were clearly regarded as 
“dismantling the MOF” (ôkurashô kaitai), which was Takemura’s slogan during his 
term as Finance Minister.  
 
Influential Sakigake lawmakers, who were on the forefront of fighting for a 
restructuring of the MOF and central bank reform, included Hatoyama Yukio, 
                                                 
73 See, section 8.7.4.4 and comments by Finance Minister Matsunaga and Omi Kôji, Economic Planning 
Agency, in Bank of Japan 2001, MPM 9 April 1998. 
74 For details, see Chapter 8. 
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Sakigake’s representative Secretary General, Igarashi Fumihiko, member of the Project 
Team and Tanaka Shûsei. Sakigake politicians “took the most aggressive attitude” 
towards a break up of the Ministry.75 For instance, the party threatened to break up the 
ruling coalition if MOF reform was not put into practice (Hori 2005: 127; Mabuchi 
1997: 185). During the reform process, an executive of the Sakigake stated that “the 
party cannot yield to the matter of separation [between the Ministry and the central 
bank]” (Asahi, 5 June 1996). However, the resolutely reform-minded Sakigake was the 
smallest partner in the three-party coalition. In the October 1996 general election, the 
LDP gained a victory, but SDP and Sakigake suffered devastating losses, deciding to 
withdraw from the Cabinet. In order to keep the majority in both houses of the Diet, the 
LDP preserved the support of the SDP and Sakigake (Hori 2005: 124; Kishimoto 1996: 
136). The Sakigake held only nine seats out of 511 in the Lower House, and had only a 
remaining two seats after the October 1996 election. With respect to the small amount 
of power regarding the number of seats, the Sakigake party was trying to prevent being 
overwhelmed in the coalition (Toya 2006: 174-175). Pushing for reforms can be 
understood as the party’s manoeuvre to win the support of the electorate, and for 
political survival, and to retain power. In this sense, some scholars argue that the 
Sakigake, with its firm anti-MOF attitude constantly pressing the LDP towards reform 
played a key role for central bank reform in Japan (Brown 1999: 188-191; Hiwatari 
2000; Mabuchi 1997).  
 
3.6.3.3 The Social Democratic Party 
The LDP’s two coalition partners, the Sakigake and the Social Democratic Party (SDP, 
Shakai Minshutô),76 were often cited collectively in the function of playing a major role 
in the reform process in which the BOJ was finally granted independence. However, 
Mabuchi (1997: 138-141) argues that the position of the SDP regarding reform was, 
unlike that of Sakigake, rather unclear.  
 
A key person for advancing reform was Itô Shigeru, SDP policy research chief and 
chair of the Project Team for administrative reform, who put the issue of central bank 
reform on the agenda of the Project Team. A major question is, how the coalitional 
                                                 
75 Grimes (2001: 207) describes the Sakigake party as “the most gung-ho advocates of radical reform“. 
76 In January 1996, the SDP decided to change its name from Nihon Shakaitô (Japan Socialist Party) to 
Shakai Minshutô (Social Democratic Party) (Katô and Curtis 1997: 41; Kishimoto 1997: 149). To avoid 
complications, this thesis congruently uses the term Social Democratic Party (SDP). 
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parties gained relatively extensive influence in the reform process and in the Project 
Team considering comparatively small number of seats in the Diet. The answer is two-
folded. First, the Project Team was characterized by an over-proportionate allocation of 
members from the SDP and Sakigake. As shown in section 3.5, only ten out of 21 
members were LDP politicians. According to Hori (2005: 126-127), in order to sustain 
the governing coalition, ruling-parties organisations were built in a way that the LDP 
could not achieve a majority. In other words, in comparison to the number of their seats 
in the Diet, Sakigake and SDP could exercise a large amount influence, and, with their 
majority in the Project Team (eleven votes versus ten votes) exert considerable pressure 
on the LDP to support financial reform. Second, the fact that the chair was filled with a 
Social Democrat made it complicated for the LDP to control the procedure of reform. 
The rationale behind the choice for Itô had two reasons. First, a LDP-chaired project 
team was considered as inappropriate to call for MOF reform. The LDP had many Diet 
members with a MOF background, a fact that strengthens the impression of a 
“conspiracy reform” (nareai kaikaku) if the LDP would have taken the chair. Second, 
Itô was regarded as a person with profound knowledge of the MOF and good contacts to, 
for example, the LDP Secretary General Katô, which made him well respected in the 
coalition (Mabuchi 1997: 134-141; Yamawaki 2002: 99). 
 
In January 1996, the prestigious post of Finance Minister was represented by a Social 
democrat, Kubo Wataru. In general, Kubo was regarded as supportive towards Bank of 
Japan Law revision and central bank independence (Hiwatari 2000: 126). For instance, 
Kubo claimed that it is important for a central bank to have independent authority in 
determining monetary policy. During a press conference on 22 May 1996 Finance 
Minister Kubo spoke in favour of investigating the reform of the BOJ further and called 
for more central bank independence.77 According to Yomiuri Shinbun (23 May 1996), 
this was a remarkable change in the attitude of the ministry, since it was the first time 
that the Finance Ministry did not oppose central bank reform categorically. However, 
Mabuchi (1997: 141; 162) views the role of Kubo much more critically. After 
criticizing the Ministry once, Kubo had never repeated his critique or announced 
concrete plans for reform. His position was rather ambiguous and ill-defined. Arguably, 
Kubo had to be very careful in his actions as the highest person of the MOF. Altogether, 
                                                 
77 The Finance Minister went so far to argue that there is no need that the government maintain its right to 
dismiss the central bank’s key staff. 
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Kubo’s “moral support” for Itô’s efforts to push towards reform was low, and his 
influence for central bank reform was minimal. To lend support to this argument, Asahi 
Shinbun (13 May 1996) reported that the financial and central bank reform efforts made 
by the SDP and Kubo, Finance Minister from January 1996 to November 1996, were 
rather “slow” (nibui). In sum, the SDP was supportive towards central bank reform even 
if its position was less strong in comparison to that of the Sakigake.   
 
3.6.4 Private Actors: Interest Groups 
The most important interest groups representing Japanese industry are the Japan 
Federation of Economic Organisations (Nippon Keidanren), the Japan Federation of 
Employers’ Association (Nikkeiren), the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(Nihon Shôkô Kaigisho), and the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai 
Dôyûkai). Among the four, only Japan’s most powerful business federation, the Japan 
Federation of Economic Organisations (Nippon Keidanren) was interested in greater 
central bank independence. In fall of 1996, the organisation published a paper calling 
for greater central bank independence.78 However, the claim for central bank reform 
came more than six months later after the start of the initiative from the government for 
central bank reform, i.e. the report of the Keidanren came at a time when the most 
crucial contents had already been decided upon by politicians.  
 
Other organisations and important persons acted even more passive, and commitments 
towards central bank independence were rare. Even if there were statements towards an 
independent BOJ, the influence was rather limited. For instance, although the chairman 
of the Bankers’ Federation and President of the Fuji Bank Hashimoto Toru called for 
more central bank independence in his last news conference as chairman, his speech 
went unnoticed (JT, 17 April 1996). Some statements were even rather cautious 
concerning central bank independence. Ushio Jirô, chairman of the Japan Association of 
Corporate Executives (keizai doyûkai), warned against hasty financial reform by stating 
that “it is dangerous to set on reforming the Finance Ministry alone simply because it 
has too much power”. Regarding the issue of central bank independence, Ushio argued 
that the BOJ can only be independent if it stops “depending on the Finance Ministry” 
(JT, 20 April 1996). However, generally speaking, strong interest groups, such as the 
                                                 
78 See, “Views on the Revision of the Bank of Japan Law”, Keidanren, 17 September 1996. 
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banking sector, had little political influence in this period. The depressing condition of 
the banking sector during the 1990s made many banks dependent on the Finance 
Ministry, preventing these banks from an active demand for more central bank 
independence. In addition, in times of bank insolvencies and scandals, an active 
exertion of influence is particularly difficult. In sum, “interest groups were indifferent to 
the restructuring of the financial bureaucracy.” (Hiwatari 2000: 110-113; Malcolm 
2001: 94-101). 
 
3.6.5 The Role of Mass Media 
According to Mabuchi (1997: 28-36), the role of mass media in prompting reform by 
constantly pressing politicians for reform was significant. The public was furious about 
scandals in the MOF (see, Chapter 8.5.1.1), and demanded mass media to launch a 
campaign towards MOF reform. Hori (2005: 121) finds that the Japanese media called 
for MOF reform already in 1995. For instance, the Asahi Shinbun (31 December 1995) 
stated that “[i]t is time to settle structural problems of the MOF […] we should discuss 
the reorganisation of the MOF […]”. In addition, the media, in favour of a separation of 
the MOF, unsatisfied with the progress of MOF reform exercised “heavy pressure” on 
the chair of the Project Team Itô and other politicians, who were too soft towards the 
MOF, to speed up reform (Hori 2005: 122; Mabuchi 1997: 36; Toya 2006: 162-163). 
The daily newspaper Mainichi Shinbun published some provocative articles, and 
criticised the work of the FSRC (for example, on 14 January 1997, 19 January 1997, 
and 1 February 1997). In sum, the majority of media was in favour of central bank 
reform and tried to influence politicians to continue their effort on the path of reform.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the process of the Bank of Japan law revision. After failing 
attempts in the 1950s and 1960s, it was not before 1996 until a new initiative for central 
bank reform has started. The Project Team for financial reform under the leadership of 
Itô and the Central Bank Study Group with the Chairman Torii were assigned with the 
task of central bank reform. This thesis demonstrated that the influence of the Ministry 
of Finance during the reform process was strong and that their demands had a lot of 
influence of the contents of the new Bank of Japan law. That is the reason why the 
process was criticized, e.g. by Mikitani (1996, 1997). This thesis found that the Bank of 
Japan and the then-Governor Matsushita were relatively unambitious to fight for a 
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higher amount of central bank independence. The behaviour of the leading party LDP 
let to the conclusion that the majority of the politicians were not overly interested in an 
independent central bank, but rather attempted to increase its own influence on the 
central bank and monetary policy.   
 
After the investigation of the process of the central bank reform, including the 
standpoints and roles of the main actors, the following chapter will focus on 
explanations of central bank reform, applying existing delegation theories to the Bank 
of Japan.  
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4. DELEGATION TO AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK – EXPLAINING 
CENTRAL BANK LAW REFORM IN JAPAN  
4.1 Introduction 
“Politicians are generally happy to exercise their power to decide things. Monetary policy is 
perhaps the most glaring exception. Delegation to an independent central bank is now the norm.” 
(Crowe 2006: 3).  
 
This chapter focuses on the decisions made by politicians to cede authority to 
independent agencies, and summarizes theories that explain why politicians in many 
countries have delegated monetary policy to independent central banks since the 1980s. 
According to the theory of public choice, politicians are assumed to maximize their own 
utility: thus, upon first sight, it seems illogical for politicians to relinquish such a 
powerful tool as monetary policy. This chapter aims to clarify this subject by analysing 
various delegation theories. 
 
From a social welfare standpoint, it is beneficial to transfer power from politicians to 
bureaucrats in the following cases: if (I) the tasks require a high extent of specific 
technical ability, (II) the ex post preferences of the public are clear, (III) a high degree 
of flexibility is unnecessary, (IV) time inconsistency is a problem, and (V) “powerful 
vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcome” (Masciandaro et al. 2008: 834; 
Alesina and Tabellini 2004: 4-5). Taking these criteria into account, Alesina and 
Tabellini (2007, 2008) conclude that monetary policy qualifies for delegation to an 
independent agency, because it is characterized by highly technical issues, and career 
oriented bureaucrats might have superior incentives than politicians. Therefore, it can be 
argued that monetary policy should be delegated to independent central banks. 
Politicians’ actions are often characterized by “myopic behaviour” that concentrates on 
short-term benefits (Bofinger et al. 2001: 209). Political decisions might threaten a 
positive outcome of economic resources, whereas the long-term time horizon of 
independent central banks makes monetary policy more efficient. Blinder (1998: 56-57) 
stresses that monetary policy needs long time horizons, and neither politicians nor the 
public have an understanding of long lags of monetary policy. Thus, independent 
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authority over monetary policy might be beneficial for policymakers (Alesina and 
Tabellini 2004; 2008).79  
 
Regarding the question of “why delegate”, an extensive amount of literature has 
analysed the motivations behind principals’ incentives to delegate functions and to 
increase the authority of agents. Delegation theory combines “several strands” of 
literature: mainstream macroeconomic literature on central bank independence, political 
science critique, rational choice theory, a more recent political economy that mixes 
components of both, a sociological view of ideas and epistemic communities, and 
parallel political science literature that takes a historical, case-study approach.  
 
The following sections turn to an analysis of central bank independence and the rules 
versus discretion debate in monetary policy. This is followed by an examination of 
delegation theories that help to explain why governments grant their central banks 
independence.  
 
4.2 Theories Explaining the Delegation to an Independent Central Bank  
4.2.1 Central Bank Independence and the Rules versus Discretion Debate in 
Monetary Policy  
The subject of central bank independence has been debated since the foundation of the 
first modern central banks in Sweden in 1668 and England in 1694. Many popular 
economists, including Walter Bagehot, Irving Fisher, John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich 
von Hayek, and Milton Friedman have made notable contributions to and have extended 
the literature on central bank independence (Debelle 1994: 92-95). 
 
The concept of independent central banks goes back to at least Jan Tinbergen (1954) 
who argued that existing conflicting economic goals must be dealt with by specialized, 
independent institutions. Since the 1970s and 1980s economists have founded the 
theoretical foundations of central bank independence (e.g. Kydland and Prescott 1977; 
Barro and Gordon 1983a, 1983b; Rogoff 1985). In the late 1980s and 1990s political 
economists started to define and measure central bank independence, concentrating on 
                                                 
79 In contrast to monetary policy, Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor (2005) argue that in case for financial 
sector supervision politicians are generally reluctant to delegate to independent agencies. However, the 
delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank requires the condition that society’s 
preferences are well known and stable (Alesina and Tabellini 2004: 27; Alesina and Tabellini 2008: 434). 
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macroeconomic effects (Bade and Parkin 1988; Grilli et al. 1991; Alesina and Summers 
1993). Later, political scientists focused on political aspects of central bank 
independence, “considering the incentives that political and socio-economic actors have 
in establishing an independent monetary institution” (Quaglia 2005: 550-551).  
 
An important body of literature concentrates on the inflationary bias of discretion in 
monetary policy making. The inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy is the 
policymaker’s incentive to accept an inflation rate higher than its optimal level in order 
to encourage economic growth (and/or a higher employment rate). The early literature 
of Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983a) focused 
on the time-inconsistency problem.80 In a model describing a non-cooperative game 
between the policymaker (the central bank) and the private sector, Barro and Gordon 
(1983b) demonstrate the advantages of rules over discretion.81  
 
The problem with politician’s incentive to inflate the economy is that, under the 
assumption of rational expectations, the public anticipates the government’s motivation. 
As a result, in the long-run, inflation rises above its natural rate. Hence, politically 
motivated intervention in monetary policy has detrimental potential to create boom-bust 
cycles that lead to an unstable economy. The optimal policy option of the government 
prior to policy implementation is not necessarily coherent with the optimal policy 
option after implementation. More precisely, there is an inconsistency in the 
government’s best strategy over time, which is known as the time-inconsistency 
problem in academic literature. By controlling inflation rates, an independent central 
bank could prevent the government from causing inflationary shocks by insulating 
monetary policy from short-term political influence. This, in turn, has a stabilizing 
effect on the economy. 82  Rogoff (1985) demonstrates that the appointment of a 
conservative central banker, who places a higher weight on inflation aversion than 
society, can avoid the inflationary bias problem, and reduce the time-inconsistency 
                                                 
80 An introduction of the rules versus discretion debate can be found in Bofinger et al. (2001: 164-204, 
chapter 6). 
81 Bofinger et al. (2001: 185-198) analyse some limitations of the simple Barro-Gordon model, coming to 
three conclusions: First, the assumption that the central bank seeks a lower unemployment rate then the 
natural rate is doubtful. Second, the result of a repeated game might differ to the one of a one-period 
game and, third, the assumption of complete information and the neglect of stochastic shocks are overly 
simplifications.  
82 In contrast, some economists argue that central bank independency is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
fight inflation (e.g., Posen 1993, Hayo 1998). 
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problem. Lohmann (1992) extends Rogoff’s analysis by adding the possibility of an 
override mechanism of the central bank by the policymaker in periods of large output 
shocks, and concludes that a partially independent central bank is a better solution than 
a fully independent central bank.   
 
In contrast, several scholars have been critical of the academic literature on time-
inconsistency, claiming that this approach lacks accuracy in describing the policy 
process of monetary policy (e.g. Blinder 1997; McCallum 1995, 1997b). For instance, 
McCallum (1995; 1997b) argues that central banks consider higher inflation as a bad 
equilibrium and, as a consequence, can be trusted not to inflate the economy. In another 
example, Blinder and Rudd (2008) find that the rise in inflation can be explained 
through supply shocks rather than inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy. In 
addition, some practical central bankers, such as Blinder (1997: 13-14) and Greenspan 
(2007) criticise the academic literature, and argue that time inconsistency “is a 
nonproblem in the real world” of modern central banks, because central bankers have 
simple tools to solve this. Accordingly, several authors claim that time inconsistency 
cannot be the sole motivation for delegation, but rather must be added to other factors, 
especially political economy reasons (Alesina and Tabellini 2008; Crowe 2006; 
Cukierman and Gerlach 2003; Goodman 1991; Lohmann 1998).  
 
4.2.2 The Macroeconomic Theory: Low Inflation and Central Bank Independence  
Based on a macroeconomic perspective, many scholars view delegation to an 
independent central bank as a solution to the time inconsistency problem83  based on the 
finding of a robust, negative correlation between central bank independence and 
inflation (Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger 2000; Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992; 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; Cukierman 1992; Hayo and Hefeker 2002, de 
Haan, Masciandaro and Quintyn 2008). 84  85  In their landmark paper, Alesina and 
                                                 
83 A fixed exchange rate system is another solution strategy.  
84 Restrictively, Cukierman (2005: 44-45) argues that, in contrast to industrial economies, the relation 
between central bank independence and inflation is unclear in the case of developing countries. In 
addition, he highlights the difference between legal and actual independence, which conceivably could 
diverse a lot. Cukierman (1994) also demonstrates that in industrial countries inflation has no correlation 
to de facto indices, especially the turnover rate of Central Bank Governors. 
85 According to Alesina and Summers (1993: 159), central bank independence may be an endogenous 
variable. They recommend considering the “joint endogeneity between economic outcomes and 
institutions” in the “analysis concerned with the long-term evolution of institutional arrangements”. As a 
consequence, it could be argued that a negative correlation between inflation and central bank 
independence is not robust. 
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Summers (1993: 154) even find “a near perfect negative correlation” between central 
bank independence and inflation. In addition, some of the existing research suggests 
that central bank independence delivers lower inflation and enhanced financial system 
stability as a “free lunch”.86 This refers to the assumption that the benefits of lower 
inflation can be achieved without any real additional economic costs in terms of 
macroeconomic performance, such as output and employment volatility, or reduced 
economic growth (Alesina and Summers 1993; Alesina and Gatti 1995; Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; Eijffinger, Van Rooij and Schaling 1996). 
 
The literature about central bank independence87 and low inflation typically emphasizes 
the government’s pre-electoral tendency to seek low interest rates or surprise monetary 
shocks in order to generate politically expedient temporary booms in the economy. The 
obvious objective of policymakers is to enhance the governing parties’ re-election 
prospects. Eventually, dependent central banks, which are subject to short-term political 
influence, may over-stimulate the economy to augment short-term output and 
employment. An independent central bank may have the credibility 88  to prevent 
politicians’ incentives to inflate the economy. Some political economists have argued 
that “the anti-inflationary value of an independent central bank depends on the degree of 
inflationary pressures faced by the government: the higher the inflationary pressure, the 
more incentive to adopt an independent central bank” (de Haan and Van’t Hag 1995; 
Franzese 1999).   
 
4.2.3 Political Economy (1): Partisan Theory 
One group of political economists argues that government partisanship affects economic 
policy preferences, meaning the economic objectives of the government form the 
outcome of monetary policy. Assuming a perfect Phillips-curve trade-off, the literature 
                                                 
86 The concept of a “free lunch” is discussed controversially in the literature. Some economists have 
found the existence of costs with the delegation to an independent central bank, including the reduction of 
welfare and higher output costs during disinflations (e.g. Alesina and Gatti 1995; Debelle 1996; Down 
2004). However, it is widely regarded that the benefits of an independent central bank exceed the 
potential costs (e.g. Alesina and Summers 1993; Bernanke et al. 2001; Cukierman et al. 1993). 
87 Following the practice of the literature, this thesis applies the terms of “autonomy” and “independence” 
alternatively. However, being more precise, autonomy involves “operational freedom”, whereas 
independence is the “lack of institutional constraints.” (Laurens et al. 2009: 6) 
88 If credibility is the reason to delegate, the principal will choose an agent with different goals. That 
means the government appoints a central banker who is more conservative than himself. Political 
economists argue that this choice of delegation is an example of the violation of the “ally principle”, 
which implies that principals prefer agents with similar ideologies (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Bendor, 
Glazer and Hammond 2001; Huber and McCarty 2004).  
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dealing with the partisan theory highlights different policy preferences concerning 
macroeconomic outcomes by left or right parties. 89  More generally, the traditional 
partisan model assumes that rightwing parties place emphasis on price stability and a 
greater role for the market whereas leftwing parties prioritise low unemployment, 
government intervention and income redistribution (Hibbs 1977; Hibbs et al. 1982; 
Oatley 1999; Alesina 1988; Alesina and Gatti 1995; Alesina and Sachs 1986; 
Havrilesky 1994: 116-117).90  
 
In comparison to the political business cycle model of Nordhaus (1975),91 92 the partisan 
theory assumes that policymakers do not behave opportunistically, but rather choose 
economic policies according to ideology-specific preferences. The partisan theory has 
found some support in empirical studies. For instance, Garrett (1998) has demonstrated 
that leftist governments may cause higher economic growth and lower unemployment 
with higher inflation under high capital mobility. Rational partisan models have recently 
been enlarged to explain central bank reform (Boylan 2001: 29). The partisan theory 
suggests that right or conservative governments which are highly concerned about 
controlling inflation are more likely to campaign and delegate monetary policy to an 
independent central bank than left-of-centre governments (Goodman 1991). 
 
However, regarding central bank reform, empirical studies demonstrate numerous 
examples of conservative governments which choose not to delegate. Bernhard (1998: 
317-318) finds no evidence of a “statistically significant relationship between 
partisanship and central bank independence”, but rather that moderate leftist parties are 
connected to high degrees of central bank independence. In addition, government 
                                                 
89 A useful summary of the partisan literature can be found in Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), Belke 
and Potrafke (2012) and Drazen (2000).  
90 The rational partisan model assumes that clear partisan outcomes do not exist in the long run, because 
rational agents anticipate the government preferences and adjust their behaviour to new conditions 
(Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997). In addition, Boix (2000) and Oatley (1999) demonstrate that partisan 
differences in policy instruments (and not policy outcome) depend on the combinations of capital 
mobility and exchange-rate regimes (Sakamoto 2005). Clark and Hallerberg (2000) come to opposite 
conclusions.  
91 According to this model, opportunistic politicians try to decrease the unemployment rate before 
elections in order to increase their chances of re-election. This conclusion is based on three assumptions: 
1. Macroeconomic policy is not neutral, 2. Economic outcomes are essential outcomes of voter behaviour 
and 3. Politicians use this non-neutrality of macroeconomic policy for their own benefit (Alpanda and 
Honig 2010).  
92 The assumptions of the public’s adaptive and non-rational expectations of Nordhaus’ political business 
cycle model have been criticised. With the adoption of rational voters – voters are rational and seek to 
maximize their utility –, Persson and Tabellini (1990) have complemented the political business cycle 
model. 
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partisanship fails to explain the vast variety of central bank independence, the timing of 
central bank reform, and cannot explain the correlation between federalism and central 
bank independence (Bernhard 2002: 8-9). A recent study by Belke and Potrafke (2012) 
confirms this straightforward argument, veryfying that short-term nominal interest rates 
were higher under the rules of leftist governments, which leads to the conclusion that 
influence of government ideology on monetary policy might cast doubts.  
 
4.2.4 Political Economy (2): The Uncertainty Argument: “Tying the Successor’s 
Hands” 
Contemporary theories of bureaucracy provide an interesting approach to explain 
politicians’ motive to delegate. The enacting legislative coalition implements 
bureaucracies in a way to protect their own policy preferences and to hinder succeeding 
governments to implement changes. Owing to the fact that any given government 
expects to be in power only for a limited period of time, politicians try to exert control 
even after the loss of power, and attempt to limit the influence of following 
administrations (Horn and Shepsle 1989; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 1989; 
Moe 1990: 227-228). Voigt and Salzberger (2002: 296) add that this strategy of 
delegation is connected with very low costs if the constraining consequences of 
delegation become effective only in the future. Oritani (2010) adds an important 
argument, namely that delegation can be a means of a ruling government to “protect” 
the electorate from unpopular policies that might take place in the future:  
“The legislature and voters (interest groups) also have a tendency to 
favor extending a certain level of autonomy to bureaucratic organizations 
as a countermeasure against political uncertainty. By insulating 
bureaucratic organizations from the legislature, even if there is a change 
in regime, the new power cannot easily implement a bold and 
unfavourable policy through such autonomous bureaucratic 
organizations” (Oritani 2010: 15).  
 
Regarding central banks, Goodman (1991: 330-334) observes that if a government with 
a preference for low inflation expects to lose power, legislators try to limit the 
successor’s policy choices by delegating monetary policy to an independent central 
bank.93  The party - or coalition - currently in power tries to ‘tie the hands of its 
successor’, and delegation of power to an independent central bank can be considered as 
                                                 
93 Goodman (1991: 334) adds that a dominant societal coalition, i.e. the financial sector, is a necessary 
condition for central bank independence.  
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a type of “self-protection” by politicians (Moe 1990). In an environment of competing 
political parties, autonomous central banks reduce electoral uncertainty about future 
monetary policy (Alesina and Gatti 1995). As a result, countries with a high extent of 
political turnover are expected to be more likely to delegate power to independent 
central banks in contrast to countries with a high political stability (Bagheri and Habibi: 
1998; Goodman 1991; Boylan 2001).94  
 
Lohmann (1998) investigates the politics of the German Bundesbank, and argues that 
political uncertainty is a sound explanation for delegation since politicians anticipate 
that they will be out of power in the future. Bernhard (2002: 33), however, criticises that 
the ‘tying the successor’s hands’ argument proposes more variation in central banks 
than is actually observable. The hypothesis suggests that ‘new’ governments should 
have changed the central bank law in order to meet their own preferences, but, in fact, 
this strategy was avoided by many governments. Rather, Bernhard (1998: 317-320) 
finds that low levels of polarization 95  correlate with high degrees of central bank 
independence, a clear contradiction to Goodman’s observations as the ‘tying the 
successor’s hands’ approach assumes that the level of central bank independence should 
be higher in polarized systems.  
 
4.2.5 Political Economy (3): Interest Groups 
Active lobbying by interest groups is another possible explanation for bureaucratic 
restructuring and delegation. By mobilizing lawmakers powerful interest groups might 
form new agencies (Moe 1989, 1995). The interest group argument is based on two 
major assumptions: First, there is the concentration of domestic aspects with the almost 
entire exclusion of international factors. Second, this concept focuses on the importance 
of demand-side pressures in the process of institutional reform: Powerful interest groups, 
such as the financial sector, industry or unions are the driving forces towards reform 
(Posen 1993, 1995b).  
 
                                                 
94 De Haan and Van’t Hag (1995) come to the exactly converse result. They use a data set of 22 
industrialised countries and do not find a positive relationship between central bank independence and 
government turnover, or the equilibrium unemployment rate. Rather, they find a negative relationship 
between central bank independence and political instability.  
95 Bernhard (1998: 316) calculates polarization as the average percentage of the voters support for 
extremist parties. A high degree of polarization implies that party legislators and coalition partners will be 
less willing to penalize the government. Therefore, one should assume that polarization is negatively 
related to central bank independence.  
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Economic actors, who benefit from low inflation and price stability, include retirees, 
small savers and mortgage holders. However, the financial sector (banks and financial 
intermediaries) is the most essential interest group that fears inflation and prefers a 
conservative monetary policy. The financial sector is the sector that is affected most 
directly and constantly by monetary policy and, thus, is seen as the strongest advocator 
of central bank independence (Goodman 1991: 333; Havrilesky 1994: 126; Posen 1993, 
1995b; Quaglia 2005: 553). Based on the above mentioned assumption, Posen (1993, 
1995b) argues that political influence of the financial sector determines the central 
bank’s degree of independence. The degree of central bank independence is regarded as 
a proxy of the strength of the inflation-opposing financial sector.96 Regarding delegation 
to an independent central bank, the critical question is whether the financial sector’s 
political influence is strong enough to organize a broad opposition to inflation.97 
 
4.2.6 Political Economy (4): The Cabinet Stability Hypothesis 
Bernhard (1998; 2002) focuses on politicians’ incentives regarding the institutional 
structure of the central bank, and argues that governments confronted with intra-party or 
coalitional conflicts about economic policy seek to resolve these disputes by shifting 
power over monetary policy to an independent agency. In the 1990s, a trend towards 
party-system instability in many industrial democracies lead to an “increased potential 
for intraparty conflict over economic and monetary policy” (Bernhard 2002: 100), 
which supported central bank reform in many countries. Put another way, Bernhard’s 
argumentation emphasizes the desire of politicians to maintain the stability of the ruling 
coalition. Politicians are likely to delegate monetary policy to an independent central 
bank (1) if government ministers, backbench legislators, or coalition partners have 
different monetary policy incentives, or (2) if government ministers, backbenchers or 
coalition partners can credibly threaten to withdraw their support or even punish the 
ruling government. In case of similar monetary policy preferences between government 
                                                 
96 Other studies find less or no evidence for Posen’s argument, for instance, de Haan and Van’t Hag 
(1995), Campillo and Miron (1997) and Temple (1998).  
97 Another point of Posen’s argumentation is that central bank independence led to a decrease of inflation 
in OECD countries if there is an agreement in the society that lower inflation is beneficial. As a 
consequence, it is useless to implement an independent central bank in a country in which the society 
does not prefer low inflation. 
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ministers, backbench legislators, and coalition partners, delegation is unlikely and the 
central bank will remain dependent upon political influence.98 
 
Politicians’ incentives are characterized by asymmetric information about the monetary 
policy process and, as a consequence, bear the risk of intra-party or intra-coalitional 
conflicts. An independent central bank can resolve this situation by disclosing 
information about government’s policy decisions and potential mistakes. Generally 
speaking, in systems in which the government’s information advantages are substantial 
and trigger various conflicts, lawmakers establish central bank independence. In 
systems with a low degree of conflict-potential, the opposite is the case and dependent 
central banks are preferred. In other words “the credibility of an independent central 
bank […] prevents intraparty conflict. As a result, parties remain in office longer, even 
if party politicians have different incentives with respect to monetary policy” (Bernhard 
1998; 2002: 12; Bernhard and Leblang 2002). 
 
4.2.7 International Political Economy 
Another strand of literature analyses the worldwide trend towards central bank 
independence from the perspective of international political economy (Bernhard 1998; 
Boylan 2001; Maxfield 1997; McNamara 2002; Polillo and Guillén 2005). The main 
argument is that central bank reform towards more independence arises from 
globalisation pressures, mostly through the increasing importance of global financial 
capital. The increase of international capital movements forces politicians to implement 
policies and institutions that support an open market, including independent central 
banks (Bernhard 2002: 32; Goodman 1992). Maxfield (1997: 9) argues that the rationale 
behind this argument is that economic internationalisation “raises the cost of poor 
monetary policy and increases the value of central bank independence.”   
 
This means that politicians transfer independence to the central bank in order to signal 
their nation’s anti-inflationary credibility to international capital markets. This move 
should attract financial investors and invite foreign capital inflows. When proceeding a 
step further, the “[f]ear of losing international financial resources lurks underneath the 
                                                 
98 Bernhard (2002: 12-13) uses this approach to conclude that in federal systems, such as the U.S., 
Germany, or Switzerland, conflict over monetary policy is high, and, therefore, politicians are tempted to 
delegate monetary policy to an independent central bank.  
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proximate legal motivation for politicians to increase central bank independence […]” 
(Maxfield 1997: 56). Independent central banks are a means to guarantee the country’s 
creditworthiness to foreign investors and to assure the value of their assets (Polillo and 
Guillén 2005: 1769).  
 
However, the applicability of an important role of international factors to central bank 
reform seems limited. First and foremost, a correlation between central bank 
independence and international factors is not statistically robust.99  Second, financial 
markets may indicate the need for financial reforms and changes, but it is false to 
conclude that they control the specific contents of reform. The international political 
economy approach assumes “a convergence across all states in the choice of central 
bank institutions” (Bernhard 2002: 33). However, because of considerable differences in 
timing and content of central bank reform across countries, the subject of central bank 
reform seemed to derive rather from “domestic political imperatives” (King 2005: 108). 
Third, various empirical studies have demonstrated that international factors cannot be 
generalized as the rationale behind delegation. In most cases, international political 
economy explanations fail to explain central bank reform in developed countries. Indeed, 
international explanations seem to explain central bank reform solely for developing 
and emerging countries.100   
 
This section has summarized existing theories about delegation to an independent 
central bank. The following sections apply these theories to central bank reform in 
Japan.  
 
4.3 Explaining Central Bank Reform in Japan 
The main task of this chapter is to examine why political key actors in Japan decided to 
revise the BOJ’s legal structure. The previous chapter summarized the most important 
theories that explain delegation to an independent central bank. The theoretical analysis 
from the previous chapter should direct to hypotheses which can be examined 
empirically to a case study, here the Bank of Japan.  
 
                                                 
99 For example, Bernhard (1998) finds no correlation between economic openness and central bank 
independence for the period between 1970 and 1989. 
100 See, for example, Maxfield (1997) who analysed central bank reform in Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and 
Thailand, and Boylan (2001) who investigated central bank reform in Chile and Mexico.  
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Countries differ in regards of many institutional aspects, e.g., concerning the political 
system and monetary regime. This chapter focuses on the Bank of Japan as a case study. 
The 1998 Bank of Japan Law revision represents an opportunity to investigate 
institutional reform, since the driving forces behind BOJ reform illustrate different 
dynamics than those found in most other countries. Put differently, Japan is a crucial 
case study chosen to test contending explanations of delegation to an independent 
central bank. Comprehensive case studies can be understood as a tool to improve 
delegation theories. Following this reasoning, this thesis incorporates specific Japanese 
institutional contexts into the analysis of institutional reform. Existing delegation 
theories based on macroeconomic factors, partisan theory, interest-group lobbying and 
coalitional policies, which are briefly examined, are incorrect for the case study of the 
Bank of Japan. In other words, the central question is which determinants explain BOJ 
reform.  
 
This thesis observes that the vast majority of existing literature about central bank 
reform does not explain why the Bank of Japan Law was revised in 1998. The primary 
objective of this thesis is to fill this gap. The objective is not only to identify which 
actors made central bank reform happen, but also to find out why the revision of the 
central bank law occurred at this particular time, why it was enforced as it was, and why 
the result obtained was as it was and not different.  
 
4.3.1 The Macroeconomic Foundation and the ‘Japan-Puzzle’ 
Based on the assumption of a negative correlation between central bank independence 
and inflation, one can argue that, theoretically, Japan must have experienced high 
inflation until 1998. The reason is that most central bank independence indices 
underline that the Bank of Japan had minimal legal independence before 1998, i.e. the 
BOJ was considered as one of the most dependent central banks in the world.101 In 
reality, however, the situation was quite different. Throughout most of the post-war 
period, Japan enjoyed a sound and stable economic performance. The BOJ received 
credit and had a proficient reputation due to Japan’s low rates of inflation coupled with 
                                                 
101 A detailed analysis of central bank independence indices and Japan is presented in Chapter 5. For a 
useful summary, see Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (1997: 183-186; 2000: 85). Pascha (2005a: 10-11) 
compares main indicators of central bank independence for Japan before and after the law revision. 
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high and comparatively stable output growth.102 The inflation performance of Japan was 
excellent from 1975 to 1990, which caught international attention, and demonstrated 
that price stability is achievable even with an institutionally dependent central bank. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, Japan’s inflation rate has declined significantly, even 
to a lower level than the rest of the world (Suzuki 1986: 105-109). According to IMF 
data, Japan’s average inflation performance between 1980 and 1989 was 2.5 per cent, 
the lowest of all 18 tested industrial countries (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991: 
344). Thus, the Japanese government had no rational reason to delegate more 
independence to the Bank of Japan in order to achieve low inflation rates, because Japan 
simply was not affected by high inflation before the reform process. Rather, Japan is 
often cited as a striking example that low inflation can be achieved even with a 
politically dependent central bank, referring to the so-called ‘Japan puzzle’ of low 
inflation performance (Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 2000: 111; Dwyer 2004: 249). As a 
consequence, Japan is often cited as counterexample to the macroeconomic hypothesis 
(Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 1997: 172-187; 2000: 89-112; Lohmann 1997; Walsh 1997). 
Thus, one has to search for different explanations for central bank reform in Japan.  
 
4.3.2 Political Economy: Partisan Theory, Interest Groups, and Cabinet Stability  
The partisan theory does not suffice to explain the timing and contents of central bank 
reform in Japan. Partisan theory suggests that conservative governments are more 
inflation-averse than leftist governments, and, therefore, are more likely to promote 
central bank independence. However, there is no evidence that partisan theory helps to 
explain an independent BOJ, because Japan’s largest party, the conservative LDP, did 
not campaign central bank reform throughout the 38 years of LDP rule.  
 
Some scholars have emphasized the immense influence of financial interest groups in 
Japanese politics (Rosenbluth 1989; Calder 1993). However, Moe’s (1990, 1995) 
approach of interest groups forming new agencies, here an independent central bank, by 
mobilizing policymakers is not applicable in Japan’s case, because this thesis has shown 
that the financial sector was not overly interested in central bank reform (see, Section 
3.6.4). In addition, Posen’s argument concerning interest group pressure ignores the 
                                                 
102 Admiration for the BOJ was argued from more than one source. Keynesians honoured the BOJ for 
ensuing Keynesian policies and Milton Friedman characterized BOJ’s monetary policies as “closest 
monetarists” (Rhodes and Yoshino 2005: 1).  
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impact of political actors. However, certain scholars have observed that politicians’ 
behaviour was the driving force behind central bank reform in Japan (see, Chapter 3) 
(Hirashima 2004: 44; Mabuchi 1997). As a result, the interest group pressure argument 
is not applicable to the BOJ case study. 
 
Regarding the Cabinet stability theory, Dwyer (2004: 251-252) cites Bernhard who 
argues that this model might not work in Japan, “because the number of coalition 
governments did not increase dramatically” before or during the period of central bank 
law reform. Rather, for the Cabinet instability hypothesis to work, one would have to 
pinpoint a central bank reform between 1993 and 1994, as this period was characterized 
by a high amount of coalition partners.103 One can argue that the Cabinet stability theory 
model might work considering the extent of internal party conflicts within the LDP.104 
Indeed, LDP factions105 play a significant role in Japanese politics. Nonetheless, there is 
no evidence that the attempt to avoid political disputes within the LDP was a reason for 
central bank reform in Japan. Rather, fierce conflicts between various factions were a 
common feature of LDP politics throughout its history (Curtis 1999: 66), without ever 
resulting in a revision of the Bank of Japan Law. Thus, the Cabinet stability hypothesis 
provides no evidence that Bank of Japan Law reform was caused by lawmakers’ 
attempts to solve internal and coalitional conflicts. Further, this hypothesis fails to 
explain the timing of central bank reform in Japan.  
 
4.3.3 The Credibility Argument  
4.3.3.1 The Credibility Argument: Domestic 
If applied to Japan, Goodman’s (1991) theoretical assertion of “tying a successor’s 
hand” suggests that LDP politicians expected to be in office for only a short term, and 
sought to limit future non-LDP governments’ influence on the BOJ and monetary policy 
by implementing an independent central bank. However, this conclusion is not 
convincing. In fact, the LDP’s political dominance strengthened the institutional 
subordination of the BOJ, and the LDP outsourced the complicated task of supervising 
                                                 
103 The governments under Prime Ministers Hosokawa (August 1993 – April 1994) and Hata (April 1994 
– June 1994) consisted of eight respectively six different coalition partners with substantial differences in 
their preferences and a high possibility of conflicts. 
104 Bernhard (1998: 315-316) points out that “large catch all parties [such as the LDP] or those with a 
wide range of class interests are more likely to suffer from ‘incentive divergence’, which occurs when 
politics that benefit one set of constituents impose costs on others.” 
105 Kishimoto (1997: 134) offers a detailed genealogy of LDP factions from 1955 to the 1990s. 
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monetary policy to the MOF, with which the LDP formed a close relationship (see, 
section 4.3.5). Rather, this thesis argues that LDP politicians had no incentive to form 
an independent central bank, but rather preferred to exert control over the BOJ. Thus, 
the line of reasoning that LDP lawmakers shifted authority to the BOJ in order to limit 
the control over monetary policy of future governments “seems far-fetched” in the case 
of BOJ reform (Pascha 2005a: 23).  
 
Credibility-based explanations as the fundamental rationale behind Bank of Japan Law 
reform cannot be backed up with evidence. In contrast, there are many arguments 
against a “straight credibility story” (Boylan 2004), leading to the conclusion that 
gaining credibility through central bank reform was not politicians’ primary incentive to 
revise the Bank of Japan Law. Boylan (2001: 152) observes that “central bank 
autonomy would seem most necessary from a credibility standpoint when private sector 
confidence is lowest.” However, private sector activity was not so low in Japan that 
politicians needed drastic measures to support domestic investment. There is no 
evidence that such a costly signal was a strategy chosen by Japanese lawmakers for 
domestic markets. If credibility was politicians’ main incentive, then there would 
arguably have been a better timing for central bank reform. In addition, the private 
sector and the general public were not overly interested in central bank reform (Chapter 
3.6.4). Pascha (2005a: 23) argues that the “public was not interested in autonomy as a 
value in itself, but in an economic improvement.”  
 
There are further arguments which undermine credibility argument. First, regarding the 
theoretical underpinning of the credibility argument, Boylan (2001: 30) states that “the 
credibility literature assumes that all politicians have the same incentives to undertake 
central bank reform”. This means that there must be, at least, a certain degree of 
homogeneity between political actors. However, in contrast to this assumption, the 
Japanese example demonstrates that there were substantial differences within the largest 
party and the coalition in regards of the preferences. Second, it is a widely accepted fact 
in the academia that central bank independence does not enhance credibility if it can be 
easily reverted. For instance, Lohmann (1998) argues that the mere threat to revoke 
central bank independence can be an effective means for influence on the central bank’s 
independence. In Japan’s case, politicians started to pressure and attack the Bank of 
Japan very soon after the implementation of the new law, and, in very drastic examples, 
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even threatened to withdraw its independence (see, Chapter 8), which is an indicator 
that clearly contradicts credibility reasons for delegation.106 
  
Third, if credibility is the primary reason for delegating authority, principals will most 
likely prefer agents who have different preferences. This kind of strategy breaks the so-
called ally principle, which claims that principals prefer agents who resemble 
themselves ideologically. Principals suppose that conservative central bankers would 
improve the credibility of commitments of disinflationary policies. Therefore, it is a 
necessary condition to grant independence to the central bank (Aziz 2005: 538; Majone 
2001: 104-116). However, the majority of Japanese politicians sought a central bank 
that has similar preferences and is easy to be controlled. Forth, because the Bank of 
Japan Law was outdated, it had to be revised sooner or later anyway. Why in 1997 of all 
years is not sufficiently explained by the credibility argument. Fifth, there was almost 
no public discussion about the Bank of Japan Law. Professionals and academics were, 
to a high extent, excluded from the reform process (Mikitani 1997). This procedure is 
not helpful to enhance credibility.  
 
4.3.3.2 The Credibility Argument: International Political Economy  
The credibility argument also reflects international implications. Some scholars argue 
that central bank reform did represent political needs to demonstrate credibility not only 
domestically but also internationally (Maxfield 1998). As already noted, since the 1990s, 
central bank independence has been regarded as a superior institutional framework, and 
was actively promoted by international organisations, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), 107  the World Bank, and the Organisations of Economic 
Cooperation Development (OECD) (Cukierman 2008: 726; McKinnon 2005). 
McKinnon (2005: 126) calls central bank independency the “new mantra” of the IMF 
and World Bank, because of their mission to advice, and, sometimes even, to pressure 
governments for independent central banks. However, in Japan’s case, there is no 
evidence that central bank reform was imposed by international organisations such as 
the IMF or the OECD (Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 138).  
                                                 
106 For instance, the government pressured the BOJ to increase the money supply in 1998, insisted on a 
purchase of Japanese government bonds (JGB, kokusai) in 1999 and opposed strongly the termination of 
the zero interest rate policy in 2000 (most strikingly, the government representatives in the Monetary 
Policy Board made use of the right of request a postponement of a monetary policy decision).  
107 Efforts of the IMF to campaign central bank independence include Romania (IMF 2004) and Turkey 
(Kiefer 2007) (in Garriga 2010: 49).  
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Some scholars, including Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (2000) and Dwyer (2004: 245; 257-
259), claim that Japanese politicians chose central bank independence in order to 
reinstate domestic and international confidence. Moreover, they state that the content of 
the new Bank of Japan Law can be explained, at least partially, by lawmakers’ effort to 
adopt international standards in the establishment of an independent central bank, or get 
closer to an Anglo-Saxon model of political economy. However, comparing the Bank of 
Japan Law with statutes of other major central banks demonstrates that the contents of 
the Bank of Japan Law has weak points and significant limits of central bank 
independence that do not necessarily meet international standard (Kanegae 1999: 90-
116).108 Thus, an argumentation that the adaption of international best practices was the 
driving force behind the contents of the new Bank of Japan Law is not convincing. 
 
One might argue that the final report of the Prime Minister’s advisory council, the 
CBSG (see, section 3.5.5), could be interpreted as evidence for the credibility argument. 
The CBSG’s final report (1996) demands “fundamental reform” of the Bank of Japan 
Law and states that “in order to gain credibility from the global market” an independent 
central bank and a clear definition of its relationship to the government are essential 
factors. However, instead of a claim for a fully independent central bank, the second 
statement has to be interpreted as a request for a strong government. The CBSG report 
calls for not only a stronger cooperation between the government and the central bank, 
but also for governmental intervention. For example, the report argues that certain 
economic periods (financial system instabilities or financial crises) require government 
involvement or the government’s final judgement. For example, this applies in regards 
of foreign exchange intervention or the management of government funds. 
 
There are additional reasons why an exaggerated concentration on the role of 
international factors is misleading in Japan’s case. First, it casts serious doubts to 
assume that foreign investors stopped, or were overly reluctant to invest in Japan, 
because of the dependent status of the BOJ before 1998. There is no data that supports 
the claim that international investors were reluctant to invest in the Japanese markets. 
Lukauskas and Shimabukuro (2006: 138) find that “significant changes in capital flows 
                                                 
108 A detailed discussion of the Bank of Japan Law follows in Chapter 5. 
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into and out of Japan did not occur in the period before revision.” That is, there was no 
pressing need to demonstrate the adoption of international standard to foreign investors 
in form of an independent central bank.  
 
Second, Drysdale, Naito, Trewin and Wilson (1999) discuss the problems of 
traditionally low flows of foreign direct investments (FDI) into Japan, and how the 
Japanese government tried to encourage FDI. The conclusion is that the Japanese 
government took “more aggressive action to promote FDI into Japan, for example via 
tax and credit incentives”, rather than through central bank reform. More importantly, 
an argument against the international credibility explanation for central bank reform is 
that fundamental issues, such as financial supervision, prudential regulation and the 
establishment of financial entities, areas that matter most to foreign investors, were 
delegated to the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA, Kinyû Kantoku Chô)109, founded 
in July 1998, and not to the Bank of Japan. Third, in comparison to international 
standards and other main central banks, the new Bank of Japan Law has articles which 
lack accuracy at best, and limit the Bank’s independence at worst.110 As a consequence, 
several politicians who had an image as ‘internationalists’, including Ikeda Motohisa 
(SDP) and Tanaka Kô (Sakigake), opposed the bill of central bank law revision in the 
Diet in March 1997, arguing that some articles of the draft were not compatible with 
international standards (Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 138-139). Scholars arguing 
for politicians’ incentives to strengthen Japan’s international credibility make the 
mistake of regarding the new Bank of Japan Law as completely equivalent to 
international standards. Forth, the effort to revise the Bank of Japan Law towards more 
independence in an entire extent was jeopardized during the reform process by the 
influence of the MOF and reform opposing politicians. A compromise agreement was 
the result. 
 
To sum up, this dissertation argues against an overly important role of the credibility 
argument, both domestically and internationally, for central bank reform in Japan. At 
best, international standard influenced some of the contents of the new law after 
politicians decided to delegate, but the above argumentation (and the findings of 
                                                 
109 In 2000, the name was changed into Financial Services Agency (in Japanese: Kinyû Chô) 
110 Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of the new Bank of Japan Law.  
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Chapter 5 which provide a detailed analysis of the law) demonstrate that the result of 
the law does not meet international best practices.  
 
4.3.4 The Legislator’s Motivation – Explaining Central Bank Reform in Japan 
As discussed in the previous section, the most common delegation theories fall short to 
explain the choice of central bank reform in Japan. Regarding a macroeconomic 
reasoning, the performance of Japan’s economy since the 1970s indicates that low 
inflation performance is based on how the central bank is embedded in the political 
system and not whether it is independent by statute. As a result, a number of papers 
have tried to go beyond the assumption of a correlation between low inflation and 
central bank independence as reasoning for delegation, and extended the earlier 
literature by adding broader political economy variables and determinants into the 
analysis. These papers emphasize the importance of political stability (the long-lasting 
LDP hegemony), the weak oppositional parties, the exceedingly autonomous behaviour 
and conservative views of monetary policy of government bureaucrats (Nakamura 1993: 
43), and, finally, the BOJ’s high technical expertise and reputation which supplied the 
Bank of Japan with a relative high degree of de facto independence. These factors111 are 
essential indicators to explain the low inflation environment in Japan (Lohmann 1997; 
Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 1997: 172-187; 2000: 89-90; Fratianni et al. 1997; Walsh 
1997). Another important factor was that the LDP followed a long-term view of 
economic policy which helped to implement low-inflation policies. Its dominance made 
the LDP invulnerable against the incentive to request expansionary policies before 
elections. Following this reasoning, inflation can be low even with a dependent central 
bank (Walsh 1997: 114). The above political factors demonstrate that Japan’s economic 
and political performance with the hegemony of the leading party LDP in the centre is 
supportive to the argument that there is a correlation between political stability and low 
inflation (Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 1997: 
190-191).  
 
In order to understand central bank reform in Japan, this thesis argues that political 
reasons with a concept of ‘blame shifting’ and a changing LDP-MOF relationship are 
                                                 
111 Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (1997: 187-188) add two further aspects that led to a low inflation 
environment in the Japanese economy: First, the memory of the high inflation in the post-war era and the 
wild inflation in the 1970s, and, second, the autonomous behaviour of some central bank Governors.  
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the most convincing approaches to explain institutional choice and revision of the 
BOJ’s new legislative framework. 
 
4.3.5 A Bureaucratic Explanation: The Changing Relationship between the LDP 
and the MOF112 
As seen in the previous section, the political and economic system in Japan is 
characterized by particular features. One notable feature is that the Japanese political 
environment has been characterized by a remarkable political stability since the Second 
World War, a stability that was based on the LDP’s commitment to seek rapid economic 
growth. This political stability was linked with a strong relationship between the LDP 
and bureaucracy. Basically, the relationship between the LDP and the MOF can be 
distinguished into three periods: 
1. The LDP dominance between 1955 and 1993 
2. The change of political power between 1993 and 1994 
3. The return of the LDP in 1994 
 
The LDP dominance between 1955 and 1993 
The LDP maintained a single party dominance (jimintô tandoku seiken) in the Japanese 
government between 1955 and 1993, during which LDP politicians formed a stable and 
close cooperation with MOF bureaucrats that was comfortable for both the LDP and 
MOF.113 As a consequence, the MOF developed into the most powerful Ministry in 
Japan, playing a dominant role in shaping the Japanese economic system. MOF 
bureaucrats accumulated a high level of professional expertise, and dominated the 
supply of information to LDP politicians.114 By providing information and expertise, 
bureaucrats were able to exert a high extent of influence on policy-making115 116 (Hori 
                                                 
112 A thorough analysis of the LDP and MOF relationship is beyond the scope of this study. Here, only 
important issues regarding BOJ reform are considered. For further study of the issue, see Amyx 2004, 
Hori 2005; Katô 2002, Mabuchi 1997).  
113  For a critical comment of this issue, see Saitô (1996: 18) who describes the “ambiguous and opaque 
relationship” between MOF and LDP lawmakers and its decision-making process as undemocratic, 
supralegal, and self-complacent.  
114 One important reason for this is that Japanese Ministers usually do not bring own staff with them when 
entering a Ministry, what means that they depend to a high extent on the Ministry (Curtis 1999: 7).  
115 This situation of a long time stable partnership between the LDP and MOF was characterized by a 
positive-sum relationship (Curtis 2002: 6; Katô 2002). 
116 In addition, it was intrinsically difficult for politicians to control the MOF, what the relationship 
between the Hosokawa Cabinet (Pascha 2005a: 23) or Finance Minister Takemura (Brown 1999: 190) 
with the MOF illustratively showed. 
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2005: 133; Aoki 1988: 286-297; Muramatsu and Scheiner 2007; Curtis 1999: 60-61; 
2002: 5-12; Katô 2002; Nemoto 2002: 19-20).  
 
In stark contrast, contacts of MOF bureaucrats to politicians of the opposition were kept 
at minimum, important legislative matters or budgetary preferences were hardly ever 
discussed. The fact that the Ministry’s political interactions focused on the LDP had an 
obvious reason. Many MOF officials had political ambitions after retirement from the 
Ministry. Entering the field of politics successfully made it profitable to build up deep 
contacts within only a single party. Therefore, personal contacts have been built and 
continuously developed between Ministry’s officials and senior politicians in the 
LDP117 (Babb 1995: 544; Brown 1999: 172-175; Curtis 1999: 62-63).  
 
The change of political power between 1993 and 1994 
The year 1993 marked a key turning point in Japanese political history. After the LDP 
lost the majority in the Lower House in 1993, the LDP was forced into the 
unprecedented situation of acting in the opposition.118 The loss of LDP’s hegemony led 
to a new political environment, and altered the relationship between the bureaucracy 
and elected officials in a significant way. As a result, the system of mutual cooperation 
between the LDP and the MOF was damaged. The LDP would have preferred to 
continue this privileged relationship, but the developments of the political environment 
made it no longer possible to maintain these exclusive insider networks.  
 
The MOF also had to deal with the new political circumstances. In essence, the Ministry 
was confronted with three options: first, to preserve the cooperation with the LDP. 
Second, the MOF could collaborate with the new ruling coalition. The last option was to 
hold a neutral position, and hope for a quick recovery of the weakened LDP. The MOF 
chose the second option and decided to cooperate with the parties in power in the same 
way it had previously done with the LDP. This applied especially to the Japan Renewal 
Party (JRP, Shinseitô), for the MOF believed that this party would hold political power 
for a long time. Put differently, the Ministry chose the most suitable way to keep as 
much influence as possible (Mabuchi 1997: 33). This choice demonstrated that the 
                                                 
117 In addition, both the majority of MOF bureaucrats and many Diet members are graduates from the 
prestigious Tôkyô University which increases potentially classmates’ relationships.  
118 See, Curtis (1999: Chapter 3, 65-98) for a detailed review of events that led to the collapse of LDP 
dominance.  
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MOF was merely interested in keeping contact with politicians in power. MOF’s 
decision to end the long-standing and profitable cooperation came like a blow to many 
LDP politicians (Toya 2006: 166). In particular, Katô, LDP Secretary General, who had 
longstanding ties with the Ministry, was shocked with MOF bureaucrats who started to 
shift their cooperation to the Hosokawa Cabinet in 1993. 
 
Due to this development, the relationship between the LDP and bureaucrats shifted from 
a cooperative to a competitive relationship. The LDP’s loss of power led to a 
fundamental change of the traditional principal-agent framework of the LDP and MOF 
from a positive-sum to a zero-sum relationship. Bureaucrats traditionally enjoy a 
competitive edge concerning information. The problem for LDP politicians was that 
they failed to build a structure that would enable them to act more independent from the 
Ministry in regards of many key policies. The resulting competitive character of the 
relationship to the MOF left many LDP politicians helpless (Muramatsu and Scheiner 
2007). 
 
 The return of the LDP in 1994 
The strategy of the MOF to shift cooperation to non-LDP parties backfired at the 
moment the LDP regained power in 1994, once again becoming the strongest party. 
However, it was impossible to rebuild the former collaboration with the MOF on its past 
foundation. In fact, it turned out that the LDP was unwilling to return to the previous 
agreement of cooperation with the MOF. Instead, having taken the former events into 
consideration, some LDP politicians became increasingly acrimonious, wishing to 
punish the MOF for its disloyalty during the LDP’s short-term period out of power 
between 1993 and 1994. Since 1993, the relationship between the LDP and the MOF 
has been generated growing mutual distrust, which made it impossible to return to the 
previous cooperation. In addition, Curtis (2002: 11-12) argues that, although the LDP 
regained part of its political power in 1994, it was dependent on coalition partners 
forming a government. This led to a weakening of the exclusive relationship between 
the LDP and the bureaucracy.  
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Still, a large number of LDP politicians had close contacts, and supported the MOF, 
feeling a responsibility from previous times to act as the Ministry’s guardian. 119 
However, influential LDP lawmakers felt bitterness against the MOF and sought 
“revenge”. A growing number of lawmakers thought it as beneficial to distance 
themselves from the MOF, increasing electoral chances by bashing the unpopular MOF. 
Politicians used a strategy to make the ministry a scapegoat (see next section) and 
decided to encourage MOF reform.120 In other words, the willingness to sacrifice the 
Ministry in order to obtain credit from the electorate gained impetus among LDP 
lawmakers (Hiwatari 2000: 126; Mabuchi 1997: 32-36; 134-255; Hori 2005: 129-130; 
Brown 1999: 172-177; Grimes 2001: 202-203; Malcolm 2001: 89-97; Sasaki 2002: 102; 
Svensson, Mabuchi, Kamikawa 2006: 65). 
 
This chapter demonstrated that the end of the LDP hegemony in 1993 led to a changing 
relationship between the LDP and the MOF opening the path for institutional reform.121  
The weakening of the cooperation between the LDP and the MOF is commonly 
regarded as an indispensable prerequisite for institutional reform, including the BOJ’s 
independence (i.e. Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 2000: 92; Hori 2005; Mabuchi 1997).  
 
The following chapter will analyse how politicians made use of the new situation 
treating the MOF as a scapegoat, blaming it for the severe economic conditions in Japan. 
The analysis is based on the concept of blame avoidance.   
 
4.3.6 The Concept of Blame Avoidance 
4.3.6.1 The Politics of Blame Avoidance 
The concept of blame avoidance has been widely discussed in the literature, for example 
by Weaver 1986; Balla et al. 2002; Shinkawa 2005; Hood 2002; McGraw 1990. The 
strategy of blame avoidance is characterized by politicians’ incentive to avoid 
                                                 
119 For instance, Hiwatari (2000: 125-131) argues that the LDP returned to some extent to its former 
position as the guard for the Ministry, after gaining an electoral success in the October 1996 Lower House 
election.  
120 At this point, it must be noted that central bank reform in Japan cannot be viewed as a single reform, 
rather it was accompanied by larger administrative reform. More precisely the revision of the Bank of 
Japan Law was part of MOF reform, the so-called “big bang”, which started in November 1996 (Nakakita 
2001: 50-51; Toya 2006). 
121 Toya (2006) points out to the complex result of the changing relationship between the LDP and MOF 
after 1994. The relationship was characterized by three features: cooperation with the jûsen problem, 
competition with the “big bang” reform, and conflict with MOF reform and Bank of Japan Law revision. 
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accountability, and their strategies are limited “by concerns about the impact of 
unpopular measures on future election outcomes.”  
 
The concept of blame avoidance became popular in the 1990s, as economic conditions 
forced politicians in developed countries to make increasingly detested choices which 
imposed high costs on the electorate. Financial globalisation has made it increasingly 
challenging for governments to pursue stability and economic revitalization in times of 
severe recessions. This leads to selfish behaviour of office-seeking politicians. If certain 
policy actions will lead to high costs, lawmakers try to avoid blame for unpopular 
decisions and view it as beneficial to delegate.122 In contrast, if benefits exceed costs 
politicians claim credit for policy decisions and remain with the status quo. In other 
words, politicians only delegate if expected benefits exceed the costs (Voigt and 
Salzberger 2002: 294-295). 
 
Weaver (1986: 377-378) finds various determinants of blame avoidance behaviour, 
including the extent of risk aversion, politicians’ motivation for re-election, the number 
of competing parties, the preferences of the voters, and how these preferences can be 
interpreted into political gains and losses. This approach argues that blame-avoidance is 
the dominant strategy of politicians seeking re-election. While not asserting that 
politicians never use alternative strategies, Weaver (1986: 371-372) stated 
unequivocally that: “Politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid blame for 
unpopular actions rather than by seeking to claim credit for popular ones […] [M]ost 
officeholders seek above all not to maximize the credit they receive but to minimize 
blame.” This can be seen as a rationale for politicians to restructure or break up 
bureaucratic institutions. 123  This argument assumes that voters are more sensitive 
towards real or potential losses than gains. Mabuchi, Kamikawa and Svensson (2006: 
46) extend Weaver’s approach by arguing that “the politics of blame avoidance—and 
the specific strategy of blame avoidance that was chosen—are shaped by institutional 
and perceptual constraints.” 
                                                 
122 For instance, Kane (1980) observes that US congressman consider it as “extremely convenient” to shift 
the blame to the Federal Reserve in times of economic turmoil culminating in financial distress. 
According to Kane the Fed’s independence is low and its main, daunting function is “to deflect blame 
from the real policy makers”. 
123 In detail, Weaver (1986) lists examples of blame avoidance behaviour by American politicians in a 
US-typical surrounding of a decentralized Congress and loose party discipline. He finds that the activity 
of blame avoidance is leading to a withdrawal of discretion. 
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Weaver (1986) distinguishes between eight blame avoidance strategies; one of these is 
the so-called scapegoat argument.124As already demonstrated, governments preferably 
delegate with the electorate unpopular, but necessary policies to international or 
independent agencies. The agency can enforce unpopular policies, even in cases of high 
resistance by the electorate. Applying this argument to central bank reform, delegation 
is regarded as a search of a “convenient scapegoat” or, in other words, a “strategic 
shirking” by politicians in order to avoid blame in difficult economic times (Semler 
1994: 51). The argument is that a political party is not necessarily weakened by central 
bank independence, but rather could benefit from granting independence to a central 
bank, in order to transfer responsibility for monetary policy in difficult economic 
situations. For example, interest rate hikes may impose immense burdens on interest 
groups or the entire electorate. In such situations, lawmakers shift the blame to the 
(independent) central bank for unpopular, but necessary policy measures. The central 
bank acts as a scapegoat or “risk taker” for politicians (Alesina and Tabellini 2005: 3, 
17-18; Boylan 2001: 126; Elgie 1998: 65-66; Johnson 2006: 92-98; Posen 2002; Tager 
2007: 363). Some scholars applied the scapegoat argument to explain monetary policy 
decisions made by central banks, including the German Bundesbank (Berger 1997; 
Marsh 1992), the ECB (Alesina and Stella 2010; Aziz 2005: 544), or the US Federal 
Reserve (Kane 1980, 1990; Morris and Munger 1998: 376).  
 
In Japan’s case, the scapegoat argument is a useful tool to explain BJL revision. The 
concept of trying to “find a scapegoat” helps to explain the rationale behind the decision 
of Japanese politicians to delegate. This strategy can be useful to explain the behaviour 
of politicians after the discovery of past scandals and policy mistakes (Weaver 1986: 
387-388).  
 
4.3.6.2 The Blame Shifting Hypothesis in Japan 
This subchapter applies the concept of blame shifting from the previous section to 
central bank reform in Japan. In a general sense, the political culture in Japan is 
particularly characterised by a concept of blame (Horiuchi 2007; Svensson, Mabuchi 
and Kamikawa 2006). For instance, Shinkawa (2005) analyses the pension retrenchment 
                                                 
124 Applying the scapegoat argument, Kane (1982) builds a theory to explain how American politicians 
have tried to use the Fed as a scapegoat.  
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in combination with the politics of blame avoidance. Hiwatari (2000) uses the blame 
avoidance concept to explain the reorganisation of the financial bureaucracy, namely the 
liquidation of housing loan finance corporations and the creation of policies for troubled 
banks.  
 
Usually, the blame avoidance approach is used to explain the behaviour between parties. 
However, in Japan the blame avoidance strategy can be applied differently. Politicians 
shifted blame to a third actor, the MOF. Politicians’ strategy to attack and shift blame to 
the MOF was only possible, because the traditionally strong cooperation between the 
LDP and the MOF was damaged (see, Section 4.3.5). Japanese lawmakers have blamed 
bureaucrats for policy failures in a regular way, which is a common strategy. 
Bureaucrats accepted such responsibility receiving politicians’ support in establishing 
new programs or institutions in return. However, in the 1990s, politicians blamed the 
Ministry in a much stronger way than usual (Muramatsu 2004: 29). 
 
Why was the strategy of blaming the MOF so attractive for politicians? Apart from the 
desire to punish the disloyal Ministry, the economic conditions were deteriorating and 
disasters such as bankruptcies of financial institutions made the situation so severe that 
politicians needed to demonstrate activism to the public. Taking this into consideration, 
making MOF the scapegoat was a rational strategy or a “convenient way” for LDP 
politicians to avoid taking responsibility as a means to guarantee their political 
survival125 (Curtis 1999: 57).  
 
4.3.6.3 Failures and Scandals in the Ministry of Finance 
In the 1990s, Japan suffered a financial crisis after the busting of the bubble economy, 
leading to a recession between 1991 and 1993. The collapse of the bubble economy led 
to a growing distrust of the public in the capability of the LDP-bureaucracy partnership 
to handle the economy successfully.  Since 1995, things had been going worse due to a 
number of financial disasters further damaging the Japanese economy. Particularly the 
problem of jûsen (tokutei jûtaku kinyû senmon gaisha) seemed out of control. Jûsen 
companies were non-bank financial firms that originally specialised in providing 
                                                 
125 It is interesting to note that, in this sense, BOJ reform shares some similarities with central bank 
reform in the UK. King (2005: 96) argues that “BoE independence was a means for New Labour to gain 
the electoral support of the median voter.” 
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housing loans. In the 1970s commercial banks and security companies founded the 
jûsen with active support from the MOF. In the 1980s, the jûsen changed their lending 
activity towards real estate development loans, ending in excessive losses. Finally, 
many jûsen went bankrupt and the government issued a rescue plan to save insolvent 
jûsen in December 1995.126 This was a very unpopular political decision among the 
voters, for taxpayer’s money was used to cover these losses (Nakasô 2001: 6). Konoe 
(2009) documents the events as following: 
 “The MOF was forced to ask directly for taxpayers’ money. After bitter 
political battles between the MOF, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries (MAFF), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which 
was the majority party of which farmers were a large constituency, a 
public fund injection of 685 billion yen ($6.3 billion) was approved for 
the resolution of jûsen in June 1996. This caused huge public criticism of 
the MOF, banks and agricultural cooperatives.”  
 
Aside from the jûsen crisis, the Japanese economy was hit by additional problems. First, 
there was the non-performing-loan (NPL) problem127 which revealed masses of newly 
disclosed bad loans. Second, in August 1995, the Hyogo Bank and Kizu Credit 
Cooperative went bankrupt, followed by the Daiwa Bank incident one month later. 128 It 
can be argued that all of these troubles were areas in which the MOF had direct 
oversight. The Ministry was considerably involved in the jûsen problem. In particular, 
one delicate detail revealed that most of the jûsen were operated by retired, high ranking 
MOF bureaucrats (Malcolm 2001: 95; Svensson, Mabuchi, and Kamikawa 2006: 64; 
van Rixtel 2002: 195). In addition to these financial disasters, since 1995 it came into 
light that a number of MOF officials were involved in a series of bribery and wining 
and dining scandals with major banks, further damaging the Ministry’s reputation. 
These scandals culminated in the arrest of various senior officials, and the resignation of 
Finance Minister Mitsuzuka Hiroshi and Vice Finance Minister Komura Takeshi in 
January 1998 (Fujii 2004: 36).129  
 
                                                 
126 See, for instance Hiwatari (2000) for details of the jûsen problem. 
127 Calculations vary on how costly the NPL crisis was, but it is widely considered as one of the most 
expansive bank rescue operation in history. The NPL had risen to 6-8 per cent of GDP (Nakasô 2001: 17).   
128 In September 1995, the Daiwa Bank announced that it had acquired enormous losses of approximately 
$ 1.1 billion in its New York branch and the MOF failed to notify the US authorities about the situation. 
129 In April 1998, after an investigation by the MOF, 112 officials were sanctioned for accepting 
unwarranted entertainment. Two top officials, Nagano Atsushi (Head of securities Bureau) and Sugii 
Takashi (high-ranking officer of Banking Bureau) among others resigned (Takahashi 2000: 17).  
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All these problems caused due attention in the mass media, resulting in a fundamental 
loss of public trust in the financial system. The voters became uneasy about the 
economic situation; the government’s handling of the problems, and, in particular, 
scandals and corruption in the MOF. The electorate was no longer convinced that the 
LDP could solve the economic problems in cooperation with the MOF. The result was 
severe public criticism of the prestigious bureaucracy, and a demand for an 
organisational restructuring of the MOF. The situation led to a phenomenon known as 
“MOF-bashing” (ôkurashô tataki) in literature and media.130 MOF bashing was not a 
completely new phenomenon, but after the disclosure of the MOF’s scandals, the 
vehemence of attacks was astonishing, especially for the Ministry itself131 (Amyx 2000: 
6-7; Curtis 1999: 55-58; Konoe 2009: 499-501; Malcolm 2001: 91-101; Miyao 2001: 
186; Pascha 2005a: 9-10). Finally, public support for MOF reached an unprecedented 
all-time low in 1996 (See, for instance, Grimes 2001: 199-203 and Malcolm 2001: 89-
101). According to a Nikkei opinion poll conducted on 12 March 1996, 74 per cent of 
the public preferred a reorganisation of the Ministry (Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 
2006: 136).132 The extent of public criticism against their institution reached a level that 
even within the Ministry almost everyone seemed to realize that a certain loss of power 
was inescapable. As a consequence, MOF bureaucrats agreed to a reduction of authority 
over the Bank of Japan as long as its power over financial administration (budget) 
would be preserved133 (Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 2000: 93; Hiwatari 2000: 126; Hori 
2005: 119-134; Mabuchi 1997: 134-255).  
 
4.3.6.4 Blame Avoidance as a Strategy for Politicians 
Elected officials from the ruling government were concerned about being punished by 
the voters for the fierce economic situation. Commitment to the MOF by leading LDP 
politicians would generate electoral vulnerability for the party. In joining the public and 
the media in criticising the MOF bureaucracy and calling for financial reform, 
                                                 
130 According to Grimes (2001: 200-202), the Ministry’ picture in the public has changed significantly 
since 1995. From 1995 on the MOF was described more and more as an institution full of over-confident 
and self-important bureaucrats. Its status as “elite of the elite was undermined by involvement in bribery 
and other scandals” (Malcolm 2001: 97).  
131 Wilson (2000: 153) notes that politicians are usually tempted to bureaucracy bashing in case 
bureaucrats become defensive or hostile towards pressure from politicians. 
132 In addition to the above-mentioned happenings, another factor that made the MOF unpopular with the 
electorate was its constant pushing for an increase in the consumption rate.  
133 Toya (2006) analyses in detail why the MOF was willing to support an institutional reform that 
reduces their own power.  
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politicians basically tried to secure their parties’ success. Saitô (1996: 16), a former BOJ 
official, argued that policymakers “pulled out their final trump card: splitting up MOF 
to mollify the public”. Taking the public disposition into account, shifting blame to the 
unpopular Ministry was a rational strategy for politicians to enhance their re-election 
prospects (Curtis 2002: 8; Dwyer 2004; Svensson, Mabuchi and Kamikawa 2006: 64). 
The behaviour of Japanese lawmakers during the financial crisis in the 1990s is a 
striking example for the rationale employed to avoid being blamed (Hiwatari 2000: 112; 
125-127; Svensson, Mabuchi, and Kamikawa 2006). The policy measures taken to 
stabilize and revive the economy put a high burden on taxpayers. In this difficult 
situation the government needed to convince the public that it was able to overcome the 
problems.  
 
Politicians from the LDP had to consider the gains and losses of dissecting the MOF 
very carefully. One the one hand, the electorate’s preference towards MOF reform was 
clear. Wilson (2000: 235) notes that lawmakers usually never lose votes by disparaging 
the bureaucracy, and this finding is applicable to Japan. However, on the other hand, the 
LDP still needed the MOF’s cooperation and expertise in policy making, which explains 
why a high number of LDP politicians avoided pushing too hard towards MOF reform. 
Instead, they tried to limit the coalitions’ demand of a comprehensive reform.  
 
Finally, politicians shifted blame to the MOF for policy failures, such as the collapse of 
the jûsen. Arguably, the MOF, with numerous self-made scandals, was an easy target 
for politicians. In particular for LDP lawmakers, political opportunism was a stronger 
incentive than traditional strong support for the Ministry (van Rixtel 2002: 197). In 
general, Japanese politicians followed two strategies: First, they aimed to punish the 
Ministry for its disloyal behaviour. Second, they intended to blame it for past policy 
mistakes and transfer their own responsibility. However, it could be argued that the 
MOF had to take all the blame from politicians, even for situations it was not fully 
responsible for. More precisely, politicians sought to drive away “the attention from 
their own inability to handle the banking problems promptly and effectively” (van 
Rixtel 2002: 197).  
 
When analysing the blame argument for central bank reform in Japan, it can be argued 
that instead of creating an independent Bank of Japan in order to avoid being blamed for 
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future monetary policy decisions, politicians delegated authority over monetary policy 
to the BOJ in order to blame and punish the MOF for past policy failures. This means 
the blame avoidance framework was used as an ex post concept rather than ex ante. 
Politicians have focused on the MOF and not the BOJ or monetary policy. They have 
not done so in order to create an independent central bank and to avoid future disputes 
over monetary policy, as the uncertainty argument assumes.  
 
In this sense, many academics argue that blame shifting was an important reason for 
creating an independent central bank in Japan in order to make the MOF a scapegoat 
(Hartcher 1998; Hiwatari 2000; Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006; Mikuni and Murphy 
2003: 49; Muramatsu and Scheiner 2007; Pascha 2005a: 21). To make this strategy 
possible, former events, such as a weakened MOF, and the Ministry’s loss of credibility 
through corruption scandals, were a prerequisite for BJL revision. Cargill, Hutchison 
and Itô (2000: 112) commented that “the decline in the reputation and credibility of the 
Ministry of Finance is especially important because it provided the political conditions 
that made possible the independence of the Bank of Japan.” In a similar vein, Grimes 
(2001: 204) concludes that the MOF’s “failure of macroeconomic and financial policy 
in the 1990s presented a rationale for increased autonomy” of the BOJ.   
 
Gilardi (2001: 15-23) offers an additional and promising concept to explain the 
politician’s strategy that supports the findings of the concept of blame avoidance as a 
rationale for central bank reform in Japan. Gilardi argues that political uncertainty is a 
theoretically sounder explanation for independence than credibility and blame shifting. 
He compares the three arguments, and comes to the conclusion that “for blame shifting, 
independence is a sort of shield for politicians. […] However, for this shifting to be 
possible, the agency does not need to be really independent, but only to be believed to 
be so.” For a credibility-based reasoning, a similar argumentation can be made. In 
contrast, the case is different for political uncertainty, since “politicians need 
independence to prevent future holders of their current political property rights to undo 
their policy choices.” Accordingly, in order to realize the objective of eliminating 
uncertainty, symbolic independence is not enough, and real independence is required. 
 
In accordance with this reasoning, this thesis demonstrated that it is most likely that the 
majority of Japanese politicians, at least LDP politicians, never intended to make the 
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BOJ de facto independent, but rather planned to increase their own influence on the 
Bank (see, Section 3.6.3.1). Given the assumption that the government never intended 
to mandate de facto independence to the Bank of Japan, Gilardi’s (2001) argument is 
convincing. Applying this argument indicates that if blame shifting was a major reason 
to delegate for Japanese politicians, then the Bank of Japan does not necessarily need to 
be granted independence in a de facto sense. Accordingly, the result of central bank 
reform manifested in the new Bank of Japan Law might be similar, regardless of what 
the main incentive was, whether an independent central bank or a weakened MOF. 
However, the de facto result will be different, namely how politicians make use of and 
interpret the new law.  
 
4.3.6.5 The Role of the Sakigake 
As demonstrated above, Japanese politicians sought to shift the blame to the bureaucrats 
as a strategy for political survival, because they were facing severe economic troubles 
(Curtis 2002: 8; Svensson, Mabuchi and Kamikawa 2006: 64). In particular, politicians 
from the Sakigake argued in favour of MOF reform, and played an important role for 
the revision of the BJL (see, Section 3.6.3.2). This section put its focus on the role of 
reformist parties, such as the Sakigake, on central bank reform.  
 
Following Shinkawa (2005: 179), the politics of delegation also imply the significance 
of veto points:134 135 He states that the “number of veto points may affect the role and 
power of the bureaucracy. Where there are no veto points, bureaucracy may be able to 
pursue their goals and interests most effectively.”  
 
During times of stable LDP majorities in the Diet, veto points could appear only within 
the party. More precisely, in cases of harmony between the LDP factions there are no 
veto points and reform movements are difficult to achieve (Immergut and Jochem 2006: 
100-103). This argument emphasises the role of LDP’s coalition partners for they have 
provided multiple veto points to the government, a condition that has increased the 
possibility of institutional reform such as central bank Law revision. Hiwatari (2000: 
                                                 
134 Veto players are a precondition for credible delegation. There are three different types of evidence: 
central banks are significantly more independent in countries with (i) strong checks and balances (Moser 
1999), (ii) strong bicameralism (Bernhard 1998) or (iii) multiple veto players (Hallerberg 2002). 
135 Köllner (2006) provides useful data on veto players and their respective strength in the Japanese 
system in comparison to other countries. 
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125-131) argues that the institutional design of Japan’s political world requires that 
parties other than the LDP call for bureaucratic restructuring. A plausible explanation 
for the reluctant behaviour towards reform of the majority of LDP lawmakers is that the 
LDP was still dependent on the Ministry’s expertise in dealing with difficult economic 
situations. Many LDP lawmakers believed that restructuring the MOF during an 
economic downturn would make problems worse (see, Section 4.3.5).  
 
In a one-party dominant system, in which chances for the opposition to replace the 
government are most unlikely, the only possibility to be in power for smaller parties is 
being part of a coalitional government. Then, however, smaller parties have to share 
blame for potentially unpopular policies such as tax increases. In contrast to smaller 
parties, only the leading party can claim credit from specific interest groups for these 
policies. In Japan’s case, a rational strategy for smaller parties is to seek the support of 
the strongest party, the LDP, in order to join the government. However, here again, the 
LDP has the advantage of being paid by interest groups for unpopular policies. One 
example is the protection of the agricultural sector for conducting (an exceptionally 
unpopular) policy measure, such as the re-financing of the jûsen.136 The LDP-coalition 
partners, the SDP and Sakigake were in the unfavourable situation to share the blame 
and lose popularity with the electorate without being substituted with the credit from 
particular interest groups. In an attempt to solve this situation, particularly the Sakigake 
pressed for a split-up of the MOF in order to gain credit from the electorate. As a result, 
insistent calling for MOF reform was a sensible strategy to boost the party’s position 
and reputation. As a consequence, parties aligned with the LDP to try to lighten the 
dilemma by pursuing alternative measures, such as the MOF partition. In short, the 
dissolution of the MOF “can be understood as an instance of bureaucratic restructuring, 
used as a partisan blame-avoidance device” (Hiwatari 2000: 126-131; Malcolm 2001: 
100).  
 
Regarding the important role of the LDP’s coalition partners, in particular the Sakigake 
for central bank reform, LDP parliamentarian and member of the CBSG, Shiozaki, later 
                                                 
136 In December 1995, the government proposed plan to save insolvent jûsen, what was very unpopular 
with the electorate. The agriculture credit cooperatives, which “in their position as largest lenders to the 
jûsen, mobilized politicians to protect their interests” (Hiwatari 2000: 114). Thus, the jûsen scandal 
revealed close connections between the LDP and the agricultural sector. Support of the agricultural sector 
was essential for the LDP to stay in power. As a consequence, their “public bailout was of major interest 
to the LDP” (van Rixtel 2002: 194-195).  
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stated that “this [central bank reform] was possible only because it was a three-party 
coalition. It would not have been possible if it was an LDP-only government” (Tahara 
1998: 36-39).137 This view is supported by Hiwatari (2000: 110) who argues that the 
break-up of the MOF was a compromise agreement of the LDP made with its coalition 
partners.138 In other words, if LDP was the solitary ruling party institutional reform 
would have been most unlikely.  
 
A theoretical approach helps to explain the reform-seeking behaviour of the Sakigake. 
De Figueiredo (2002) develops simple game theoretic models of politicians’ structural 
choice139 to insulate policy, and finds that in systems with many veto players the only 
proponents of insulating policy from politics are “electorally weak groups”. That is, 
rather than pure uncertainty reasons, the level of electoral strength is the driving force 
behind delegation. “Weak” parties expect to be in power only a short time, and, after 
losing power, the chance to regain power is expected to be low. Thus, it can be argued 
that the Sakigake, as a small party, sought to use its time in the government efficiently, 
and to encourage as many reforms, including BOJ reform, as possible as long as they 
were part of the government.  
 
To sum up, the emergence of the 1998 Bank of Japan Law reform was largely the result 
of consensus-building across political partisanship. After the consensus forming, 
political key actors were able to shift blame to the MOF. Finding a scapegoat as a 
strategy of blame avoidance was a strategy that finally led to the outcome of Bank of 
Japan Law revision. 
 
4.3.7 The Concept of Ideas 
There is an additional concept that explains delegation, namely the concept of ideas. 
The literature on ideas is voluminous. Many scholars in social science, comparative 
politics, political economy and international relations theory employ the concept of 
ideas140 and beliefs141 to elucidate changes in the institutional design and choices in 
                                                 
137 In Toya (2006: 163). 
138 Curtis (1999: 200-203) argues that a reason of the success of the LDP-JSP-Sakigake coalition was its 
policy coordination focused on consultations and compromises.  
139 This model is based on Moe’s (1990) concept of structural choice.  
140 Parsons (2002: 48) defines ideas as “subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal 
relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions.”  
141 Beliefs are defined as “mental events that entail thought” (Yee 1996: 69).  
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policymaking (Berman 2001: 231; Campbell 2002: 21-22; Haas 1992; Jacobsen 1995: 
283; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; Yee 1996). The benefits of an ideas-based approach 
are that it can be applied by a wide range of disciplines, including historical 
institutionalism, rational choice positivism, cultural and normative studies, 
constructivism, and sociology, which, in turn, apply various methodologies, including 
quantitative analysis, game theory, historical narrative, and qualitative analysis (Berman 
2001: 233; King 2005: 96-97).142 143 
 
The concept of ideas is related to so-called epistemic communities,144 which promote 
ideas to political actors. An epistemic community “is a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim 
to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” (Haas 1992: 3). 
Epistemic communities seek to exert continuing influence on politicians in order to 
implement institutional changes. Their influence increases in periods of uncertainties or 
economic distresses, i.e., when politicians are pressured to find a salient solution as 
soon as possible. Nonetheless, epistemic communities have to take political needs into 
consideration in the promotion of new ideas. If lawmakers are not convinced by the new 
idea, they usually prefer to maintain the status quo. The ideas of epistemic communities 
can overcome the policy process only if political sponsors are willing to promote the 
new ideology (Berman 2001: 234; King 2005: 98; McNamara 1998, Parsons 2002). In 
this sense, proponents of the concept of ideational explanations argue that central bank 
independence is caused by “the active involvement of an epistemic community that 
influenced a key politician to adopt this reform” (King 2005: 98).  
 
4.3.8 The Concept of Ideas in Japan 
The concept of ideas is also applied by some Japanese scholars. For instance, Hamada 
and Noguchi (2005) emphasize the role of ideas in policy making, especially in 
                                                 
142 For a survey of the literature, see Schmidt and Radaelli (2004).  
143 Although the concept of ideas is broadly regarded as one aspect among many for explaining political 
behaviour, both sceptics and supporters argue that the ideational literature has not gained a broader 
audience due to its lack of a comprehensive research design and precise specification (Berman 2001: 231; 
Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; Yee 1996: 69-70). 
144 The term epistemic community has been defined in various ways. Basically, epistemic communities 
are a certain set of people, i.e. scientific communities or professionals. Epistemic communities can also be 
organisations, such as IMF, OECD, BIS, or G 7, and in a wider range it includes i.e. a group of academics. 
A similar definition suggests that epistemic communities are “a sociological group with a common style 
of thinking” (Haas 1992: 3, note 4). See, Haas (1992: 3) for a summary and further explanation of the 
term. 
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macroeconomic issues. Hamada and Noguchi present two examples in which “wrong” 
ideas negatively influenced policy decision-making in Japan. Regarding deflation, for 
instance, the public was misguided that deflation is beneficial for the Japanese 
economy.145 The authors argue that this “erroneous thinking” was widely supported by 
the mass media, prolonging the recession of the Japanese economy since the 1990s.  
 
Arguably, it is far-fetched to claim that the concept of ideas is an essential model of 
delegation to an independent Bank of Japan. However, some aspects deserve attention. 
For instance, McNamara’s three-stage model (1998) underlines the importance of the 
activity of individuals (for instance, politicians or academics) rather than groups, such 
as partisan or the financial sector, in explaining central bank reform.146 In other words, 
this concept helps to explain why lawmakers from different parties, such as Katô and 
Shiozaki from the LDP, Itô from the SDP and Chair of the Project Team, and politicians 
from the Sakigake supported BOJ independence. Kanegae (1999: 17) argues that certain 
academics had promoted central bank independence in Japan at an earlier point in 
time.147 However, the idea of central bank independence found little support in political 
circles until 1996. However, in 1996, the situation changed regarding politicians’ 
willingness to reform the obsolete Bank of Japan Law. Ideas dealing with central bank 
independence became important, for instance, from institutions, the Research group of 
financial system of the Japan Society for Monetary Economics (JSME) 148  and 
academics including Kanegae (1995), Mikitani (1996, 1997), and Aizawa (1995).  
According to the concept of ideas, the existence of Japanese economists and academics 
that were eager to convince and advise politicians is another crucial point. Professor 
Mikitani Ryoichi of Kobe University and member of the JSME was one person who 
fiercely promoted central bank reform. He gave a speech in which he argued for central 
bank independence in the Upper House.  
 
                                                 
145 Hamada and Noguchi (2005: 3) list some statements that stand for a positive attitude towards deflation, 
for instance, “deflation is not a monetary problem”, “deflation should be remedied not by monetary policy 
but by government expenditure policy”, and “deflation originated from technological innovations and 
from inexpensive imports is a blessing”.  
146 For instance, King (2005) applies McNamara’s model to explain central bank reform in the United 
Kingdom. 
147 See, e.g. Yoshino (1962), Saitô (1988), Suzuki (1993), and Kanegae (1995). 
148 Kanegae (1999: iv-v)  
 86 
4.3.9 Central Bank Reform in Japan 
The major incentive of Bank of Japan Law revision was to weaken the power of the 
MOF (Oritani 2010: 16). Thus, because of the linkage of MOF reform and the political 
changes, certain scholars find that the Bank of Japan Law revision came to some extent 
by “windfall” (tana kara botamochi) (Yamawaki 2002: 103), characterizing it as a 
“coincidental” reform (Volz and Fujimura 2008: 6). Figure 4-1 summarizes the findings 
of this chapter and the circumstances that led to central bank reform in Japan. Scandals 
and crises of the MOF had deepened the mistrust in the bureaucracy, and helped to 
generate support for the concept of an independent central bank, amongst the general 
public, the media and politicians. This coincides with McNamara’s (2002) argument 
that crises open the door for institutional changes. That is the reason why many scholars 
argue that the independence of the new Bank of Japan was not something the BOJ had 
successfully fought for and won (kachitotta), rather reform came by default, arriving as 
a consequence of the failures and scandals (tekishitsu) of the MOF (Fujii 2004: 268; 
Mabuchi 1997: 62; Nakakita 2001: 50, 58; Yamawaki 2002: 265). Mikitani and 
Kuwayama (1998: 2) conclude that “the successful effort to enact a new [BOJ] law 
gained its impetus from failure.”  
 
In order to implement central bank reform, fundamental changes in the political-
bureaucratic environment, such as the loss of power of the LDP and the changing 
relationship between the LDP and the MOF, were necessary. The findings of this thesis 
argue that blame shifting was an important reason for Japanese politicians to revise the 
BOJ Law. Making the MOF a scapegoat for the economic distress in the 1990s was a 
rational blame avoidance strategy used by lawmakers to survive the impending election. 
The concept of blame avoidance in combination with fundamental changes in the 
political-bureaucratic environment, such as the loss of power of the LDP and the 
changing relationship LDP and MOF, provide a sound explanation for central bank 
reform in Japan. Another factor were key actors who promoted the idea of central bank 
reform (e.g. Yoshino, Mikitani, Kanegae) to politicians who were supportive of the idea 
of central bank independence (Politicians from the Sakigake or Shiozaki), or at least, 
who saw the necessity for a fundamental change in order to secure re-election prospects, 
because of an unstable tripartite ruling coalition. It can be also argued that BOJ reform 
was forced from beginning to end by politicians, which is a rare phenomenon for a 
financial market reform. 
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Figure 4-1: Bank of Japan Reform 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the existing literature on delegation to an independent central 
bank and tested the most relevant theories on the Bank of Japan. In addition, this 
chapter demonstrated that central bank reform in Japan cannot be explained by a single 
delegation theory, but rather has multifaceted reasons. In Japan’s case, many of the 
common delegation theories do not work. Rather, this thesis attributed the motive to 
decidedly political factors. Extraordinary political events and bureaucratic scandals led 
to high uncertainty among the electorate. The collapse of LDP hegemony in 1993 is 
regarded as a landmark event that led to a changing relationship between the LDP and 
MOF. This thesis identifies the resulting modified relationship as an important factor for 
financial reform, including the revision of the Bank of Japan Law. The examination of 
the Bank of Japan Law revision process demonstrates that “selfish politico-economic 
reasons” played a key role (Pascha 2005a: 9). The most important motive for the ruling 
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parties in the Hashimoto Cabinet to support reform was the struggle for political 
survival, namely their attempt to survive the forthcoming election.  
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5. THE BANK OF JAPAN AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE (DE IURE 
ANALYSIS) 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the Bank of Japan’s de iure central bank 
independence by analysing the new Bank of Japan Law. Section 5.1 provides 
definitions of the term central bank independence. Section 5.2 draws attention to the 
Bank of Japan and its de iure status (BOJ Law), and is structured as follows. Section 
5.2.1 starts with a description of the Bank of Japan Act from 1942, followed by a 
detailed investigation of the 1998 Bank of Japan Law in section 5.2.2. The foci of the 
analyses are a summary of the most essential contents, and the examination of the most 
significant features of central bank independence. On the basis of this discussion, this 
section demonstrates that the Bank of Japan Law includes various weaknesses regarding 
independence (Section 5.3). One important strand of literature about central bank 
independence focuses on the measurement of central bank independence. Section 5.4 
provides an introduction of the most important indices, discusses the problems and 
difficulties, and summarizes the results concerning the Bank of Japan. Section 5.5 
provides a conclusion.  
 
5.1 Central Bank Independence 
5.1.1 Introduction 
As previously stated, many governments have granted legal independence to their 
central banks. Legal independence means that the central bank is able to conduct 
monetary policy without explicit or implicit pressure from the government. This section 
guides through the analysis of different categories of central bank independence and 
aims to draw conclusions for the Bank of Japan.  
 
Due to its complexity, it is necessary to analyse the term ‘central bank independence’ in 
more detail. Starting with a general definition, according to the Webster’s New 
Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd edition, the term independent is defined as: 
“…not subject to the control, influence, or determination of another or others…not 
depending on another for financial support…”. One line of research considers central 
bank independence as the degree of influence which the government or politicians can 
(legally) exert on the central bank. This means a central bank acts independently if it 
conducts monetary policy without pressure and interventions of the government. Bell 
(2001: 459), for instance, defines central bank independence as “the institutional 
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capacity – typically derived from an institutional mandate, with the support of 
government – to conduct monetary policy free from significant government input or 
meddling”. Similarly, Capie et al. (1994: 50) views central bank independence as “the 
right to change the key operational instrument without consultation or challenge from 
government.” 
 
Bernhard (2002: 21-22) identifies three formal characteristics of central bank 
independence. First, the control of monetary policy instruments (Debelle and Fischer 
1994; Fischer 1995). A second aspect that determines the central bank’s independence 
is the appointment process of its key positions. The key question is to what extent the 
Cabinet is able to select the composition of the bank’s monetary policy decision-making 
body. Is the Cabinet alone or are there other parties, such as the legislature or 
commercial banks that build the central bank’s governing members? Another related 
issue is the length of the terms of the key staff. The third element of central bank 
independence refers to the Cabinet’s power to formulate ex-post sanctions, including 
oversight (Bawn 1997; Lupia and McCubbins 1994; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), 
replacements of the staff (Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Lohmann 1992), and policy veto 
points (Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Segal 1994). Putting all arguments together, central 
bank independence “reflects the bank’s ability to control monetary instruments, 
restrictions on the Cabinet’s influence over the appointment procedure, and limitations 
on the Cabinet’s ability to punish the central bank” (Bernhard 2002: 21). In a 
subsequent step, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of independence 
to gain a deeper understanding of the issue of central bank independence, which will be 
investigated in the following sections. 
 
5.1.2 Definition of Central Bank Independence 
5.1.2.1 Goal Independence  
Certain scholars divide central bank independence into two aspects: goal and instrument 
independence (Debelle and Fischer 1994; Fischer 1995; Walsh 1995). According to 
Debelle and Fischer (1994: 197), a goal independent central bank is characterized by an 
independent setting of the final goals of monetary policy, i.e., the central bank can 
decide whether it concentrates on price stability, growth rate, or unemployment.149 
                                                 
149 Sibert (2009) notes that among the major central banks only the ECB has an unusual high amount of 
goal independence. However, the U.S. Federal Reserve is also commonly regarded as goal independent 
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Bofinger et al. (2001: 209) provides a similar definition: “A central bank enjoys goal 
independence when it is free to choose its goals or at least free to decide the actual 
target values for a given goal.” However, a clear definition of the goals of monetary 
policy should include both the choice between price stability and nominal GDP, and a 
precise description of the time horizon for their achievement and numerical target 
values. As a consequence, goal independence can have various interpretations, and has 
in reality many different forms (Bofinger et al. 2001: 209-210). Arguments, which 
speak for goal independent central banks, can be summarized as follows (Goodhart 
2000: 227-228): 
 
1. A monetary target set by the government may reduce credibility  
2. A government-set target may decrease the discretionary powers of central 
banks, particularly in the case of an adverse supply shock  
3. The last argument has to do with empirics. Two of the most successful 
central banks in the world, the US Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank, 
never had to follow an explicit target set by the government. It is doubtful if 
they could have been so successful without a special kind of institutional 
framework 
 
An additional advantage is that goal independence shields the central bank from too 
much political pressure. This, however, comes at the costs of democratic accountability 
(Baltensberger et al. 2007: 90). Economic literature identifies the following arguments 
against the implementation of goal independence (Goodhart 2000: 227-228):  
 
1. The central bank’s key staff is not elected by the public. A high degree of 
power of a central bank may trigger the problem of a democratic deficit 
2. If the government is responsible for setting the objective, an effective 
coordination between the government and the central bank is more probable 
3. A government-set explicit and quantified target is an essential factor for 
transparency and accountability. In the case of multiple objectives or 
imprecisely formulated targets, it is difficult to hold the central bank 
                                                                                                                                               
(e.g. Belke and Polleit 2009: 528). Mishkin (2007: 321) views the Fed as both instrument and goal 
independent.  
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accountable, which means that transparency is reduced. To avoid this 
problem, a government-set target may be helpful 
 
As a consequence, making central banks goal independent is criticised by some scholars 
(for instance, Blinder 1998). Bernanke et al. (1999: 312) conclude that “[b]ecause 
ultimately policy objectives in a democracy must reflect the popular will, they should be 
set by elected officials”.  
 
5.1.2.2 Instrument Independence 
The other concept is instrument independence. Instrument independence refers to the 
central bank’s authority to choose every monetary policy instrument it views as 
adequate without governmental interference (Lybek and Morris 2004: 11), i.e., an 
instrument independent central bank can choose its means to realize its operating targets 
without restraint (Debelle and Fischer 1994: 197). According to Bofinger et al. (2001: 
213), instrument independence is characterized by three essential features: the control of 
the short-term interest rate as the key element of monetary policy, the control of the 
exchange rate as a supplementary target, and limitations of central bank credits to the 
government. 
 
 In comparison to the discussion of goal independence, the vast majority of economists 
agree upon the necessity instrument independent central banks (e.g. Amato und Gerlach 
2002; Fischer 1995; Mishkin 2004b). Indeed, in most cases the central bank statutes 
allow the central bank to determine interest rates independently. As a result of the goal 
and instrument independence debate, Fischer (1995: 202) concludes that “[t]he most 
important conclusion of both theoretical and empirical literatures is that a central bank 
should have instrument independence, but should not have goal independence.” To 
implement the goals fixed by the government, central banks should have independence 
both from government and financial markets. 
 
5.1.3 Central Bank Independence: Another Concept 
However, in order to gain a more extensive understanding of central bank independence 
one has to distinguish between additional categories. In a more detailed approach, 
academics differentiate between the following categories of central bank independence: 
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1. Institutional and legal independence 
2. Personal independence 
3. Functional and operational independence 
4. Financial and organisational independence 
 
Institutional and Legal Independence 
According to Bebenroth and Vollmer (2007: 45), “a central bank is institutionally 
independent if its status is enshrined in central bank law.” Institutional independence is 
one key aspect of central bank independence, and the absence of government 
intervention in central bank decision-making processes should be mentioned in a central 
bank’s statute. Generally, “it is widely accepted that institutional features aimed at 
granting legal independence to the central bank must ensure its undisputed authority to 
fulfil a clear monetary policy mandate” (Martinez-Resano 2004: 7). Legal independence 
is formally derived from the central bank law or statute, and “concerns its prescribed 
relationship to the central government” (Marcussen 2005: 907). In most countries, 
“central bank independence is not a constitutional requirement but rather determined by 
a legislative statute, the legal independence of the central bank is granted by a majority 
vote of the legislators and can be removed by the same decision rule” (Moser 1999: 
1571). However, one has to be careful, for a central bank’s legal independence can be 
very different from its de facto independence.150  
 
Personal Independence 
Personal independence refers to the role, status and composition of the supreme 
management bodies of the central bank. It answers the question whether or under which 
conditions the central bank’s key staff can be dismissed by the government,151  the 
length of the mandate, and the procedure of appointment with possible renewals of 
Policy Board members. It is considered supportive for personal independence if the 
term of office is non-renewable (Bofinger et al. 2001: 215-216; Negrea and Munteanu 
2008: 517).  
 
                                                 
150 This will be shown in a following section about central bank indices.  
151 In case of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the governing body only consists of one person, the 
Governor. This fact is especially prone to partisan appointments of the government (Bofinger et al. 2001: 
215).  
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Functional and Operational Independence 
The issue of functional and operational independence has already been widely discussed 
in literature on central banks due to their influence on monetary policy decision making. 
Functional and operational independence is also referred to as political independence 
(Negrea and Munteanu 2008: 518). Operational independence is understood as having 
extensive discretionary powers to effectively conduct monetary policy objectives. 
Operational independence basically requires independent interest rate setting (Martinez-
Resano 2004: 7).    
 
Financial and Organisational Independence 
In comparison to other issues regarding central bank independence, the subject of 
financial independence is relatively scarce in literature. However, this does not mean 
that financial independence is unimportant. In fact, “financial independence aspirations 
occupy a prominent role in most central bank’s statutes”. Financially independent 
central banks are provided with “sufficient resources to attain its fundamental policy 
objections” and with “the adequate balance sheet structure to efficiently perform its 
functions”. However, the definition of the term is deliberately wide-ranging in order to 
deal with the multifaceted structure of central banks in the real world (Martinez-Resano 
2004: 6-8). In addition, according to Negrea and Munteanu (2008: 518), financial 
independence requires the partition of government funds from those of the central bank. 
In fact, “central bank functions are inevitably deployed on its balance sheet and have 
effects on its income statement. A financially independent central bank exhibits the 
adequate balance sheet structure […] to efficiently perform its functions”. The 
institutional device of a central bank’s independence should be constructed in a way that 
vulnerabilities are minimized, for instance, through adequate capitalization (Martinez-
Resano 2004: 6-8). Simplifying the issue of financial and organisational independence a 
great deal, the central bank should be able to finance its expenditures without being 
dependent on the government’s budget, i.e. “the central bank should be able to finance 
its expenditures out of current profits” (Belke and Polleit 2009: 528-529).  
 
On the basis of these definitions, the following section will focus on the analysis of 
central bank independence of the Bank of Japan according to the new Bank of Japan 
Law. 
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5.2 The Bank of Japan Law  
5.2.1 The Bank of Japan Law of 1942 
The contents of the Bank of Japan Law of 1942 were interpreted as critical by many 
academics. This law was enacted under heavy influence of the National General 
Mobilization Law and served national purposes (Fujiki 2001: 76). For instance, former 
Executive Director of the BOJ Suzuki Yoshio (1994: 86)152 characterized the Bank of 
Japan Law as “outdated and vague” and “based on fascist ideology and wartime 
conditions”. The following subchapters will briefly investigate the main issues of the 
1942 Bank of Japan Law.153 
 
5.2.1.1 The Bank of Japan’s Objectives 
In regards of standard central bank’s objectives, the Bank of Japan Law of 1942 had no 
special clause regarding financial stability or price stability. Instead, the Bank of Japan 
Law stressed that the central bank should support the national policy (Article 1),154 and 
contribute to national targets (Article 2).155 In other words, the BOJ’s central role was to 
support the government and this law was implemented to finance the war economy.  
 
5.2.1.2 The Policy Board 
In 1949, the Bank of Japan Law was supplemented with the implementation of a Policy 
Board which acted as the supreme policy-making body of the Bank. 156  The Policy 
Board was composed of seven members. Five members had voting privileges, namely 
the Bank’s Governor and four members, each with expertise from four business sectors: 
city banking, regional banking157, commerce and industry and agriculture. However, in 
practice, the experts from industry and commerce and agriculture were repeatedly filled 
with retired officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery, and the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry respectively (Iwata 1994: 148; Nakao and 
                                                 
152 Quoted from van Rixtel (2002: 198, note 16).  
153 For comprehensive characteristics of the Bank of Japan Law from 1942 see Kanegae (1995). 
Furthermore, Kanegae (1995: 101-110 and 144-147) carries out a detailed comparison between the Bank 
of Japan Law from 1942 with the German Reichsbank Law, the Law of the Deutsche Bundesbank (1957), 
and the US Federal Reserve System.  
154 “The Bank of Japan has for its object the regulation of the currency, the control and facilitation of 
credit and finance, and the maintenance and fostering of the credit system, pursuant to the national policy, 
in order that the general economic activities of the nation might adequately be enhanced”. (BJL, Article 
1) 
155 “The Bank of Japan shall be managed solely for achievement of national aims“ (BJL, Article 2) 
156 See, Chapter 3 of this thesis (delegation).  
157 Yamawaki (2002: 83) notes that the representative from regional banks often was a former BOJ 
official.  
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Horii 1991: 27-28; Yamawaki 2002: 60-66). The additional two Policy Board members 
were government representatives, one from the Ministry of Finance and one from the 
Economic Planning Agency (EPA). These two representatives had no voting privileges, 
rather they facilitated the “communication and consultation between the government 
and the Bank” (Nakao and Horii 1991: 27; Henning 1994: 69-70).  
 
All five eligible to vote were appointed by the Cabinet and approved by the Diet. The 
Governor served a five-year term and the other Policy Board members served four-year 
terms respectively. 158  The two government representatives served non-fixed terms 
(Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 1997: 182). The Policy Board customarily assembled twice 
a week. The voting members of the Policy Board chose the chairman, although it was 
customarily the Governor (Miller 1996: 6; Nakao and Horii 1991: 27-28). The Minister 
of Finance was provided with special “override provisions”, which made the Ministry 
“the ultimate power” over monetary policy (Capie et al. 1994: 169). Cargill, Hutchison 
and Itô (2000: 89) criticised that the Policy Board with its new implemented authority 
missed a promising opportunity to enhance the independence of the Bank of Japan as it 
was legally the supreme body of monetary policymaking. Instead, the Board preferred 
to follow the policy recommendations of the Executive Board or the MOF. As a result, 
the BOJ’s Policy Board was frequently referred to as the “sleeping board” (nemureru 
iinkai159 or kyûmin iinkai) or “silent board” (van Rixtel 2002; Fujii 2004: 16-17; Fujiki 
2004: 53; Kamikawa 2006: 132-133; Kawakita 1995: 47-50; Arita 2007: 16; Iwata 
2009: 26; Yamawaki 2002: 60-66; 75-78; Fujiwara 2003).160 161 Fujiwara, one Deputy 
Governor of the new BOJ, called the meetings of the Policy Board “a ceremonial 
occasion” and a “joke” (Interview, Business Week, 12 June 2000).  
    
                                                 
158 Except for obvious reasons such as physical or mental incapacity Board members could not be 
dismissed (Nakao and Horii 1991: 27-28). In exception, the MOF in agreement with the Cabinet 
dismissed Governor Yûki Toyotarô in 1944 (Henning 1994: 73-74). 
159 Iwata (2009: 26) argues that the term “nemureru iinkai” came from the fact that the Board did not 
include any monetary experts, for instance, from the BOJ`s Planning Department. 
160 For a more detailed analysis of the origin and working of the Policy Board, see Yamawaki 2002, 
Chapter 2. 
161 However, Kamikawa (2006: 133) argues that this practice “enhanced rather than undermined the 
independence of the Bank of Japan that the executive board of directors which was composed of the 
officials of the Bank but one Finance Ministry official who was transferred temporarily had the real 
power.” 
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5.2.1.3 The Executive Board 
Within the BOJ, the most important monetary policy decisions were discussed and 
decided by the Executive Board in the so-called round table meetings (marutaku). 
(Iwata 1994: 148; Yamawaki 2002: 65).162  Toya (2006: 127) states that the BOJ’s 
monetary policy decisions were made de facto by the Executive Board in consultation 
with the MOF. The MOF’s strong influence on monetary policy decision-making was 
an issue of strong criticism (e.g. Mabuchi 1997). The Executive Committee met on 
every business day except Wednesdays. The frequent meetings were a useful measure to 
build up consensus on monetary policy decisions, for instance discount rate changes, 
call money rate, and targets for monetary growth (Kawakita 1995: 34-53; Yamawaki 
2002: 76).  
 
The Executive Board consisted of the Governor, Deputy Governor and seven BOJ 
Executive Directors. The BOJ executives consisted of the Senior Deputy Governor (five 
year term), the Deputy Governor for International Relations (four year term), and the 
incumbent Executive Directors of the Bank (four year term). Traditionally, one 
Executive Director of the BOJ was a former MOF bureaucrat (amakudari). However, 
the MOF-affiliated Executive Director never had direct responsibility over any 
monetary policy-making department. 163  The Senior Deputy was appointed by the 
Cabinet and the Deputy Governor for International Relations and the Executive 
Directors were appointed by the Finance Minister based on recommendations made by 
the BOJ. The appointment of Executive Directors was not subject to the approval of the 
Diet (Iwata 1994: 148; Kawakita 1995: 34; Miller 1996: 7; Nakao and Horii 1991: 27-
28; Suzuki 1992: 167; Yamawaki 2002: 76).    
 
5.2.1.4 The Responsibilities of the Bank of the Japan 
The BOJ was provided with the power to carry out a high extent of central bank 
operations, for instance, it was able to set the official discount rate (Article 20 and 21) 
and the reserve requirements. Furthermore, the law ensured the Bank full discretion 
over open-market operations. However, in reality, changes of the discount rate or the 
reserve requirements needed the approval of the Finance Minister. Iwata (1994: 150) 
                                                 
162 The formal notation of the Executive Board is yakuin shûkai meaning “executive director’s meeting”.  
163 Henning (1994: 73, note 27) observes that the MOF-based executive director’s responsibility has been 
traditionally restricted to government bond auctions and related subjects.  
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considers decisions over the change of the discount rate as “too politicized” between the 
BOJ, MOF, Prime Ministers and party leaders of the LDP. To be precise, the 
responsibilities of the Bank of Japan were fundamentally limited by wide-ranging 
powers and control mechanisms of the government and MOF. The BJL of 1942 had no 
clear clause regarding bank supervision and on-site examinations of private banks. 
Article 1 of the Bank of Japan Law requested the BOJ maintain a safe and sound 
financial system, and, as a consequence, the BOJ should have responsibilities to provide 
payment services, to monitor and supervise private financial institutions and to serve as 
a lender of the last resort. In reality, however, although both the MOF and the BOJ 
supervised private banks, the BOJ only signed contracts with banks which opened an 
account at the central bank (van Rixtel 2002: 132-133).  
 
5.2.1.5 The Accountability and Transparency of the Bank of Japan 
On the basis of the 1942 Law, the BOJ clearly lacked significant requirements for 
accountability and transparency. The sole obligation that had some references to a 
central bank’s accountability is Article 41, which claimed that the BOJ “shall make 
public a statement of the general condition of the operation of the Bank for each 
business period in accordance with the prescriptions of the competent minister”. This 
clause is a requirement to provide information, such as statistics and special reports 
about the Bank’s operations, and an annual report.  
 
5.2.1.6 The Relationship with the Government 
Regarding the financing of the government,164 the Bank of Japan Law of 1942 sets no 
limit on the extension of credit to the government. Rather, the Bank is obliged to supply 
uncollateralized loans to the government on request (Article 22 and 23), and to 
“undertake such businesses as are necessary for the maintenance and fostering of the 
credit system” (Article 25). On the other hand, the Finance Law of 1947 does not permit 
the BOJ to underwrite government bonds and extend loans to the government with a 
maturity higher than one year, unless these bonds are issued to refinance maturing debt. 
In this case, the Diet must authorize the required amount.165 In addition, the BOJ may 
                                                 
164 Certain scholars consider central banks as ‘semi-governmental’ organisations. However, according to 
van Rixtel (2002: 178, note 5), the BOJ is not a government organisation.  
165 In practice, during the period of 1973 and 1988 the government suffered relatively high budget deficits 
and the BOJ extended its operations and bought government bonds to refinance government debt 
(Henning 1994: 74-75). 
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supply credit in form of underwriting bills for short-term government finance (Henning 
1994: 74-75). However, aside from financing the government the Bank of Japan Law 
provided the government with other wide-ranging powers over the BOJ, but also 
general control rights (Article 42), government authorization rights (Articles 31 and 39), 
business instruction rights (Article 43 and 45), the authority to dismiss the Governor 
(Article 47) (Nakakita 2001: 49).  
 
The Relationship between the BOJ and MOF 
The Ministry of Finance was provided with wide-ranging powers over most important 
subjects of the Japanese economy. Taxes were controlled by the National Tax Agency 
(Kokuzei chô), an affiliated agency of the MOF, the government budget via the MOF’s 
budget bureau, foreign exchange intervention and international capital flow via the 
international finance bureau, government bond issue through the finance bureau, and the 
banking sector via the banking bureau. In all its responsibilities and powers, the MOF 
was highly connected with the political world. Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (1997: 190) 
stress the close interaction of Japanese bureaucracy with politics also in regard of 
monetary policy:  
“The Ministry of Finance and the LDP (until 1993, at least) had generally 
assumed responsibility for monetary policy and its inflationary 
consequences. The government agencies, viewed in their entirety, took 
responsibility for economic policy, and the government agencies were 
closely identified with the LDP.”  
 
This means that the Ministry of Finance had wide-ranging power over the Bank of 
Japan. Legally, the Bank of Japan Law of 1942 left the Bank under the direct control of 
the MOF in nearly every essential matter. Good examples are Article 42 which states 
that the Ministry had supervisory power over the Bank or Article 43 which states that 
the MOF could order “[…] the Bank to undertake any necessary business, or order 
alternatives in the By-Laws as well as other necessary actions”. In addition, the MOF 
had “major oversight responsibility of BOJ operations and staffing”. For instance, the 
MOF’s permission was necessary if the Bank planned to establish branches, additional 
officers, or secure agents (Article 44). The Bank’s main officials, the Governor, Vice 
Governor, Executive Directors, Auditors, and Advisors “were either appointed by, or 
subject to approval by the Minister [of Finance]” (Article 16). The amount of bank note 
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issue was decided by the Cabinet, and note issues in excess of this amount had to be 
approved by the MOF (Article 30 and 31) (Henning 1994: 75; Miller 1996).  
 
Furthermore, the Finance Minister’s power over Bank of Japan operations was 
broadened to the private sector. The Minister “[…] whenever deemed necessary […] 
[could] order banks or other financial institutions to cooperate in the execution of the 
business of the Bank of Japan” (Article 28). The approval of the Finance Minister was 
necessary for almost all important operations of the BOJ (Kawakita 1995: 64-67). In 
general, regarding central bank independence, the “old” Bank of Japan can be 
considered as one of the most dependent central banks in the world (see, Section 
5.4.3.1). The Ministry had the power to issue directives to conduct or to refrain from 
certain policy measures, to dismiss members of the Policy and the Executive Board, to 
force the Bank to lend money to the government, and to deny the Bank’s budget 
requests. To sum up, the Bank of Japan Law of 1942 did not contain any clauses 
concerning the Bank’s actual independency. Instead, the legal status limited the BOJ’s 
role to an agent of the Ministry of Finance. 
 
5.2.1.7 Foreign Exchange Rate Interventions 
The Finance Minister was empowered in deciding Japan’s exchange rate policy. The 
Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account Law of 1951 provided the legal framework for 
foreign exchange rate interventions. The Foreign Exchange Funds Special Account 
(FEFSA) issues short-term securities to gain Yen funds in order to finance foreign 
exchange capital; these Yen funds are purchased by the Bank of Japan or other 
governmental organisations (OECD 1972: 24). Articles 1, 5, and 6 of the BJL of 1942 
provided the Finance Minister with the power to direct the BOJ in purchasing and 
selling foreign exchange. The budget of the special account was arranged by the Cabinet 
and needed the approval of the Diet. However, the Bank could independently conduct 
open market operations, and, therefore, had the power to sterilize foreign exchange 
interventions on domestic money markets (Henning 1994: 80-82). In the following 
section, the focus will shift to the new Bank of Japan Law and anlyse the Bank of 
Japan’s independence in detail.  
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5.2.2 The Bank of Japan Law of 1998 
This section examines the most important subjects of the newly revised Bank of Japan 
Law from 1998.166 The Bank of Japan Act (Act No. 89) is structured in ten chapters: 
 
Chapter I: General Provisions (Article 1-13) 
Chapter II: The Policy Board (Article 14-20) 
Chapter III: Executives and Staff (Article 21-32) 
Chapter IV: Business (Article 33-45) 
Chapter V: Bank of Japan Notes (Article 46-49) 
Chapter VI: Accounting (Article 50-53) 
Chapter VII: Reporting to the Diet (Article 54-55) 
Chapter VIII: Rectification of Illegal Actions (Article 56-58) 
Chapter IX: Miscellaneous Provisions (Article 59-62) 
Chapter X: Penal Provisions (Article 63-66) 
 
Based on the Bank of Japan Act, this section will discuss the most important aspects of 
the new BJL regarding central bank independence.  
 
5.2.2.1 The Bank of Japan’s Objectives 
The new BOJ Law provides the BOJ with two operating principles in implementing 
currency and monetary control. First, there is the “pursuit of price stability” (bukka no 
antei) which aims to contribute “to the sound development of the national economy” 
(kokumin keizai no kenzen na hatten ni shi suru) (Article 2). The second goal is the 
“maintenance of an orderly financial system” (shikin kessai no enkatsu…shinyô chitsujo 
no iji) (Article 1, Paragraph 2).  
 
5.2.2.2 The Policy Board 
The 1998 Bank of Japan Law revision confirmed the position of the Policy Board as 
supreme decision-making body (saikô ishi kettei kikan), which sets the fundamental 
direction of monetary policy operations, whereas the Executive Board, which had the de 
                                                 
166 In some cases it will be referred to the old law. However, an explicit comparison between the pre-1998 
and new law will not be conducted. For a detailed comparison, see, i.e., Tatewaki 1998: 77-118).  
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facto power over monetary policy, was abolished.167 The Policy Board’s powers relating 
to currency and monetary control are formulated in Article 15 of the BJL. The 
composition of the Board was fundamentally modified in the new law. According to the 
new law, the Board should consist of nine members: the Governor, two Deputy 
Governors168 and six “deliberative members” (Article 16, Paragraph 2). The deliberative 
members should be “experts on the economy or finance”, or have “academic expertise 
or experience” (Article 23, Paragraph 2). All Policy Board members are appointed by 
the Cabinet and need the approval of the Diet, both the Lower and the Upper House. 
The enhanced size of the Policy Board was viewed to guarantee a broader view about 
monetary policy, since they do not represent financial institutions, agriculture, or 
commerce (Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 2000: 102; Ôshima and Ide 2006: 12).  
  
However, two government representatives (the Minister of Finance and the Minister of 
the Economic Planning Agency, respectively their representatives) can attend Board 
meetings (Article 19). Although they have no voting rights in monetary policy decisions, 
they can express views, submit proposals and even request a postponement of a 
monetary policy decision until the next Board meeting (Article 19, Paragraph 2).169 
However, the Bank can reject the request made by the government representatives 
(Article 19, Paragraph 3). Regardless of the rejection provision, the two government 
representatives are a limiting factor for the central bank’s independence.170  
 
In comparison to the 1942 Bank of Japan Law, the government lost its previous formal 
representation in the BOJ’s Monetary Policy Board. However, the former practice of 
filling the Policy Board regularly with former Government officials (see, section 
5.2.1.2) was re-installed with the appointment of Mutô and Iwata in 2003 (see, section 
8.5.2). Yamawaki (2002: 85) argues that the presence of the government has changed. 
                                                 
167 One BOJ executive stated that the power “was given back to the Policy Board from the Executive 
Board” (shikkô bu kara seisaku iinkai ni taisei hôkan sareta) (Nikkei, 8 May 1998). 
168 There were critical voices of the concept of two Deputy Governors (see, e.g. Nakahara 2006: 268-269). 
169 The right to postpone a vote was anchored in other central bank laws as well, for example in the 
Deutsche Bundesbank Law. The government had the right to postpone decisions up to two weeks. 
However, due to requirements for the currency union this article was abandoned in December, 22, 1997 
(Botzenhardt 2001: 49, note 113).  
170 Fujiwara (2003a) illustrates the procedure of a BOJ Monetary Policy Board Meeting and the role of 
the government representatives. They express views of the government and doing requests on behalf of 
the government. The publications of the transcripts (gijiroku) give detailed descriptions of the 
government representatives’ influence (after ten years the BOJ publishes complete transcripts of 
Monetary Policy Board Meetings).  
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Under the old law, the two government members came from a government office 
(yakusho jinji), whereas now one representative is from the MOF and the other from the 
Economic Planning Agency (since 2002 from the Cabinet Office). Table 5-1 
summarizes the main features of the BOJ’s Policy Board, and provides a rough 
comparison with other major central banks.  
 
Table 5-1: Comparison of the Monetary Policy Decision-Making Body of the Old and 
New BOJ with the ECB and the US Federal Reserve   
  BOJ 1942 BOJ 1998 ECB US Federal 
Reserve 
Supreme 
decision 
making body 
Policy Board 
(since 1949) 
Policy Board Governing Council Federal Open Market 
Committee 
Size of voting 
members 
5 9 24 (6 Executive 
Board; 18 NCB 
Governors) 
12 (7 Board of 
Governors + 5 Reserve 
Bank (RB) Presidents 
Highest 
member 
Governor Governor President Chairman  
Term of office Governor 5 
yrs; others 4 
yrs 
All 5 yrs 
(Possibility of 
re-appointment) 
8 yrs (ECB Governor 
and Vice Governor); > 
5 yrs (Central Bank 
Governors) 
4 yrs (Chairman and 
Vice Chairman) 14 yrs 
(Board of Governors); 
5 yrs (RB Presidents) 
Appointment Nomination 
by Cabinet. 
Approval of 
Diet is 
required 
Same 6 members of the 
Executive Board are 
appointed by common 
accord of the Heads of 
State or Govt of the 
euro area countries. 
The Governors of the 
euro area central 
banks are appointed 
according to national 
central bank laws. 
7 members of the 
Board of Governors 
are appointed by the 
President and 
confirmed by the 
Senate (veto  power). 
RB Presidents are 
appointed by the Board 
of Directors, subject to 
final approval by the 
Board of Governors. 
Frequency of 
MPM 
1x month 1-2x  month 1x month 8x year171 
Decision-
making 
process 
Consensus 
(nemawashi)
172 
Majority voting Consensus Majority voting 
Accountability Collective Individual Collective Individual 
Publication of 
minutes 
No Yes (after next 
meeting) 
No Yes (before next 
meeting 
Publication of 
transcripts 
No After 10 yrs No After 5 yrs 
Government 
representatives 
2 (but no 
voting rights) 
2 may attend  President of ECOFIN 
and Commission  
No 
                                                 
171 According to the Federal Act (Section 12 A [a]), “at least four times each year”. However, it is 
common practice to meet eight times each year.  
172 The decision-making process about monetary policy was characterized by a special consensus-building 
process (nemawashi). Miller (1996) describes this Japanese-style decision-making process with a so-
called preclearance system. 
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Sources: Bank of Japan 2004; European Central Bank 2004; Homepages of the central 
banks. 
 
 
5.2.2.3 The Responsibilities of the Bank of Japan 
5.2.2.3.1 Banknote Issuance and Coins 
Like many other central banks in the world, the BOJ is provided with the monopoly to 
issue banknotes (BJL, Articles 1 and 46), which act as legal tender in Japan. According 
to the BJL, Article 46, Paragraph 2, there is no limit given by the government regarding 
the amount of banknote issuance. The BOJ “shall determine the procedures regarding 
printing and cancellation of Bank of Japan notes”, and it is required to “submit these 
procedures to the Minister of Finance for approval” (Article 49).173 In addition, the 
Minister of Finance determines the forms of the notes (Article 47, Paragraph 2) and the 
types of the banknotes are decided upon by Cabinet Order (Article 47). In case of acute 
counterfeiting problems, the Bank may suggest a redesign of the banknotes to the 
Finance Ministry.  
 
Since the revision of the Bank of Japan Law, banknote issuance has not been backed by 
assets. In contrast, the Bank of Japan Law of 1942 “required the Bank to hold prime 
assets equivalent to the amount of banknotes outstanding, and also had a maximum 
issuance limit system, which set the upper limit of the amount of banknotes 
outstanding.” However, these conditions were eliminated by the 1998 Bank of Japan 
Law revision. Two main reasons might be responsible for this. First, in a fiat money 
system the value of banknotes should be stabilised through monetary policy and not 
through a direct connection with the Bank’s amount of assets. Second, the importance 
of the banknote maximum issue system has decreased (Bodea and Huemer 2010: 50-51). 
 
The issuance of coins is under the control of the Ministry of Finance. The “Law 
Concerning the Unit of Currency and the Issuance of Coins” (Clause 2, Section 4) states 
that “the issue of coins is affected by granting produced coins to the Bank of Japan, 
under order of the Minister of Finance.” The BOJ’s task is to put the coins into 
circulation and the publication of monthly data on the amount of coins (Bank of Japan 
2002 Policy Planning Office; Bodea and Huemer 2010: 50-51). 
                                                 
173 Banknotes are produced by the National Printing Bureau, which is a government agency.  
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5.2.2.3.2 Special Uncollateralized Loans (Lender of the Last Resort) 
The 1942 BOJ Law stated that the Ministry may compel the BOJ to supply loans to any 
sector of the government (Article 25).174 This clause was not completely revised, but 
Article 38 of the new law specifies this issue, claiming that “The Minister of Finance 
may request the Bank of Japan to conduct the business necessary to maintain the orderly 
financial system, including provision of loans…” (Italics added). This Article gives the 
impression that the Bank has the power to reject the Minister’s request. Although the 
proposal for interventions in order to maintain an orderly financial system can be 
initiated by either the Bank of Japan or the Minister of Finance, the BOJ may conduct 
operations or not, and, thus, has the responsibility to function as the lender of the last 
resort.  
 
5.2.2.3.3 Supervision, Regulation and Financial Stability: Prudential Policy – On-
Site Examination 
The government maintained a dominant position regarding the supervision of the 
banking industry. Articles 38 and 39 and to a somewhat lesser extent Article 37 clearly 
show the strong position of the government.175 The prudential policy of the Bank of 
Japan is limited to the inspection and supervision and the lender of the last resort 
function (emergency liquidity injections) (Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 2000: 105; van 
Rixtel 2002: 211-212). The Bank of Japan’s examinations “are not a separate or 
independent task, but a direct consequence of other tasks, in particular to conduct or 
prepare the provisions of temporary loans (Article 37), to implement business 
contributing to the maintenance of an orderly financial system (Article 38), and to 
conduct business contributing to the smooth settlement of funds (Article 39).”  
 
In sum, the BOJ shares responsibilities concerning both macro-financial stability and 
micro-prudential supervision. However, this is restricted to financial institutions that 
have an account at the Bank. Furthermore, according to the obligation to maintain an 
orderly financial system (Article 1 and 2), the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Finance may request the Bank to conduct business, including provision of 
                                                 
174 The MOF exercised this right, for instance, in 1965 when Yamaichi Securities Company was provided 
with BOJ loans (Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 2000: 104).  
175 It is worth mentioning that this is totally in line with the recommendations made by the Central Bank 
Study Group in November 1996 (see, Chapter 3).  
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uncollateralized loans (Article 38). “Such government requests may cover financial 
institutions with insolvency (and not just liquidity) issues and imply a government 
guarantee that the BOJ will recover the loans.” The BOJ may also provide 
uncollateralized loans to financial institutions on its own account in case of unexpected 
experiences of temporary shortages of funds for payment due to accidental causes 
(Article 37). Again, the requirement to inform both the Minister of Finance and the 
Commissioner of the FSA without delay prevails.  
 
In contrast to the 1942 Bank of Japan Law, the new law legitimises the BOJ to carry out 
bank supervision through on-site examinations (kôsa) on the basis of its responsibility 
to maintain financial stability (as part of the lender of the last resort function). This 
authority is limited to those institutions the Bank is currently providing loans to, or 
expected to provide loans to in the future (Article 44). The BOJ’s role in micro-financial 
supervision is indicated in the on-site examinations of financial institutions (Article 44). 
“In particular, the Bank conducts a risk-based examination aimed at ensuring that 
counterparties are sound. Examinations are carried out on a contractual basis for those 
financial institutions which have accounts at the Bank, and use the RTGS system” 
(Real-time gross settlement). Concerning micro-financial supervision, the BOJ shares 
responsibility with the FSA and upon request, the Bank may submit the results to the 
Commissioner of the FSA (Article 44, Paragraph 3). The FSA and the MOF exert some 
influence with respect to policy planning and legislative and policy proposals (Bank of 
Japan 2004: 38-39; Bodea and Huemer 2010: 50). It can be argued that through the 
interaction between the Bank and the Financial Services Agency (FSA) governmental 
influence is implemented in the BJL. That is, according to the Bank of Japan Law, the 
BOJ is requested to submit the results of on-site examinations to the Commissioner 
(Article 44, Paragraph 3). In order “to coordinate with the FSA and minimise the 
reporting costs of financial institutions, the BOJ pre-announces at the beginning of each 
fiscal year its schedule for on-site examinations.”176 In addition, “the Bank cooperates 
closely with the FSA by maintaining informal contacts at the top level and expert level, 
as well as exchanging in staff exchanges” (Bodea and Huemer 2010: 50). A document 
of the Bank of Japan states that: 
                                                 
176 Regarding micro-supervision, although there is no formal institutional arrangement between the two 
institutions, “the decade-long financial crisis in Japan has enhanced cooperation” (Bodea and Huemer 
2010: 50). 
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“The Bank of Japan may also conduct other business when necessary, 
conditional upon the authorization of the Minister of Finance and the 
Commissioner of the Financial Services Agency (BOJ Law, Art. 43). 
Note that the Commissioner of the Financial Services Agency has been 
entrusted with the competence by the Prime Minister (BOJ Law, Art. 61-
2). (Bank of Japan 2002c: 2) 
 
On-site examinations are implemented under a contract between the Bank and the 
institution concerned. A clear legal basis for on-site examinations is manifested in the 
BJL Article 44, Paragraph 1. In total, until 2004, the BOJ had examination contracts 
with 565 institutions, including seven city banks, 64 regional banks, 50 regional banks 
II, 71 foreign banks, two long-term credit banks, 27 trust banks, 285 shinkin banks, and 
42 securities companies (Bank of Japan 2004: 38-39 Annual Review). On-site 
Examinations between 2002 and 2011 conducted by the Bank of Japan can be seen in 
Table 5-2.  
 
Table 5-2: On-Site Examinations Conducted by the Bank of Japan between 2002 and 
2011 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total Domestically 
licensed Japanese 
banks 
Shinkin 
banks 
Other (securities companies, 
Japanese branches of foreign 
banks 
2002 115 35 67 13 
2003 140 NA NA NA 
2004 153 46 67 40 
2005 160 42 73 45 
2006 131 43 73 15 
2007 119 39 66 14 
2008 128 52 46 30 
2009 112 46 47 19 
2010 100 38 43 19 
2011 68 26 29 13 
Source: Own compilation based on Bank of Japan Annual Review 2002-2011; For 
Fiscal 2011: Bank of Japan: On-Site Examination Policy for Fiscal 2012, 30 March 
2012. 
 
 
5.2.2.3.4 Payment Systems, Securities Clearing and Settlement Systems 
The BOJ does not only conduct monetary policy, simultaneously the Bank is obliged to 
ensure the smooth settlement of funds among banks and other financial institutions 
(Article 39), in order to fulfil its obligation of “contributing to the maintenance of an 
orderly financial system” (Article 1, Paragraph 2). Upon governmental request, the BOJ 
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may conduct businesses others than the regular business prescribed in Article 33.177 
However, the authorisation from the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance is 
necessary. The BOJ may also provide financial institutions and other financial business 
entities specified by a Cabinet Order with uncollateralized loans (the period is 
prescribed by the Order) (Article 37). This lending activity is required to be reported 
without delay to the Prime and Finance Minister (Article 37, Paragraph 2).  
 
In order to realize the targets in the settlement of funds, the Bank provides an 
assortment of payment and settlement services, such as the provision of means of 
payment (i.e. banknotes and deposits in current accounts held with the Bank),178 and the 
operation of the BOJ-NET (Bank of Japan Financial Network System) Funds transfer 
system.179 In securities settlements, the Bank operates the Japanese Government Bond 
(JGB) Book-Entry System and the JGB Registration System (Bank of Japan 2004: 64-
68; 184-187). Moreover, the BOJ supervises the private payment and settlement 
systems. During the conduction of on-site examinations and off-site monitoring of 
financial institutions, the BOJ also estimates the risks for payment and settlement 
systems. In addition, the Bank cooperates with private sector providers of payment and 
settlement services to establish measures for risk reduction (Bodea and Huemer 2010: 
49-50; Bank of Japan 2004: 55-78). 
 
In the subject of payment and securities settlement, the Bank shares responsibilities with 
the Prime Minister (in charge of regulation and supervision) and, under delegated 
authority, with the Financial Services Agency. The major responsibility of financial 
institution supervision, including their payment and settlement functions lies within the 
FSA. However, the FSA and BOJ exchange information, although there is no formal 
framework for interaction on issues regarding payment and settlement systems. 
 
                                                 
177 The regular business include (i) discounting of commercial bills and other bills and notes (ii) making 
loans against collateral (iii) buying and selling of commercial bills (iv) lending and borrowing of 
government bonds (v) receiving money for deposits (vi) dealing in domestic exchange, and (vii) taking 
custody of negotiable securities (BJL, Article 33).  
178 This measure was particularly important in the period of the quantitative easing policy between 2001 
and 2006.  
179 For details, see Bank of Japan (2004: 47-78). 
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5.2.2.4 The Relationship with the Government 
The relationship between the BOJ and the government was altered fundamentally in the 
new law. The BOJ was granted formal independence, whereas the government and the 
MOF lost a huge amount of their former legal control over the Bank. The main clause 
for the BOJ’s independence is formulated in Article 3, Paragraph 1, which states that 
the “Bank of Japan’s autonomy regarding currency and monetary control shall be 
respected” (nippon ginkô no tsûka oyobi kinyû no chôsetsu ni okeru jishusei ha, sonchô 
sare nakeraba naranai). In addition, the BJL states that “due consideration shall be 
given to the autonomy of the Bank’s business operations” (nippon ginkô no gyômu unei 
ni okeru jishusei ha, jûbun hairyo sare nakereba naranai) (Article 5, Paragraph 2).  
 
Regarding the authority to dismiss BOJ executives, this right of the government has 
been considerably retrenched. In detail, only in drastic cases, such as adjudicated 
bankruptcy, criminal behaviour or the incapacity to fulfil its duties, a removal is 
justified (Article 25). Most of the former authority of the Ministry of Finance over the 
BOJ was diminished. However, the MOF still maintains some power over the Bank. 
The most important aspect is its authority over the BOJ’s budget (Article 51), which 
limits the Bank’s financial independence. In addition, the appointment of the BOJ’s 
Executive Directors and Counsellors are in the hands of the Ministry (Article 23, 
Paragraph 4). 
 
In sum, the BOJ’s independence towards the government is limited. The BJL claims 
that the Bank should maintain close contacts with the government and exchange views 
in a sufficient way in order to guarantee that monetary policy is “harmonious” 
(seigôteki) to the economic policy of the government (Article 4). The obvious 
contradiction of Article 3 and Article 5, Paragraph 2, with Article 4 leads to a high 
potential for conflicts between the Japanese government and the BOJ.180  
  
Government financing 
Regarding financial issues, the Bank of Japan acts as fiscal agent for the government, 
i.e., the Bank of Japan Law claims that the Bank is responsible for Treasury funds 
(Article 35) and national government affairs concerning currency and finance (Article 
                                                 
180 See, analysis in Chapter 8.  
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36). The BOJ conducts the following operations on behalf of the government: treasury 
operations, government bond operations, custodial services for government-held 
securities, and foreign exchange market intervention (Bank of Japan 2002c: 7). The 
Annual Review of the BOJ (Bank of Japan 2004: 62-63) states that 
“The Bank acts as the custodian of securities acquired by or submitted 
(as collateral or deposits) to the government. The Bank receives, delivers, 
and stores such [Treasury funds; Financing bills] securities on behalf of 
the government”  
 
 Regarding financing the government, the BOJ might be requested to provide the 
government with uncollateralized loans, subscribe or underwrite government bonds, and 
subscribe or underwrite financial bills (Article 34). This Article of the BJL is critical to 
central bank independence as it does not indicate whether the BOJ has an independent 
choice to set limits for the purchase of the described financial operations. Rather, the 
law claims that the amount of uncollateralized loans and subscribed or underwritten 
government bonds are subject to a limit set by the Diet. In principle, the Public Finance 
Law (Article 5) prohibits the BOJ from underwriting government bonds and making 
loans to the government. However, this does not apply to “special cases” within the 
amount determined by the Diet resolution (Bank of Japan Law, Article 34, Paragraph 
1).181 In addition, the Public Finance Law (Article 5) prohibits the BOJ to “participate 
directly in the primary market for government securities.” However, there are 
exceptions to this rule. The BJL, Article 34, Paragraph 3, states that the BOJ may 
subscribe or underwrite “government bonds to a limit imposed by a Diet resolution 
prescribed by the exception clause in Article 5 of the Fiscal Law” (Bank of Japan 2002: 
4-5). 
 
The Bank of Japan states that “the government (Ministry of Finance) determines the 
eligibility requirements for participating in bidding on primary issues of government 
securities (government bonds) and other matters related to primary issues (name and 
number, legal basis for each issue, issuing method, and other issuing conditions)” (Bank 
of Japan 2002c: 9). In order to secure a correct procedure of operations between the 
Bank and the government, the BOJ published a paper “Principal Terms and Conditions 
                                                 
181 Article 34, Paragraph 1: “The Bank of Japan may […] making loans, without collateral, subject to a 
limit imposed by a Diet resolution prescribed by the exception clause in Article 5 of the Fiscal Law (Law 
No. 34 of 1947)” [sic].   
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for Transactions with the Government”, which is determined by the Bank’s Policy 
Board (Bank of Japan 2002c: 5).  
 
5.2.2.5 Foreign Exchange Rate Interventions 
Regarding foreign exchange rate interventions, the Bank of Japan Law from 1942 stated 
in a rather unclear way that “[the BOJ] may, whenever deemed necessary, buy or sell 
foreign exchange” (Article 23). The issue was cleared to some extent in the new BOJ 
Law. Now the BOJ is authorised to carry out foreign exchange transactions on its own 
account as an agent of the government, including for the purpose of stabilising the 
exchange rate of the national currency, or as an agent of foreign central banks and 
international institutions, such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (Article 
40).  
 
According to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law (Article 7, Paragraph 3), the 
government has the responsibility for exchange rate policy: “the Minister of Finance 
shall endeavour to stabilize the external value of the Yen through foreign exchange 
trading and other measures”. The BOJ makes use of funds from the Foreign Exchange 
Fund Special Account if it intervenes in the foreign exchange markets on behalf of the 
government.182 Foreign exchange interventions and the accounting of the FEFSA are 
responsibilities of the government. The BOJ acts only as an agent to manage 
government financial operations, and purchases and sells foreign exchange in order to 
stabilize the domestic currency. This separation of responsibilities is lucidly stated in 
legislation (Law Establishing the Ministry of Finance, Art. 4; Foreign Exchange Fund 
Special Account Law, Art 6; Bank of Japan Law Art. 36, 40-2). In case of interventions 
in foreign currency markets, the MOF gives specific instructions to the BOJ. The BOJ 
Forex Division gathers real-time information, and provides this information to the 
Ministry (Figure 5-1). (Bank of Japan 2002c: 2; Bodea and Huemer 2010: 48-49). 
However, this arrangement of FEI has been criticized by some scholars. For instance, 
Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (2000: 104-105) argue that the law lacks clarity in the 
separation of responsibilities between the government and the Bank. 
 
                                                 
182 This fund consists of foreign currency and Yen Funds. Short-term government bills (financial bills) are 
issued by the MOF to gain Yen for the funds which will be used to buy assets denominated in foreign 
currency. As a consequence, the interventions are automatically sterilised (Fatum and Hutchison 2006; 
Bodea and Huemer 2010: 48).  
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Figure 5-1: Foreign Exchange Rate Interventions 
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  Instructions    on market conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own compilation based on Bank of Japan (2004: 156) 
 
 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
As a conclusion for the previous sections about the old and the new Bank of Japan Law, 
Table 5-3 presents a comparative illustration of the Bank of Japan before and after the 
law revision in regards of central bank independence. This table demonstrates that the 
BOJ’s independence has increased a lot.  
 
Table 5-3: Comparison between the Old and the New Bank of Japan Law 
 1942 BOJ Law 1998 BOJ Law  Important characteristics 
of the new BOJ  
Central bank 
objectives 
To promote full 
potential of the 
economy (Art 1 and 
2) 
Pursuit of price stability, and 
contributing to sound development 
of national economy (Art 2) 
Maintenance of an orderly 
financial system (Art 1-2) 
Multiple goals: Price stability 
and support of the national 
economy 
Banknote 
issuance 
Limit set by Diet BOJ has the task to issue 
banknotes (Art 46) 
No limit set for banknote 
issue  
Relationship 
to government  
MOF had authority 
over a wide range of 
businesses (Art 43); 
Cabinet can dismiss 
the Governor and 
Deputy Governor 
(Art 47) 
BOJ’s autonomy shall be respected 
(Art 3 and 5-2); MOF’s authority 
to control business removed. 
Governor cannot be dismissed (Art 
25) 
Higher level of independence 
for the BOJ 
BOJ budget MOF approves 
budget 
MOF approves budget. 
In case of rejection, the MOF must 
give reasons 
Higher level of independence. 
Still, very critical for 
financial independence 
Special loans Description unclear 
(Art 25) 
MOF may request the BOJ to 
conduct business necessary to 
stabilise financial system (Art 38) 
Better explanation of special 
loans 
On-site 
examinations 
No description BOJ may enter into a contract with 
financial institutions regarding on-
site examination (Art 44) 
Better explanation of on-site 
examinations 
Foreign Not mentioned BOJ may buy and sell foreign BOJ has power to intervene. 
Government of Japan 
(Ministry of Finance) 
Bank of Japan 
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Exchange 
Intervention 
exchange on its own account (Art 
40) 
Still, authority over FEI by 
the MOF 
Transparency 
and 
accountability 
Not mentioned  Disclosure and transparency 
implemented (Art 3). Publication 
of minutes (Art 20). Report twice a 
year to the Diet (Art 54) Governor 
to Diet at request (54-3) 
Accountability of BOJ to the 
Diet is enhanced 
Source: Own compilation   
 
 
The previous sections investigated the contents of the new Bank of Japan Law. The 
following section will provide an analysis of the Bank of Japan’s independence, 
including a critical evaluation and examination of the limits of central bank 
independence.  
 
5.3 Central Bank Independence of the Bank of Japan  
5.3.1 Results of the New Bank of Japan Law 
One key result of the previous section is that the new Bank of Japan Law of 1998 
strengthened the central bank’s institutional independence significantly. As argued 
above, Article 3 of the Bank of Japan Law states that the “…Bank of Japan’s autonomy 
regarding currency and monetary control shall be respected…”. Regarding business 
operations, Article 5 claims that “[…] due consideration shall be given to the autonomy 
of the Bank’s business operations”.183 Since the Finance Ministry is cut off from some 
of its former control over the BOJ in the new BJL, the Bank is much more 
institutionally independent than under the institutional framework of the old law. 
According to Itô (2006: 106), the BOJ’s institutional independence is “guaranteed in the 
sense that Governors as well as Policy Board members will not be dismissed unless 
physically or mentally incapacitated.” In addition, since 1998 onwards the BOJ has 
experienced a significant increase in legal independence from the Ministry of Finance. 
In this regard, the BOJ is legally independent as the law provides the Bank with the task 
of price stability (Article 2), and the responsibility to contribute to the maintenance of a 
sound economy (Article 1). The BOJ’s legal status is manifested in Article 6, namely 
                                                 
183 The Bank of Japan Law uses the term “autonomy” (jishusei) rather than “independence” (dokuritsusei), 
a term which is widely used in the literature. The difference between both terms is that “autonomy entails 
operational freedom, while independence indicates a lack of institutional constraints” (Lybek and Morris 
2004: 4, note 2). Kanda Hideki, an observer member of the FSRC subcommittee, demanded to scrutinize 
the two terms in more detail (Yomiuri, 26 February 1997). However, most Japanese sources do also use 
both terms alternately. For further explanations, see Kanegae (1999: 105-106).  
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that “[t]he Bank of Japan shall be a legal person”.184 Cargill (2006) argues that the 
capital structure of the central bank has implications for legal independence. However, 
the institutional device of the BOJ was completed without any meaningful changes to 
the distribution of stock ownership between government and public. Regarding the 
ownership of the Bank of Japan, the government invested 55 per cent of the paid-in 
capital of 100 million Yen, the other 45 per cent were provided by the private sector. In 
other words, the BOJ belongs to the rare and small number of central banks with private 
shareholders. 185  However, private shareholders are not allowed to interfere in the 
management of the BOJ (Kawakita 1995: 12-14). 
 
The term of office for the Bank of Japan’s Governor, the Deputy Governor’s and the 
deliberative members of the Policy Board are five years, and all positions are provided 
with the option of reappointment (Article 24, Paragraph 2).186 The new BJL strengthens 
the personal independence of the BOJ, and a dismissal of Board members through the 
Cabinet or the Finance Minister is only allowed if members are found guilty of serious 
misconduct, or are incapable of performing their duties correctly (Article 25) 
(Bebenroth and Vollmer 2007: 46). The fact that Japan is a parliamentary democracy is 
worthy of mention, i.e., the parliament elects the Prime Minister. As a result, a political 
change is only to be expected in the case of an election of a new parliament. Elections 
of the Lower House, the important chamber of the parliament, only take place every 
four years. As a consequence, the five-year term for Policy Board members is not long 
enough to guarantee political independence against the government. 
 
Fujiwara (1998), member of the FSRC, which was in charge of the BOJ Law revision 
and BOJ Deputy Governor, elucidated what central bank independence means to him. 
An independent central bank is not only independent from politicians (seiji kara no 
dokuritsu) and government (chôkan kara no dokuritsu), but also independent from its 
past (kako kara no dokuritsu), and breaks with former practices such as the decision-
                                                 
184 However, there is no manifestation in the constitution as, for example, in the ECB. Article 108 of the 
EU Treaty claims independence for the central bank.  Negrea and Munteanu (2008: 518) use the same 
argumentation of Article 108 to claim political independence for the ECB.  
185 Other countries are, for example, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Pakistan, South Africa, Switzerland, 
and USA.  
186 However, in 1998, there was an extraordinary exception. Four members were appointed to the Policy 
Board at the same time. To avoid the same situation four years later two members were appointed with a 
four year term (Miki and Nakahara). The other two members were provided with a two and three year 
term respectively and the possibility of a reappointment (Ueda and Shinotsuka). 
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making process and the practice of alternating Governors between the BOJ and the 
MOF. 
 
Some observers argue positively regarding the new Bank of Japan Law. Matsushita, 
Governor from 1994 to 1998, said that BOJ Law revision towards central bank 
independence and transparency was the most significant event in the BOJ’s 115 year 
history (Bank of Japan 1997, press conference 11 June 1997). According to Itô (2006: 
106), the new law “is in every sense a state-of-the-art modern central banking law”. Itô 
values the (single) mandate of price stability (Article 2) and the assurance of 
institutional independence due to the strengthened position of the Bank’s key staff. Also, 
Ôshima and Ide (2006: 11) evaluate the new Bank of Japan Law as an increase in 
central bank independence to a high extent (nichigin no hôteki na dokuritsusei ha 
oohaba ni kyôka sareru). Iwata Kazumasa, BOJ Deputy Governor from 2003 to 2008, 
argued that the BOJ’s de iure independence “has been significantly strengthened”, 
mainly because the Policy Board is independent of interference in decision-making. 
Finance Minister Mitsuzuka stated in an interview that the new Bank of Japan Law 
secures the BOJ’s independence and transparency in a way that meets the international 
standard (Yomiuri, 21 June 1997).  
 
Regardless of the improvements in terms of central bank independence, there are many 
critical voices concerning the BJL revision. Critique of the new Bank of Japan Law was 
stated quite early, namely already during the drafting process. Prominent academics, 
such as Nakakita Toru, Professor of finance at Tôyô University and Okina Yuri, then-
senior researcher at the Japan Research Institute Ltd., were disappointed by the report of 
the Prime Minister’s private advisory panel upon which the current Bank of Japan Law 
is based on. The main point of criticism, for instance from Aizawa Kôetsu, economics 
Professor from Nagasaki University, was that the report failed to stipulate suitable 
methods to guarantee BOJ’s independence and to clear up the relationship to the 
government. Above all, it failed to limit means of governmental interference (Aizawa 
1997; Japan Times, 13 Nov 1996, 7 Feb 1997). Altogether, Miller (1996: 19) judges the 
Committee’s report critically: “[t]he proposal is a masterful exercise in studied 
ambiguity, and it is sufficiently opaque to allow the MOF to continue to exercise 
powers over the Bank’s activities that are quite similar to the powers it now [under the 
Bank of Japan Law of 1942] enjoys.” 
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Similar to the draft of the CBSG (see, Section 3.5.6), the overall result of the new Bank 
of Japan Law revision is vague, and regarding some relevant issues of central bank 
independence disappointing. Murashima (2002: 267-272) states that some parts of the 
new Bank of Japan Law are too abstract and need to provide specific details, especially 
in the regards of the contradictions between Article 3 and 4. Some prominent observers 
argue that the vagueness of the BOJ can be explained in part by cultural aspects (bunka) 
of Japanese society.187 Another aspect is the need for compromise (Moe 1990, 1995). In 
this case, the result of delegation will be weakened, because of an unavoidable 
compromise between different parties. The result of the Bank of Japan Law revision can 
be explained by Moe’s assumption of the necessity of a compromise mechanism 
between the government and the MOF. As shown in Chapter 3, the MOF was highly 
involved in the process of reform, and was able to prevent the development of a central 
bank that was too independent. In addition, many politicians opposed an independent 
central bank, and were only willing to do so in order to survive the next election. As a 
consequence, a revised central bank law that progressed towards some more 
independence, but with many restrictions seemed to be a compromise most decision 
makers could live with.  
 
As a result, several articles of the new law left a lot of room for interpretation. When 
comparing the Bank of Japan Law with central bank laws of other countries, it becomes 
evident that the Bank of Japan Law has legal weaknesses and significant limits in 
regards of its central bank independence. As noted by Tatewaki (1998: 166-167), 
especially Articles 4 and 19 of the new Bank of Japan Law are a sign of “extraordinary 
wide differences” (kairi ha kiwamete ookii) to global standards. Mikitani and 
Kuwayama (1998: 5-8) argue that the designers of the new law tried to impose an 
impractical separation of monetary policy and other responsibilities, e.g., acting as the 
government’s bank, being the banker’s bank and acting as an international monetary 
authority. The law respects independence only when the execution of monetary policy is 
conducted, but not in the case of other functions. Moreover, it explains in detail matters 
that belong to the BOJ and implicitly leaves the rest to the MOF. Another issue that 
imposes some problems is the BOJ’s position under the new constitution. It is rather 
                                                 
187 Interview with former MOF official on 30 October 2009, and banking official on 31 July 2009. 
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ambiguous whether the Bank answers to the Diet, or the Cabinet, or if it is indirectly a 
subordinate organ of the MOF. 
 
To sum up, there is no objection to calling this central bank law revision an imperfect 
reform (Mabuchi 1997: 72). Dwyer (2004) quotes Taketomi (1997) and Suzuki (1997) 
who concluded that the new law granted the BOJ a somewhat lower degree of 
independence and a little higher degree of transparency than the international standard. 
Due to various deficiencies and ambiguities in the new law, it is possible to doubt 
whether the BJL meets the international standard. The next section analyses these 
deficiencies and ambiguities and critically assesses the new Bank of Japan Law in more 
detail.  
 
5.3.2 A Critical Assessment of the New Bank of Japan Law  
Kanegae (1999: iv) questions how the new Bank of Japan Law was implemented in 
such a fast way. The reason might be that the reform was conducted merely by 
politicians. If reform had been accomplished by government bureaucracy, central 
bankers, and academic experts, it would have taken much more time. Indeed, Chapter 4 
of this thesis demonstrated that the process of central bank law revision, from the 
beginning to the promulgation did not take much longer than one year. This may 
explain why the new Bank of Japan Law lacks clarity in many respects. Basically, 
lawmakers and their advisers did not have enough time to think and work out all 
debatable issues in a sufficient way.188 This chapter debates aspects of the new BJL 
which were criticized most by observers. 
 
1.   The BOJ’s Objective 
2. Relationship with the Government  
3. The Right to Postpone BOJ Monetary Policy Decisions  
4. Critique on the BOJ’s Financial Independence  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
188 Needless to say, several clauses that weaken the BOJ’s independence might be implemented 
deliberately due to political reasons.  
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1. The BOJ’s Objective  
General consensus exists that a single goal is preferable over multiple goals for central 
bank independence and the adequate execution of monetary policy. Issing (2012: 57-59) 
argues that the problem of a dual objective for a central bank is that the central bank 
most likely seeks to achieve only one goal at a time, which is problematic from a 
constitutionalist point of view. For example, a clearly formulated and single monetary 
policy goal enables adequate monitoring and promotes the accountability of a central 
bank. Glastra (1997: 324-325) argues that “The announcement of a single goal (or a 
primary goal), rather than several unranked goals, enables authorities and public opinion 
to control [a central bank’s] performance more effectively.” 
 
In the 1990s, the vast majority of economists reached a common agreement that “price 
stability should be the primary objective of monetary policy” (Laurens et al. 2009: 6). 
However, many central bank laws are rather ambiguous regarding supreme goals, or 
“contain various (possibly conflicting) objectives without giving indications as to their 
prioritisation.” Still, a clear objective is very important for every economic actor. For 
example, quoting Goodhart (1993: 4), “it will always be possible for the Governor to 
say: Well, we have lived in a very difficult world, doing everything we can to achieve 
price stability”. In other words, it is always possible to find excuses if the central bank 
is not reaching the policy targets of the principal. Therefore, it is important to formulate 
clear objectives for the central bank.189 The clearer the objective of monetary policy is 
formulated in the statutes, the more independent the central bank is. Various central 
bank independence indices demonstrate this fact. If price stability 190  is the central 
bank’s single goal, the Bank is more autonomous, since the degree of priority given to 
this goal indicates the degree of conservatism imparted by the Bank’s statutes (Arnone 
et al. 2006: 23). 
 
                                                 
189 A notable exception is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand: the Bank’s Governor has to consent with the 
government over the target range of inflation which is clearly defined in the Policy Target Agreement (de 
Haan, Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger 1998: 5). 
190 However, the term of price stability has different interpretations: price level constancy or zero inflation. 
Depending on the definition, the goal of long-run price level constancy provides low uncertainty 
regarding the price level for the long run, but high uncertainty for the short run, respectively vice versa 
for the goal of zero inflation (Fischer 1995). In other words the central bank (for the ECB, de Haan 1997) 
has “some room of manoeuvre” regarding the objectives of monetary policy (de Haan, Amtenbrink and 
Eijffinger 1998: 4).  
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Starting with the central bank’s objective, the Bank of Japan Law fails to specify price 
stability, and takes for granted that the objectives of price stability (Article 2) and the 
objectives of maintaining financial stability (Article 1) do not conflict with one another. 
Kanegae (2007: 3) cites the “Bank of Japan’s Independence Study Group” (nippon 
ginkô no dokuritsu sei ni kan suru kenkyû kai), which claims that the BOJ’s objective 
should focus on price stability. Shiratsuka (2001: 50) acknowledges that the new law 
does not provide a clear definition of the term price stability, and, as a consequence, “a 
consensus has yet to be gained as to how to transform it [price stability] into the practice 
of monetary policy.” Regarding its second objective, Shiratsuka argues that there is no 
trade-off between price stability and output in the long run. Hence, a central bank 
should concentrate on a low and stable inflation rate.  
 
Many academics dispute over the question whether price stability can be considered as 
the supreme goal of Japanese monetary policy. For example, Hasan and Mester (2008) 
and Itô (2009: 64) falsely identify price stability as the single goal of the Bank of Japan. 
The majority of scholars, including Gerdesmeier et al. (2007), Kanegae (1999: 97), 
Yamawaki (2002: 202), Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001), Fujii (2004: 90), and Ôshima 
and Ide (2006), disagree and argue that the BOJ has multiple monetary policy objectives, 
namely price stability and the maintenance of an orderly financial system. Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006: 13) criticise that the Bank of Japan Law does not formulate an explicit 
prioritisation, or a precise definition, or quantification of its objectives (see, also 
Chapter 6). Regardless of a final evaluation, it is indisputable that price stability is 
determined as a clear responsibility of the BOJ, whereas the responsibility for financial 
stability is shared with the government. Bebenroth and Vollmer (2007: 45) argue that 
the new Bank of Japan Law “explicitly claims a harmony between price stability and 
economic development.”  
 
The Bank of Japan interprets its monetary policy objective two-folded. The first 
objective is the pursuit of price stability (bukka no antei), and the second is the 
stabilisation of the financial system (kinyû shisutemu no antei), which is defined by the 
BOJ Law (Bank of Japan 2000; Interview with Shirakawa, 8 April 2010). The BOJ 
itself stated that “The Bank of Japan is called upon to make a positive contribution to 
the sound development of Japan’s economy by pursuing monetary policy aimed at price 
stability, securing a smoothly functioning system of payments and settlements, and 
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contributing to financial system stability.” (Bank of Japan, Annual Review 2003: 65). 
Fujiwara (1998), who was a member of the FSRC, which was in charge of BOJ Law 
revision, also emphasizes the existence of multiple goals of the BOJ Law.  
 
Regarding price stability, in October 2000 the BOJ published a report “On price 
stability” (bukka no antei ni tsuite). The report is not very clear, stating that “price 
stability is a condition that is neither inflation nor deflation” (bukka antei to ha, infure 
demo defure demo nai jôtai). Similarly, the report’s explanation of price stability as “an 
environment where economic agents including households and firms can make 
decisions regarding such economic activity as consumption and investment without 
being concerned about the fluctuation of the general price level” lacks sufficient 
accuracy (Bank of Japan 2000: 3). Naturally, there are some critical voices regarding 
the BOJ’s objectives. Iwata (2008) goes quite far by comparing the goals of the BOJ 
with the US Federal Reserve, arguing that the BOJ follows two goals without clear 
priority: “[t]he dual mandate of sustainable growth under price stability is similar to the 
maximum employment and price stability mandate of the Federal Reserve.”191 Ôshima 
and Ide (2006: 10-11) provide another important interpretation, namely that the BOJ 
Law’s term for price stability (bukka no antei) avoids the broader term of currency 
stability (tsûka kachi no antei), which is related to both price and exchange rate stability. 
This indicates that interventions in foreign exchange markets are still the responsibility 
of the government (see, also discussion in Mabuchi 1997: 79-80).  
 
The different viewpoints about the BOJ’s monetary policy objectives demonstrate that 
the formulation of this important issue is not clearly defined in the new Bank of Japan 
Law. As a result of the imprecise definition of price stability in the new BJL and 
documents of the BOJ, financial markets and BOJ watchers have difficulties to fully 
understand monetary policy decisions made by the BOJ. When studying statements and 
speeches made by Policy Board members regarding price stability and the output gap to 
explain changes in the central bank’s monetary policy, it becomes clear that members 
have different approaches regarding price stability. This problem could be avoided if 
there was a precise definition of price stability.  
                                                 
191 Under the quantitative easing policy between 2001 and 2006, the BOJ followed a primary goal of price 
stability and the exit of deflation.  
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2. Relationship with the Government  
Article 4 of the new law states that the Bank has to “…always keep close contact with 
the government and exchange views sufficiently so that its currency and monetary 
control and the basic stance of the government’s economic policy shall be mutually 
harmonious”. In practice, the exercise of this clause can mean everything and the 
interpretation of this article is wide-ranging. In its most benign interpretation, it could 
mean that only exchanges of views are conducted, whereas other interpretations assume 
concrete policy requests from the government to the BOJ.192 
 
Tatewaki (1998: 85-86) criticises Article 4, specifically pointing out that this Article can 
be interpreted as the central bank’s duty (gimu) to set up direct transmission lines of 
communication with and to provide information to the government. In times of 
disagreement about the suitability of the policy, this arrangement can be harmful, or 
represent a “sacrifice” (gisei) to price stability.193 However, it can be argued that the 
obligation to “maintain close contact with the government” is not restricted to the BOJ, 
but rather a common feature of many central bank laws. The main problem in the 
Japanese case is the phrase “always” (tsune ni) in Article 4. This expression requires, in 
a legal sense, that the Bank has to consult permanently with the government in all cases, 
even in situations in which cooperation between a central bank and the government may 
be harmful. 
 
Another limit of functional independence is Article 38. The Prime Minister and the 
Finance Ministry can force the BOJ to conduct necessary businesses to maintain a stable 
financial system. Although the law uses the wording “may request”, the government has 
enough tools to exert pressure on the Bank of Japan. Article 34 of the BJL is also 
critical for functional independence, for it claims that the BOJ may give loans without 
collaterals to the government subject to a limit imposed by the Diet, finance the 
                                                 
192 During the Law revision Japan’s Prime Minister Hashimoto and Kitawaki from the Shinshinto Party 
hold the viewpoint that the BOJ should maintain close contact with the Diet. The result can be seen in 
Article 4 of the new law, which makes the BOJ an implicit subordinate of the government. The statement 
that the policies of the Bank and government “shall be mutually harmonious” shows a crucial assumption 
that the government has on behalf of the BOJ. The conclusion seems obvious: Policymakers wanted to 
believe that the BOJ would act as cooperatively as always and would easily bow to political pressure 
(Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 136-137). 
193 The author mentions the period of severe inflation after the oil shock and the bubble after the Plaza 
Accord in which directives to the BOJ led to unfavourable results. 
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government’s temporary borrowing and subscribe or underwrite government bonds 
(also subject to a limit by the Diet).  
 
3. The Right to Postpone BOJ Monetary Policy Decisions  
Some academics, such as Ôkina Yuri, criticise the fact that government officials are 
allowed to participate in Monetary Policy Meetings according to Article 19 of the Bank 
of Japan Law (JT, 13 November 1996). Hall (2008: 129) argues that although the 
government representatives are not permitted to vote, their “presence is a constant 
reminder of the contingency of the Bank of Japan’s also quite recent independent 
status.” 194  The law even allows the government representatives to call for a 
postponement of policy decisions. The right to postpone BOJ decisions (Article 19, 
Paragraph 2) is a fundamental constraint of the BOJ’s functional independence.195 
Kanegae (2007: 3) cites the “Bank of Japan’s Independence Study Group”, which states 
that the presence of government representatives in the BOJ’s Policy Board is 
dispensable, and especially the right of postponement contradicts the concept of central 
bank independence.196  
 
4. Critique of the BOJ’s Financial Independence  
Financial independence is an essential prerequisite for an independent central bank. The 
BOJ was granted enhanced financial independence in insignificant budget matters, i.e., 
the Bank could “determine the standards of salaries paid to its executives and staff, 
consistent with the general standards prevailing in society” (Article 31). However, apart 
from that, financial matters of the BOJ lack substantial requirements of independence, 
and, in fact, the Bank of Japan’s financial independence is particularly limited. 
Regarding financing the government, the BOJ might be requested to provide the 
government with uncollateralized loans, and to subscribe or underwrite government 
bonds and financial bills (Article 34). This article is critical to central bank 
independence because it does not indicate whether the BOJ has the independent 
                                                 
194 It has to be noted that according to Bini-Smaghi and Gros’ (2001) accountability index, the 
participation of government representatives increases the central bank’s accountability.  
195Article 19 stipulates that the Minister of Finance and the Minister of economic and fiscal policy have 
the right to attend and express views at Monetary Policy Board Meetings (Paragraph 1) and may request 
the delay of monetary policy decisions (Paragraph 2).  
196 Mabuchi (1997: 309-312) states that Nakanishi from the FRSC subcommittee compared the right to 
postpone a vote to the right of giving orders. In the 6th meeting of the FRSC he demanded a correction of 
the postponement article. Chairman Tachi later said in a press conference that there are no objections in 
the committee regarding this issue.  
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authority to set limits for the purchase of the described financial operations. Moreover, 
certain scholars claim that the right of the MOF to decide over the Bank’s budget 
(Article 51) is simply not an ideal design for an independent central bank. Kanegae 
(2007: 3) cites the “Bank of Japan’s Independence Study Group”, which claims that the 
Policy Board should autonomously decide about its budget. It is sufficient if the 
government is informed and the budget is inspected by the Board of Audit (kaikei kensa 
in). Mikitani and Kuwayama (1998) argue that budget issues in the new BJL are solved 
quite uncommon, because the Bank is required “to prepare a current expenditure budget 
with current expenditures to be determined by a government Cabinet order.” According 
to the Bank of Japan Law, Article 51,197 the BOJ must obtain prior authorization from 
the government (Minister of Finance) for its budgeted expenditure before each business 
year. A serious problem of a budget plan is how to separate monetary and non-monetary 
policy operations (Mikitani and Kuwayama 1998). In case of non-authorisation, the 
Ministry must declare the reasons publicly. The Bank may express its views to the 
Minister of Finance, or, if necessary, announce them publicly. Article 52 claims that the 
Bank must submit financial statements every six months, such as the inventory and 
balance sheet in combination with the Executive Auditors’ opinion to the Minister of 
Finance. After having received his approval the report shall be published.198 
 
The surplus of the Bank’s operations has to be transferred to the Ministry of Finance. 
Ten per cent of the amount is deduced as inflow to the reserve fund, and a dividend is 
paid to shareholders (Bebenroth and Vollmer 2007: 46). The formulation in Article 53 
(Disposal of surplus) hinders financial independence, and endangers the institutional 
setup of the Bank of Japan. The important question what happens if the Bank’s 
operations result in a settlement of losses is not cleared.199 In several countries, such as 
Japan, Finland and Switzerland, financial independence of the central bank has become 
an issue of public interest (Bindseil, Manzanares and Weller 2004: 8; Martinez-Resano 
2004: 7). In fact, the financial status of the BOJ has been the subject of fiery debates in 
recent years, particularly the issue of balance sheet risk as a side effect of the 
                                                 
197 “Every fiscal period, the Bank of Japan shall prepare a budget for general and administrative expenses, 
and submit it to the Minister of Finance for his or her authorization before the business year begins.”  
198 According the IMF (2000: 76), the majority of central banks have to disclosure its financial data 
annually. Exceptions are besides Japan, the central banks of Albania, Angola and Slovakia.  
199 For legal problems of Article 53, see Oritani (2010: 25). 
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quantitative easing policy which was conducted between 2001 and 2006.200 Yamawaki 
(2002: 125-126) observes that BOJ officials did not claim independence over their own 
budget during the BJL revision process, but rather were ready to compromise, agreeing 
that the budget is an issue which requires approval by the Diet. However, an 
independent central bank should be responsible for the management of its own budget, 
and should not be dependent on the Ministry of Finance.  
 
5.3.3 Constitutional Doubts about the Bank of Japan Law  
During the BJL reform process discussions about independent agencies (dokuritsu seifu 
kikan) and doubts about the constitutionality of the Bank of Japan legislation emerged 
(Nakakita 2001: 74-75; Oritani 2010: 20; Ôshima and Ide 2006: 11). Article 65 of the 
Constitution of Japan reserves executive authority to the Cabinet.201 The Bank of Japan 
(2000: 27-28) states that during the revision of the Bank of Japan Law, a discussion 
emerged concerning the independence of the BOJ. Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
(CLB; naikaku hôsei kyoku) issued a statement that the “executive branch of the 
government should have control of the “budgetary authority” and “appointive authority” 
in order to meet the conditions of the Constitution, Article 65. However, according to 
the Bank of Japan, both the Cabinet’s power over the appointment (Article 23) and the 
control over the “budgetary authority” (Article 51) should be questioned.  
 
The different positions suggest that the legal position of the BOJ is ambiguous. 
According to Japan’s Constitution, there are three branches of government: the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The Central Bank Study Group regarded the 
BOJ as part of the executive branch, which, on basis of Article 65 of the Constitution, 
belongs under the direct authority of the Japanese Cabinet. On the contrary, MOF 
officials agreed with the argument that the Bank of Japan is part of the “administrative” 
branch. Hence, the central bank must report to the Cabinet by means of the Ministry of 
Finance. Mikitani and Kuwayama (1998: 19-20) argue that the practical implication of 
the constitutional setting is that the BOJ has to report indirectly to the Diet, a fact that 
might be interpreted as proof that the BOJ is not an independent agency: 
“Whether out of confusion, or based on a new interpretation of the 
Constitution, the practical implication of this is found in the reporting 
                                                 
200 See, detailed analysis in the following chapter. 
201 For a detailed summary of the discussion about Article 65 of the constitution, see Yamawaki 2002, 
chapter 3).  
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provisions of Article 54 of the new law. Entitled “Reporting to the Diet”, 
this section sets down a welcome requirement of accountability by 
requiring the Bank of Japan to report approximately every six months on 
all of the Policy Board’s policy decisions and on operations to carry them 
out. But the law instructs the BOJ to submit its report “to the Diet 
through the Minister of Finance”: It is hard to see what purpose is served 
by making the BOJ report indirectly, other than to underscore that it is 
not an independent agency with responsibility directly to the Cabinet.”  
 
Regarding the issues of appointment and budget, the so-called Study Group on the 
Central Bank from the Perspective of Public Law (kôhôteki kanten kara mita chûô ginkô 
ni tsuite no kenkyûkai) 202  under the chair of Professor Shiono Hiroshi from Tôa 
University (and Professor Emeritus of the Tôkyô University) was established to 
investigate both the issues of “appointive authority” and “budgetary authority”.203 A 
conclusion was reached that the Cabinet Legislation Bureau is mistaken. Regarding 
“appointive authority”, the Study Group stated that “the Cabinet’s control over the 
appointive authority of the Bank of Japan is not a condition for securing 
constitutionality”, and, “considering that the policy and operations of the Bank of Japan 
are entrusted to it by the nation, involvement of the Cabinet and the Diet in the staff 
matters of the Bank of Japan should be perceived from the perspective that the public 
should select the person that bears ultimate responsibility for what they entrust”. 
Regarding “budgetary authority”, the Study Group concluded that “the Cabinet need not 
have budgetary authority over the Bank of Japan in order to prove that the Bank is 
under the authority of the Cabinet subject to the Constitution”. The Study Group 
justified its conclusion, stating that “although the Cabinet Legislation Bureau mentioned 
budgetary authority and appointive authority as a basis for the constitutionality of the 
Bank of Japan Act, if true, then even the Supreme Court can be said to be under control 
of the Cabinet” (Bank of Japan 2000: 27-28; translated by Oritani 2010: 21).  
 
                                                 
202 The group consisted of 4 law experts (respectively, five from January to June 1998). Shiono (2001: 3) 
adds that Bank of Japan staff joined the group meetings too.  
203 Dwyer (2004: 256) notes that MOF officials regarded the politically dependent Bank of England 
(BOE) as a model for the Japanese central bank and lobbied for a high degree of government influence 
over budget issues and the empowerment to intervene in monetary policy issues. The Diet refused many 
of the MOF’s suggestions. However, the MOF was quite successful in influencing the process of central 
bank reform to their favour. Brown (1999: 174) observes that the article that empowered the finance 
minister to control the budget of the Bank of Japan was a success of lobbying MOF officials. 
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5.4 Central Bank Independence Indices 
5.4.1 Introduction   
One principal question underlying the topic of independent central banks is how to 
measure central bank independence. A large body of literature exists about the 
measurement of central bank independence. This section summarizes the most 
important central bank indices. Section 5.4.2 explains why central bank indices are 
problematic and section 5.4.3 draws some conclusions for Japan.  
 
Regarding the central bank’s own assessment of independence, Sterne (2000: 109-112) 
develops a survey and sent it to central banks asking question such as “how would you 
define central bank independence?” Sterne (2000: 110) summarizes his findings as 
follows: 
”Almost all central banks considered instrument independence to be an 
important aspect of independence. By contrast, goal independence tends 
to be important to central banks in particular circumstances […] only 
22% of respondents mentioned the ability to set targets, objectives or 
goals, while 38% defined independence by stressing the importance of 
legal objectives.” 
 
Central bank independence indices can be distinguished into two groups: De iure and de 
facto indices. De iure indices are typically derived from central bank statutes and 
contracts, while de facto indices are usually based on surveys (Freytag 2002: 41). The 
most common methodology is to build an index of central bank independence based on 
an arrangement of institutional and legal aspects (de iure index). Standard proxy 
measures for central bank independence rely on interpreting quantitative measures for 
formal institutional arrangements. There are proxies of almost all aspects of central 
bank independence, including appointment procedure, the Bank’s monetary policy 
decision-making body, and the interaction with the government. Behavioural features 
are considered only by a small number of papers. However, the vast divergence of the 
various indices suggests that there is no standard methodology for analysing und 
building measures of central bank independence.  
 
For instance, in a prominent paper Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) propose a 
complex de facto central bank independence index based on three aspects of actual 
independence. The first aspect is the average turnover rate of Central Bank 
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Governors.204 Second, an index structured using the results of a survey conducted in 
central banks, which focuses on central bank practices. And third, an aggregation of the 
de iure index and the average rate of turnover. The Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 
index was the first central bank independence index which emphasizes the possibility of 
a wide gap between the de iure and the de facto independence of a central bank. The 
formal statute of the central bank affects its real independence, but there also many 
other determinants, such as “informal arrangements or actual practises, the personalities 
of the key staff and the quality of research at the central bank.” (Arnone et al. 2006: 14). 
It is important to consider whether the proxies on independence should have an equal 
weight, or whether important aspects should be given a higher (or lower) factor. The 
majority of literature has followed the way to weight all variables equally in order to 
reduce the potential for arbitrariness. However, there are considerable exceptions, most 
notably, Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992).  
  
5.4.2 Critique of Central Bank Independence Indices 
There are many “obstacles” within the empirical literature of central bank independence, 
“but the most challenging has been the measurement of the independence of monetary 
authorities” (Alesina and Stella 2010: 15). As a result, the application of central bank 
independence measures is controversial and is subject to conceptual and empirical 
problems (Forder 2000). For instance, Laurens et al. (2009: 32) argue that “it is difficult 
to construct a central bank independence measure that is unbiased. In particular, even 
subtle differences in defining a variable, especially within de iure indicators can 
generate large discrepancies in results.”  That means that every indicator is somewhat 
subjective, and only measures a limited division of reality.  
 
Considering the vast amount of literature on this subject, it is no wonder that the term is 
used in different definitions and methodologies (de Haan 1997; Forder 1998, 1999; 
Mangano 1998). Many studies of central bank independence are “quite sloppy” when it 
comes to a clear definition of the term central bank independence (de Haan 1997: 397). 
Due to these difficulties, Forder (1996: 44) rejects central bank independence 
measurement, declaring that “it is quite clear that the reading of statutes is not a measure 
                                                 
204 This measure is problematic as a little turnover rate alone is not evidence enough for an independent 
central bank. It is also conceivable that the Central Bank Governor is just willing to accommodate the 
government requests (de Haan and Kooi 2000), and, therefore, has a long tenure.  
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of independence in the sense required by the theory which suggests that independence is 
useful. The most it might provide is a measure of formal, legal independence. But such 
independence is not economically significant. There is no theory that says it matters 
what the rules say. There is only a theory that says it matters what the behaviour is.” 
According to Cargill (1995: 163), “the basic problem with indices is they ultimately rely 
on a researcher’s interpretation of central bank laws”. James (2010: 14) argues that 
scholars “surprisingly often” find mistakes in central bank measures, especially in 
countries scholars know best. In contrast, in the case of more distant countries, scholars 
are usually more willing to accept the results of the central bank measures. For instance, 
Grilli et al. (1991) overestimate the independence of the French National Bank; Alesina 
(1988) criticises the method of Bade and Parkin (1988) regarding the estimation of the 
Bank of Italy; and Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) argue that the central bank of the 
Netherlands is more independent than evaluated in Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti’s 
index (1992). Due to these inconsistencies, James (2010: 14) concludes that “an 
apparently rigorous scientific exercise becomes very quickly and evidently random and 
arbitrary.” 
 
The main argument of critics concerning central bank independence (e.g. Forder 1996; 
Banaian, Burdekin, Willett 1995, Eijffinger and de Haan 1996, Mangano 1998), is that 
the interpretation of central bank statutes has no meaning when it comes to identifying a 
central bank’s de facto independence, but rather depends on the actual behaviour of the 
main actors. The statute of a central bank might be fundamentally diverse from concrete 
practice (Alpanda and Honig 2010). In other words, de iure independence is insufficient 
to explain the actual behaviour of the central bank and its relationship to the government. 
The history of central banking provides several examples which verify that statutorily 
dependent central banks may act independently and vice versa. 205  For instance, 
Maxfield (1997: 21-22) demonstrates that the actual behaviour of central banks 
illustrates more variations than the central bank law. Rather than to a determined index, 
central bank independence is related to concrete behaviour of players, in particular the 
Central Bank Governor and the Prime Minister. This explains why actual central bank 
                                                 
205 For instance, Mishkin (2004a) argues that the Bank of Canada is legally a dependent central bank, 
because the government has the ultimate responsibility over monetary policy. In practice, however, the 
Bank of Canada acts quite independently. On the contrary, the central bank of Argentina, although legally 
highly independent, is exposed to government pressure. For example, in 2001, the Argentine government 
dismissed the vastly respected central bank president Pedro Pou and replaced him with a president loyal 
to the government. 
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independence differs over time, although the statute of the central bank remains the 
same. However, the vast majority of central bank independence literature concedes that 
well-constructed indices provide a good overview, and may provide a rough idea of 
how central bank independence is institutionalized and interpreted in a certain country. 
In the following section, this thesis aims to identify, to analyse, and to clarify mistakes 
and misconceptions about central bank indices in the application of the Bank of 
Japan.206  
 
5.4.3 The Bank of Japan and Central Bank Independence Indices 
This section presents the results of various central bank independence indices before 
and after the 1998 BOJ Law revision. For reasons of comparison, this section offers the 
data of three other major central banks, namely the German Bundesbank (for the old 
BOJ Law) or ECB (for the new BOJ Law), the US Federal Reserve, and the Bank of 
England. This section provides a summary of the most popular central bank 
independence indexes and their results regarding the Bank of Japan.  
  
5.4.3.1 Evaluation of the Bank of Japan Law of 1942 
As demonstrated in a previous section, under the 1942 BJL the BOJ was highly 
dependent on the government. Most central bank indicators confirm this, and rate the 
BOJ as having a low amount of central bank independence in comparison to other major 
central banks in the developed world. For example, the often-quoted Cukierman, Webb, 
and Neyapti (1992) index ranked the independence of the 1942 BOJ with 0.18 points on 
a scale ranging from 0 to 1, in which zero stands for the lowest degree of independence 
(Table 5-4). This result is on the same level as central banks in, e.g., Pakistan, Morocco, 
or Panama. Another rating was made by the simple Bade and Parkin (1988: 8) index, 
which is based on four proxies for central bank independence. This index rates the BOJ 
with a relatively high degree of central bank independence, namely three points out of 
four, or in normalized values 0.75. That is the same level as the US Federal Reserve. 
Bade and Parkin (1988) mistakenly argue that the Policy Board of the BOJ, under the 
1942 BJL, had extensive powers in regards of deciding the operation of business, fixing 
and changing rates of discount, changing the qualifications of bills to be discounted, 
fixing, changing, and abolishing maximum rates of interest, reserve ratios, and controls 
                                                 
206 For details, however, one has to consult concrete case studies and the application of the central bank 
law in a de iure environment what will be conducted in Chapter 8 of this thesis.  
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over loans. However, the result by Bade and Parkin (1988) is misleading and needs 
correction.   
 
Table 5-4 presents selected central bank independence indices, and compares the results 
for the Bank of Japan with other central banks, namely the German Bundesbank, the US 
Federal Reserve, and the Bank of England. The results demonstrate that the Bundesbank 
is the most independent central bank, followed by the US Federal Reserve. Taking the 
mean value of all seven indices into account, the BOJ has a significant higher result 
than the Bank of England (0.52 versus 0.41). However, omitting the misleading result of 
Bade and Parkin (1988) and Alesina (1988, 1989), the result of the BOJ is comparable 
with the Bank of England.  
 
Table 5-4: Results of Selected Central Bank Independence Indices (before 1998)  
 Japan Germany US  UK 
Bade, Parkin (1988) 0.75 1 0.75 0.5 
Alesina (1988, 1989) 0.75 1 0.75 0.5 
Grilli, Masciandaro, Tabellini  (1991) 0.38 0.81 0.75 0.38 
Burdekin, Willett (1991) 0.33 1 0.67 0.33 
Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti (1992) 0.18 0.69 0.48 0.27 
Alesina, Summers (1993) 0.63 1 0.88 0.5  
Eijffinger, Schaling (1993) 0.6 1 0.6 0.4 
Mean Value  0.52 0.93 0.7 0.41 
Source: Own construction based on the central bank indices 
Note: Numbers are in normalized values 
 
 
One can interpret the different results that emerge in various central bank independence 
indices as evidence that there is not much consensus in economic literature on how to 
measure central bank independence appropriately. In particular, the classification of the 
Bank of Japan is a problem in the existing literature and reveals many contradictions 
(Botzenhardt 2001: 22, 41, 49; Mangano 1998; Acemoglu et al. 2008). For instance, 
veto rights of the government implemented in some central bank laws are difficult to 
measure due to their mainly formal character. Botzenhardt (2001) combines the most 
essential indices and ranks the central banks on a scale between 1 and 10 (Table 5-5).  
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Table 5-5: Rankings in Selected Central Bank Independence Indices (before 1998) 
 BOJ Bundesbank Fed BOE 
Bade, Parkin (1988) 3.5 1.5 3.5 7.5 
Alesina (1988, 1989) 3.5 1.5 3.5 7 
Grilli, Masciandaro, 
Tabellini (1991) 
8.5 1 2.5 8.5 
Burdekin, Willett (1991) 7 1.5 3 7 
de Haan, Sturm (1992) 8.5 1 2 6 
Cukierman (1992) 10 2 3 6 
Eijffinger, Schaling (1993) 4 1.5 4.5 8 
Alesina, Summers (1993) 5 1.5 3 8 
Fratianni, Huang (1994) 8 1 3 4.5 
Medium 6.5 1.39 3.11 6.94 
Standard deviation 2.29 0.31 0.66 1.19 
Difference max-min 6.50 1.00 2.50 4.00 
Source: Based on Botzenhardt (2001: 78) 
 
 
Table 5-5 demonstrates great divergences between various indices for the Bank of Japan 
and compares them with other central banks. A difference of 6.50 points between the 
highest and lowest index, which is the highest value of all samples, demonstrates the 
heterogeneity of various indices. In relative numbers the indices demonstrate a 
difference of 64 per cent for the BOJ.207 Mangano (1998) argues that the independence 
of the Bank of Japan is one of the most controversial. For instance, two of the most 
prominent central bank independence indices, the Grilli, Masciandaro Tabellini index 
(1991) and the Cukierman (1992) index208 have an average difference of nearly 50 per 
cent in their assessment of the Bank of Japan.209 
 
5.4.3.2 Evaluations of the Bank of Japan Law of 1998  
This section analyses central bank independence indices regarding the “new” Bank of 
Japan. One essential form of index is the Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti index (1992). 
Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (2000) employed this index to examine to which extent the 
legal independence of the BOJ improved after the BJL revision. The value of 0.39 for 
the new BOJ demonstrates that the central bank’s independence had enhanced 
                                                 
207 In the whole sample, only the central bank of Canada has with the value with 70 per cent a higher 
result. 
208 This index is similar to Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992).  
209 Other central banks that have a high spread are from Denmark, France and Greece.  
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fundamentally in comparison to the prior value of 0.18 before the BJL revision. Table 
5-6 provides a detailed list of the updated index. In comparative rankings, the BOJ’s 
independence improved its rank to the middle range (see, Appendix A for the 
construction and coding of Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti central bank independence 
index). 
 
Table 5-6:  The Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) Index – Comparison between 
the Old and New BOJ 
 Factor Old 
BOJ 
New 
BOJ 
Score 
old BOJ 
Score new 
BOJ 
Component       
1. Governor/CEO (Weight in overall 
index = 20%) 
a. Lengths of term in office 
b. Who appoints the CEO? 
c. Provisions for dismissal 
d. May CEO hold other offices? 
 
 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
 
 
0.5 
0.25 
0.83210 
0.5 
 
 
0.5 
0.75 
0.83 
1 
 
 
0.025 
0.0125 
0.0415 
0.025 
 
 
0.025 
0.0375 
0.0415 
0.05 
Subtotal 0.2   0.104 0.154 
2. Policy formulations (Weight in 
overall index = 15%) 
a. Who formulates monetary policy? 
b. Who has final word in resolution of 
conflict? 
c. Role in government budgetary process 
 
 
0.05 
0.05 
 
0.05 
 
 
0.67 
0 
 
0 
 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0.0335 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0.05 
0.05 
 
0 
Subtotal 2 0.15   0.0335 0.1 
3. Policy objective (Weight in overall 
index = 15%) 
a. central bank objectives 
 
 
0.15 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.6 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.09 
Subtotal 3 0.15   0 0.09 
4. Lending to government (Weight in 
overall index = 50%) 
a. Limitations on advances 
(nonsecuritized lending)  
b. Limitations on securitized lending 
c. Who decides control of terms of 
lending? 
d. Maturity of loans 
e. Restriction on interest rates on loans 
f. Prohibition on lending in primary 
market 
 
 
 
0.18 
0.12 
 
0.12 
0.03 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
 
 
0 
0 
 
0.33 
0 
0.25 
 
0 
 
 
 
0 
0 
 
0.33 
0 
0.25 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.033 
 
0.006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.033 
 
0.006 
Subtotal 4 0.5   0.039 0.039 
Total 1+2+3+4 1   0.18211 0.39 
Source: Based on Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (2000: 109) 
                                                 
210 This evaluation is wrong by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti. A value of 0.33 is more appropriate. 
211 With the corrected data from 1c the overall value is even lower (0.16).  
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Table 5-7 provides an updated version of Table 5-4, and views the results of the seven 
central bank independence indices for the Bank of Japan after the central bank Law 
revision. The BOJ scores higher in almost all central bank independence indices. 
Exceptions are the indices by Bade and Parkin (1988) and Alesina (1988, 1989). The 
reason behind this is that the structure of this index is very simple and the estimation in 
the original study was not correct. The mean value of all seven central bank 
independence indices increased from 0.52 to 0.68.  
 
Table 5-7: Results of Selected Central Bank Independence Indices (before and after 
the BOJ Law Revision) 
 BOJ 1942 BOJ 1998 
Bade, Parkin (1988) 0.75 0.75 
Alesina (1988, 1989) 0.75 0.75 
Grilli, Masciandaro, Tabellini  (1991) 0.38 0.63 
Burdekin, Willett (1991) 0.33 0.67 
Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti (1992) 0.18 0.39 
Alesina, Summers (1993) 0.63 0.75 
Eijffinger, Schaling (1993) 0.6 0.8 
Mean Value 0.52 0.68 
Source: Own calculation based on the central bank indices 
Note: Numbers are in normalized values 
 
 
Besides these “traditional” central bank independence indices, the issue is still discussed 
in the academic literature. Petursson (2000), who employ the index of Fry et al. (2000), 
ranks the independence of the new BOJ higher than the indices of Table 5-7, giving 9.3 
points out of 10. This value is equivalent to that of the ECB (9.3), marginally higher 
than the Fed (9.2), and considerably higher than that of the BOE (7.7). According to 
Petursson’s evaluation, the BOJ is almost completely goal and instrument independent. 
Another study was completed by Alpanda and Honig (2010). They establish a new de 
facto ranking of central bank independence based on the degree to which monetary 
policy is significantly more expansionary before elections. They rank central bank 
independence according to election-induced and within-country differences in money 
growth rates. In the 115 cross-country analysis, the BOJ comes in place 35. The 
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following section focuses on a recent study by Laurens et al. (2009), and critically 
assesses their evaluation of the Bank of Japan.  
 
5.4.3.3 The Laurens et al. (2009) Central Bank Independence Index 
A recent study by Laurens et al. (2009) constructs an index of central bank 
independence by combining the methodologies of two concepts: the GMT (1991) and 
the Cukierman (1992) index. This index is divided into political and economic 
independence. Political independence consists of three aspects: the appointment 
procedure, the relationship with the government and with constituting laws. Economic 
independence consists of financing public debt and monetary instruments. The data is 
from 2003, i.e., the result of the BOJ can be compared to the Bank of Japan Law 
revision ex ante and ex post (Table 5-8).  
 
Laurens et al. (2009: 41) indicate that the BOJ has only little political independence 
(0.13 points on a scale from 0 to 1), the lowest of all samples. In terms of economic 
independence, the new Bank of Japan scores 0.75 points. In addition, they analyse 
whether central bank independence has improved over time (end 1980s in comparison 
to 2003). The result is disenchanting for the BOJ, political independence did not 
improve at all, and economic independence only marginally. More precisely, according 
to this analysis, central bank reform in Japan was not successful regarding the Bank’s 
political independence and had only little impact on economic independence.  
 
Table 5-8 summarizes the results for the BOJ, ECB, US Federal Reserve and BOE. This 
thesis finds that, regarding the Bank of Japan, there are considerable inaccuracies in the 
IMF study. Laurens et al. (2009) find that the political independence has not improved 
after the BJL revision in 1998. However, this assessment is not correct. This thesis 
provides a “correction” and explanation of the Bank of Japan based on the analysis in 
Section 4-1. Regarding point 5, the involvement of the government in the Monetary 
Policy Board, it is unclear why Laurens et al. (2009) give one point to the BOE, but not 
to the BOJ. Admittedly, this point is very difficult. In fact, until now, the Japanese 
government has sent representatives to all Policy Board meetings. However, this index 
assesses the de iure independence of central banks. The Bank of Japan Law, Article 19, 
Paragraph 1, states that government representatives “may, when necessary attend and 
express views” at Monetary Policy Meetings (hitsuyô ni ôji, […] kaigi ni shusseki shite). 
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That is, an appearance at Monetary Policy Meeting is not mandatory by law. 
Accordingly, the Bank of England scores one point here, because Section 13-13 of the 
Bank of England Act 1998 states that “A representative of the Treasury may attend, and 
speak at, any meeting of the Committee.” Concerning the ECB, the president of the 
ECOFIN and commission are present (Bini-Smaghi Gros 2001: 154). As a result, the 
BOJ scores one point here and Laurens et al.’s (2009) evaluation is inaccurate.  
 
Regarding point 6 of the index, the approval by the government, the Laurens et al. 
(2009) index gives no point for the BOJ, which is dubious. Although the Japanese 
government has the right to request a postponement, this request can be overruled by the 
Policy Board. As a result, the BOJ should receive a point here. Regarding point 8, legal 
protection of the central bank, the Bank of Japan Law, Article 3, states that the “Bank of 
Japan’s autonomy regarding currency and monetary control shall be respected.” Thus, 
again, the BOJ should receive a point here. Altogether, the BOJ scores four points, a 
value which is somewhat less than that of the US Federal Reserve, but higher than that 
scored by the Bank of England.  
 
The second aspect of the index is economic independence. The BOJ has improved its 
economic independence to one point to overall six points. However, the BOJ scores 
lower in comparison to the ECB, US Federal Reserve, and BOE. This is due to aspects 2 
and 5 of the index. Regarding providing credit to the government, there is no clause in 
the BJL, which defines the interest rate for the credit. Regarding the purchase of 
government securities, the BOJ can be forced to subscribe or underwrite government 
securities to a limit imposed by the Diet (Article 34). Both aspects limit the BOJ’s 
economic independence. Here, Laurens et al.’s (2009) evaluation of the BOJ is correct.  
 
Table 5-8: The Laurens et al. (2009) Central Bank Independence Index 
 New 
BOJ  
New 
BOJ* 
Old 
BOJ   
ECB Fed BOE 
Political Independence       
1. Appointment        
1. Governor appointed without  government 
involvement 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
2. Governor’s tenure higher than 5 years 0 0 0 1 0 0 
3. Policy Board members appointed without 
government involvement 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
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4. Policy Board members appointed for more 
than five years 
0 0 0 1 1 0 
2. Relationship with the Government       
5. Mandatory involvement of government in 
the Policy Board (yes=0; no=1) 
0 1 0 1 1 1 
6. Government approval is required in 
formulating monetary policy (yes=0; no=1) 
0 1 0 1 1 0 
3. Constituting Laws       
7. Legal obligation to pursue price stability as 
one of primary objectives 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
8. Legal protection for central bank in case of 
conflict with government (yes=1; no=0) 
0 1 0 1 1 1 
Score (1)  1 4 1 8 5 3 
Normalized value 0.13 0.5 0.13 1 0.63 0.38 
  
Economic Independence       
1. Financing of Public Deficits       
1. No automatic procedure for govt. to get 
credit from the central bank 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
2. Credit at market interest rate 0 0 0 1 1 1 
3. Credit is temporary 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4. Credit limited amount 1 1 0 1 1 1 
5. Purchase of government securities in the 
primary market (yes=0; no=1) 
0 0 1 1 1 1 
2. Monetary Instruments       
6. Central bank is responsible for setting 
policy rate 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
7. Monitoring of the banking sector (no 
responsibility = 2 points; shared responsibility 
= 1 point) 
2 2 1 2 1 2 
Score (2) 6 6 5 8 7 8 
Normalized value 0.75 0.75 0.63 1 0.88 1 
Overall score (1+2) 7 10 6 16 12 11 
Normalized value 0.44 0.63 0.38 1 0.75 0.69 
Source: Based on Laurens et al. (2009) 
Note: * own calculation 
 
 
Aggregating political and economic independence, the BOJ scores ten points, or in 
normalized values 0.63, which is substantially higher than before the BJL revision. In 
comparison to other major central banks, the BOJ’s independence is still lower.    
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The Bank of Japan Law revision of 1998 has improved the BOJ’s legal independence 
significantly, and the authority of the government over the Bank was weakened in 
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comparison to the old BJL. However, although improvements regarding central bank 
independence have been implemented, the principal finding of this chapter is that the 
overall result of the new law is insufficient. Indeed, many articles of the Bank of Japan 
Law are deficient in unambiguous formulations in both the Japanese and English 
version. More precisely, many articles, especially Articles 4 (relationship with the 
government) and 19 (attendance of government representatives) do not fulfil the 
international standard and might be an obstruction to the conduct of independent 
monetary policies (see analysis in the de facto chapter). In addition, regarding a central 
bank’s financial independence the Bank of Japan is far behind other major central banks.  
 
The result of the BOJ Law revision can be seen in major central bank indices, in which 
the value of the BOJ has increased, for example in the Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 
index (1992). However, the section concerning central bank independence measurement 
demonstrated that the BOJ is difficult to evaluate and the results of various central bank 
independence indices vary extensively. Some deficiencies of the Bank of Japan Law, 
such as the financial dependency on the Finance Ministry (Article 51), are not covered 
by most central bank independence indices. A current study by Laurens et al. (2009) 
reveals significant inaccuracies in the evaluation of the BOJ’s political independence. 
The independence index has been updated and corrected in this chapter.  
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6. CENTRAL BANK ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
6.1 Introduction 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, a broad consensus among economists and 
policymakers has emerged that central banks should be autonomous from their 
governments. Following this trend, central bank statutes have been revised towards 
central bank independence in many countries. This trend cannot be viewed separately, 
and central bank independence is connected to the concept of central bank 
accountability and transparency, which will be analysed in this chapter.  
 
6.2 Central Bank Accountability 
6.2.1 Introduction – Democratic Legitimacy and Accountability 
When discussing the issue of central bank independence, one might argue the more 
independence the merrier. However, it has to be noted that there is the possibility of 
negative side effects. Independent central banks might limit the capacity of governments 
to respond to economic shocks, such as a sudden rise in oil prices. In these times, 
governments’ efforts to stabilize output and employment can be harmed by independent 
central banks only focussing on the goal of achieving price stability. It can be argued 
that the loss of flexibility in the management of monetary policy is economically and 
politically costly, and might exceed the benefits of independent central banks, especially 
if the general public is more concerned about unemployment than inflation (Briault et al. 
1996: 2).  
 
As a result, there are strong voices from government authorities and academics 
demanding that independent central banks should be accountable to the government. De 
Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998: 2) argue that “the basic argument for the 
democratic accountability of central banks is that delegation of powers to unelected 
officials can only be acceptable in a democratic society if central banks are one way or 
another accountable to democratically elected institutions.” Sibert’s (2009) standpoint is 
similar: “In a democracy, it is only acceptable to delegate power to an independent 
institution if that institution has legitimacy. Both formal and substantive accountability 
can create legitimacy.” Padoa-Schioppa (2000: 29) introduces a new argument, namely 
the moral obligation of politicians and central banks, and states: 
“Accountability is an essential and constituent element of a democratic 
political order. In such an order, institutions and bodies with the power to 
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affect the lives and welfare of the community must be subject to the 
scrutiny of the citizens or of their elected representatives. This is 
particularly relevant for those policy fields – such as central banking – 
where decisions are consciously removed from the day-to-day influences 
of the political arena. Thus, accountability pertains to a civic and moral 
obligation inherent in the political order, and is not directly related to 
what could be termed the “economic order””. 
 
According to these statements, issues of democratic deficit and central bank 
accountability have become more relevant since the rise of central bank independence. 
As a result of this discussion, the majority of scholars, including Stiglitz (1998), Forder 
(2002), and Buiter (2008) stress the requirement for greater accountability in order to 
resolve the democratic deficit problem212 of independent central banks. Before going 
into detail about the concept of central bank accountability, the following section 
attempts to provide a definition of the term accountability.  
 
6.2.2 Definition of Accountability  
Given the broad scope of the subject of accountability, it is useful to offer a definition of 
the term, before analysing the concept of accountability for central banks in general, and, 
in particular, for the Bank of Japan. In the most general sense, Webster’s New 
Encyclopedic Dictionary defines ‘accountability’ as “an obligation or willingness to 
accept responsibility or to account for one’s actions”. A similar interpretation is 
presented by The Oxford English Dictionary, which defines accountable as “obliged to 
give a reckoning or explanation for one’s actions; responsible.” The term ‘responsible’ 
is defined as “legally or morally obliged to take care of something or to carry out a duty; 
liable to be blamed for loss or failure.” More detailed is the explanation offered by 
Schedler (1999: 17), who characterizes accountability as follows: “A is accountable to 
B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to 
justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct”. Schedler’s 
definition refers to three issues of accountability. First, the central bank must provide all 
information that explains its actions to the ultimate principal (the general public). 
Second, the central bank must justify its actions. And, third, in case of failures and 
misconduct the principal must be able to punish the central bank. Based on Schedler’s 
approach, Buiter (2006) distinguishes between formal and substantive accountability. 
                                                 
212 The phrase “democratic deficit” is often linked to the ECB, which critics view as a central bank with a 
tendency of being too independent and insufficiently accountable to European citizens (e.g., Aziz: 2005; 
Elgie: 2002; Forder: 2002; Sibert: 2009; Follesdal and Hix: 2006; Gormley and de Haan 1996). 
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The former are ex-post explanations and reporting obligations, requiring a sufficient 
extent of openness and transparency. Hereby, the principal must be fully permitted to 
monitor the agent. The latter refers to consequences, including sanction measures that 
the principal might put on the agent in case of misconduct.213  
 
According to Stiglitz (2003: 111), accountability requires three fundamentals: First, 
people or organisations are given clear objectives. Second, there is a consistent method 
of measuring whether the goals have been achieved or not. And, third, a kind of 
sanction measures must exist in order to punish the persons in charge if the achievement 
of the targets has been failed. Stiglitz argues that “the political notion of accountability 
corresponds closely to the economists’ concepts of incentives.” However, in case of a 
non-achievement of a/the targeted goals, it is often complicated to determine the reasons 
for the undesired outcome. For example, an “intervening event”, such as an economic 
shock, may have arisen for which the agent is not responsible, or which he could not 
have sufficiently prevented it. Recently, the concept of accountability in monetary 
policy has produced a large and diverse literature among academic economists. 
However, an accurate and comprehensive definition is difficult to make (Lepper and 
Sterne 2002: 275; Huepkes, Quintyn and Taylor 2005: 33). Jabko (2009: 392) 
summarizes the problem of defining accountability:   
“A commonsense definition of accountability is […] demanding. A 
central bank can be called accountable if it can be held to account for its 
decisions-both in the sense of explaining its decisions and in the sense of 
taking responsibility for its decisions. This, in turn, requires a 
constituency or even perhaps a political body to which the central bank 
must be brought to account” 
 
Jabko’s (2009) quotation leads to the question “to whom is a central bank accountable?”. 
Based on this question and the previous definitions, the following chapter analyses the 
accountability of central banks.  
 
6.2.3 The Accountability of Central Banks 
Padoa-Schioppa (2000: 29) starts his analysis of central bank accountability with the 
question “accountable for what? accountable to whom?” Suppose that central banks 
were private institutions. In this case central banks would be accountable to their 
                                                 
213 Buiter (2006) argues that “central bank operational independence means absence of substantive 
accountability.”  
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stockholders. However, arguably that is not the case. Rather, central banks are 
accountable to the principal, the general public and the government (as the 
representative for the public). Accordingly, Briault et al. (1996: 1-3) argue that a 
principal-agent relationship is the “natural context” to analyse the issue of central bank 
accountability.  
 
Many scholars argue that there is a connection between central bank independence and 
central bank accountability (Laurens et al. 2009: 90; Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and 
Schaling 2000). Lybek and Morris (2004: 4, italics added) emphasize the role of 
accountability for central banks: “Central bank autonomy and accountability are now 
generally accepted as the best way to achieve and maintain price stability”. Altogether, 
formal mechanisms of accountability requirements imposed by the government reduce 
the negative effects of asymmetric information (uncertain preferences of the central 
bank). Based on this assumption, Grauwe and Gros (2008: 32) provide a simple model 
of the correlation between central bank independence and accountability (Figure 6-1). 
The development towards greater central bank independence is directly related and 
complementary to the concept of accountability. The concept of accountability can be 
understood as a counterbalance to enhanced independence214 (Laurens et al. 2009: 90; 
Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and Schaling 2000; Sterne 2000: 99). 
 
Figure 6-1: Central Bank Independence and Accountability  
 
Central Bank Independence  
Central Bank Accountability    
 
                                                 
214 Coined slightly differently, “greater accountability is the government’s quid pro quo for granting 
greater central bank autonomy.” (Briault et al. 1996: 1).  
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Source: Based on Grauwe and Gros (2008: 32). 
 
 
One important question is whether or not central bank independence is directly linked to 
accountability. The literature is split in this issue. Some scholars find a positive 
correlation between accountability and independence (for instance, Bini-Smaghi and 
Gros (2001), and Frisell, Roszbach and Spagnolo (2008)). Hughes Hallett and Libich 
(2006) construct a monetary policy game with three institutional features: independence, 
accountability and transparency. They emphasize synergies and trade-offs between 
accountability and independence. On the other hand, Masciandaro, Quintyn and Taylor 
(2007) demonstrate that the independence of central banks is not perfectly linked to 
accountability. Correspondingly, Sterne’s (2000: 89, 101-102) cross-county analysis of 
94 central banks does not show any significant correlation between independence and 
accountability. Some countries have central banks with very high degrees of 
independence and with limited accountability, while many other central banks enjoy 
both high levels of independence and accountability.215 Grauwe and Gros (2008: 30-31) 
comment that the “lack of relationship between accountability and independence across 
countries may be due to the fact that the relation between accountability and 
independence may be influenced by social and political factors.” Hüpkes et al. (2005: 8) 
add the problem of legitimacy of independent organisations and argue that the 
relationship between central bank independence and accountability can be explained 
with the concept of complementarities: 
“accountability generates legitimacy, and legitimacy supports 
independence, it becomes clear that the relationship between 
accountability and independence does not imply a trade-off, but is one of 
complementarities […] good accountability arrangements make 
independence effective because they provide legitimacy to the 
independent agency.” 
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the concept of central bank accountability, 
one has to distinguish the term in more detail. The following sections distinguish 
between ex ante and ex post, and additionally between de iure and de facto 
accountability.  
 
 
                                                 
215 For instance, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden (Sterne 2000: 102).  
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6.2.4 Different Types of Accountability 
Accountability can be divided into two different types, namely ex ante and ex post 
accountability. Ex ante control is the principal’s (government or parliament) right to 
give instructions and tasks to the central bank, including rules, principles and standards. 
Additionally, ex ante accountability is the central bank’s obligation to report to the 
principal before monetary policy action is taken. The central bank must provide 
forecasts for relevant macroeconomic data and “justify deviations of forecast values 
from target values”.216 In contrast, ex post accountability is the central bank’s obligation 
to report after monetary policy decisions have been made, including publications 
whether or to what extent it has been able to achieve its monetary policy objectives and 
to report before the parliament on a regular basis to explain its monetary policy 
decisions (Bini-Smaghi and Gros 2001; Bofinger et al. 2001: 221-222; Hüpkes et al. 
2005: 19).  
 
Another possible distinction can be made between de iure and de facto accountability. 
De iure accountability requires a formal contract between the central bank and the 
government, which must be manifested in the central bank law. It is hereby it is 
essential “to specify not only the object of the responsibility, but also statements about 
assumption of responsibility, the reporting duties of the central bank, and punishment in 
case of failure”. De facto accountability goes beyond the legal provisions issued in the 
central bank law. In the centre is the central bank’s willingness to be accountable, and to 
explain monetary policy decisions and actions (Laurens et al. 2009: 94; Grauwe and 
Gros 2008: 20). Briault et al. (1996: 67) refer to transparency and information by deeds 
(words) when they talk about de facto accountability. These words include speeches, 
press statements, appearances before parliament by central bank staff, inflation reports, 
and the publication of minutes of monetary policy meetings. As a result, the concept of 
transparency is one essential feature of de facto accountability.  
 
                                                 
216 In reality, ex ante accountability is difficult for the central bank since it depends solely on forecasts. As 
a consequence there are doubts of the efficiency of ex ante accountability. For instance, former ECB 
president Duisenberg stated that “the publication of the forecasts cannot contribute to accountability. 
Rather, its performance in maintaining price stability in the medium term should be used by the public to 
judge the success […]” (Duisenberg 1999: 4). 
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The issue of central bank transparency is the subject of the following section. After 
analysing different aspects of central bank transparency, current transparency practices - 
both formal and informal - will be considered.  
 
6.3 Central Bank Transparency  
6.3.1 Introduction  
A growing body of contemporary research has focused on the issue of transparency of 
central banks. Transparency is commonly regarded as one important aspect of 
accountability. In the past central banks had been surrounded by an aura of 
metaphysical approaches, and some authors characterized central banking with terms 
such as “mystique” or as an “esoteric art” (Brunner 1981: 5; Goodfriend 1986: 63-64). 
Times have changed and, at present, a broad consensus among academics and central 
bankers has emerged that sophisticated transparency arrangements is an obligation when 
creating an independent central bank which, finally, lead to benefits for both the central 
bank and the public (Issing 1999: 66). Before analysing the issue of transparency, 
including central bank transparency measures, in more detail, it is necessary to gain a 
better understanding by trying to provide a definition of the term of transparency.  
 
6.3.2 Definition of Transparency 
Unfortunately, there is no “universally accepted definition of central bank transparency” 
(Chortareas, Stasavage, and Sterne 2002: 99), and it is a term which is particularly 
difficult to define (Winkler 2000). Webster’s English dictionary defines the term 
‘transparent’ as “easily understood or seen through”. In the context of monetary policy, 
transparency can be broadly defined as the extent to which central banks disclose 
information related to the monetary policymaking process. Ferguson (2001) defines 
transparency as “the openness of a central bank in stating its monetary policy decision 
and explaining the reasoning behind them”. The move towards greater levels of 
transparency is one subject of Blinder’s (2004) “Quiet Revolution” in central banking. 
Emphasizing the role of the public, Blinder (2004) argues that central bank information 
should be clear, have sound contents and be open to the public. The German 
Bundesbank (2000: 17) views transparency as a commitment by the central bank, 
stating that “[t]ransparency […] plays the part of self-imposed commitment: by 
disclosing the basis of the policy decisions, the central bank enables the general public 
to assess their adequacy.”  
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6.3.3 The Transparency of Central Banks 
Since the 1990s, numerous central banks have increased the transparency regarding 
objectives, monetary policy procedures, monetary policy explanations, models and 
forecasts. The general trend towards enhanced transparency since the late 1990s was 
commented by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007: 1) as follows: “greater transparency in 
central bank operations is the most dramatic change in the conduct of monetary policy 
in recent years”. To comment the current trend towards more transparent central banks, 
it is useful to take the words of Alan Greenspan, US Federal Reserve Chairman between 
1987 and 2006, into account. In a 1987 testimony Greenspan stated that “since I have 
become a central banker I have learned to mumble with great incoherence. I seem 
unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.”217 This is in line with 
the “never explain, never excuse” attitude by the former Bank of England Governor 
Montagnu Norman (Yellen 2013). However, 15 years later, in 2002 at a conference on 
transparency, Greenspan (2002: 6) stated the complete opposite: “Openness is an 
obligation of a central bank in a free and democratic society.”218  
 
How can this trend towards more central bank transparency be explained? It can be 
argued that there is a common sense of the advantages of greater central bank 
transparency (IMF 1999; BIS 1999, 2009). The Central Bank Governance Group of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) argues that transparency of monetary policy is 
considered as beneficial for both the principal and the agent. It leads to a decrease of 
asymmetric information between the central bank and the public which reduces 
macroeconomic uncertainty (BIS 2009: 145-146). Another important factor is the 
promotion of central bank transparency by influential international organisations such 
as the abovementioned BIS and IMF. Both institutions have published papers (e.g. IMF 
1999; BIS 1999, 2009) to encourage discussion on central bank transparency and to 
develop a common framework for central bank transparency, including the central 
bank’s policy objectives, operating targets, reaction functions and the decision-making 
process.  
 
                                                 
217 Quoted from Geraats (2007: 37).  
218 Quoted from Cukierman (2005: 25).  
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The economic literature suggests two benefits of central bank transparency. First, 
empirical studies have found that enhanced transparency has led to an increase of 
predictability of monetary policy decisions and, therefore, to an increase in private 
sector forecast accuracy, stabilising inflation expectations. And second, transparency in 
monetary policy has reduced the average level and the variability of inflation, while 
additionally lowering the output variability (Carpenter 2004; Dincer and Eichengreen 
2007).219  
 
Central bank transparency has become the issue of intense academic debates. One line 
of argumentation in the academic literature analyses the economic consequences of 
greater transparency on the conduct of monetary policy. An influential precursor to the 
early transparency literature is the seminal paper by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), 
who analyse the optimal degree of ambiguity in monetary policy. Faust and Svensson 
(2001) extend the model by distinguishing between imperfect monetary control and 
operational transparency. As a consequence of the debate, it can not necessarily be 
argued that the more central bank transparency the merrier. For instance, Blinder (2004) 
warns that monetary policy decision-making cannot be performed completely open. 
Blinder discourages from too much transparency as, for example, the decision to 
publish transcripts bears the risk that certain members may refrain from speaking 
candidly in the meetings. In particular, practising central bankers have a cautious stance 
towards too much transparency. For instance, former US Federal Reserve Governor 
Alan Greenspan argues critically in regards of too much transparency. 220  Another 
example is Otmar Issing, former Chief Economist of the ECB, who argues that: 
“[i]t is not quite obvious to my mind that the legitimate and important 
cause of transparency would be advanced if central banks were to make 
available to the public the maximum amount of information at their 
disposal […] Moreover, could the public ever be sure that some 
important information was not withheld, some ulterior motives hidden, 
some decisions not revealed?” Issing (1999b, Speech 28 January 1999)  
 
                                                 
219  Laurens et al. (2009: 108-111) present eight aspects that build the rationale towards enhanced 
transparency: 1. increase central bank credibility, 2. influence of expectations, 3. protect the independence 
of central banks, 4. strengthen the understanding of monetary policy, 5. reduction of information 
asymmetries and uncertainty in financial markets, 6. enhance market efficiency, 7. reduction of 
government uncertainty on monetary policy performance, and 8. enhance fiscal and monetary policy 
coordination 
220 See, the commentary of Alan Greenspan in Capie et al. (1994: 253).  
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This quote shows that critical voices warn against unlimited transparency. However, in 
spite of these arguments, the majority of academics and central bankers argue in favour 
of central bank transparency. In order to understand the concept of central bank 
transparency better, it is necessary to go into more detail. The following section focuses 
on the relationship between transparency and accountability.  
 
6.3.4 Transparency versus Accountability 
Regarding the relationship between central bank accountability and transparency, the 
Central Bank Governance Group of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) states 
that: 
“For the purpose of de iure accountability, central banks are generally 
subject to some disclosure requirements. But the transparency of many 
central banks nowadays goes far beyond these mandatory information 
disclosures. The current practices and trends in central bank transparency 
greatly contribute to de facto accountability. As a result, central bank 
accountability and transparency are intrinsically related.” (BIS 2009: 
144) 
 
In the economic literature, it is commonplace that transparency is a part of 
accountability problems (e.g., Briault et al. 1996; Grauwe and Gros 2008). However, 
Castellani (2002: 4) argues that the traditional “accountability through transparency” 
approach is incomplete: “Contributions, focusing on transparency as a precondition for 
holding the monetary authority responsible for its policy-making, abstract from a formal 
conceptualisation of accountability. Most of them miss to distinguish accountability and 
transparency in a clear way.” According to Issing (1999b), the difference between 
accountability and transparency is that accountability has to take into account the 
“deeds” of the central bankers, whereas transparency focuses on the communication 
strategy with the applied “words”. The ensuing section refers to these “words” by 
providing information about publications of a central bank.  
 
6.3.5 Publications and Communication 
One important aspect of central bank transparency is communication with the 
government, parliament, general public and financial markets. The provision of valuable 
information regarding the future course of monetary policy can be accomplished 
through the publication of minutes of monetary policy committee meetings and 
forecasts. In publishing valuable information, central banks offer insight into how they 
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view the economy, and explain its monetary policy decisions, which may enhance, and 
protect a central bank’s independence.  
 
Many scholars consider the publication of minutes of the monetary policy committee 
meetings as an essential source of information (Blinder et al. 2008; Buiter 1999; Kohn 
and Sack 2004; Svensson 2000). The publication of the individual voting behaviour of 
the members is useful information for the estimation of the future strategy of interest 
rates. 221  In addition, macroeconomic forecasts are another important aspect of 
publications and a part of economic transparency (see definition in the following 
section). However, Geraats (2001) finds that forecasts concerning economic shocks 
taken by central banks are not better than those of organizations, such as the IMF, 
OECD, and national and private research institutes, and that central bank forecasts 
eliminate the information asymmetry of economic shocks. To lend some support to this 
finding, Issing (1999a: 507) states that: 
“I am rather sympathetic to the view that central banks have only limited 
information advantage over sophisticated market participants, both with 
respect to the available data and-perhaps-also with respect to the 
understanding how the economy works. Central banks should not 
endeavour to maintain or even create any such information asymmetry, 
nor should they pretend that they have some superior or magical insights”  
 
According to Bofinger et al. (2001: 224), the central bank’s only information advantage 
implies the “knowledge about the intended path of short-term interest rates”. In contrast 
to these arguments, Romer and Romer (2000) find that central banks have an 
information advantage, and that forecasts made by the US Federal Reserve about 
inflation (BIP deflator) are superior to those of commercial forecasters. 
 
6.3.6 Different Types of Transparency  
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) define transparency as the level of disclosure of 
information related to the monetary policy decision-making process. As this is a 
complex subject it is necessary to differentiate the term transparency further. In 
accordance with Geraats’ (2001) terminology, transparency can be classified into five 
different types: 
                                                 
221 Bofinger et al. (2001: 228), however, points out that highly controversial issues are rather discussed 
informally and not in the Monetary Policy Meetings and argues that there is no empirical evidence that 
central banks with a intensive information strategy performs better than central banks which provide only 
fractions of possible information.  
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1. Political Transparency 
2. Economic Transparency 
3. Procedural Transparency 
4. Policy Transparency 
5. Operational Transparency 
 
Political transparency refers to the degree of openness and clearness of arrangements of 
the central bank’s objectives. This demands an explicit statement and a formal 
definition of the objectives on monetary policy, including an unambiguous prioritization 
in the case of conflicting goals and quantitative targets. Political transparency is 
enhanced by explicit institutional arrangements, such as central bank independence, 
central bank contracts and explicit override mechanisms of the government. Clearly 
defined arrangements help to avoid excessive influence of politicians, which can 
endanger the formal goal of the central bank. 222 223 
 
Economic transparency refers to the disclosure of economic information regarding 
monetary policy. This includes all information the central bank applies to conduct 
monetary policy. The publication of forecasts is an important feature of economic 
transparency. The public can build its own forecasts based on the information provided 
by the central bank. Another aspect is the employment of policy models to forecast 
economic determinants (inflation, economic growth). Geraats (2001) argue that the 
publication of central bank forecasts reduces the inflation bias and provides the central 
bank with enhanced flexibility to stabilize the economy.  
 
Procedural transparency concentrates on the method of making monetary policy 
decisions. The most important feature is the publication of minutes of Monetary Policy 
Board Meetings, which allow the public to observe the decision-making process of 
monetary policy. It should include the provision of an explicit monetary policy rule or 
strategy that explains the monetary policy framework, the way monetary policy 
decisions are achieved and, preferably, individual voting records. Gersbach and Hahn 
                                                 
222 It has to be noted that political transparency does not necessarily need to be under control of the 
central bank. It is often determined by the government or legislature (political authorities).  
223 It is striking that inflation targeting central banks score the maximum value of political independency. 
However, inflation targeting is not a necessary condition for political independence as the example of the 
ECB shows (Eijffinger and Geraats 2006).  
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(2004) demonstrate that voting transparency is beneficial in the case of different 
preferences of the central bank in regards of socially optimal objective. In contrast, in 
the case of differing degrees of competency of central bankers, the publication of voting 
records might be damaging (Gersbach and Hahn 2008).  
 
Policy transparency asks in what time horizon monetary policy decisions are announced. 
An immediate announcement to inform economic agents is clearly preferred. Preferably, 
it consists of explanations of the decision and a policy indication of future monetary 
policy actions. Operational transparency refers to the conduct of the central bank’s 
monetary policy actions, including analyses of past errors when aiming to accomplish 
the operating targets of monetary policy and an announcement of reasons in case of 
divergences between the target and the achieved results, such as macroeconomic 
disturbances and unanticipated shocks that influence the transmission of monetary 
policy. Jensen (2001) argues that enhanced operational independence is beneficial in 
case of low credibility of central banks. Table 6-1 summarizes the characteristics of 
each aspect of transparency. 
 
Table 6-1: Aspects of Central Bank Transparency 
Aspects of 
Transparency 
Characteristics 
Political Formal objective 
Quantitative targets 
Institutional arrangements 
Economic Economic data 
Policy models 
central bank forecasts 
Procedural Explicit strategy 
Minutes 
Voting records 
Policy Prompt announcement 
Policy explanations 
Policy inclination 
Operational Control errors 
Transmission disturbances 
Evaluation policy outcome 
Source: Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) 
 
Having provided with background knowledge of the terms and concepts of central bank 
accountability and transparency, the analysis will now focus on the Bank of Japan’s 
accountability and transparency.  
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6.4 The Accountability and Transparency of the Bank of Japan 
A key question is to what extent are requirements concerning accountability and 
transparency manifested in the Bank of Japan Law from 1998. Most important is Article 
3, Paragraph 2 of the BJL, which claims that the BOJ is obliged to “clarify to the public 
the content of its decisions, as well as its decision making process, regarding currency 
and monetary control”. Other obligations of accountability in the new BJL are the 
following:  
 
1. A summary of the Policy Board meetings including the decisions on monetary 
policy have to be published after a specific period of time decided by the Board 
(Article 20). A disclosure of the complete transcripts (gijiroku) of the Policy 
Board meetings (Article 20, Paragraph 2) follows after an appropriate amount of 
time.224 
 
2. Approximately every six months the Bank is compelled to submit a report on 
the Bank’s decisions through the Minister of Finance to the Diet. In addition, the 
central bank’s Governor225 or a representative have to appear before the Diet on 
request in order to explain the Bank’s operations (Article 54).  
 
3. Regarding the conduct of personal financial affairs, the salaries of BOJ 
executives and staff (Article 31) and rules concerning the obligation to separate 
themselves from private enterprises (Article 32) are required to make public in 
order to avoid conflicts of interests. 
 
6.4.1 The Bank of Japan’s Self-Conception of Accountability 
The Bank of Japan’s statements about accountability are mostly restricted to issues 
regarding transparency. Statements concerning the BOJ’s relationship to the 
government are missing. One reason for this is a different understanding of the term 
‘accountability’ in Japan. Former BOJ Governor Matsushita (1996), for instance, 
describes the Japanese approach to the term of accountability as follows:  
                                                 
224 In practice, the BOJ publishes the transcripts after ten years (in Japanese).   
225 In detail the Law claims that “the Governor, the Chairman of the Policy Board or a representative 
designated by them […]”. In practice, the Governor acts usually as the chairman. 
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“the word "accountability“ is not familiar to the Japanese […]. The word 
‘accountability’ is commonly translated into a Japanese word meaning 
‘responsibility.’ However, this translation does not fully reflect the true 
meaning of the word. The word “accountability” derives from ‘account’, 
which has such meanings as to count money or to explain. In other words, 
‘accountability’ implies not simply responsibility but ‘responsibility to 
explain properly’. Unfortunately, there is no corresponding Japanese 
word. This may be an indication of the fact that the concept of this word 
was not recognized widely in Japan. Yet, it is an indispensable concept 
when discussing central bank independence.”  
 
Indeed, the Japanese term for accountability is setsumei sekinin (Bank of Japan 1996, 
2000b; Gotô 1998), which is not a precise replacement of the term ‘accountability’. In 
spite of a clear definition what exactly the term accountability means, the BOJ already 
began to improve its accountability even before the revision of the BOJ law. For 
instance, in 1995, the BOJ started to announce all relevant changes in its open market 
operations, including a basic thinking behind such changes and its immediate policy 
actions regarding money market rates. Furthermore, in regards of changing the official 
discount rate, the BOJ has provided “in official statements a more detailed explanation 
than before on the Bank's economic outlook and the reasoning behind the policy 
change.” In addition, from 1996 on, the BOJ has upgraded the contents of the Policy 
Board’s monthly and annual reports, including details and explanations of monetary 
policy decisions (Matsushita 1996).    
 
Table 6-2 offers a selection of statements made by the BOJ concerning accountability. 
These statements made by BOJ staff or recorded in BOJ official documents demonstrate 
that the concept of accountability is considered similar to the academic approach 
presented in the sections before. Furthermore, the BOJ is continuously working on 
making progress in explaining its viewpoint on policy and business operations in order 
to increase accountability (Bank of Japan 2004: 18). However, more specific statements 
about accountability which exceed the claim of enhanced transparency, for instance the 
role of the government and possible sanction measures, are completely missing. 
 
Table 6-2: Selection of Statements by the Bank of Japan Regarding Central Bank 
Accountability  
Statement  Statement 
Deputy Governor 
Yamaguchi (1999) 
“naturally, the independence of monetary policy must be 
underpinned by accountability. In this regard, we should make 
continuous efforts in explaining our thinking on monetary 
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policy, on whatever occasions available, in easy-to-understand 
terms, so as to gain the understanding of the public”  
BOJ document (BOJ 
– Outline of monetary 
policy)226 
”It is very important to present the Bank's basic thinking on the 
conduct of monetary policy and evaluation of the 
developments of the economy and prices in a timely and lucid 
manner, from the viewpoint of fulfilling the Bank's 
accountability to the public.” 
Shiratsuka (2001: 65) “accountability of a central bank is ensured by its obligation to 
give a convincing rationale for its policy conduct, especially in 
the case of missing a previously announced target”. 
The Bank of Japan 
(2002) 
“accountability for the conduct of monetary policy and other 
responsibilities assigned to the central bank should be specified 
in legislation.”  
Deputy Governor 
Iwata (2008) 
“[…] at the same time, in a democratic society, the 
responsibility to fulfil the mandate of policy objectives is 
increased; that is to say, this independence is accompanied by 
accountability. A lack of transparency in the decision-making 
process may easily lead to a deficit of accountability.” 
Source: Own compilation based on documents by the Bank of Japan 
 
 
Additionally, Fujiwara (1998) offers insights about a somewhat irritating approach of 
accountability proposed by Hayami, BOJ Governor from 1998 to 2003. Hayami, known 
as a devout Christian, explained that the real meaning of accountability refers to the 
“Last Judgement” (saigo no shinpan) and how one is accountable for oneself. The 
emphasis of personal accountability and conscience (ningen no ryôshin) before the 
Christian God is a somewhat dubious approach by a Governor of a central bank. 
However, Hayami’s approach of accountability might help to explain his behaviour of 
vigorously following his own approach (see, case studies in Chapter 8).  
 
Anoter issue is ethical discipline. In 1998 the Bank of Japan published documents such 
as the “Rules Regarding Ethical Discipline” and a “Code of Conduct for the Bank 
Executives and Staff”, in order to establish an ethical behaviour standard for BOJ 
officials. The former is a code of conduct for Bank of Japan executives and staff, which 
was decided upon the Policy Board in accordance with Article 32 of the BJL. It claims 
that BOJ officials must carry out their duties under the highest amount of responsibility, 
and requires BOJ executives and staff to “understand the public mission of the Bank of 
Japan and endeavor to discharge duties efficiently and with an emphasis on fairness” 
                                                 
226 http://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outline/ 
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(Article 2). Additionally, the rules describe confidentiality obligations (Article 6), 
restrictions on concurrent employment (Article 7), and include comments regarding 
external activities (Article 9). The latter, “Code of Conduct for the Bank Executives and 
Staff”, was published by the Policy Board on 6 March 1998, and provides detailed 
ethical standards and prohibitions for external activities, including information 
disclosure, standards for speeches, prohibition on dining, gifts, reception of special 
treatment, activities for personal profit and restrictions on outside business and 
employment after retirement (Bank of Japan 2002c: 20).  
 
6.4.2 The Bank of Japan and Price Stability 
A clear central bank objective is an important feature of accountability (De Haan, 
Amtenbrink and Eijffinger 1998). It can be argued that the 1998 Bank of Japan Law 
requires the Bank to take responsibility for defining the term price stability in a clear 
way. However, for quite a long time the BOJ preferred to remain vague about a 
definition of price stability, for instance to quantify the term. In a report published in 
October of 2000, the Bank stated that there is no consensus in the Policy Board 
regarding a clear definition of price stability. Policy Board members explained this with 
the argument that a severe economic environment with deflationary tendencies interest 
rates near zero. The belief that it is too complicated to provide a clear definition of price 
stability was dominant in the BOJ (Bank of Japan 2000a). It seems that the BOJ was 
concerned that a failure to achieve a precise monetary policy goal may harm the Bank’s 
credibility and reputation.  
 
Since March 2006, the BOJ releases “The Bank’s Thinking on Price Stability” 227 on an 
annual basis, which provides some guidance in quantitative targets.228 Minegishi and 
Cournede (2009: 38) remark that this document is based on the view of the Policy 
Board members,229 and, thus, strictly speaking, is not the policy target of the BOJ. In the 
edition published in March 2006 following is stated:  
                                                 
227 Bank of Japan, “The Bank’s Thinking on Price Stability,” Bank of Japan Quarterly Bulletin, 14 (2), 
2006, pp. 65–90 (available at http://www.boj.or.jp//en/type/release/zuiji_new/mpo0603a.htm). 
228 The plan to issue the Bank’s thinking on price stability was already discussed in the Monetary Policy 
Meeting on March 2000. In October the same year the BOJ released a document “On price stability”.  
229 “The Bank of Japan will review its basic thinking on price stability, and disclose a level of inflation 
rate that its Policy Board members currently understand as price stability from a medium- to long-term 
viewpoint, in their conduct of monetary policy. Board members will conduct monetary policy in the light 
of such thinking and understanding” (BOJ 2006: 44, Annual Review 2006).  
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“by making use of the rate of year-on-year change in the consumer price 
index to describe the understanding, an approximate range between zero 
and two per cent was generally consistent with the distribution of each 
Board member’s understanding of medium- to long-term price stability.” 
(Bank of Japan 2006, italics added) 
 
The given quantitative range of the target between zero and two per cent is quite broad, 
and, thus, it is possible to doubt a large practical benefit. It is not clear which price 
index the BOJ employs to judge whether or not price stability has been achieved. For 
instance, the Bank of Japan does not unmistakably state whether or not price stability 
includes asset prices. In other words, the BOJ fails to provide an explicit monetary 
policy goal. The Bank of Japan’s definition of price stability is unclear in comparison to 
that of the ECB or Swiss National Bank, which have an explicit and clear monetary 
policy objective. Basically, the BOJ preferred to take a cautious stance towards defining 
a clear monetary policy objective. The reason behind this is that the BOJ’s definition of 
price stability is performed by each Policy Board member separately (Blinder et al. 
2001: 79-81; Minegishi and Cournede 2009). This means that the understanding of price 
stability may change if new Policy Board members enter the Board, or if a member 
changes his policy stance. This procedure implies that the government can impose much 
more influence on the Bank of Japan by choosing members that have an understanding 
of price stability that is close to that of the government. Recently, the BOJ has changed 
its policy goals. Since February 2012, the BOJ has introduced an inflation target of one 
per cent (For details, see Bank of Japan 2012, Minutes 13-14 February 2012). Table 6-3 
summarizes selected statements by the Bank of Japan regarding the subject of price 
stability. 
 
Table 6-3: Selection of Statements by the Bank of Japan Regarding the 
Understanding of Price Stability 
Time Source Statement 
27 May 
1994 
Principles for the 
Conduct and the Goal 
of Monetary Policy 
(Speech made by 
Governor Mieno) 
 
“One of main goals of monetary policy is 
delivering ‘sustainable growth without 
inflation’ in the medium- to long-run. […] The 
question is often posed on which price indicator, 
the Consumer Price Index or the Wholesale Price 
Index, the definition of price stability should be 
based. However, it is inappropriate to single out a 
price indicator, as the goal of monetary policy is 
the ‘stability of prices’ not ‘stability of a price 
index.’” 
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11 October 
1996 
Financial Innovation, 
Financial Market 
Globalization, and 
Monetary Policy 
Management (Speech 
made by Governor 
Matsushita) 
“The Bank of Japan [...] intends to manage 
monetary policy appropriately with the aim of 
maintaining price stability, preventing inflation 
or deflation of domestic prices.” 
 
27 June 
1997 
A New Framework of 
Monetary Policy 
under the New Bank 
of Japan Law (Speech 
made by Governor 
Matsushita) 
 
“It is, however, not easy to define price stability. 
There are diverse types of price indicators: for 
example, the Consumer Price Index, Wholesale 
Price Indexes, and the GDP deflator. Each of 
these has its limitation, such as the range of items 
covered or the timing of release. Further, many 
studies have been conducted more recently on 
the possibility that these indicators offer a 
substantially biased measurement of prices.” 
13 October 
2000 
On Price Stability “[I]t is not deemed appropriate to define price 
stability by numerical values. […] Price 
stability, a situation neither inflationary nor 
deflationary, can be conceptually defined as an 
environment where economic agents including 
households and firms can make decisions 
regarding such economic activity as consumption 
and investment without being concerned about 
the fluctuation of the general price level.” 
9 March 
2006 
The Introduction of a 
New Framework for 
the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy 
“Price stability is a state where various economic 
agents including households and firms may make 
decisions regarding such economic activities as 
consumption and investments without being 
concerned about the fluctuations in the general 
price level. […] Price stability is, conceptually, a 
state where the change in the price index without 
measurement bias is zero per cent.” 
9 March 
2006 
An Understanding of 
Medium- to Long-
term Price Stability 
“It was agreed that, by making use of the rate of 
year-on year change in the consumer price index 
to describe the understanding, an approximate 
range between zero and two per cent was 
generally consistent with the distribution of each 
Board member’s understanding of medium- to 
long-term price stability. Most Board members’ 
median figures fell on both sides of one per 
cent.” 
27 April 
2007 
Outlook for Economic 
Activity and Prices 
“The ‘understanding’ expressed in terms of the 
year-on-year rate of change in the CPI, takes the 
form of a range approximately between 0 and 
2 per cent, with most Policy Board members’ 
median figures falling on one side or the other of 
1 per cent.” 
18 Clarification of the “In a positive range of 2 per cent or lower, and 
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December 
2009 
`Understanding of 
Medium- to Long 
Term Price Stability' 
the mid points of most Policy Board members’ 
understanding’ are around 1 per cent.” 
14 
February 
2012 
The Price Stability 
Goal in the Medium 
to Long Term 
 
“The Bank judges that ‘the price stability goal in 
the medium to long term’ is in a positive range of 
2 per cent or lower in terms of the year-on-year 
rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) 
and, more specifically, set a goal at 1 per cent 
for the time being.” 
Source: Based on Nishizaki, Sekine, and Ueno (2012: 15-16), italics added.  
 
 
6.4.3 The Transparency of the Bank of Japan 
In comparison to the old BOJ Law, the revision of the BOJ Law has increased the 
transparency to a substantial amount (Uekusa 1999, Mikitani and Kuwayama 1999). 
The transparency of the Bank of Japan can be distinguished into three aspects:  
transparency to the public, transparency to the government and transparency to the Diet 
or State (The Bank of Japan 2002c; Kanegae and Senda 2005: 18-19). 
 
1. Transparency to the public 
1. The BOJ must clarify the contents of its decisions to the public (Article 3, 
Paragraph 2) 
2. After each Policy Board meeting the BOJ shall publish a document which 
contains an outline of its decisions (Article 20, Paragraph 1) 
3. Publication of complete transcripts after a appropriate amount of time 
(Article 20, Paragraph 2) 
4. The BOJ shall make available financial statements (Article 52, Paragraph 
3) 
 
2. Transparency to the government 
1. The BOJ must maintain always close contact and exchange views with the 
government (Article 4) 
2. The BOJ must submit results of on-site examinations on request (Article 44, 
Paragraph 3) 
3. A budget plan has to be submitted to the MOF every fiscal year for 
authorization (Article 51) 
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4. The BOJ shall report illegal activities of BOJ staff to the Finance or Prime 
Minister (Article 56) 
5. The Bank must prepare reports about its business operations on request of 
the Prime Minister of Minister of Finance (Article 58) 
 
3. Transparency to the Diet 
1. the BOJ must prepare and submit a report to the Diet approximately every 
six month (Article 54, Paragraph 1) (the so-called “Semiannual Report on 
Currency and Monetary Control”) and explain it to the Diet (Article 54, 
Paragraph 2) 
2. The Governor or a representative must attend to the Diet on request (Article 
54, Paragraph 3) 
 
Kanegae (2007: 2-8) critically raises the question if the responsibility to explain the 
monetary policy decisions is guaranteed in a sufficient way through the above-listed 
paragraphs of the Bank of Japan Law. Indeed, in practice, it seems that the BOJ acts 
cautiously in regards of providing too much transparency. For instance, in 1998, the 
BOJ was aware that a vast amount of financial institutions were facing difficulties, but 
refrained from reporting it to the public. Ueda Kazuo, Policy Board member from 1998 
to 2005, argued that if the BOJ had published its information, the problem would have 
deteriorated. 230  Ueda’s stance is similar to that of other economists previously 
mentioned in this chapter on criticisms of too much central bank transparency, arguing 
that it is not always optimal for a central bank to reveal all of its information. 
 
6.4.4 The Bank of Japan’s Transparency in Practice 
After having identified the BOJ’s transparency de iure, the following analysis covers 
transparency arrangements and improvements in practice. Blinder et al. (2001: 81) 
argue that the difficult economic situation in Japan since the beginning of the new 
millennium has directed the BOJ towards more transparency in order to “pre-empt 
political attacks on its legitimacy and independency.” 
 
 
                                                 
230 Comments by Ueda in Blinder et al. (2001: 108). 
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The Bank of Japan’s Publications 
As seen in a previous section, publications are a major issue of the transparency of a 
central bank. After the BOJ was granted independence, the central bank made first 
efforts to exercise its independence and transparency through the expansion of 
publications on its webpage. The BOJ offered a variety of informative data and detailed 
accounts of the monetary policy board meetings. The Bank of Japan publishes a high 
amount of information with following aims: 
1. To enhance transparency 
2. To provide precise and reliable data that adequately reflects 
changes in economic and financial structures 
3. To respond to the changing needs of users  
4. To improve the compilation of statistics  
 
First and foremost are publications regarding the meetings of the Policy Board, 
including announcements of decisions (kettei naiyô) and the publication of minutes 
(yôshi). The Bank of Japan is one of the central banks which even publish the entire 
transcripts (gijiroku) of the Board meetings. 
  
The BOJ publishes a variety of monetary and financial statistics, including the corporate 
goods price index (CGPI), changes in the money stock (M2+CDs) and credit, the 
amount of outstanding deposits by depositor, the loans and discounts outstanding by 
sector, and the balance of payments statistics.231 In addition, the Bank of Japan gathers 
survey data in form of the “Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan” 
(nichgin tanki keizai kansoku; short: tankan) (Table 6-4) and, since 1993, the “Opinion 
Survey on the General Public’s Views and Behavior” (seikatsu ishiki ni kan suru ankêto 
chôsa), which surveys how the public’s impression is affected by changes in financial 
and economic conditions. Since 2002, the BOJ has started to publish data on the 
“amount outstanding of collateral” accepted by the BOJ, the amount of JGSs held by the 
BOJ, and data about its purchases of stocks (Bank of Japan 2003: 16-17, Annual 
Review 2003).  
  
                                                 
231 This is entrusted by the Ministry of Finance to the Bank of Japan.  
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The Bank of Japan conducts research on economic and financial conditions, as well as 
the financial system and financial markets, and publishes various reports, including the 
Monthly Report of Recent Economic and Financial Developments. Further information 
is provided in the Bank of Japan Quarterly Bulletin, Outline of Business Operations, 
and the Annual Review. Additionally, the BOJ publishes various research papers, 
including the Monetary and Economic Studies and the IMES discussion paper series. 
Table 6-4 provides a summary of the BOJ’s major publications, which comprises the 
frequency and contents.  
 
Table 6-4: Major Publications of the Bank of Japan 
Title Frequency of 
Publication 
Contents 
Announcements of MPM 
decisions (kettei naiyô) 
after each MPM 
(1-2x month) 
monetary policy decisions, including 
guidelines for money market 
operations and changes in the official 
discount rate 
Minutes of MPM’s (yôshi) after each 
meeting 
Summary of discussions of MPM.  
Transcripts of MPM’s 
(gijiroku)   
10 yrs. after the  
meetings 
The entire transcript of each MPM. 
Monthly Report of Recent 
Economic and Financial 
Developments (kinyû keizai 
geppô) 
monthly Analyses of the economic and 
financial developments on which 
decisions on money market operations 
are based. Consists of “The Bank’s 
View” and “The Background” 
Outlook for Economic 
Activity and Prices232 (keizai 
bukka jôsei no tenbô) 
2x year (April 
and October) 
Part of the monthly report. Policy 
member’s forecast of real GDP, 
domestic wholesale price index, CPI   
Semi-annual Report on 
Currency and Monetary 
Control (tsûka oyobi kinyû 
no chôsetsu ni kan suru 
hôkoku sho)* 
2x year Report to the Diet on the Bank’s 
monetary policy (Art. 54 of the BOJ 
Law) 
Contains decisions of Monetary Policy 
Meetings and operations by the BOJ 
Outline of Business 
Operations for Fiscal XXXX 
(gyômu gaikyô sho) 
annually Outline of the Bank’s business 
operations in each fiscal period as 
specified in Article 55 
Annual Review annually Review of monetary and economic 
developments. Outline of Bank’s 
organisation. Financial statements 
Tankan (nichgin tanki keizai 
kansoku) 
quarterly Short-term economic survey of 
enterprises 
Monetary and Economic 
Studies 
annually Monetary and Economic Studies is 
published by the Bank of Japan's 
                                                 
232 Before April 2004 the English title was “Outlook for Risk Assessment of the Economy and Prices”.  
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Institute for Monetary and Economic 
Studies (IMES). The publication seeks 
to provide information on monetary 
and economic issues to the general 
public 
IMES Discussion Paper 
Series 
Various issues 
per year 
IMES Discussion Paper Series is 
circulated in order to stimulate 
discussion and comments 
Source: Bank of Japan (2004): 19-20; Bank of Japan and IMES webpage. 
Note: *available only in Japanese; summary available in English.  
 
 
Press Conferences 
For some central banks, including the BOJ, press conferences are an integral part of the 
Monetary Policy Meetings. Press conferences, usually held by the Governor, are 
mandatory once a month. Most important for transparency is that the BOJ holds a press 
conference after the Monetary Policy Meeting, in case of changes in the monetary 
policy guideline. The Governor, in the position as chair of the Policy Board, explains 
why these changes had been decided by the Bank. Subsequently, a question and answer 
session with Journalists follows. This information is made available to the public in 
form of summaries on the Bank of Japan website on the following business day (Bank 
of Japan 2002c: 11). Since October 2003, the BOJ has increased its transparency by 
holding a press conference after every Monetary Policy Meeting, even when the 
monetary policy remains unchanged.  
 
Monetary Policy Meetings 
The BOJ decides the monetary policy by means of a majority vote, which is published 
in the Minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings. Since July 2005, the transparency has 
been enhanced by the publication of the number of votes for and against a policy move. 
In February 2007, a further step was taken and individual voting records are made 
public in the Minutes. This was a bold move and up to now only very few central banks 
are following this openness. The publication of individual voting records provides an 
enormous amount of personal accountability. However, the publication of individual 
voting records can be regarded as an issue of too much transparency (see section 5.3.6). 
The problem is that Policy Board members can be reappointed, and, by means of an 
individual voting record, Policy Board members’ preferences can be easily understood.  
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Monitoring Policy Board members’ preferences closely can tempt the government to 
reappoint members who are regarded as beneficial for the government. To date, two 
Policy Board members have been reappointed, namely Ueda Kazuo and Suda Miyako. 
Ueda started in 1998 with a two year term and the possibility of re-appointment. The 
rationale behind this was to avoid the term of all four members who were appointed in 
April 1998 ending on the same date. Regarding Suda, it is said that her reappointment 
was due to the problem that no adequate female successor could be found (Nakahara 
2006). After ten years in office, Suda was replaced by Shirai Sayuri in 2011. However, 
the Bank of Japan Law does not claim that a woman has to be part of the Policy Board. 
Another person who had served longer than the usual five years was Nishimura 
Kiyohiko. Appointed in 2005 as a deliberative Policy Board member, he was promoted 
to Deputy Governor in 2008, and served until March 2013.  
 
Monetary Policy Models and Forecasts 
Since October 2000, the BOJ has begun to publish economic forecasts of inflation and 
the GDP growth rate. In the semiannually “Outlook and Risk Assessment of the 
Economy and Prices”233, forecasts of each Policy Board member in regards of the 
inflation and the GDP are published. In April of each year, forecasts are published for 
the current year, whereas in October of each year forecasts of the current and following 
year are provided. In April 2001, forecasts of “consumer goods price inflation” (CGPI 
inflation) were added (Fujiwara 2005: 255-256). Then-Governor Hayami stated that the 
report  
“summarizes the standard scenario and risks pertaining to the economic 
outlook, as well as giving forecasts of prices and growth rate by Policy 
Board Members as a reference. The scenario and a list of possible risks 
given in the report have been useful in terms of both enriching discussion 
and improving external accountability by providing a common platform 
for subsequent discussions at Monetary Policy Meetings” (Hayami 2004: 
541).  
 
Since April 2005, the BOJ has decided to extend the projection period by one year, 
which means that the BOJ publishes forecasts for the current fiscal year and the 
following fiscal year in the April and October issues of the “Outlook” (Bank of Japan, 6 
April 2005). Table 6-5 shows which economic models the BOJ applies to conduct such 
forecasts. Since 2004, the BOJ has employed the Japanese Economic Model (JEM), 
                                                 
233 In 2004 the title changed to “Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices” (see, Note 229).   
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which was supplemented by the Quarterly Economic Model (Q-JEM) in 2008 and the 
Medium-Scale Japanese Economic Model (M-JEM) in 2009.  
 
Table 6-5: Economic Models Applied by the BOJ  
 JEM Q-JEM M-JEM 
Since 2004 2008 2009 
Literature Fujiwara et al. (2005) 
Kimura et al. (2006) 
Ôkina et al. (2008) 
Miyao et al. (2008) 
Ichiue et al. (2009) 
Fukunaga et al. (2011) 
Fueki et al. (2010) 
Fueki et al. (2011) 
Saitô et al. (2011) 
Source: Based on Fueki and Fukunaga (2011: 33) 
 
 
Regarding the usefulness of forecast modelling, Fujiwara (2005) finds that the BOJ’s 
inflation and growth forecasts have impact on the forecasts of academic and private 
agents. After the publication of forecasts in the BOJ’s “Outlook”, private actors adjust 
their forecasts which results in a decreased heterogeneity between private forecasts. 
Thus, forecasts by the BOJ contribute to stabilize the expectations for inflation and 
growth.  
 
6.4.5 The Communication Strategy of the Bank of Japan  
Due to the fact that the BOJ has no clear price stability objectives (at least until 2012), it 
is a logical consequence that financial markets and the general public are putting greater 
weight on Policy Board members public statements, e.g. regarding their standpoint on 
price stability. However, statements by Policy Board members are the cause of 
confusion in the financial markets from time to time. For instance, certain members said 
that the Japanese economy is not in a deflationary spiral (defure supairaru)234, and, in 
2000, some members were of the opinion that Japan’s deflation was a “good deflation” 
(yoi bukka geraku ron) caused by increased competition. The communication strategy 
until 2001 (and much later) was dominated by the argument that in an environment of 
interest near zero a central bank has little power to influence prices and economic 
growth. The communication was limited to explaining precisely that message. Basically, 
statements by BOJ members indicate that the communication strategy aimed at 
minimizing threats to the legitimacy and independence of the BOJ, rather than fueling 
expectations. Owing to the “unique circumstances” of deflation and very low interest 
                                                 
234 See, e.g., Minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings on 9 April 1998, or 19 May 1998. 
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rates in addition to the “youth” and “fragility” of the new independent BOJ (Blinder et 
al. 2001: 81-82), it was most important for the BOJ to defend itself by building a 
strategy of counteract against every critique it was confronted with. 235  A specific 
example of how the BOJ’s lack of clear strategy in communication could damage the 
efficiency of monetary policy is the end of zero interest rate policy in August 2000. It 
can be argued that the BOJ failed to provide a quantified target range for inflation and a 
forecast for future inflation after deciding upon the termination of the zero interest rate 
policy. This could lead market participants to believe that further interest rate hikes 
might follow. If the BOJ had provided a better defined target and forecasts, it might 
have been possible to limit unwanted reactions by market participants (Blinder et al. 
2001: 81-82). 
 
6.5 The Bank of Japan and Central Bank Accountability and Transparency 
Indices 
This section focuses on accountability and transparency indices and their application to 
the Bank of Japan. Quantitative measures provide additional and comparative insights 
into the BOJ’s practice of accountability and transparency (here, in comparison with the 
ECB, the Fed, and the BOE). Arguably, the indexation of central bank accountability 
and transparency is often not investigated in as much depth as the issue of central bank 
independence, but has become an important subject in recent research. The previous 
section illustrated that the terms of central bank accountability and transparency cover 
several different aspects, making it a difficult task to build a comprehensive measure of 
central bank accountability and transparency.  
 
The following sections will focus on central bank accountability and transparency 
indices. The results of the Bank of Japan will be discussed in order to gain a deeper 
understanding the BOJ’s accountability and transparency 
 
6.5.1 The Bank of Japan and Central Bank Accountability Indices  
Measuring central bank accountability and transparency is a demanding challenge. The 
problems of achiving a precise classification of both concepts involve difficulties that 
defy simple solutions, and it is doubtful whether the construction of a transparency or 
                                                 
235 See, discussion in section 8-8.  
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accountability index is possible without bias and arbitrariness. For example, it is not 
always clear to which issue of accountability or transparency “the various potential 
measures should be allocated. A central bank report may, by example, contribute to both 
transparency and accountability.” (Sterne 2000: 72). As a consequence, Bini-Smaghi 
and Gros (2001: 7) argue that “it is tempting to assess central bank accountability and 
transparency by creating an indicator as done in the literature on central bank 
independence. We [Bini-Smaghi and Gros] have succumbed to this temptation, but only 
to show that indicators based on formal criteria are not useful in this field.” However, 
this does not principally mean that research based on measuring accountability or 
transparency is an impossible task. It is rather the case that one must be aware of these 
problems if more than superficial results are to be obtained from the many cross-
national measures on the issue of central bank accountability and transparency.  
 
Regardless of the difficulties, several sets of indicators have been suggested for 
developing an index of central bank accountability and transparency. Indeed, a 
quantitative index may be useful in facilitating the comparison of central bank 
accountability and transparency amongst central banks. Measuring the degree of central 
bank accountability and transparency in quantitative numbers implicates that some 
subjective choices were made, for instance, which aspects to focus on or how detailed 
the various issues of accountability and transparency should be covered in the index. 
Another point is the important question of using weighted or non-weighted factors. 
Laurens et al. (2009: 99) state that “whether the variables impact equally on 
independence, or whether some of them should be given a higher (lower) weight. A 
widely adopted solution has been to weight all variables equally so as to reduce the 
potential for arbitrariness.” The last decision to make is whether to use the central 
banks’ statute or the de facto situation of central banks. The majority of scholars employ 
the statutes of the central banks as the main source of information. However, there is no 
standard procedure for a proxy of accountability and building a measure based on 
quantitative numbers. Indeed, some scholars mix de iure with de facto components of 
accountability, e.g. Laurens et al. (2009)236, whose index will be discussed later.  
 
                                                 
236 The final objective of monetary policy and the conflict resolution procedures are valued de iure, 
whereas the quantification of objectives is valued de facto. In addition, regular appearances before 
parliament are not clearly separated between de iure and de facto.  
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In addition, indices help to document changes and developments of accountability and 
transparency practices over time. This subsection provides a summary of the results of 
various central bank accountability indices, providing a comparative data set of the BOJ, 
ECB, US Federal Reserve and BOE. Subsequently, the accountability of the BOJ will 
be scrutinized in correlation with a more detailed discussion of the index by de Haan, 
Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998) and the IMF study by Laurens et al. (2009). It must 
be noted that this approach is not meant as a clear comparison with the other central 
banks, nor is it a perfectly correct assessment of the BOJ’s accountability and 
transparency. To be more precise, it aims to provide a useful summary of the analyses 
carried out in previous sections.  
 
6.5.1.1 Results of Selected Central Bank Accountability Indices  
Several studies have concentrated on empirically researching measures of central bank 
accountability. This section introduces some major central bank accountability indices 
and their results for the Bank of Japan in comparisons to the European Central Bank, 
US Federal Reserve, and the Bank of England. Subsequently, the indices by de Haan, 
Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger (1998) and Laurens et al. (2009) will be discussed in more 
detail.  
 
Bini-Smaghi and Gros 2001 
Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001) construct an index of central bank accountability, 
applying it – as done in this thesis – to four major central banks: the Bank of Japan, the 
European Central Bank, the US Federal Reserve, and the Bank of England. Nota bene, 
Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001) do not generate a numerical index, but rather present a 
qualitative assessment of 15 aspects of central bank accountability. The index is divided 
into three subjects:  
1. Ex ante accountability 
2. Ex post accountability 
3. Accountability procedures 
 
Translating Bini-Smaghi and Gros’ results into numerical numbers, the BOJ scores 7 
points, and reaches an accountability level that is somewhat lower but still comparable 
to that of the the European Central Bank. In contrast, the US Federal Reserve and the 
Bank of England score much higher.  
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Siklos (2002) 
Siklos (2002) constructs an index of accountability based on twelve variables, and 
applies it to 20 central banks, which are all from advanced industrial countries. The BOJ 
scores remarkably high, ranking second after the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The 
focus of this index on the concept of disclosure and publications appears to be 
favourable for the evaluation of the BOJ’s accountability.   
 
Table 6-6 summarizes the outcome of selected accountability indices regarding the BOJ 
in comparison to other major central banks: the European Central Bank, the US Federal 
Reserve, and the Bank of England. The results of these central bank accountability 
indicators show that there are considerable variations in accountability. Taking the mean 
value, the BOJ has an accountability value of 0.61 which is higher than the ECB or the 
Federal Reserve. The most accountable central bank in this sample is the Bank of 
England which scores 0.71 on average.  
 
Table 6-6: Results of Selected Central Bank Accountability Indices (in Normalized 
Values) 
 BOJ ECB Fed BOE 
De Haan, Amtenbrink, Eijffinger (1998) 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.85 
Bini-Smaghi, Gros (2001) 0.47 0.50 0.70 0.77 
Siklos (2002) 0.79 0.71 0.56 0.69 
Hughes Hallett, Libich (2006) 0.67 0.17 0.50 0.67 
Arnone, Laurens, Segalotto (2009) 0.68 0.77 0.72 0.58 
Mean value of central bank 
accountability 
0.61 0.49 0.59 0.71 
Source: Own calculation based on the central bank accountability indices  
 
 
6.5.1.2 The de Haan et al. (1998) Central Bank Accountability Index 
De Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998) conducted a cross-country analysis of 16 
central banks by constructing an index for democratic accountability. This indicator 
examines the relationship between central bank independence and accountability and is 
distinguishes between three aspects:  
1. Ultimate objectives of monetary policy 
2. Transparency of actual monetary policy 
3. Final responsibility for monetary policy 
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Concerning the first aspect, this indicator inspects whether the ultimate objectives of 
monetary policy are clearly defined, and if a priority exists in case of multiple goals.237 
Both the majority of economists and international organisations, such as the IMF or BIS, 
stress the importance of clear monetary policy objectives. For instance, the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (2008: 1) emphasizes the necessity of clear and precise 
monetary policy goals for a central bank, a prerequisite for the concept of accountability. 
The second aspect deals with transparency of monetary policy, or, coined differently, 
the communication strategy taken by the central bank. This includes the requirement to 
publish minutes of the Policy Board meetings and an explanation if the previously 
formulated targets of monetary policy have been achieved. The third aspect, final 
responsibility, contains three essential features, namely the relationship to the 
delegating authority, the presence of override clauses, and the question if the central 
bank key staff can be easily dismissed. Regarding the relationship to the delegating 
authority, usually the parliament has the ultimate responsibility for monetary policy, as 
it has the power to change the legal statute of the central bank and arrange the rules for 
the central bank. This power is referred to as ex-ante control in the academic literature. 
In the case of ex-post accountability, the parliament can revise the central bank law in 
reaction to certain behaviour of the central bank, for instance, if the targets of monetary 
policy have not been achieved.238  
 
In a previous section about principal and agent theory, the necessity of the principal’s 
authorization to observe the agent, i.e., the public and parliament can monitor the 
actions of the central bank, was emphasized. A key question is how the government 
manages to keep an independent central bank accountable for monetary policy. One 
possibility is the implementation of override mechanisms. The subject of override 
mechanisms239 can be seperated into three different types, namely the right to issue 
instructions, the right to approve, suspend, annul or defer decisions, and the right to 
censor decisions on legal grounds. However, the mere existence of override 
                                                 
237 It should be noted that in a legal sense it is problematic to provide the power over the primary 
objectives to an independent agency, which is not democratically elected. 
238 Obviously, the revision of the law is much more problematic if the parliamentary system consists of 
two rather than one chamber.  
239  However, the economic literature is not clear about the positive effects of override mechanisms on the 
degree of central bank accountability, because it is regarded as an aspect of central bank independence 
and not necessarily accountability (Laurens et al. 2009: 104).   
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mechanisms itself does not enhance the democratic accountability of central banks; 
rather the condition of the mechanisms must be completely apparent. Meaning, override 
mechanisms should be both transparent and made public. “Override mechanisms can 
build a bridge between the central bank and democratically elected institutions”, but “it 
has to be ensured that the mechanism is not used as a tool for undesired political 
influence by the executive government”.240 
 
The last aspect of final responsibility focuses on the dismissal of central bank key staff 
through the delegating authority, which is a subject of ex-post accountability. Literature 
that deals with central bank independence often claims long and non-renewable terms 
for central bank key staff. The key question is under what circumstances central bankers 
can be removed. In most cases, a dismissal can be understood as a sanction for weak 
performance (de Haan, Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger 1998: 5-7). After having decided 
upon the monetary policy, monetary authorities should be held accountable. The 
government carefully scrutinizes the central bank’s performance, making the bank 
accountable for its monetary policy decisions. Again, at this stage the ex-post structure 
of the procedure is important, because the actions are not taken simultaneously. Instead, 
they are subjects of different information sets. As a consequence, the policy that is the 
best solution in a current situation can turn out to be a mistake in the future.241 
 
Table 6-7 demonstrates the results of the de Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998) 
accountability index for the BOJ, and compares it with the the European Central Bank, 
the US Federal Reserve, and the Bank of England. The BOJ has the exact same level of 
accountability as the US Federal Reserve. Similar to the results of other indices, the 
Bank of England has one of the most accountable central banks, while the result of the 
the European Central Bank demonstrates relatively low democratic accountability. Point 
9 and 10 are somewhat elusive for the evaluation of the final responsibility of monetary 
policy in Japan.242 Although, the government representatives attend Monetary Policy 
Meeting’s and have the right to request a postponement of monetary policy decisions, 
                                                 
240 Mihailov and Ullrich (2007) construct a model that analyses the effects of overriding of economic 
policy decision by the government. They find that accountability do not solve the trade-off between 
anchoring inflation expectations on target and output stabilization.  
241 Here again, the termination of the zero interest rate policy in August 2000 is a good example (a 
detailed analysis is presented in Chapter 8). 
242 For example, Sousa (2002) and Grauwe and Gros (2008) give points for the BOJ for the questions nine 
and ten, an evaluation the author of this thesis doubts.  
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the Policy Board can override the government’s request, and, therefore, the government 
finally has no power to change monetary policy. Consequently, it is appropriate to 
assess the BOJ with zero points in this regard.  
 
Table 6-7: Comparing the Accountability of Selected Central Banks – The de Haan et 
al. (1998) Accountability Index 
Aspects of accountability BOJ  ECB Fed  BOE 
Ultimate objectives of monetary policy     
1. Does the law stipulate the objectives of monetary policy? + + + + 
2. Clear prioritization of objectives - + - + 
3. Clear definition of objectives - + - + 
4. Are the objectives quantified? - - - + 
Subtotal  1 3 1 4 
Transparency     
5. The publication of an inflation or monetary policy report + - + + 
6. Are minutes published within a reasonable time? + - + + 
7. Explanations of the achievement of its goals + + + + 
Subtotal 3 1 3 3 
Final responsibility     
8. Is the central bank monitored by parliament? + - + + 
9. Has the govt. (or parliament) the right give instructions? - - - + 
10. Is there any kind of review in the procedure to apply the 
override mechanism?243 
- - - + 
11. Has the central bank possibility for an appeal in case of 
instruction? 
- - - - 
12. Can the central bank law be changed by a simple majority 
in Parliament? 
+ - + + 
13. Is past performance a reason for dismissal of a Central 
Bank Governor?244 
- - - - 
Subtotal 2 0 2 4 
Total 6 4 6 11 
Source: Own estimation based on the index by de Haan et al. (1998) 
Note: (+) is regarded as one point, and (-) is zero points.  
 
 
6.5.1.3 The Laurens et al. (2009) Central Bank Accountability Index 
The IMF offers a recent and comprehensive study conducted by Laurens et al. (2009), 
which contains a measure of accountability for 109 countries. The detailed components 
of the index are presented in Appendix B. This subchapter offers an update of the 
                                                 
243 For example, override mechanism are implemented in BOE, BOC, Swedish Riksbank, and RBNZ.  
244 For example, the dismissal of a Central Bank Governor is possible for RBN and conditionally possible 
for the BOC.  
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information on this index to understand the accountability of the BOJ, and focuses on 
difficulties of the assessment of the Bank of Japan. 
 
Table 6-8: The Laurens et al. (2009) Central Bank Accountability Index 
 BOJ* BOJ** ECB Fed BOE 
Responsibility      
1. Who sets objectives of monetary policy? 1 1 1 1 0 
2. Is central bank subject to possible interference 
in monetary policy? 
0 0 1 1 0 
Objectives      
3. Clarity on final objectives of monetary policy 
(de iure)  
0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 
4. Quantification of target (de facto) 1 1*** 1 0 1 
5. Publication of economic outlook  1 1 0.33 1 0.66 
Ex post accountability      
6. Reporting mechanisms 0.66 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.66 
7. Regular appearance before parliament 0 1 1 1 1 
8. Conflict resolution procedures 0.66 1 0 0 1 
Governance      
9. Decision-making structure 1 1 1 1 1 
10. Clear and detailed explanation of appointment 
procedures 
1 1 1 1 1 
Total 6.83 8.16 7.66 7.16 5.83 
Normalized value 0.68 0.82 0.77 0.72 0.58 
Source: based on Laurens et al. (2009) 
Notes: 
* Calculation by Laurens et al. (2009). 
** Own calculation  
*** In February 2012, the BOJ introduced an inflation target of 1 per cent 
 
 
The results of the index, presented in Table 6-8, contradict the view of the majority of 
accountability measures which find that one of the most accountable central bank is the 
Bank of England, whereas the European Central Bank is usually regarded as a central 
bank which is not very accountable. The author’s estimation of the accountability of the 
BOJ is a value of 0.82, a better result than the other central banks. There are some 
differences in the assessment of the accountability of the Bank of Japan when 
comparing the work of Laurens et al. (2009) to the author of this thesis. The focus will 
now shift to a discussion of the most important points in which the evaluation differs 
from the original work by Laurens et al. (2009) (in case of consistency, a repetition of 
the evaluation is avoided).  
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Point 2 deals with interference in monetary policy decisions by another institution. The 
central bank scores 0 points in case of (a) the presence of government representative(s) 
with voting right, or (b) the need of approval of the government in monetary policy 
decisions. When applying Laurens et al.’s (2009) definition literally, the BOJ should 
score a point as neither of the requirements are given. However, the right of government 
representatives to request a postponement of monetary policy decisions might be 
interpreted as interference in the monetary policy process. Regarding Point 4, the 
quantification of the central bank’s objective, Laurens et al. (2009), applying the data 
from 2003, interpreted the BOJ’s quantitative easing policy period from 2001 to 2006 as 
a quantification of the monetary objective.245 After the exit of the quantitative easing 
policy in March 2006, the BOJ returned to a conventional monetary policy framework 
based on the uncollateralized overnight call rate. Most recently, since February 2012, 
the BOJ has introduced an inflation target of 1 per cent. That is the reason why the BOJ 
scores a point here.  
 
Point 7 deals with appearances before parliament. This variable combines the de iure 
and the de facto interaction between the central bank and the legislature. In case of the 
presence of a “tangible relationship” between the two, the central bank scores a point. 
The BOE appears on a regular basis, the ECB quarterly, and the US Fed annually (Bini-
Smaghi, Gros 2001: 154), which means that all score a point. The BOJ has to appear at 
least twice a year, and the BOJ Governor or other key staff of the BOJ is required to 
appear before the Diet on request (Article 54-3, BOJ Law). As a result, the BOJ scores a 
point here.246 Point 8 of the index focuses on conflict resolution procedures. Definition 
of conflicts means that the possibility of a disagreement between the central bank and 
the government must be defined. The “procedure to resolve conflict” is the course 
followed in the relationship between the central bank and the government in case a 
conflict arises. By “clear outcomes in the case to resolve conflict” the authors mean “the 
last resort procedures that have to be adopted in case the conflict is not resolved. This 
usually involves the possibility for one of the two subjects or for a third one (e.g. 
parliament) to have the last word at the end of the conflict resolution procedure.” As a 
                                                 
245 However, Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) correctly concluded that the targets for the current account 
balance implemented during the quantitative easing policy were not clear enough to score a point here. 
246 It must be noted that the Japanese government exercised the right excessively during the period of 
Governor Hayami 1998-2003.  
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consequence, the BOJ scores a full point. Although the Japanese government has the 
right to request a postponement of monetary policy decisions, the BOJ can override the 
government’s request (Article 19, Paragraph 3).247 248 
 
6.5.2 The Bank of Japan and Central Bank Transparency Indices 
This part follows the methodology of the previous part: First, this section summarizes 
the results of selected indices of central bank transparency for the BOJ in comparison to 
the European Centarl Bank, US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. 
Subsequently, this subchapter discusses the evaluation of the BOJ’s transparency in 
more detail, based on an index by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006).  
 
6.5.2.1 Results of Selected Central Bank Transparency Indices 
The issue of central bank transparency has been debated for a relatively long time, but 
concepts to measure it “were severely limited until central banks […] began to release 
more and more information.” Basically, transparency is regarded as a qualitative 
concept. As a consequence, it is difficult to define distinct measures. However, some 
measures for transparency exist. One of the first studies was carried out by Bini-Smaghi 
and Gros (2001), who offer a simple but proficient central bank transparency index that 
consists of four issues of the central bank: 1. objectives 2. strategy 3. publication of data 
and forecasts and, 4. communication strategy. In 2000, Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger, 
and Sterne presented a study which encompasses 94 central banks, and composes an 
index of policy explanations that consists of explanations of policy decisions, 
explanations in forecasts and predictive analysis, and, lastly, explanations in publishing 
assessments and research. More recent studies of central bank transparency indices 
includes, for example, Siklos (2002), Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), the IMF study by 
Laurens et al. (2009), the OECD study by Minegishi and Cournede (2009), and Dincer 
and Eichengreen (2010).  
 
The construction of central bank transparency measures is an issue of subjectivity and, 
consequently, the results vary considerably (Table 6-9). According to the Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006) index, the most transparent central banks are Reserve Bank of New 
                                                 
247 Siklos (2002: 248) confirms this evaluation. 
248 The application of this process can be instructively analysed with the decision to abandon the zero 
interest rate policy in August 2000 (see, Chapter 8). 
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Zealand, the Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank. Contrarily, the BOJ and the 
Swiss National Bank score worst. Estimations made by Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001) 
rate the level of transparency of the European Central Bank as high, whereas others 
view the European Central Bank as less transparent.249 
 
Siklos (2002) creates a transparency index that attempts to assess the degree of 
economically and institutionally relevant information published by a central bank. The 
disclosure performance is taken from 20 central banks, all from advanced industrial 
countries. 250  This index assigns the best transparency performance to the Bank of 
England, followed by the US Federal Reserve. The European Central Bank scores 
poorly, while the BOJ scores relatively well coming in at 6th place with a value of 0.74. 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2010), by using the transparency index by Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006), have extended the sample to 100 countries and put the focus on a longer 
time period (between 1998 and 2005). This index reveals that Japan’s transparency has 
risen since 2004, i.e. the BOJ scores higher than in the original Eijffinger and Geraats 
index.  
 
The results of selected central bank transparency indices for the BOJ in comparison to 
the ECB, US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England are summarized in Table 6-9. 
The average value suggests that the BOJ has a higher level of transparency than the 
ECB (0.68 vs. 0.64). However, the result depends on which measure is taken. Together 
with the US Federal Reserve, all three central banks are outscored by the Bank of 
England, which has (as an inflation targeter) the significant highest level of 
transparency among the four central banks.  
  
Table 6-9: Results of Selected Central Bank Transparency Indices (in Normalized 
Values) 
 BOJ ECB Fed BOE 
Siklos (2002) 0.74 0.52 0.87 0.91 
Eijffinger, Geraats (2006) 0.53 0.70 0.67 0.87 
Laurens et al. (2009)  0.79 0.63 0.84 1.00 
Minegishi, Cournede (2009)  0.73 0.64 0.67 0.83 
                                                 
249 A survey by Reuters ranks European Central Bank last of G7 central banks. 
250 Interestingly, one principal component refers to the special recognition of the role of financial system 
stability. In case of an implementation of such a clause the index provides the central bank with a point. 
Usually, the presence of multiply objects is regarded as detrimental to accountability.  
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Dincer, Eichengreen (2010) 0.63 0.73 0.67 0.83 
Mean value of central bank 
transparency 
0.68 0.64 0.74 0.89 
Source: Own calculation based on the central bank transparency indices 
 
 
6.5.2.2 The Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) Central Bank Transparency Index 
This section applies the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index in more detail, as this 
measure is a very popular and is frequently applied in the economic literature.251 This 
comprehensive index for central bank transparency is based on five categories of 
transparency: political, economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency (see, 
section 6.3.6). The sample consists of nine major central banks 252  for the period 
between 1998 and 2002. Each of the five aspects of transparency contains three 
questions with equal weight and a maximum score of one. The total is the summed up 
value from the different transparency aspects, i.e. 15 points is the maximum score. The 
data was taken from published central bank and government documents available on the 
according websites. The detailed components of the index are presented in Appendix C. 
The results of the BOJ for 2002 (original assessment by Eijffinger and Geraats [2006]) 
and 2011 (own estimation) in comparison to the ECB, Fed and BOE are presented in 
Table 6-10.  
 
Table 6-10: The Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) Central Bank Transparency Index 
Aspects of central bank 
transparency 
BOJ 
2002 
BOJ 
2012 
ECB 
2002 
Fed 
2002 
BOE 
2002 
Political transparency      
1. Formal objectives 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 1 
2. Quantitative targets 0 1 1 0 1 
3. Institutional arrangements 1 1 1 0.5 1 
Economic transparency      
4. Economic data 1 1 1 1 1 
5. Policy models 0 1 1 1 1 
6. Central bank forecasts 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
                                                 
251 For instance, Lyziak et al. (2007) apply the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index for the central bank of 
Poland, Malik (2008) for Pakistan, Jarmuzek et al. (2004) for a comparative analysis of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland vs. the ECB. The BIS (2009) applies this index to compare monetary 
policy frameworks. 
252 The nine central banks are the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank, Bank of England, 
Bank of Canada, European Central Bank, US Federal Reserve, Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank of Japan, 
and the Swiss National Bank.  
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Procedural transparency      
7. Explicit strategy 0 0 1 0 1 
8. Minutes 1 1 0 1 1 
9. Voting records 1 1 0 1 1 
Policy transparency      
10. Prompt announcement 1 1 1 1 1 
11. Policy explanations 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 
12. Policy inclination 0 0 0 1 0 
Operational transparency      
13. Control errors 0.5 1 1 1 1 
14. Transmission disturbances 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 1 
15. Evaluation policy outcome 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total Value 8 11 10.5 10 13 
Normalized Value 0.53 0.73 0.70 0.67 0.87 
Source: Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). Updated data for the BOJ for the year 2012 own 
estimation. 
 
 
Political Transparency (1-3) 
As discussed in previous chapter of this thesis, the BOJ has multiple monetary policy 
objections without explicit prioritisation.253  However, considerable improvements in 
formulating the targets of its monetary policy have been introduced by the BOJ. Since 
March 2006, the BOJ has released “The Bank’s Thinking on Price Stability” on an 
annual basis which provides some guidance in regards of quantitative targets. However, 
the stated values are based on Policy Board members’ view, and, therefore, are not the 
policy target of the BOJ in a strict sense (Minegishi and Cournede (2009: 38).254 
Starting in February of 2012, the BOJ introduced a new price stability goal in the 
medium to long term of one per cent, which offers a precise definition or quantification 
of its monetary policy objective. Altogether, the BOJ scores 2.5 points in regards of 
political transparency. 
 
Economic Transparency (4-6) 
The BOJ is close to score the maximum score in economic transparency. Regarding 
economic models (question 5), it is essential to know what kind of policy models the 
                                                 
253 Minegishi and Cournede (2009: 37) refer to Article 2 of the BOJ Law and assess a full point to the 
BOJ.  
254 There exist numerous papers on the consequences of policy decisions announcements. However, all 
these studies concentrate on reserves targeting. Most central banks have abandon this policy tool with the 
notable exception of the Bank of Japan with its zero-interest-rate-policy from 1999 to 2000 (Eijffinger 
and Geraats 2006) and the quantitative easing policy from 2001 to 2006.  
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central bank employs in order to interpret its actions. Until 2004, the BOJ had not 
disclosed a formal macroeconomic model for policy analysis. However, since 2004, the 
BOJ employs the Japanese economic model (JEM) (see, e.g., Fujiwara et al. 2005), 
since 2008, the quarterly Japanese economic model (Q-JEM) (see, e.g., Fukunaga et al. 
2011) and since 2009, the medium-scale Japanese economic model (M-JEM) (see, e.g., 
Fueki et al. 2010 and 2011) (see, Table 6-5).  
 
Regarding question five in the index, which deals with forecasts of the central bank, the 
BOJ had improved its transparency. Since 2004, the BOJ has employed the Japanese 
Economic Model (JEM) (Fujiwara et al. 2005). In 2008, the BOJ introduced a new 
hybrid-type model named Q-JEM (Quarterly-Japanese Economic Model) (Hara et al. 
2009, Fukunaga et al. (2011). One year later, the suite of models was expanded by the 
medium-scale Japanese economic model (M-JEM) (Fueki et al. 2010, 2011). In 
Eijffinger and Geraats’ (2006) study, Japan does not reach the maximum score, because 
it explained monetary policy decisions only after changes in monetary policy until 2003. 
Recently, the BOJ has begun to explain policy actions also when it does not change 
monetary policy and, therefore, deserves a full point in the index.  
 
Question 6 focuses on macroeconomic forecasts. The BOJ has published inflation and 
output forecasts semi-annually since October of 2000, starting with data for the current 
fiscal year in the April issue and for the current and following year in the October issue. 
The projection period horizon was extended in 2005 by one year in the April issue of 
“Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices”. That is, the BOJ published its outlook for 
the current fiscal year and the following fiscal year in both the April and the October 
issues (Bank of Japan 6 April 2005). In 2008, shortly after Shirakawa took the helm of 
the BOJ, the central bank increased its transparency in terms of its views concerning 
growth and inflation again. The Bank started to extend the forecast horizon for growth 
and inflation to the current fiscal year and two fiscal years ahead.  
 
It can be summarised that the BOJ has implemented an approach in which each 
individual Policy Board member estimates the suitable course of future policy interest 
rates by providing forecasts of the real gross domestic product (GDP), core consumer 
price index (CPI) and corporate goods price index (CGPI) over a two-year time horizon, 
“thereby taking into account market expectations on the future development of policy 
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rates” (Iwata 2008). In addition, since 2008, the BOJ provides information by making 
use of a “risk balance sheet”255, which is published in the “Outlook for Economic 
Activity and Prices”. Herein, minimum, central and maximum projections made by each 
voting member are summarised. 
 
Procedural Transparency (7-9) 
The Japanese central bank scores 2 points concerning procedural transparency. The BOJ 
publishes detailed minutes in a timely fashion256, including individual voting records257 
(individual accountability), and the comments made by the two government 
representatives. Already since 2000, the BOJ has started to publish detailed minutes, 
thus, assuming the role of a forerunner for other central banks (e.g. US Federal Reserve 
from 2005). Since 2007, the BOJ has improved its procedural transparency further, 
releasing the voting record immediately after Monetary Policy Meetings. 258 
 
Policy Transparency (10-12) 
Regarding question 11, the BOJ has been systematically providing policy explanations 
since 2003. Previously there were some occasions when no explanation was provided 
for decisions to keep policy unchanged. Question 12 focuses on explicit future policy 
inclination.259 From 2008 on, the BOJ had followed the trend set by the Fed to provide 
“verbal forward-looking guidance in policy decision statements” (Minegishi and 
Cournede 2009). However, this arrangement is not sufficient policy inclination to score 
a point. Altogether, the BOJ scores two points in the area of policy transparency.  
 
                                                 
255 On 30 April 2008, Policy Board members discussed in the Monetary Policy Meeting how the Risk 
Balance Charts should be used.  “A few members expressed the view that, in a situation of high 
uncertainty, the Risk Balance Charts, each of which showed a probability distribution of risks aggregated 
from those produced by individual Policy Board members, would act as a valuable communication tool, 
enhancing monetary policy transparency.  One member said that the information that was most important 
to convey was about the mechanism behind economic and price developments, and it was necessary in the 
Bank's communication to explain in a well-balanced manner both the mechanism and the figures 
indicated by the Risk Balance Charts, to prevent the figures from taking on a life of their own.  A few 
members said that the Bank should decide whether it would continue to release the Risk Balance Charts 
after carefully assessing the market's reaction.” (BOJ 2008, Minutes of 30 April 2008).  
256 Usually, the BOJ releases the minutes shortly after the subsequent meeting.  
257 Geraats (2005: 20) remarks that the disclosure of voting patterns is remarkably uncommon. Besides 
the BOJ only a few central banks, such as Bank of Korea, Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, 
Swedish Riksbank and the Polish National Bank are publishing voting records.   
258 Before that the record had been disclosed only at the time of the publication of the minutes.  
259 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand was the first central bank which released its own policy rate 
projection. Norway and Sweden followed this practice in 2005 and 2007 respectively (Minegishi and 
Cournede 2009).  
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Operational Transparency (13-15) 
The BOJ scores two points in operational transparency. The score of 0.5 in Eijffinger 
and Geraats index regarding question 13 - control errors - refers to the fact that the 
operating target of the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the BOJ during the 
quantitative easing policy between 2001 and 2006 was rather vaguely specified and had 
considerable fluctuations without sufficient explanations. After the termination of the 
quantitative easing policy, the BOJ’s main operation target is the uncollateralized 
overnight call rate. Thus, the BOJ scores a full point. Although the BOJ provides 
information on macroeconomic disturbances on basis of a monthly analysis of the 
current macroeconomic situation (in the Monthly Report of Recent Economic and 
Financial Developments), it has not (yet) discussed past forecast errors. Therefore, the 
BOJ obtains only 0.5 points. Although the Japanese central bank does provide an 
informal evaluation of policy outcome in the Monthly Report of Recent Economic and 
Financial Developments, an explicit account for deviations between the policy 
outcomes and the objectives is not sufficiently provided.  
 
6.5.2.3 The Development of Bank of Japan’s Transparency  
Many studies have demonstrated that in recent years central banks have adopted more 
transparent communication strategies, and have converged strongly among OECD 
countries (see, Minegishi and Cournede 2009, Dincer and Eichengreen 2010).260 This 
argument holds true for the Bank of Japan. In the original work of Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006), the BOJ scored only 8 points, which was second lowest after the Swiss 
National Bank. The Bank of Japan (2002, Self assessment) has claimed that it 
continuously makes the effort to enhance its transparency in regards of its monetary 
policy. Table 6-10 and 6-11 confirms this view, and demonstrates that the BOJ’s 
transparency has increased to a considerable degree.  
 
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) indicator compares transparency between 1998 and 2002, 
and shows that the level of transparency has improved in most central banks over time. 
However, the BOJ’s transparency between 1998 and 2002 has not improved, which is a 
very untypical result in international comparison (the other notable exception was the 
Bank of Canada). However, Dincer and Eichengreen (2010: 35) argue that since 2003 
                                                 
260 However, one aspect which still varies a lot across central banks is the transparency about the 
decision-making process with respect to minutes and voting records.  
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the BOJ’s transparency has essentially raised. Various other central bank transparency 
indices confirm this view and suggest that the BOJ had made big progress in central 
bank transparency. In an OECD study, Minegishi and Cournede (2009) showed that the 
Bank of Japan had made the largest improvement towards central bank transparency 
among all samples, increasing its score from 0.36 points in 1999 to 0.73 points in 2009, 
which is a plus of 0.37 (Table 6-11). 
 
Table 6-11: The Development of the Bank of Japan’s Transparency 
 Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2010) 
Minegishi and 
Cournede (2009) 
1998 0.53 NA 
1999 0.53 0.36 
2000 0.57 0.52 
2001 0.53 0.57 
2002 0.53 0.57 
2003 0.53 0.61 
2004 0.63 0.61 
2005 0.63 0.62 
2006 0.63 0.64 
2007 NA 0.68 
2008 NA 0.73 
2009 NA 0.73 
Difference 
1999-2006 
+0.10 +0.28 
Difference 
1999-2009 
___ +0.37 
Source: Own calculation based on Dincer and Eichengreen (2010) and Minegishi and 
Cournede (2009) 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
After defining and explaining the terms of central bank accountability and transparency, 
this chapter analysed the Bank of Japan’s accountability and transparency. Based on the 
new BOJ Law, the BOJ has increased its accountability and particularly its transparency 
to a substantial amount. This section has demonstrated that the assessment of the BOJ’s 
transparency and accountability in different indices of central bank accountability and 
central bank transparency depends on the structure of the index. Generally speaking, the 
BOJ scores well if the index focuses mainly on publications of minutes’ of Monetary 
Policy Board Meetings and the voting structure, or the disclosure of information. In 
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contrast, if the index shows a priority on objectives of monetary policy, the BOJ scores 
comparatively poor. This has changed since February 2012, when the BOJ introduced 
an inflation target. A second conclusion of this chapter is that the accountability and 
transparency of the Bank of Japan has increased over time to a high extent since the 
revision of the Bank of Japan Law in 1998. This observation is confirmed by an update 
of the accountability index by Laurens et al. (2009) and the transparency index by 
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). This section demonstrated that the accountability and 
transparency of the BOJ is higher than in the evaluations of the original works.  
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7. THE DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE OF THE “OLD” BANK OF JAPAN 
7.1 Introduction 
The requirement for independent central banks is deep-rooted in both economic theory 
and in political practice, and, at present, many governments have granted their central 
banks’ independence. However, de iure central bank independence does not guarantee 
de facto independence (Cukierman 2005; Itô 2009: 62). For instance, Capie et al. (1994: 
50) argue that it is impossible to understand the degree of central bank independence 
from the perspective of legislation alone. This chapter analyses the independence of the 
“old” Bank of Japan in a de facto sense, basing the following chapter on selected case 
studies.  
 
Cross-country analyses about central banks usually analyse the de iure environment, 
and conclude that the Bank of Japan has been independent from political influence since 
the BJL revision (see, for instance, Gerdesmeier, Mongelli and Roffia 2007: 14). 
However, looking behind the central bank statute and analysing the central bank’s 
actual independence is worthy of attention. Cukierman (2005: 40) notes the following: 
 “Due to its multi-dimensional nature there is no single compelling 
measure of central bank independence. Much of the academic literature 
of the last twenty years has utilized legal characteristics from central 
bank charters to construct aggregate indices of legal independence. 
However, since charters normally are highly incomplete contracts, actual 
independence is also affected by numerous more or less formal 
arrangements between governments and the central bank. As a 
consequence, there normally are discrepancies between the legal and the 
actual independence of a central bank.”  
 
As a result, the de facto independence of a central bank may differ to a high extent from 
its de iure independence (Cukierman 1992; Klomp and de Haan 2010; Wagner 1999: 8-
9). De facto independence includes informal measures of central bank behaviour. 
Boylan (2001: 66) argues that:  
“Informal measures attempt to gauge less visible aspects of central bank 
behavior. Unofficial arrangements between the central bank and various 
parts of the government, the quality of the bank’s research department, 
and the personalities of key individuals in the central bank are all 
variables thought to affect behavioural autonomy.”  
 
Following a similar line of argument, Louis Rasminsky, former Governor of Bank of 
Canada, stated in 1966 that “The formal status of the central bank varies a great deal 
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from country to country. In any case this is a field in which the real situation is not 
likely to be revealed by the terms of the statute. Much depends on history and tradition 
and a fair amount even on the personalities involved.”261 Stressing the importance of 
analysing central bank independence not only via the central bank statute, but rather via 
the overall institutional setting of a central bank, the Italian central banker Carlo Ciampi 
(Financial Times 1992, quoted from James 2010: 14) stated that “a meaningful appraisal 
of central bank independence requires a thorough evaluation of the institutional setting 
and of the bank’s modus operandi as developed over time and consolidated in practice.” 
The determination of central bank independence involves “a fairly intimate knowledge 
of the structure, organisation, and the working practices of the institution, to say nothing 
of the personalities in both the central bank and the government” (Capie et al. 1994: 55).  
 
This section provides an overview of the relationship between the Japanese Government 
with the Bank of Japan and the decision-making process of monetary policy before 
turning to the new Bank of Japan in the subsequent chapter. This procedure enables a 
comparative view of the BOJ to be established. 
 
7.2 The System of Alternating Bank of Japan Governors 
Since the end of 1960s, the governorship of the BOJ has been characterized by a well-
established pattern in which the position of the BOJ Governor was alternately filled by a 
former MOF top bureaucrat and a Bank official. Table 7-1 illustrates that the Deputy 
Governor was assigned by the other organisation respectively. The promoted MOF 
official would be a former Administrative Vice Minister262 (van Rixtel 2002: 129; Iwata 
2009: 18-21; Kawakita 1995: 67-70; Motoyoshi 2006; 30-31; Yamawaki 2002: 248-
249). According to Uekusa (2008), a very attractive job for retiring MOF officials was 
to become the Governor of the BOJ as a form of amakudari (“descent from heaven”). In 
other words, as noted by Grimes (2001: 197), the post of the BOJ Governor was the 
“biggest prize among MOF bureaucrats’ post-retirement jobs.” The agreement of 
rotating Governors guaranteed the Ministry a high degree of control over the Bank’s 
activities.  
                                                 
261 This quote is taken from Siklos (2002: 2) 
262 Amyx (2000: 19) commented that “[t]he staffing of the top BOJ post by a former MOF AVM 
[Administrative Vice Minister] was problematic – not only in terms of MOF influence on BOJ policy but 
also in terms of political influence on the central bank. This was because every MOF AVM was well 
versed in annual budget negotiations with politicians and was necessarily very political.”  
 184 
 
Table 7-1: The System of Alternating BOJ Governors from 1969-1998 
Period Governor Affiliation Deputy Governor Affiliation 
1969-1974 Sasaki Tadashi BOJ Kôno Tsûichi MOF 
1974-1979 Morinaga Teiichirô MOF Maekawa Haruo BOJ 
1979-1984 Maekawa Haruo BOJ Sumita Satoshi MOF 
1984-1989 Sumita Satoshi MOF Mieno Yasushi BOJ 
1989-1994 Mieno Yasushi BOJ Yoshimoto Hiroshi MOF 
1994-1998 Matsushita Yasuo MOF Fukui Toshihiko BOJ 
Source: Own compilation based on Bank of Japan webpage 
 
 
All efforts to overcome this tacit agreement of rotating governorship failed. In 1994, 
Takemura Masayoshi from the New Party Sakigake, who as the Finance Minister had 
the right to recommend the next BOJ Governor, tried to abandon the sticky pattern of 
rotating BOJ Governors. Takemura intended to nominate a candidate from the private 
sector. The name of economist Tanaka Naoki as a prospective following BOJ Governor 
circulated in the press. In contrast, the MOF lobbied for Matsushita Yasuo, a retired 
MOF top bureaucrat. However, Takemura’s effort to overcome the system failed since 
the ties between the BOJ and the Ministry were too strong and could not be broken.263 
The Finance Minister acquiescently commented that “neither the bureaucracies nor the 
markets were prepared for a Governor who broke the pattern”. In order to preserve the 
stability of the financial system, Takemura finally appointed the candidate from the 
MOF, Matsushita Yasuo, as BOJ Governor (Grimes 2001: 197-198; Yamawaki 2002: 
247-249).  
 
Owing to this alternating system of BOJ Governors, it is obvious to assume that MOF-
affiliated Governors followed the views and “recommendations” of the government to a 
higher degree than BOJ-affiliated Governors. In contrast to this assumption, Kamikawa 
(2006: 132) argues that this system was favourable to the BOJ, because it guaranteed 
that a BOJ-affiliated person would become Governor every second time, and excluded 
other candidates from the process. Kamikawa states that: 
“In 1964, there was a conflict over the Governor post between the 
Ministry and the Bank. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato took the occasion to 
                                                 
263 It must be noted that powerful forces in the BOJ backed Matsushita. Takemura asked Mieno whether 
to nominate BOJ-career Fukui or, as an alternative to re-appoint Mieno for a second term as BOJ chief. 
Both possibilities were denied by the BOJ Governor who recommended Matsushita (Grimes 2001: 198; 
Yamawaki 2002: 247-248).  
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appoint a private bank president as the Governor [Usami Makoto]. The 
tradition that the Bank and the Ministry got the position by turns seems to 
be based on reflection on this. The Bank became able to get the position 
certainly once in twice.” 
 
It can be assumed that MOF-affiliated Governors have a bad performance regarding 
their inflation-records. However, Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (1997: 187-188) do not find 
significant evidence of such a correlation.264 Similarly, in a recent study, Harada (2008) 
evaluates all BOJ Governors Sasaki Tadashi to Fukui Toshihiko and finds no evidence 
that a Governor of BOJ origin performs better than a MOF-rooted Governor. In 
comparison with the predecessor, the real gross domestic product growth must be higher 
and the inflation rate more stable in order to obtain a positive evaluation. According to 
this approach, Morinaga (MOF), Maekawa and Fukui (both BOJ) performed relatively 
well. On the other hand, among the Governors with a weak performance, three came 
from the BOJ (Sasaki, Mieno, and Hayami) and only two from the MOF (Sumita and 
Matsushita). As a result, origin alone does not make a good central bank leader.  
  
7.3 Temporary Assignments (shukkô) 
One custom of amakudari (descent from heaven) was the practice of shukkô (temporary 
transfer of employees). It was common practice to assign staff members between the 
MOF and the BOJ on a temporary basis. One MOF official was always in the Credit and 
Market Management Department of the BOJ. Another retired MOF official filled one of 
the six positions as BOJ Executive Director, and an additional bureaucrat was assigned 
as Executive Auditor. In the case of the BOJ, “temporary assignment to the MOF 
seemed to have been an important prerequisite for becoming a senior executive in the 
BOJ’s important Policy Planning Department”.265 BOJ officials were sent both to the 
Finance Ministry and to other government institutions, such as the Research Department 
of the Economic Planning Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Export-Import 
Bank of Japan, and, in addition, to some private banks (van Rixtel 2002: 127-129; 174). 
In short, it can be argued that the practice of shukkô increased the control of the 
Ministry over the Bank of Japan. However, the following section presents some facts 
                                                 
264 Theoretically, it is possible that a MOF-affiliated Governor can be an example of a “Thomas Becket 
behaviour” what former Governors of the German Bundesbank, such as Hans Tietmeyer, strikingly 
demonstrated. In the Japanese case, however, given the strong ties of bureaucrats with their Ministry, 
such behaviour is most unlikely. 
265 Miller (1996: 25) finds that working in the Policy Planning Department was a springboard for 
promotion to the Executive Board and subsequently to the Policy Board. 
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that the “close” relationship between the BOJ and the Ministry was not entirely 
disadvantageous for the Bank.  
 
7.4 The Ministry of Finance as Safeguard of the Bank of Japan 
As already demonstrated in a former section of this thesis, the BOJ was legally 
dependent on the Government, in particular on the MOF.266 It can be said that the BOJ 
was nothing more than an extension of the Ministry. Regarding the relationship to the 
MOF, several sources characterized the BOJ in a derogatory manner, such as 
“manservant of the MOF” (Mikitani and Kuwayama 1998: 16), as the “Nihonbashi 
honkakuchô branch office of the Ministry” (Kawakita 1995: 64), the “Ministry of 
Finances’ Bank of Japan Section”267 (Asahi, 20 June 1996), or “office within the MOF’s 
Banking Bureau” (Henning 1994: 75). 268  Kyûno, Masao (1996), Professor at the 
Seinangakuin University even titles the BOJ as the “maid of the government” (seifu no 
jijo). Another term is “subcontractor of the MOF” (ôkurashô no shitauke) (Yomiuri, 21 
March 1998). These terms imply the plausible assumption that the BOJ was a “mere 
follower of the Ministry” (Nakakita 2001: 56). A former section of this thesis has 
demonstrated that this subordination of the BOJ is based on the central bank’s legal 
framework. 
 
However, it can be argued that this subservient relationship had some advantages for the 
BOJ. Several scholars highlighted the MOF’s role in protecting the BOJ from political 
influence, and refer to a beneficial “comparative autonomy of the Ministry-Bank 
coalition” as a successful model for price stability, which gained an excellent reputation 
worldwide (e.g., Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 1997: 192; Asahi, 20 June 1996). In other 
words, it can be argued that the BOJ was hiding behind the MOF’s protection against 
political circles (Fujiwara, Interview, Business Week, 12 June 2000). Two important 
features characterized the Ministry: first, the MOF was considered as more conservative 
regarding monetary issues than the government, and, second, the Ministry enjoyed “an 
unusually high degree of autonomy from politicians”. On the basis of these two 
conditions, the MOF acted as a benevolent protector of the Bank, and absorbed political 
                                                 
266 For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between the BOJ and the MOF before the law revision, 
see Kawakita 1995, chapter 2 or Kanegae 1995).  
267 Ôkurashô nihonbashi honkakuchô shucchô sho and Ôkurashô nichigin ka. The term nihonbashi 
honkakuchô refers to the location of the Bank of Japan.  
268 Mikuni and Murphy (2003: 49) find that Ikeda Hayato, Japan’s Prime Minister in the 1960s, had 
considered that the BOJ’s function is to serve as the MOF’s agent.  
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pressure acting like a “buffer” between the BOJ and political pressure (Henning 1994: 
75-77; Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 2000: 89-91). In practice, if the BOJ and the MOF 
followed the same policy direction, their combined power was usually strong enough to 
resist political pressure. On the contrary, in case of disagreement between the two 
organizations, political players were most likely to gain the upper hand. Discrepancies 
about monetary policy happened frequently as the MOF had “a broader set of 
objectives” than the BOJ. That is, not only price stability, but rather wide-ranging 
subjects, for instance, exchange rate stability, high economic growth rate, high 
employment rate and budget deficit consolidation were issues of concern for the MOF 
(Henning 1994: 75-76). 
 
In many situations the MOF’s role as a benevolent protector against politicians was 
useful for the Bank. On the other hand, having the MOF as safeguard was connected 
with a high cost for the BOJ. First, the MOF’s broader objectives were the basis for the 
incentive to exert pressure on the BOJ, and to use monetary policy tools to achieve their 
own goals. Hence, an independent MOF was not a perfect substitute for an independent 
central bank and price stability. Second and more important, the strong MOF-BOJ 
relationship supported the development of a rotating Governor system between the two 
institutions, resulting in the fact that every second BOJ Governor was chosen by the 
Ministry (Table 7-1), a rather unfavourable condition for the independence of a central 
bank (Cargill, Hutchison and Itô 1997: 188). According to Henning (1994: 76-77), the 
MOF and BOJ conducted a monthly meeting in which the MOF’s Administrative Vice 
Minister of Finance and the BOJ’s Deputy Governor, together with their senior 
subordinates, gathered to discuss monetary issues. Another important issue of 
discussions were the meetings of the MOF’s Director General of the Banking Bureau 
and the BOJ’s Director of the Department of Policy Planning, who discussed the 
appropriate level of the discount rate. In case of conflicts, higher-ranking officials were 
consulted. Serious problems of this practice were “leaks”, namely the “unauthorized 
disclosure of policy deliberations”, what sometimes disturbed the bargaining process. 
That is, in case of discrepancies between both organizations, deliberately disclosing 
information to the public was a strategy by the BOJ. This strategy was choosen in order 
to gain advantage in “behind-the-scenes-bargaining” over the MOF. It can be argued 
that this practice was a compensation for the BOJ for its “institutional subordination” to 
the MOF.    
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Lohmann (1998) argues that it is irrelevant whether or not a central bank is de iure 
independent, but rather the way the central bank is embedded in a larger political system. 
Thus, even if the Bank of Japan is formally subordinate to the Ministry of Finance, 
monetary policy will be insulated from the pressures of electoral and partisan politics to 
the extent that the Ministry of Finance is independent” (Lohmann 1997: 65). Lohmann 
(1997: 77) points out that in the “old” Japanese system, the Japanese government with 
its powerful bureaucracy and single-party rule can commit to price stability without a 
monetary institution, i.e., institutions are irrelevant. Mabuchi (1997: 167) finds it 
intriguing that before elections monetary policy decisions mabe by the BOJ were 
extraordinarily rare. This might be a result of enormous pressure by LDP lawmakers. 
Mabuchi (1995) argues that the BOJ’s dependent status to the government explains to a 
large extent the reason for continued low-interest policies, a positive factor that 
supported the rapid growth economy. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that a 
dependent central bank might be a beneficial institutional set up. On basis of the 
described relationship between the BOJ and MOF (as a part of the government), the 
following section explains the decision-making-process of monetary policy.  
 
7.5 The Monetary Policy Decision-Making Process 
Legally, the BOJ was not permitted to devise and implement monetary controls on its 
own. Thus, one set of scholars, for instance Suzuki (1996: 22) and Kawakita (1995: 63-
64), argue that the decision concerning important issues of monetary policy, such as the 
discount rate, was in reality controlled by the MOF (Figure 7-1). Horiuchi (1993: 103) 
states that “the BOJ was subordinate to other government agencies in the policy-making 
process. It was requires by law to have its monetary controls conform to the pattern of 
capital fund allocation as coordinated mainly by MOF and MITI.” However, the BOJ 
attempted to fight for more control over monetary policy in order to maintain at least 
some semblance of power. Under the old law, an interest rate hike by the BOJ was 
regarded as a victory, and a rate cut as a defeat for the central bank (kinri wo agereba 
kachi, sagereba make). That is, the performance of Bank of Japan Governors’ was 
evaluated according to his record with X wins and Y losses in which X stand for rate 
hikes and Y for rate cuts. As a result, it was a very complicated task for the BOJ to raise 
rates, but it was important to demonstrate that the BOJ was able to act independently 
from time to time. It was especially difficult for the BOJ when it came to finding the 
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right timing for rate hikes, since a failure was utilized by the Ministry to gain more 
control (Kawakita 1995: 60; Motoyoshi 2006: 50-53).  
 
The strong ties between both the BOJ and the government with the MOF required a 
special process of decision-making for monetary policy. For example, if the Bank 
intended to raise interest rates, it had to follow complex rules of intense consultations 
with the Ministry, the Finance Minister and the Prime Minister in advance. Without 
consensus of the most important key players, policy changes were most unlikely. A 
multifaceted procedure of comprehensive consultations with tacit agreements had 
become common practice for Japanese monetary policy making (Henning 1994: 70-72). 
Coined differently, the decision-making process was and is characterized by a special 
consensus-building process (nemawashi). Miller (1996) describes this Japanese-style 
decision-making process for monetary policy as a so-called preclearance system.269 
Nemawashi is an informal negotiation process, seeking approval from all parties 
concerned before officially suggesting a proposal. Consultations between all parties 
concerned have often a behind-the-door character, and usually require a large amount of 
time. This system of pre-consultation is based on two conditions: first, a stable political 
environment with long-term relationships between the actors (Government-MOF-BOJ), 
and, second, a focus on rapid economic growth. Without one of these conditions, this 
decision-making system of preclearance would not have been functioned. 
 
If the BOJ planned a policy move, for instance an interest rate hike, BOJ officials had to 
consult and convince their counterparts in the Ministry, and needed the “explicit private 
approval by the MOF” (Henning 1994). Most importantly, the top levels of the MOF 
bureaucracy had to be supportive of this certain policy move. Subsequently, the 
bureaucrats consulted the Finance Minister. 270  If the Minister agreed, he tried to 
persuade other Cabinet Ministers. Once the majority backed the move, the rate hike was 
decided upon. However, obviously the most powerful person in this process was the 
                                                 
269 Miller (1996: 20, note 82) notes that the term ‘preclearance’ to describe the Japanese form of 
bureaucracy was first suggested by Professor Kanda Hideki, University of Tôkyô, Law Department.  
270 According to Henning (1994: 72), “in practice the [finance] minister acts more often as a conduit for 
political pressures.” However, due to influence from his new institution the finance minister “is likely to 
express monetary preferences more conservative than those of other members of the Cabinet, influenced 
as he is by MOF, and indeed more conservative than his own before he became minister.“ 
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Prime Minister, and his veto could stop every effort for a policy change (Cargill, 
Hutchison and Itô 1997: 182-183). 271  
 
Figure 7-1 illustrates the decision-making process and timing of monetary policy. 
Regarding the first step, the initiative for a monetary policy change, could be initiated 
by either the MOF or the BOJ, depending on the key figures and economic and political 
circumstances. In case the MOF was the initiator, a consultation between the BOJ’s 
Policy Board and the Executive Board took place after the MOF’s demand. Formally, 
the decision was made by the Policy Board, but in practice the process was dominated 
by the Executive Board giving “advice” to the Policy Board. Finally, after a report to 
the Minister of Finance the decision was announced. Figure 7-1 demonstrates the fact, 
that a policy change by the BOJ alone was difficult, but rather a consultation/debate 
with the MOF took place.  
 
Figure 7-1: The Monetary Policy Decision-Making Process before the Law Revision 
 
   1. initiative    2. consultation 
 
 
   5. report         4. decision 3. advice/decision 
 
 
 
6. announcement  
 
Source: Own compilation based on Goerdeler (1987: 62) 
 
 
To sum up, the BOJ usually sought agreement with the Ministry on major monetary 
policy decisions, both for changes in the reserve requirements as to what was a formal 
obligation of the Bank of Japan Law, but also for changes in the key interest rate, the 
discount rate. However, the following chapter demonstrates that the Bank, despite its 
legal constraints, achieved a remarkable degree of a de facto independence.  
 
                                                 
271 Henning (1994: 71) distinguishes between different Prime Ministers and argues that, for instance, 
Ikeda and Tanaka “dominated monetary policy setting”, whereas Satô, Takeshita, and Kaifu left main 
monetary policy decisions in the hands of the Bank. Prime Minister Nakasone granted relatively much 
freedom to Governor Maekawa but gave strong rules to Sumita.  
Minister of 
Finance 
Bank of Japan 
– Policy Board 
Board 
Bank of Japan – 
Executive Board 
Board 
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7.6 The Bank of Japan’s De Facto Independence  
“The BoJ’s degree of de facto independence seems to have varied considerably 
over the past few decades, even at times when its legal framework was 
constant.” (Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 130) 
 
This quote confirms the findings from a previous section, namely that de iure central 
bank independence is not necessarily on the same level as the de facto independence. 
Chapter 5 has examined the formal status of the Bank of Japan Law of 1942, and 
concluded that the Bank of Japan was a dependent central bank. This chapter briefly 
examines the de facto conditions of the BOJ. In spite of the BOJ’s very limited legal 
independence, certain scholars argue the Bank indeed gained a relatively high level of 
de facto independence (Blanchard 2000: 204; Capie et al. 1994: 169; Horiuchi 1993: 
114; Kamikawa 2006; Mabuchi 1995). 
 
For example, if the MOF would push its legal limits, and enforce its preferred monetary 
policy direction, or punish the Bank for inobservance, i.e., by means of a dismissal of 
the BOJ Governor, the political costs would be immense and probably exceed the 
expected benefits. As a consequence, the Ministry refrained from exercising the most 
drastic control mechanism, and it never issued a direct directive to the BOJ or exercised 
its power to dismiss a Governor or Deputy Governor, because the Ministry feared 
strong criticism from the media and the public. A removal of the central bank’s 
Governor would be particularly delicate, if it was politically motivated, and if the MOF 
just desired to interfere in the Bank’s monetary policy. Miller (1996: 9-11) finds that 
despite its high-level legal endowments, the absence of open confrontation between the 
two agencies demonstrates that the de facto control of the Ministry was limited. 
Goerdeler (1987: 50) argues that, although the BOJ gained a certain extent of de facto 
independence, it was still dependent on the government. As a matter of fact, although 
the government, in particular the Finance Minister, had a high degree of authority over 
the Bank, the relationship between the Bank and the Ministry was generally 
characterized by cooperation. However, many exceptions demonstrate that the 
relationship was not permanently harmonious. In many occasions, fierce battles 
between the BOJ and MOF over monetary policy took place.  
 
Miller (1996) applies case studies in which conflicts between the Bank and the Ministry 
occurred, and concludes that the de facto independence of the BOJ was much higher 
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than the written statute of the Bank of Japan would suggest. In many cases the Bank 
successfully resisted pressure, “despite the MOF ostensibly overwhelming legal 
authority.” As a consequence, the (Western) concept of central bank independence is 
insufficient to explain the case of the Bank of Japan. From time to time, the Bank 
managed to act independently, while other times it is little more than subservient to the 
MOF:  
“In the Bank of Japan, we do not observe either an independent or a 
dependent central bank; rather, we observe an institution engaged in a 
form of preclearance with other interested parties-most importantly the 
MOF-during the implementation of governmental policies” (Miller 1996: 
9). 
 
However, since the 1970s, the BOJ has been able to strengthen its position towards the 
Japanese Government and the MOF. 272  It is ironic that an increased de facto 
independence was (partially) facilitated by a major policy mistake of the Government. 
During the oil-shock in 1972, the government pressured the BOJ not to raise the interest 
rate. The government’s request turned out to be a vast error, ending in sky-scraping 
inflation rates. From that time on, the Bank could always claim that its judgement of the 
Japanese economy was correct, and found itself in a better position when it came to 
disagreements with the Ministry about monetary policy. Additionally, after an excellent 
inflation record in the period from 1975 to 1985, the BOJ gained a reputation273 of a 
successful ‘inflation fighter’, which made political interference even harder, and, 
according to Cargill, Hutchison and Itô (2000: 90), a “de facto independence seemed to 
have been established”. 274  Another significant factor for the BOJ’s de facto 
independence was that open market operations gained more importance as a monetary 
policy tool during the time of deregulation of the financial markets. The BOJ enjoyed 
full discretion over open market operation. Therefore, Kamikawa (2006) argues that the 
BOJ acted quite independent from the Prime Minister and MOF during the loosening of 
monetary policy in the late 1980s. However, Henning (1994: 70-71, note 22) reports 
that then-Finance Minister Hashimoto declared in 1990 that the BOJ had complete 
                                                 
272 Mabuchi (1995) argues that the BOJ gained a de facto independence from the MOF already during the 
occupation era. 
273 For instance, Friedman (1985) hails the BOJ for its successful practice of monetary aggregate targeting 
in the 1970s and 1980s; a policy tool that was introduced by BOJ Governor Morinaga (For more 
information, see Suzuki (1986)).  
274 Grimes (2003: 74) argues that although the BOJ’s independence increased during the tenure of 
Morinaga (1974–79) and Maekawa (1979–84), “significant external control mechanisms over the bank 
remained in place. These mechanisms came into play when policy disagreements arose between the 
central bankers and the central government.” 
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control over the discount rate, building the image that the BOJ acts independently. This 
drives the conclusion that the BOJ was used as the scapegoat for high interest rates. 
 
Another aspect is that the use of CPI inflation rates is insufficient to evaluate the BOJ’s 
independency, at least since the latter half of the 1980s. In comparison to stable CPI 
rates, stock prices and land prices increased radically, resulting in an asset price bubble 
in the late 1980s. The majority of scholars suggest that the BOJ’s easy monetary policy 
was one factor behind this unfavourable development (Fukuda 2001: 140). However, 
Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka (2001) find that in the latter half of the 1980s the BOJ 
was strongly influenced by political pressure to conduct easy monetary policy. The BOJ 
was pressured to prevent the appreciation of the Yen, and to reduce the current account 
surplus. As a consequence, CPI inflation rates for the period between 1985 and 1990 are 
insufficient to judge whether or not the BOJ has in fact achieved de facto independence.   
 
7.7 Conclusion  
The political and economic system in Japan is characterized by peculiar features. One is 
the complex relationship between the Japanese Government, Ministry of Finance and 
Bank of Japan. This complex relationship is the reason why it is difficult to attempt to 
understand the case of the BOJ using a simple, dependent-independent central bank 
Anglo-Saxon framework. Moreover, it is the reason why the application of central bank 
independence indexes from the previous chapter must be emploxed carefully. This 
chapter concludes that a simple distinction between dependent and independent central 
banks is an insufficient approach to understanding central banking in Japan. For 
example, it was shown that, although the legal independence of the old Bank of Japan 
was very limited, the BOJ has managed to gain a considerable amount of de facto 
independence since the 1970s.  
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8. THE DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE OF THE “NEW” BANK OF JAPAN  
The previous chapter offered a first analysis of the de facto environment of the Bank of 
Japan’s independence under the old BJL of 1942, serving as preparation for the 
following case studies on the Bank of Japan under the new BJL of 1998. This chapter 
places special focus upon the relationship between the Bank of Japan, the government 
and politicians. The chapter will aim to show how the government tried to exert 
influence on monetary policy decisions made by the Bank. 
 
8.1 Introduction  
The Bank of Japan Law revision in 1998 granted the Bank independence. However, the 
BOJ does not sit in an ivory tower, but rather it is accountable for its decisions to the 
public, the Japanese Government and the Diet. The revision of the BJL changed the 
legal relationship between the BOJ and the Japanese Government essentially (see, 
Chapter 5). This section focuses on the changed relationship between the central bank 
and the government on a de facto basis and how political influence and pressure was 
conducted.  
 
Basically, there are two sets of political influence exerted on a central bank by the 
government and politicians. The first is by means of the appointment process of the 
central bank’s key staff. The second one is via interference in the monetary policy 
decision-making process. According to Chappell et al. (1993), the first is an “indirect” 
channel of political influence, whereas the influence on the process of monetary policy 
decision-making can be regarded as a “direct” channel of political influence. There are 
several explanations for political pressure on the central bank or conflicts between the 
government (and politicians) and the central bank, for instance, if the government 
disagrees with the current stance of monetary policy. Another plausible reason is if the 
central bank’s outlook for future economic growth differs from that of the government 
(Siklos and Bohl 2005). 
 
This chapter presents a detailed case study of the Bank of Japan in relation to the above-
mentioned two subjects of governmental influence. The first regards the appointment 
process of three Governors of the newly independent central bank: Hayami Masaru, 
Fukui Toshihiko and Shirakawa Masaaki. In addition, the appointments of Deputy 
Governors, deliberative Policy Board members and BOJ executives are briefly covered 
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in this chapter. The second major channel of government interference concerns, as 
stated before, the process of monetary policy. This section will attempt to provide 
insights into some key decisions in monetary policy from 1998 to 2006. First, the 
decision to introduce the zero interest rate policy (zero interest rate policy) in February 
1999 will be of interest. Second, the decision to end zero interest rate policy and the 
raise the interest rate in August 2000 will be examined. The third issue concerns the 
introduction of the quantitative easing policy in March 2001 with the decision to end 
quantitative easing policy in March 2006 and the raising of the interest rate in June 2006 
and February 2007. These issues will be investigated in relation to the political 
economy of an independent central bank. Before an analysis of political interference is 
presented, a history of recent monetary policy events is provided to enable a deeper 
understanding of the subsequent analysis of political pressure on monetary policy 
decisions.  
 
8.2 The Relationship between Central Banks and Governments 
Since the subject of central bank independence became popular, economic literature has 
concentrated on the relationship between governments and central banks (Bade and 
Parkin 1988). Although more and more governments granted central banks 
independence, politicians in many countries sought to continue to exert influence on 
monetary policy decisions. The relationship between central banks and governments is 
particularly difficult and is characterized by many cultural specifications.  
 
Havrilesky (1995) analyses the political pressures exerted by three principals on the 
allegedly independent US Federal Reserve: the Treasury (executive), the Congress 
(legislative) and the private financial sector. In another study, Havrilesky (1994) uses 
newspapers as a primary source (Wall Street Journal) and identifies the number of 
articles which contain pressure imposed by the Treasury on the central bank as an 
indicator. Calls and pressures for changes in the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) signal the 
Treasury’s preference of monetary policy.275 In a next step, Havrilesky measures the 
Fed’s responses to these signals through the movements of the FFR.276 The political 
                                                 
275 Policy signals by the principal can influence monetary policy. In combination with credible threats of 
punishment in case of the agent’s misconduct the affect is even higher (Bernhard 2002: 58).  
276 In an analysis of the German Bundesbank, Maier (2002) extends the method by Havrilesky in two 
aspects. First, he adds signalling from interest groups such as the financial sector, employers, trade unions 
plus other influences such as academic researchers, international institutions. Second, Maier introduces an 
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economy literature suggests that electoral and/or partisan factors are significant sources 
of conflict, in particular, if the central bank installs a monetary policy that is not in line 
with the government’s policy goals (see, e.g. Alesina, Cohen and Roubini 1992). Siklos 
and Bohl (2005: 4) specifically identify inflation bias as the main source of conflict 
between the government and the central bank. Here, conflicts are more likely to take 
place when an economy is in a recession, because the government usually hopes for an 
easier monetary policy to boost the economy in order to strengthen re-election prospects. 
Another source of conflict is public communication by central bank officials.  
 
The assumption that the government has to take sanctions on the central bank implies 
that the central bank is not a mere follower of the government’s instructions. Rather, 
central banks can be regarded as active strategic players and central bankers cautiously 
contemplate the consequences of their actions by watching the political environment 
carefully in order to anticipate the reaction of markets and policymakers. This is 
regarded as an attempt to protect their independent position. The central bank’s strategic 
behaviour can be distinguished into two categories. First, central bankers usually seek 
support for their policies, not only among policymakers, but also in the public. This can 
be accomplished in form of publications of economic data and monetary policy options 
(Berger 1997; Forder 1996; 45-47). Second, a central bank will typically avoid starting 
hopeless disputes with the Cabinet. In case the Cabinet enjoys sound support from the 
legislative, a central bank usually seeks to avoid working against the government’s 
policy choices (Bernhard 2002: 58-59).277  
 
The government and politicians can use threats to the central bank in order to signal 
their policy preferences. 278  One common threat is to change the central bank’s 
institutional status if the central bank does not follow the government’s preferences in 
economic policy. This can be done by means of a legislative order for the revision of the 
central bank statute. However, the threat to change the central bank’s institutional status 
                                                                                                                                               
additional variable, namely public support, a variable that may weaken the pressure exerted on the 
Bundesbank. 
277 Berger (1997) argues that the success of the German Bundesbank was often explained with the Bank’s 
skilful ability to seek support for its monetary policies in the society and among politicians. In addition, 
conflicts with the government, which could threaten the bank’s reputation, were selected cautiously by 
the Bank’s authorities.  
278 In case of the U.S. Federal reserve, numerous studies demonstrate that lawmakers signal their 
preferences in monetary policy to their central banks. This can be done by means of the publication of 
statements or public complaints about present policies (Havrilesky 1988, 1995; Morris 2002).  
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usually requires cooperation between the Cabinet and legislature. If the Cabinet and 
legislature are divided, a threat to punish the central bank through a revision of the 
central bank’s statute is not credible in most cases. This means that the central bank can 
play off the two principals by supporting only one principal, either the Cabinet or the 
legislature. If one veto player is satisfied by the central bank policies, any attempts to 
punish the central bank will be extremely difficult (Morris 2002). The existence of 
multiple veto players in the legislative procedure can weaken the power of policymakers 
to threaten the central bank (Lohmann 1998; Morris 2002). Morris and Munger (1998) 
argue that threats of sanctions by the principal are sufficient to make the agent follow 
the principal’s preferences in economic policy. When applied to the U.S. and the 
Congress, this means that “bureaucratic agencies will never, in equilibrium, undertake 
an action that causes the Congress to impose sanctions. […] Congress performs no 
“active” oversight because it doesn’t have to: the threat of ex post sanctions is sufficient 
to ensure ex ante compliance.” (Morris and Munger 1998: 366).  
 
However, some scholars have verified empirically that sanction measures by the 
government against the central bank are conducted only in rare cases (Bernhard 2002: 
28-29). The central bank literature offers three reasons for this. First, politicians 
deliberately delegate monetary policy to independent central banks. Their 
unaccountable behaviour is totally accepted by politicians. Second, lawmakers are 
simply satisfied with the central bank’s performance. Here, the central bank has 
anticipated the preferences of the government correctly, and follows them in order to 
prevent sanction mechanisms. 279  In other words, the government has no reason to 
punish the central bank. Third, sanction mechanisms, especially threats to revise the 
central bank Law, are politically costly for lawmakers. Thus, Woolley and LeLoup 
(1989) argue that threats by politicians to a central bank are hardly ever credible. This 
drives the conclusion that political oversight plays only a minor role in monetary policy 
making, regardless of the central bank’s institutional status. The following sections 
focus on the Bank of Japan with the Japanese government and politicians with a 
principal-agent model.   
 
                                                 
279 See, for example Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast (1989), Lupia and McCubbins (1994), 
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1989), McCubbins and Schwartz (1984). 
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8.3 The Relationship between the Bank of Japan and the Government under the 
New Bank of Japan Law 
The new BJL requires the Bank to always “maintain close contact” with the government. 
This requirement makes it necessary that the BOJ communicate directly with politicians 
– a major change in comparison to the old BJL. Before the law revision, the BOJ 
communicated mostly with the MOF. A previous section demonstrated that the MOF 
acted as a “buffer” between the Bank and the government before the Bank of Japan Law 
revision. In contrast, under the new BJL, the BOJ is obliged to deal directly with the 
government, a completely new situation which many BOJ officials overextended. In 
comparison to MOF bureaucrats, politicians follow different incentives, and tend to 
have short-term goals towards, for instance, a low unemployment rate or a high growth 
rate that might conflict with the central bank’s aim of price stability. Moreover, the 
average turn-over rate of politicians, in particular in Japan, is lower compared to MOF 
bureaucrats. These changes require BOJ officials to be able to rapidly adapt to new 
political environments. As a result of the direct interaction with politicians, the BOJ 
established a Diet Liaison Division which dealt with the Diet and the press. Moreover, a 
special senior BOJ official was appointed to advise the Governor regarding this issue 
(Bank of Japan 2002: 17). 
 
As the former sections demonstrated, the MOF was deprived of its former 
comprehensive legal power over the BOJ and monetary policy, and, thus, interactions 
between both organizations weakened. Most importantly, the MOF lost its permanent 
seat in the Policy Board. Instead, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economic 
and Fiscal Policy can attend the Policy Board meetings and express views. In addition, 
van Rixtel (2002: 248) notes that after 1998 the BOJ no longer assigned an amakudari 
kanryô from the MOF to the position of one BOJ Executive Director. In contrast, there 
are still numerous informal interactions between the BOJ and the MOF in relevant 
departments or divisions. Most prominent are informal exchanges of views before the 
BOJ Governor or other Policy Board members have to appear before the Diet. Pascha 
(2005a: 22) adds that apart from the usual interactions between the BOJ and the MOF, 
such as the attendance of government representatives in Monetary Policy Meetings and 
the attendance of the BOJ’s Governor before the Diet on request, there is “a large 
number of informal consultations” (sôdan). Malcolm (2001: 93) argues the MOF 
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“maintained a modest degree of indirect control over the BOJ via the Bank’s 
accountability to the Diet through the Finance Minister.” 
 
8.4 The Principal-Agent Relationship of the Bank of Japan and the Government 
and Diet 
According to Chapter 2 about the theory of central banks, one adequate method for 
explaining the political economy of central banks is a principal-agent framework. As 
previously demonstrated one important point of change in the BJL revision was the 
relationship of the BOJ with the government (seifu) and the Diet (kokkai). Figure 8-1 
and 8-2 compare the relationship of the BOJ with the government and Diet before and 
after the BJL revision in a principal-agent framework. The figures illustrate that the 
position of the Diet was strengthened in the new BOJ Law, including the Bank’s 
obligation to be accountable before the Diet (see, Chapter 5). Before the revision, the 
relationship of the Bank of Japan had more characteristics of a single principal-agent 
relationship (Figure 8-1). The government had a high extent of power over the BOJ. It 
had the right to approve the budget of the BOJ (yosan ninka) (through the MOF), had a 
high extent of power over the Bank’s operations (gyômu meirei) (through the MOF), 
and had the right to appoint the Governor (sôsai ninmei). The BOJ had to report to the 
Diet one time a year.  
 
Figure 8-1: The Principal-Agent Relationship before the Law Revision 
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Figure 8-2 shows that the principal-agent relationship between the Bank of Japan and 
the government and the Diet after the BOJ Law revision in 1998. Owing to the new BOJ 
Law, the relationship has changed towards a principal-agent framework characterized 
by multiple principals. Under the new BJL the Diet’s approval is needed to appoint the 
BOJ’s Governor, Deputy Governors and deliberative members of the Policy Board. In 
addition, the BOJ held even more accountable to the Diet than before as it is now 
required to report to the Diet twice a year. Moreover, the Governor has to appear before 
the Diet on request. According to the Bank of Japan Law, the Bank can conduct 
monetary policy independently. In terms of a principal-agent framework, this means 
that the agent has the first-mover advantage, and the principal can respond after the 
decision of the BOJ’s Policy Board. In the new BJL the government’s (executive) 
power has decreased. Nevertheless, it still can exert a substantial amount of pressure on 
the BOJ through three channels, namely the request to postpone a monetary policy 
decision, the approval of the BOJ’s budget, and the request for special loans.  
 
Figure 8-2: The Multiple Principal-Agent Relationship of the Bank of Japan after the 
Law Revision 
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Regarding central bank accountability and a principal-agent framework, Oritani (2010: 
32-33) argues that there are multiple principals, and that these represent the ultimate 
principal, the general public:  
”Ultimately, the principal of a central bank is the general public. Indeed, 
it may be argued that the central bank is accountable not to the 
legislature, but to the general public. However, in a representative 
democratic system, the central bank is not a direct agent of the general 
public, but is formally an agent of the legislature or the executive branch. 
This goes to the heart of the problem of multiple principal agents. The 
formal principal (eg a government at the end of its mandate) may have 
incentives that lead it to misrepresent the interests of the ultimate 
principal (eg the public).”  
 
Jabko (2009: 395) stresses the existence of multiple principals, and states that there is a 
recent trend towards increased central bank accountability (see, Chapter 6), in particular 
in the legislative branch:  “Interestingly, the principle of legislative oversight is no 
longer really contested anywhere. Even when central bankers are independent from the 
executive branch of government, […] they [central banks] must publicly report […] to 
the legislative branch.” Similarly, the Central Bank Governance Group of the BIS 
(2009: 139-140) argues that: 
“Central banks are subject to a number of formal accountability 
arrangements. […] The legal foundations for central bank accountability 
tend to be specified in the constitution and the central bank statutes. […] 
Generally, central banks are formally accountable to the legislative or 
executive branch of government, depending on the constitutional 
delegation of responsibilities. […] For monetary policy, central banks 
have traditionally been formally accountable to the executive branch, in 
particular to the ministry of finance. Although this is still the case for a 
number of countries, central bank laws increasingly make the central 
bank accountable to the legislature.” 
 
Political pressure can be applied through two different principals, the executive and the 
legislative. As the case studies will demonstrate, both principals have a wide arsenal of 
tools for exerting pressure and influence on the Bank of Japan. In the case of conflicts 
between the principal and the agent, the key question is how the principal can make the 
agent obey the principal. As Chapter 6 on “accountability” has demonstrated, the 
possibility of sanction measures by the principal is an important factor of an 
accountable central bank. Here, the independence of a central bank plays a role. 
Alpanda and Honig (2010) find that dependent central banks are more susceptible to 
political pressure to stimulate the economy before elections or to finance government 
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spending. According to this statement, it can be deduced that the BJL revision of 1998 
freed the BOJ from the high degree of governmental pressure that had previously 
characterized the relationship between the BOJ and the Japanese government. The 
rervision had granted the BOJ a higher amount of central bank independence. However, 
this assumption turns out to be oversimplified, and the following sections will 
demonstrate exactly why this is the case.  
 
This chapter focuses on two principals: the government (executive branch) and Diet 
politicians (legislative branch). This simplification allows us to exclude international 
pressure, e.g., from the US government and/or international organisations. It can be 
assumed that international pressure, if it occurred was aimed at Japanese politicians, and 
they, in turn, directed the pressure to the BOJ if it seemed appropriate to them. Pressure 
from the outside was mostly indirect, and only had influence on the BOJ if Japanese 
politicians used it to generate more pressure on the BOJ. The following chapters offer 
case studies regarding the appointment procedure of the BOJ (Section 8.5) and 
interference by the government in monetary policy (Section 8.7).  
 
8.5 The Appointment Process 
“The procedures for identifying a new pope or a new Dalai Lama are less 
opaque than those which precede the appointment of a Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, a Governor of the Bank of England or a President of the 
ECB.” Davies (2005) 
 
As stated in the introduction, one means of influence politicians use on the central bank 
is the appointment of the Governor, Deputy Governor, and Policy Board members 
(Chang 2003, Gilardi 2001: 12; Maxfield 1997: 32).280 281 282 In contrast, Wilson (2000: 
197-200) generally argues that a president who appoints a leader of a department or 
bureau usually does not seek to meet special goals with the appointment. Generally, the 
Prime Minister or the government have no clear plan as to which policy the appointee 
                                                 
280  Empirical research on the U.S. Federal Reserve and the German Bundesbank showed that 
appointments of the central bank’s key staff have influence on monetary policy (Chang 2003).  
281 Some political economists demonstrate that non-government appointees support tight monetary policy 
more often than do government appointees (Havrilesky and Gildea 1992). In addition, presidents 
repeatedly choose appointees with the aim to exert influence on monetary policy (Morris 2002; Waller 
1992) and to please interest groups (Havrilesky and Gildea 1992).  
282 This drives the conclusion that principals might well be able to limit adverse selection problems 
through appointments, but they find it hard to solve ex post moral hazard by the appointees (Gilardi 2001: 
12). 
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will follow in the future. After the appointment, Wilson characterizes the relationship 
between the principal and the agent as “somewhere between benign neglect and active 
hostility.” However, as Capie et al. (1994: 55) point out “[p]eople in power normally 
appoint others to centres of power with whom they are comfortable. Hence, the 
appointment power is, of itself, likely to make the central bank subservient to the wishes 
of the government.” Assuming the delegating authorities are driven by the incentive to 
establish a de facto independent central bank, they will appoint a Central Bank 
Governor with high leadership potential. However, the leadership quality of a certain 
candidate is difficult to determine in advance. Rather, a Governor’s quality is visible 
only ex post through actual practice (Maxfield 1997: 32).   
 
In this section the principal plays the main role, because the government is in the 
position to appoint the Governor of the central bank. However, the appointment of 
Policy Board members requires the consent of both houses of the Diet. The analysis of 
the rationale behind politicians’ selection of particular Governors is the key question in 
this section. It can be argued that Japanese Prime Ministers, as the principals with the 
right to nominate candidates, can simply choose agents whose positions on monetary 
policy align with their own. However, due to the necessity of the Diet’s approval, the 
appointment of a BOJ Governor is a very complex procedure.  
 
One obvious finding is that the system of alternating Governor and Deputy Governor 
seemed to have changed with the new Bank of Japan Law in 1998, as all three 
Governors came from the BOJ until 2013 (Table 8-1). However, politicians did not 
necessarily mean to change the former system with alternating Governors between the 
BOJ and the MOF (see, Chapter 7). It was widely expected that Matsushita and Deputy 
Governor Fukui would fulfil their term until 1999, and that Fukui would take over the 
helm of the BOJ afterwards. However, the scandal of the arrested BOJ official 
Yoshizawa changed all plans, and, after the resignation of Matsushita and Fukui, a new 
candidate had to be found. It is ironic that this traditional system was only changed due 
to the emergence of a scandal (Yamawaki 2002: 250-260). In 2008, the Democratic 
Party of Japan, however, tried to put a final end to the debate about the system of 
rotating governorship. Several of the DPJ’s policymakers opposed MOF-affiliated 
candidates for the post of Governor or Deputy Governor in 2008, making Shirakawa to 
the third successive Governor with BOJ background (Table 8-1).  
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Table 8-1: BOJ Governors and Deputy Governors after the Law Revision 
Period Governor Affiliation Deputy Governor Affiliation 
1998-2003 Hayami Masaru BOJ Yamaguchi Yutaka 
Fujiwara Sakuya 
BOJ 
Jiji Press 
2003-2008 Fukui Toshihiko BOJ Iwata Kazumasa 
 
Mutô Toshiro 
Tôkyô University, 
Government283 
MOF 
2008-2013 Shirakawa Masaaki BOJ Nishimura Kiyohiko 
Yamaguchi Hirohide  
Tôkyô University  
BOJ 
Source: Own illustration  
 
The quote at the beginning of this section can be applied perfectly to the appointment 
process of BOJ Governors. This section analyses the appointment procedure of the three 
Governors who have been leading the BOJ until now, Hayami Masaru in 1998, Fukui 
Toshihiko in 2003, and Shirakawa Masaaki in 2008. In addition to the BOJ Governors, 
the appointments of the Deputy Governors, some deliberative members of the Policy 
Board and, very briefly, Executive Directors are investigated.  
 
8.5.1 The Appointment Process in 1998  
8.5.1.1 The Start of the Bank of Japan Law in 1998 
Before the new BOJ Law took effect on 1 April 1998, the BOJ was involved in an 
unprecedented scandal which influenced the government’s choice of the Governor and 
Deputy Governors. In 1997, BOJ officials had accepted lavish entertainment and gifts 
(settai oshoku) in exchange for information on interest rates. On top of the scandal, on 
13 March 1998, the Head of the Capital Markets Division (eigyôkyoku shôken kachô) 
Yoshizawa Yasuyuki was arrested for accepting bribes in exchange for the disclosure of 
confidential information to executives of the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) and the 
Sanwa Bank about the Bank’s Tankan quarterly economic survey. After a thorough of 
investigation, almost one hundred BOJ officials were disciplined either in form of a 
warning (keikoku) or reprimand (kenseki). Two BOJ Executive Directors, Homma 
Tadayo and Kinoshita Eiichirô, resigned (Fujii 2004: 38-39; 63-65; Nakahara 2006: 23-
32; Toya 2006: 201; van Rixtel 2002: 206-208). 
 
                                                 
283 Iwata was a member of the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). In addition, he acted as a Cabinet 
advisor. 
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Taking responsibility for this scandal, Governor Matsushita Yasuo also resigned. The 
appointment of Matsushita, former Administrative Vice Finance Minister, in 1994 was 
possible because of the amakudari system of alternating BOJ Governors. However, he 
later faced harsh criticism due to the emerging “MOF bashing” (Chapter 4). Matsushita 
resigned in accordance with the traditional Japanese gesture of taking responsibility for 
the misconducts of subordinates, stating that “I feel grave responsibility as the head of 
the organisation [BOJ]“. Later, it turned out that also Deputy Governor Fukui could not 
avoid his resignation.284 Under normal circumstances, both terms of Matsushita and 
Fukui would have lasted until December 1999. That means, less than one month before 
the new BOJ Law took effect in April 1998, the Japanese government faced the difficult 
task of appointing a new Governor and Deputy Governor in a very limited period of 
time. 
 
8.5.1.2 The Appointment of Governor Hayami 
After the BJL revision influential LDP politicians requested a non-MOF Governor for 
the new Bank of Japan. After the exposure of the Yoshizawa scandal, these politicians 
were the driving forces behind the claim that Matsushita had to step down. For instance, 
Secretary General (kanjichô) Katô Kôichi and Nonaka Hiromu, Deputy Secretary 
General (kanjichô dairi) demanded a Matsushita to resign, arguing that it is 
inappropriate to have a former Vice Finance Minister as a BOJ Governor for the newly 
independent Bank of Japan (Fujii 2004: 37; Asahi 11 March 1998). Due to the strong 
pressure from these politicians, it was clear that Governor Matsushita had to take 
responsibility for the scandal and resign. The situation with Deputy Governor Fukui was 
different. Observers agree that under normal circumstances Fukui, who had filled all 
crucial posts at the BOJ throughout his career, would have been promoted to the next 
Governor (Arita 2007: 19; Fujii 2004: 17).  
 
After the resignation of Matsushita, the general secretaries of the three party ruling 
coalition discussed the issue of BOJ Governor. One politician said that “Fukui was the 
only suitable candidate, but after the scandals there are problems [to select] him” 
(tekininsha ha Fukui shi shika inai ga, nichigin naibu no fushôji ni sai shi, yahari 
mondai ga aru) (Nikkei, 13 March 1998). However, government officials were 
                                                 
284 In addition, Mieno, BOJ Governor from 1989 to 1994, resigned from his post as “honorary adviser” 
(meiyo komon) (Nikkei, 17 Mar 1998).  
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concerned that recent scandals could give opposition parties the opportunity to start a 
political battle against the Hashimoto administration if the Cabinet appointed Fukui 
(Kyodo, 12 March 1998). In addition, there were strong voices against Fukui within the 
LDP who opposed fiercely his promotion to Governor (kiwamete tsuyoi hanpatsu). At a 
LDP general meeting on 13 March 1998, many lawmakers argued against Fukui. For 
instance, Kamei Shizuka, former Minister of Construction, requested a Governor from 
the private sector. Similarly, Upper House Diet member Etô Takami stated that “since 
Governor Matsushita was only an outsider in the BOJ, the responsibility [for the 
scandal] belongs to the BOJ insider and Deputy Governor Fukui. A promotion of Fukui 
to Governor is out of question.” This means that there was critique of Fukui from both 
the ruling parties and the opposition, which made his appointment to Governor 
impossible.  
 
In sum, insiders from both the MOF and the BOJ were regarded as inappropriate 
choices by many, including the majority of politicians. In addition, in order to gain 
public support, the government needed a person without any scandals overshadowing 
his reputation (Arita 2007: 19). In the end, former BOJ Governor Mieno Yasushi, who 
originally was in favour of Fukui, recommended Hayami Masaru to former Prime 
Minister Takeshita Noboru. Takeshita then communicated this suggestion to Prime 
Minister Hashimoto. On 16 March 1998, Chief Cabinet Secretary Muraoka Kanezô 
announced that Prime Minister Hashimoto had selected Hayami to succeed Matsushita 
(Fujii 2004: 37-42; Nakahara 2006: 101), and four days later, the Cabinet appointed him 
BOJ Governor. Uchida Kenzo, Professor at Tokai University, called Hayami a “surprise 
nomination” (JT, 20 March 1998). Similar sentiments can be found in the Japanese 
press, for example, it was referred to as a “spontaneous decision” (kyûten chokka) 
(Asahi, 17 March 1998), an “emergency evacuation” (kinkyû hinan) (Fujii 2004: 42) or 
“only choice” solution (JT, 20 March 1998). The government “was not very happy with 
this choice”, but Hayami was the only suitable candidate that could be found in the 
limited amount of time.285 
 
Hayami Masaru, who spent 34 years in the BOJ, had worked mainly in the foreign 
department, including a tenure as chief representative in Europe. In 1978, Hayami was 
                                                 
285 Interview with monetary expert, January 2010.  
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promoted to Executive Director. Nevertheless, the new Governor was not considered a 
BOJ insider, because he was never in the prestigious Policy Planning Department or 
Monetary Affairs Department, which were usually regarded as springboard for higher 
positions. Apart from working at the BOJ, Hayami had plenty experience in the private-
sector. In 1981, he took a position at Nissho Iwai Corporation, a leading Japanese 
trading company. Between 1995 and 1998 Hayami acted as Chairman of the business 
lobbying group “Japan Association of Corporate Executives” (Keizai Dôyûkai). Prime 
Minister Hashimoto commented that he “wanted someone who is well versed in 
international finance as well as the real economy [who] can deal with any debates 
ranging from international currency markets to the real economy” (Sprague 1998). 
Some sources assert that the choice of Hayami indicates that the government intended 
“to clean the bank of its scandal-tinted image”, rather than selecting a monetary expert, 
for Hayami was not regarded as an expert of monetary policy (Arita 2007: 20; Fujii 
2004: 49).  
 
Several influential lawmakers made some positive remarks about Hayami’s 
appointment. For instance, Finance Minister Matsunaga Hikaru stated, “[h]e [Hayami] 
is an extraordinarily fine man. [hijô ni rippa na hito] He has experience as BOJ 
executive and in foreign countries, he is fluent in English. He is a good choice for BOJ 
Governor.” (Nikkei, 17 March 1998). Similarly, Horiuchi Mitsuo, METI Minister, said 
that “[Hayami] is a good personal decision. He is someone who frankly states his 
opinion, in the recent time a good [quality]”.286 Hayami had close contacts and enjoyed 
high reputations among private economists and in business circles (Sprague 1998). For 
instance, Toyoda Shôichirô, president of Keidanren stated that “Hayami is experienced 
in monetary affairs, has good connections to foreign countries. He is a good choice.”287 
President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI; Nihon Shôkô 
Kaigisho) Inaba Kôsaku said that “Hayami is a good choice as he has experience both 
within the BOJ and as private person. He is the perfect choice for BOJ Governor.”288 
Other business leaders, including Imai Takashi, Vice president of Keidanren and 
                                                 
286 In contrast, some influential lawmakers opposed the appointment of Hayami. Mori Yoshirô, then-LDP 
general secretary and Prime Minister between 2000 and 2001, was dead against Hayami. Mori was still 
angry that Hayami in the position of chairman of the Keizai Dôyûkai has supported the Hosokawa 
Cabinet and not the LDP in 1993.  
287 In Japanese: “Kare ha kinyû ni mo kuwashii shi, gaikoku ni mo jinmyaku ga aru. Nichigin shusshin to 
itte mo, yamete kara daibu tatsu. Ii jinji da.“ 
288 In Japanese: “Hayami san ha, minkan to itte mo nichigin OB demo ari, chôdo nakama no you na 
hito…. Nichigin sôsai toshite ha tekinin de ha nai ka.“ 
 208 
president of Nippon Steel Corporation (Shin Nippon Seitetsu), Nasu Shô, president of 
Tôkyô Electric Power (Tôkyô denryoku), Nagano Takeshi, Mitsubishi Company and 
Shinagawa Masaji, from Nippon Insurance Company, similarly argued that Hayami was 
the appropriate choice (Asahi, 17 March 1998). In academic circles, Hayami was 
regarded as a person who can bring fresh air into the BOJ. For instance, Uchida Kenzo, 
Professor at Tokai University or Suzuki Yukio, Professor at Reitaku University agreed 
that Hayami was the right choice for BOJ Governor (e.g., Uchida Kenzo 1998: JT, 20 
March 1998; Suzuki Yoshio 1998: 30 March 1998).  
 
However, regardless of these individual positive voices the overall reactions after 
Hayami’s appointment were not enthusiastic; mainly, because many observers were 
sceptical if the new BOJ under the leadership of Hayami would be able to act 
independently from the government, and financial markets first implemented a wait-
and-see tactic to watch how the bank would conduct monetary policy under the new 
BOJ. According to the Economist (19 March 1998), it was widely believed that Hayami 
was appointed because politicians considered him as someone they could easily 
influence and exert pressure on. Thus, BOJ watcher Fujii (2004: 12) summarized that 
his feelings on the appointment of Hayami were mixed between “hope and fear” (kitai 
to fuan).289 It can be concluded that Hayami was chosen as a compromise candidate 
between different interest groups. 
 
8.5.1.3 The Deputy Governors 
According to the new Bank of Japan Law, Article 16, Paragraph 2, the BOJ shall consist 
of two Deputy Governors, who shall be appointed by the Cabinet with the consent of 
both parliamentary houses (Article 23). This means the Japanese Government had to 
appoint two Deputy Governors after the resignation of Fukui.  
 
On 20 March 1998, Prime Minister Hashimoto appointed Fujiwara Sakuya to Deputy 
Governor. This choice was a big surprise to many observers (Itô 2006: 106; Yamawaki 
2002: 251). Fujiwara himself was truly amazed by his appointment, admitting that he 
continued to believe that his appointment was a “joke” (Fujiwara 1998; Fujiwara 2003b: 
8-10). Many economists criticised this appointment, because Fujiwara was regarded as 
                                                 
289 It has to be noted that Hayami would not have been appointed to Governor of the new BOJ without the 
corruption scandal in 1997 (Fujii 2004). 
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everything but a monetary expert (e.g., Iwata 2009: 36). Fujiwara, who had studied 
French literature, said about himself that he was poor in economics and even hated 
economics. Entering Jiji Press in 1962, he was disappointed that he was sent into the 
economics department and not the culture or foreign department (Fujiwara 2003b: 10-
11). Although Fujiwara was reporting on issues regarding the BOJ in his position as a 
journalist for Jiji Press, and he was a member of the “journalist club of the BOJ” 
(nippon ginkô no kisha kurabbu) (Fujiwara 1998), Fujiwara bluntly admitted his 
weaknesses regarding economic issues, and he considered himself as an “amateur” 
(Fujiwara, 29 May 1998) or “complete layman” (zubu no shirôto) of monetary 
economics “who does not know the theory and practice” of financial issues. He stated, 
“I am old enough not to understand financial (instruments) […] such as derivatives”290 
(Asahi, 21 March 1998).  
 
Similar to the appointment of Governor Hayami, the reason behind Fujiwara’s 
appointment was to bring fresh air (atarashii fû) into the BOJ, in order to overcome the 
recent corruption scandal which resulted in the resignation of Governor Matsushita and 
Deputy Governor Fukui. The BOJ needed to regain credibility, and the government 
believed that a first step towards rebuilding its reputation could be accomplished with 
nominations of persons for the central bank’s key staff who came from outside the BOJ. 
Thus, it can be argued that the unprecedented scandal within the BOJ facilitated the 
appointment of an outsider like Fujiwara (Fujii 2004: 43).291 The government, facing 
pressure to nominate a candidate with a clean image, wished to appoint a person who 
could concentrate on the new, revised Bank of Japan (nichigin kaikaku ni sennen). The 
government trusted Fujiwara, who acted as a member of the MOF’s FSRC with the task 
of BOJ Law revision (see, Section 3.5.7), to be a suitable person for the post of Deputy 
Governor (Fujiwara 2003b: 12-13). The slogan of “restoring of trust” (shinrai kaifuku) 
of the BOJ was the reason Fujiwara was chosen, and was his main task at the central 
bank. As the head of a special working group, Fujiwara’s duty was to examine issues 
regarding legal compliance of BOJ officials. This group included Kamoshida Takayuki, 
BOJ Executive Director, the BOJ’s audit office chief, and an external lawyer (JT, 28 
March 1998).  
                                                 
290 In Japanese: “Kinyû ni tsuite […] deribatibu mo rikai dekinai” 
291 Originally, in preparation of shifting towards a system with two Deputy Governors, Nagashima Akira, 
BOJ executive from 1993 to 1998 was regarded of taking the post of Deputy Governor (Nikkei, 15 
January 1998; Bank of Japan 1998, Minutes of MPM; Fujii 2004: 43).  
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Yamaguchi Yutaka, a career BOJ official, was appointed as the BOJ’s second Deputy 
Governor on 1 April 1998. In contrast to Hayami and Fujiwara, his appointment was 
unanimously viewed as a good choice, and Yamaguchi was regarded as a highly 
respectable monetary expert. Yamaguchi’s main task was the coordination of monetary 
policy operations and the handling of international relations (Nikkei, 21 March 1998). 
He regarded his task as “acting as a bridge between the staff of the Bank of Japan and 
the Policy Board” (Fujii 2004: 54; Yomiuri, 2 April 1998).292 The Governor and the two 
Deputy Governors are called the “Executives” (shikkô bu) of the Policy Board.  
 
8.5.1.4 The Policy Board 
The key question regarding the design of the Policy Board is whether it supports the 
depoliticisation of the decision-making process. In fact, in comparison to the old 
regulations, the “new” Policy Board of the BOJ has essential differences and was 
depoliticised in many respects. The most striking depoliticization encompassed the 
termination of two government representatives as members of the Policy Board. 
However, under the new BOJ Law, two government representatives can join Monetary 
Policy Meetings. The composition of the BOJ’s Policy Board changed significantly 
with the new BOJ Law. According to Article 16, Paragraph 2, the Policy Board shall 
consist of the Governor, two Deputy Governors and six deliberative members. That 
equals a total of nine members. After the Bank of Japan Law amendment of 1949, the 
Policy Board consisted of seven members, the Governor, four deliberative members, 
and two government representatives (Section 5.2.2.2). The major changes of the 1998 
Bank of Japan Law in comparison to the old law can be seen in Table 8-2.  
 
Table 8-2: The Policy Board of the BOJ before and after the Law Revision 
(According to the Bank of Japan Law) 
 Policy Board 
(1949) 
Policy Board 
(1998) 
Governor 1 1 
Deputy Governor  * 2  
Other members 4  6  
Government representatives  2  -- 
Total members 7  9  
Source: Own compilation 
                                                 
292 In Japanese: “Nichigin sutaffu to seisaku iinkai no hashiwatashi ni tsutometai”.  
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Note:  
* In the old BOJ Law, the Deputy Governor was not a member of the Policy Board. 
 
 
The deliberative members changed significantly in the BOJ Law revision. While the 
four other members of the old law represented a specific field or Ministry (Section 
5.2.1.2), the six members of the new Policy Board were required to be monetary experts, 
including academics.  
 
Table 8-3: The Policy Board of the BOJ before and after the Law Revision (de facto) 
 Bank of Japan Law 
1942/1949 
Bank of Japan Law 
1998 
Governor Matsushita Yasuo Hayami Masaru* 
Deputy Governor ___ Fujiwara Sakuya 
Yamaguchi Yutaka 
Other members Koino Shigeru** 
Gotô Yasuo 
Taketomi Susumu 
*** 
Gotô, Yasuo  
Taketomi, Susumu  
Shinotsuka, Eiko  
Miki, Toshio  
Nakahara, Nobuyuki 
Ueda, Kazuo 
Government 
representative  
Nakagawa Takanobu (EPA) 
Fujishima Yasuyuki (MOF) 
___ 
 
Total members 6  9  
Source: Own compilation 
Notes:  
* To be precise, Hayami was enacted as Governor already on 20 March 1998, ten days 
before the new BOJ Law took effect.  
** The term of Koino Shigeru ended on 7 April 1998.  
*** Since Ikura Kazuya (Shiga Bank) left the Policy Board in March 1996, the Policy 
Board consisted of only 6 members until April 1998.   
 
 
Table 8-3 demonstrate that the changeover to the new Policy Board was a dynamic 
process. The board included members who were appointed under the old BOJ Law: 
Gotô Yasuo in 1995 and Taketomi Susumu in 1997. In a speech given on 9 June 1998 
Gotô reports about his impression on the Policy Board under both the old and the new 
law. He welcomes the extension of deliberative members in the board, for different 
backgrounds of the individual members can lead to a better understanding and outcome 
of monetary policy.  
 
 212 
However, the government’s appointments of new Policy Board members can be seen as 
ambivalent. 293  Some members of the Policy Board, which included two outside 
economists (Ueda and Shinotsuka) and two industrialists (Nakahara and Miki), seemed 
to be more qualified by constituency than by expertise (Table 8-4). Iwata (2009) 
criticised the level of the BOJ’s Policy Board in general, because many members are not 
monetary experts, and are poorly educated in comparison to international standards.294 
For instance, Shinotsuka Eiko, 295  former Professor of Labour Economics at 
Ochanomizu University, described herself as a “real layman” when dealing with 
financial economics (Fujii 2004: 30-32; JT, 2 April 1998). 
 
Table 8-4: Affiliation of Policy Board Members (1 April 1998)  
Policy Board member Affiliation  
Hayami, Masaru Bank of Japan; Nissho Iwai Corp.; Keizai 
Dôyûkai 
Fujiwara, Sakuya Jiji Press journalist 
Yamaguchi, Yutaka Bank of Japan 
Gotô, Yasuo Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishery  
Taketomi, Susumu Japan Industrial Bank 
Miki, Toshio Nippon Steel 
Nakahara, Nobuyuki Tônen Corp (Oil) 
Shinotsuka, Eiko Professor at Ochanomizu University  
Ueda, Kazuo Professor at Tôkyô University 
Source: Own compilation based on Bank of Japan webpage 
 
   
8.5.2 The Appointment Process in 2003 
8.5.2.1 The Appoitment of Governor Fukui 
The term of Governor Hayami ended in March 2003. When deliberating on a suitable 
successor for Hayami, politicians intensified their pressure on the BOJ during the last 
months of Hayami’s term. Prime Minister Koizumi and several ministers, especially 
Economy Minister Takenaka Heizô, made no secret of their preference of a more 
aggressive monetary policy of the BOJ. Lawmakers repeated their demand for a 
harmonious policy between the government and the Bank, and openly showed that they 
                                                 
293 It has to be noted that then-Deputy Governor Fukui had high responsibility in the composition of the 
Policy Board (Fujii 2004).  
294 Adolph  (2004) confirms this view. Japan has only six per cent of Policy Board members with an 
advanced economic degree (only Ireland has a worse result). 
295 Fujii (2004: 30) reports that there were strong demands from the side of politicians to appoint one 
woman to the Policy Board.  
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had a strict preference for a Governor who would work aggressively to end deflation 
(defure taiji ni sekkyokuteki na hito), preferably someone who introduced an inflation 
target (infure targetto) (Hamada and Noguchi 2005: 39-41; Lukauskas and 
Shimabukuro 2006: 144-145; Katz 2003: 48). In short, the Prime Minister tried to make 
“sure that the BOJ under his leadership would cooperate with the government on the 
effort to end deflation.” (Cargill and Sakamoto 2008: 121).296  
 
Prime Minister Koizumi was known to have a preference for outsiders for government 
jobs.297 It was also reported that he preferred to appoint an outsider from the private 
sector, e.g., a Professor or a business executive, for top positions in the central bank. 
The problem of appointing an outsider is that they may lack political ability. Some 
sources stated that Imai Takashi, former chairmen of Keidanren, was Koizumi`s 
favourite candidate. However, his support for Imai was not clearly stated, but rather 
characterized by an uncertain attitude, and Imai was not supported by the majority of 
the LDP (Fujii 2004: 29, 281-282). Later, many sources reported that Koizumi regarded 
former Policy Board member Nakahara as a possible candidate for Governor (Katz 
2003: 48; Nikkei, 25 February 2003; Hamada and Noguchi 2005: 39-40). Nakahara, 
who was supported by LDP General Secretary Yamazaki Taku, would have been the 
worst choice for the BOJ, and the BOJ was alarmed when the name of Nakahara entered 
the agenda. Nakahara’s view of monetary policy was the opposite of most central 
bankers (he constantly dissented from the Chairman’s proposal for monetary policy 
during his term as Policy Board member from 1998 to 2002). The BOJ started a 
campaign to prevent Nakahara (Nakahara soshi) from being selected and to support 
former Deputy Governor Fukui Toshihiko (Fukui suisen) as Hayami’s successor. 
Incumbent Governor Hayami said to Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda (LDP) that he 
recommended Fukui (Fukui ni shite hoshii). A good sign for the BOJ was that Nakahara 
did not gain much support from politicians and bureaucrats. A Governor who is close to 
the government and constantly dissents with the majority of the Policy Board would 
weaken the BOJ’s credibility. Finally, Nakahara disappeared from the Prime Minister’s 
list of suitable candidates for BOJ Governor (Fujii 2004: 281-286; Nikkei, 25 February 
2003; Katz 2003: 48). In contrast, Fukui was supported not only by the Bank of Japan, 
                                                 
296 Here, Wilson’s (2000: 198-199) finding that a government appoints candidates of an organisation 
without achieving certain policy goals is not verified for the Japanese case.   
297 For instance, in 2001 Koizumi appointed the economist Takenaka Heizô to Minister of State for 
Economic and Fiscal Policy. 
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but also by influential politicians, most intensely by former Prime Minister Miyazawa 
and former Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo (Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 
146). Still, the government, Prime Minister Koizumi and particularly Economy Minister 
Takenaka were not convinced that Fukui was the best candidate.  
 
However, Fukui, who previously worked as Deputy chairman of the Keizai Dôyûkai 
(Japan Association of Corporate Executives), had strong supporters from the private 
sector, e.g. Kobayashi Yôtarô of Keizai Dôyûkai and Okuda Hiroshi, chairman of 
Toyota and head of Keidanren, and Kobayashi Yôtarô, then-chairman of Keizai 
Dôyûkai (Katz 2003; Nikkei 25 February 2003; Fujii 2004: 283-284). Fukui, who 
enjoyed broad support in politics and business, was considered to be more flexible in 
monetary policy and more willing to cooperate with the government than Hayami 
(Iwamoto 2006; Katz 2003; Pascha 2005a, 2005b: 53).  
 
Finally, Prime Minister Koizumi overcame his doubts about Fukui, and, on 20 March 
2003, the government appointed him Governor. Koizumi states that “we have chosen a 
person who understands well the thinking of the government” (Nikkei, 25 February 
2003). It was clear that the Prime Minister did not favour Fukui, but he had no better 
alternative. Fukui’s attitude regarding fighting deflation was a factor that hindered 
Koizumi’s full support of him. During his position as Executive Director of Fujitsu 
Research, Fukui published an article which revealed his strong opposition against 
inflationary measures. At a hearing at the Lower House Finance Committee meeting 
before his appointment on 18 March 2003, Fukui made cautious statements about the 
effectiveness of inflation targeting (Iwamoto 2006: 155). Generally, Fukui was regarded 
as an old fashioned BOJ man (furui taipu no chûô ginkô man) (Kanno, Nikkei 25 
February 2003) who preferred to maintain the status quo. Other observers believed that 
Fukui would be as reluctant to ease monetary policy as his predecessor Hayami 
(Hamada and Noguchi 2005). Therefore, Fukui’s nomination was connected with the 
impression of maintaining the current monetary policy, which was in opposition to the 
Prime Minister’s reform plans. Koizumi intended to combine monetary policy and 
structural reforms to revive the Japanese economy. 298  Some critics believe that the 
selection of Fukui indicated that Koizumi’s reform plans had been suppressed by LDP 
                                                 
298 Koizumi’s slogan was “economic recovery cannot occur without structural (fiscal) reform” 
(Yamamoto 2010; Bank of Japan 2001, MPM 17-18 May 2001).  
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politicians and bureaucrats. LDP lawmaker Yamamoto Kôzô (2010) critically stated 
that Koizumi ruined a perfect opportunity to make a policy change at the time of 
appointing a new Bank of Japan Governor by choosing the candidate that most closely 
represents the status quo, namely Fukui Toshihiko. 
 
Nevertheless, there was hope that Fukui might take bold action against deflation 
pressures, and implement non-traditional monetary policies, including operations of 
buying exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trust funds (REIT) 
(Iwamoto 2006: 158-159). The government clearly stated what they expect from the 
BOJ under the leadership of Fukui, in particular in a meeting between Prime Minister 
Koizumi and Fukui on 14 March. Four days later, the Upper House of the Diet intensely 
questioned Fukui. Fukui was told that politicians expect bold actions against deflation. 
After having been in office for only five days, Fukui held his first Monetary Policy 
Meeting as Governor on 25 March 2003, the representative from the government’s 
Cabinet Office remarked: “The Government considered that it was timely to hold this ad 
hoc Monetary Policy Meeting as the current situation was unpredictable. Moreover, the 
Government hoped that the Bank, headed by the new Governor and Deputy Governors, 
would conduct monetary policy to overcome deflation in closer coordination with the 
Government.” (Bank of Japan, Minutes 25 March 2003).  
 
Altogether, the appointment of Fukui was viewed as a “conservative choice” (hoshuteki 
na sentaku), or, according to Finance Minister Shiokawa Masajûrô as a “secure choice” 
(antei shita jinsen). Fukui was regarded to have strong ties to politicians (seifu to no 
paipu wo futoku suru) and the MOF (Nikkei, 25 February 2003). Besides Governor 
Fukui two Deputy Governors were appointed: Mutô Toshirô and Iwata Kazumasa. 
 
8.5.2.2 The Deputy Governors 
In general, Prime Minister Koizumi was looking for a team made up of a BOJ Governor 
and two Deputy Governors (sannin setto) who were against deflation (defure taiji ha). 
Most preferably, the three persons on the top of the BOJ should be a combination of one 
BOJ, one MOF and one private person (Fujii, Nikkei, 29 December 2002). While the 
appointment of Governor Fukui was not surprising to most observers, the appointments 
of the two Deputy Governors, Mutô Toshirô and Iwata Kazumasa, were considered 
astonishing and ambivalent. 
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Mutô acted as Administrative Vice Minister of the MOF between 2000 and 2003. He 
retained heavy influence in the ministry and had very close contacts in the Diet and with 
the country’s technocrats, businessmen, and politicians 299  (Nikkei, 8 March 2008; 
Nikkei Weekly, 10 March 2008). Some observers argued that he was very close to 
Koizumi, and was titled as “Koizumi’s wise man” (Koizumi no chie bukuro). Mutô 
strengthened the mutual relations between the MOF with the Prime Minister’s office 
and other governmental ministries. In short, it can be argued that Mutô was the 
ministry’s man inside the BOJ (Fujii 2004: 284-285; Posen 2004: 3; Katz 2003, Sugano 
Mikio [Nikkei 25 February 2003]). Finance Minister Shiokawa, who proposed the 
appointment of Mutô to Prime Minister Koizumi, said about his appointment that it is 
important to have a person within the BOJ who can transmit the position of the 
government to the BOJ. The Finance Minister expected a better cooperation between 
the government and the BOJ via Mutô (Asahi, 14 March 2003; Nikkei, 25 February 
2003). Unsurprisingly, Mutô’s appointment was strongly supported by the MOF. It was 
common knowledge that some highly influential people in the MOF wanted to regain 
some of the influence over the BOJ. Promoting and installing a former Vice Minister of 
Finance as Deputy Governor in the central bank was a promising way of guaranteeing 
just that.  
 
The second appointed Deputy Governor was Iwata Kazumasa, who worked for the EPA 
from 1970 to 1985, before he received tenure as Professor of economics at Tôkyô 
University in 1986. Between 2001 and 2003, he held a position as a Cabinet Advisor 
(naikaku fu seisaku tôkatsu kan) in the Cabinet Office of Koizumi. Iwata was 
considered as more radical in comparison to Mutô regarding measures to overcome 
deflation and he was a proponent of introducing an inflation target. In various speeches 
concerning monetary policy, Iwata did not miss an opportunity to promote measures 
such as the extensive purchasing of JGB’s in order to fight deflation more aggressively. 
Moreover, he seemed to support fiscal expansion and structural reform. In 2001, in his 
position as Cabinet advisor Iwata claimed that the BOJ should introduce quantitative 
easing measures (Nakahara 2006: 153). Iwata’s most prominent supporter, who really 
pushed hard for his appointment, was Takenaka Heizô, the economic and financial-
                                                 
299 Interview with Bank official, 2008.  
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services minister. In short, Iwata was expected to be a “deflation fighter” (defure faitâ) 
and a supporter of the introduction of an inflation target (Fujii 2004: 285; Asahi, 25 
February 2003; Nikkei, 12 March 2003). 
 
Both Deputy Governors were “arguably aided in informal coordination with their 
former agencies” (Posen: 2004: 3), Mutô for the MOF and Iwata for the EPA. It was 
doubted that the BOJ could preserve its independence with a powerful man from the 
MOF inside the Bank (The Economist, 27 February 2003). Both kept close ties to 
politicians and their ministries during their terms as Deputy Governor. This means that 
none of the Deputy Governors originated from the BOJ. More precisely, Governor 
Fukui was the only one from the BOJ in the Policy Board (Table 8-5). It demonstrated 
how determined the government was to fight deflation. Regarding the central bank’s 
independence, it can be argued that the selection of these two Deputy Governors 
weakened the independence of the BOJ. It can be argued that the government wanted to 
control and put pressure on Governor Fukui by means of the appointment of Mutô and 
Iwata. Finance Minister Shiokawa commented that “a person from the MOF is entering 
[the Policy Board], so we [the government] can manage a smooth policy” (zaimushô 
shusshin sha ga iri, sumûzu na seisaku na unei dekiru). (Nikkei, 25 February 2003). In 
short, the government demanded that Governor Fukui listen carefully to the opinions of 
Mutô and Iwata, in particular their ideas of non-traditional policies, in order to fight 
deflation more aggressively. The government expected much from the “new system” 
(shin taisei) of Governor and Deputy Governors. Economy Minister Takenaka stated 
that “the government and BOJ will be one system, each has to play its role in a reliable 
way to get out of deflation”300 (Nikkei, 25 February 2003).  
 
8.5.2.3 The Policy Board 
The compilation of the Fukui-led BOJ’s Policy Board is presented in Table 8-5 with the 
affiliation of each member. Next to the Governor and the two Deputy Governors, the 
Board consists of six deliberative members, including two academics (Ueda and Suda), 
one researcher (Taya), and three businessmen (Nakahara, Fukuma and Haru).  
 
 
                                                 
300 In Japanese: “seifu-nichigin ga itttai to natte defure kokufuku ni torikomu naka, otagai no yakuwari wo 
shikkari mitasanakereba naranai.” 
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Table 8-5: Affiliation of Policy Board Members (20 March 2003)  
Policy Board member Affiliation  
Fukui, Toshihiko Bank of Japan; 1998-2001 Fujitsu Research, 
2001-2003 Keizai Dôyûkai  
Mutô, Toshirô Ministry of Finance 
Iwata, Kazumasa Cabinet office; Professor at Tôkyô University 
Ueda, Kazuo Professor Tôkyô University 
Taya, Teizô Daiwa Research Institute 
Suda, Miyako Professor Gakushûin University 
Nakahara, Shin Bank of Tôkyô Mitsubishi  
Fukuma, Toshikatsu Mitsui Corporation 
Haru, Hidehiko Tôkyô Electric Power Corporation  
Source: Own compilation based on Bank of Japan’s webpage 
 
 
8.5.3 The Appointment Process in 2008 
Governor Fukui’s term ended in March 2008. The appointment process of the 
succeeding Governor Shirakawa Masaaki was exceptionally turbulent. The LDP lost the 
July 2007 election in the Upper House and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ, 
Minshutô) became the strongest party in the Upper House. This political development 
towards a twisted Diet (nejire kokkai) complicated the appointment of a new Governor 
and Deputy Governor. Legally, the appointment of the BOJ Governor requires the 
agreement of both houses (BJL, Article 23). The LDP party leader Fukuda Yasuo 
proposed several candidates, but many of them were rejected by the opposition-
controlled Upper House until both Houses of the Diet agreed on Shirakawa. 
 
8.5.3.1 The Process of Failed Appointment – Mutô and Tanami 
On 7 March 2008, the Japanese government nominated incumbent Deputy Governor 
Mutô to Governor, and Itô Takatoshi, a Professor at the University of Tôkyô, and 
Shirakawa Masaaki, a former BOJ Executive Director to Deputy Governor (Table 8-6). 
Four days later, a Diet hearing in the Upper and Lower House for the three candidates 
took place. After the hearing, the Executive Committee of the DPJ decided to reject 
Mutô and Itô. On the next day, the DPJ-controlled Upper House only confirmed 
Shirakawa as Deputy Governor.301 The following day, on 13 March, the Lower House 
                                                 
301 In terms of legislation the House of Representatives can overrule a rejection by the House of 
Councillors with a two-thirds majority vote (Article 59 of the Constitution). However, this regulation is 
not valid for the appointment of BOJ’s top positions such as the Governor, Deputy Governors, and 
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voted for all three candidates, but this vote had no impact as the approval of both 
chambers is necessary for appointing BOJ Policy Board members.  
 
Before the DPJ became the largest party in the House of Councillors in July 2007, Mutô 
had been widely considered as succeeding BOJ Governor. Joining the BOJ as Deputy 
Governor in 2003, he had been prepped by Governor Fukui to be his successor. The 
rationale behind Muto’s refusal was his 37 year long career at the Ministry of Finance. 
Between 2000 and 2003, Mutô served as Administrative Vice Finance Minister (jimu 
jikan), the highest rank for a bureaucrat. Some politicians from the opposition were 
concerned that a former MOF top man serving as the central bank’s Governor would 
endanger the BOJ’s independence. Candidate for Deputy Governor Itô Takatoshi notes 
that he was asked by Prime Minister Fukuda to become Deputy Governor on 6 March 
2008. The reason for the DPJ and Upper House to reject Itô was his membership in the 
CEFP (Keizai zaisei shimon kaigi), which was regarded as too close to the government 
by politicians from the opposition (Itô 2008).  
 
The government’s second candidate for BOJ governorship was Tanami Kôji, Governor 
of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC, Nihon kokusai kyôryoku ginkô). 
However, Tanami was rejected for the same reason as Mutô, namely his former 
affiliation to the MOF. Tanami arrived at the MOF in 1964 and served as Vice Finance 
Minister from January 1998 to July 1999. In contrast, Nishimura Kiyohiko, a Policy 
Board member since 2005, was accepted as Deputy Governor and was appointed on 18 
March 2008. As a result, when Fukui stepped down on 19 March, the BOJ was without 
an official leader, and was trapped in a so-called leadership vacuum (lîdâshippu kûseki). 
Deputy Governor Shirakawa took the position of acting Governor. That means the 
Policy Board of the BOJ was filled with only seven members instead of the required 
nine persons.  
 
8.5.3.2 The Appointment of Governor Shirakawa 
Early in April of 2008, Deputy Governor Shirakawa was nominated as Governor of the 
BOJ, and after the approval of the Upper House on 9 April, the stalemate over the 
leadership at the BOJ finally ended. However, Watanabe, a nominee for the position of 
                                                                                                                                               
Monetary Policy Board members. Article 23 of the Bank of Japan Law requires the approval of both Diet 
chambers. 
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Deputy Governor, was blocked by the DPJ. The opposition disapproved Ikeo Kazuhito, 
a Keio University Professor, and another candidate for the Policy Board. Ikeo was 
nominated on 29 May 2008, and the Lower House endorsed him on 12 June. However, 
on 23 June the government withdrew the nomination after the opposition announced 
that they would reject him in the Upper House. It should be noted that the DPJ basically 
endorsed Ikeo, but another opposition party, the People’s New Party (Kokumin Shintô), 
were against him. Ikeo did not have direct ties to the Ministry of Finance, but used to be 
a member of the government’s Financial System Council (FSC). Until October, the BOJ 
had only one Deputy Governor, until finally Yamaguchi Hirohide was approved by both 
Houses of the Diet and appointed on 27 October 2008. Table 8-6 summarizes the 
complicated process of appointment of the BOJ Governor and Deputy Governors in 
2008.  
 
Table 8-6: The Appointment Process in 2008  
Nomination  Governor Deputy 
Governor 
Upper 
House 
Lower 
House 
Appointment 
7 March Mutô  Itô  
Shirakawa 
12 March 
 
13 March  
20 March 
18 March  Tanami  Nishimura 19 March 19 March 20 March 
7 April Shirakawa Watanabe  9 April  9 April  9 April 
15 October  Yamaguchi 24 October 24 October 27 October 
Source: Own illustration 
Note: The candidates marked in italics were rejected by the Upper House 
 
 
The procedure of appointment of Governor Shirakawa leads to the question why so 
many candidates have been rejected by the opposition, and why the government kept on 
proposing candidates who the opposition would not endorse. This issue will be 
investigated in the following sections.  
 
8.5.3.3 The Standpoint of the Opposition – The Democratic Party of Japan 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), in particular in the party leader Ozawa Ichirô, 
had previously announced that they would reject all candidates with a MOF background 
for BOJ Governor and Deputy Governor. According to Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 
(2006: 3), the DPJ and other opposition parties intended to break the high degree of 
influence of the MOF over the BOJ and its monetary policy. Basically, the majority of 
the DPJ promoted a separation of fiscal and monetary policy (zaisei kinyû bunri ron). In 
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this regard, the DPJ’s political indisposition against Mutô was no surprise to observers. 
Generally, the DPJ was well-known for their anti-bureaucratic stance (Sasaki 2002: 
103). It must be noted that various DPJ politicians, for instance General Secretary 
Hatoyama Yukio and Vice President Naoto Kan, already argued critically against Mutô 
in 2003 when he was nominated as Deputy Governor. However, because the LDP-led 
coalition enjoyed the majority in both houses of the Diet at that time, Mutô became 
Deputy Governor in 2003. However, Hatoyama repeated his resentment against the 
appointment of Mutô in 2007 (Nikkei, 11 August 2008), and, in 2008, the DPJ used its 
majority in the Upper House to reject him.302 Thus, it was no surprise for the ruling 
parties that Mutô was rejected by the Upper House.  
 
Politicians from the Upper House argued that appointing candidates from the MOF to a 
top position in the central bank would make the central bank subservient to the Ministry, 
as it was before the BOJ Law revision. 303  MOF-affiliated Governors or Deputy 
Governors could exert intense pressure on the BOJ to support the government in 
managing the massive Japanese government debt, and, eventually threaten the central 
bank’s independence. However, the DPJ’s viewpoint remained incongruent and 
enigmatic. DPJ party leader Ozawa Ichirô stated that: 
 “[w]e [the DPJ] are not opposed to finance ministry officials holding 
jobs at the central bank, as this is common in other countries as well, but 
rather we are against fixed positions being reserved exclusively for such 
officials.” (Rial 2008). 
 
Despite Ozawa’s statement, the opposition controlled Upper House rejected all 
candidates with a background from the MOF or other governmental institutions (Table 
8-6). For instance, during Muto’s hearing in the Diet, DPJ lawmakers criticized the 
BOJ’s quantitative easing policy during which the bank purchased high amounts of 
government bonds. Somewhat inconsistent is that the DPJ itself proposed and supported 
this policy measure as a tool to fight deflation before. Moreover, it was common 
knowledge that Sengoku Yoshito, former DPJ policy chief, was dead against Mutô, but 
Ozawa, the DPJ party leader, was willing to consent and to accept him. In addition, with 
                                                 
302 In contrast, other sources assert that DPJ’s Ozawa was willing to accept Mutô (Japan Echo, Nikkei 
Shinbun). 
303 The chair of the Financial System Research Council Tachi Ryûichirô hold the viewpoint that former 
MOF officials should not be restricted to take the helm of the BOJ when they are the most appropriate 
candidates (Ziegler 1998: 604). 
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the rejection of Watanabe Hiroshi, the case is even more unclear. Whereas Ozawa 
criticized the nomination of Watanabe as an act of amakudari (descent from heaven), 
other politicians in the DPJ were willing to accept him as a compromise candidate due 
to his international experience, including Maehara Seiji and Hatoyama Yukio, who 
candidly declared that he disagrees with Ozawa304 (Shiraishi 2008).  
 
8.5.3.4 The Standpoint of the LDP and Prime Minister Fukuda 
Why did the LDP and Prime Minster Fukuda insist on candidates for BOJ Governor and 
Deputy Governor who have been affiliated with the MOF? The Prime Minister’s 
strategy seemed dubious. After the opposition rejected Mutô, DPJ politicians made it 
very clear that they would not accept any candidates from the MOF. However, Fukuda 
stuck to his strategy to nominate candidates who had their origin in the Ministry. That is 
why most observers blamed the Fukuda-led LDP for the leadership vacuum in the BOJ 
in March of 2008. The Fukuda Cabinet was characterized by a strong influence from the 
MOF (as it was with the Koizumi Cabinet) (Uekusa 2008). This helps to explain why 
Prime Minister Fukuda tried to push MOF candidates to the helm of the BOJ, although 
there were strong signs that they would be rejected by the opposition.  
 
Regarding the nomination of Mutô, there circulates an additional explanation for 
Fukuda’s behaviour.305 Prime Minister Fukuda wanted to pay the debts of his father 
Fukuda Takeo, Prime Minister from 1976 to 1978. Tanaka Kakuei, Prime Minister from 
1972 to 1974, and Fukuda Takeo were fierce rivals, and involved in an intense power 
struggle over the control of the LDP (the so-called Kaku-Fuku War). In 1974, Tanaka 
was Prime Minister and Fukuda was Finance Minister. Regarding the post of Vice 
Finance Minister (Ôkura jimu jikan), Fukuda wanted to appoint Hashiguchi Osamu, 
whereas Tanaka preferred Takagi Fumio. After a long struggle, Tanaka was successful 
and Takagi was appointed to Vice Finance Minister. Later, Hashiguchi’s daughter 
married Mutô Toshirô. With the promotion of Mutô to BOJ Governor Fukuda Yasuo 
could have repaid the “old debts” for the failed attempt of his father to have Hashiguchi 
implemented. However, Ozawa Ichirô was a prodigy of Tanaka, and tried to prevent the 
promotion of Mutô and other MOF-affiliated candidates (Figure 8-3).  
 
                                                 
304 Interview with former BOJ official, 2008.  
305 Interview with former BOJ official, 2008.  
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Figure 8-3: The Continuation of the “Kaku-Fuku War”  
  
 
       
   
 
 
       
 
 
 
         
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
 
8.5.3.5 Governor Shirakawa  
The previous sections have demonstrated that Shirakawa Masaaki became BOJ 
Governor rather by incident. However, Shirakawa’s expertise on monetary policy is 
highly respected and most analysts considered him as well-suited for the post of Bank 
of Japan Governor, although some observers worried about his poor political skills (e.g. 
Sano 2008). Jacob Frenkel, a former Bank of Israel Governor and Shirakawa’s teacher 
at Chicago University, regarded this point as an advantage for the new Governor, stating 
that “Shirakawa wasn’t a candidate of any political party. He doesn't owe anybody 
anything.” (Clenfield 2008). However, despite his poor political skills when he was 
appointed, Governor Shirakawa managed to build favourable relations with the 
government, including regular discussions with the Prime Minister, during his tenure. 
These relations have helped him to absorb some pressures to implement stronger policy 
measures against deflation. The compilation of the Shirakawa-led BOJ’s Policy Board 
is presented in Table 8-7 with the affiliation of each Policy Board member. Suda, re-
appointed in 2006, was the second academic in the Policy Board together with Deputy 
Governor Nishimura. Four members were businessmen (Mizuno, Noda, Nakamura and 
Kamezaki). Governor Shirakawa and Deputy Yamaguchi were long-time BOJ 
Fukuda, Yasuo Ozawa, Ichirô 
Mutô Toshirô 
 
Takagi, Fumio Hashiguchi, Osamu 
Tanaka, Kakuei Fukuda, Takeo 
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employees. Due to the confrontations in the appointment process between the 
government and the Upper House of the Diet, there was a vacancy in the Policy Board, 
and the Board consisted only of eight members. It was not until the appointment of 
Morimoto Yoshihisa on 1 July 2010 that the Policy Board was completed.  
 
Table 8-7: Affiliation of Policy Board Members (20 March 2008) 
Policy Board member Affiliation  
Shirakawa, Masaaki Bank of Japan; Professor Kyôto University  
Nishimura, Kiyohiko G.  Professor Tôkyô University 
Yamaguchi, Hirohide* Bank of Japan 
Suda, Miyako Professor Gakushûin University 
Mizuno, Atsushi  Nomura Securities  
Noda, Tadao Daiichi Kangyô Bank; Mizuho Bank 
Nakamura, Seiji Mitsui Corporation 
Kamezaki, Hidetoshi  Mitsubishi Corporation 
Source: Own compilation based on Bank of Japan webpage 
Note:  
* Yamaguchi started his tenure on 27 October 2008. Before that the BOJ had only one 
Deputy Governor.  
 
 
8.5.4 Appointments to the Policy Board and Executive Directors 
The previous sections focused on the appointment of the Governor and Deputy 
Governors. This short section offers some examples of appointments of deliberative 
Policy Board members and Executive Directors.  
 
In October 1999, the term of Policy Board member Gotô Yasuo, who was a former 
bureaucrat at the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery and who was appointed 
together with Taketomi Susumu under the old BOJ Law in 1995 and 1997 respectively, 
ended. The BOJ unsuccessfully tried to work towards a re-appointment of Gotô. 
Although there was no objection from the MOF and the government, the re-appointment 
failed over an agreement by the ruling and opposition parties to avoid candidates with 
an age over 70 years (Fujii 2004: 132-133). Later, Hayami promoted the appointment of 
Mizuguchi Kôichi, former vice chairperson of Keizai Dôyûkai, whereas others in the 
BOJ promoted Ogura Kazuo, former ambassador of France (Nakahara 2006: 84-90). 
However, both the BOJ and Hayami lost the battle in promoting their favourite 
candidate. Gotô’s successor was Taya Teizô, an economist of Daiwa research and a 
former IMF economist. Taya was appointed in December 1999 after an almost two 
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month vacancy in the Policy Board. There was a rumour that the appointment of Policy 
Board member Taya was strongly demanded by the MOF (Nikkei, 7 December 1999) 
and that the two months vacancy was caused by a quarrel between the MOF and BOJ. 
EPA Minister Sakaiya recommended Taya to Finance Minister Minister Miyazawa, 
who had close ties to Taya. The Finance Minister finally informed Hayami (Fujii 2004: 
136-137). Policy Board member Nakahara Nobuyuki, who had close connections to 
Prime Minister Obuchi, recommended the appointment of Taya as Taya seemed to be in 
favour of unorthodox policies and monetary easing. Nakahara has hoped to find an ally 
in the Policy Board for the promotion of quantitative easing policy.306 
 
To prevent a simultaneous exodus of all Policy Board members, the four Policy Board 
members who started their tenure in April 1998 were awarded different length of 
tenures. This rule was installed in order to prevent the ruling party or the Diet from 
replacing four members of the Policy Board with candidates who may share similar 
views at the same time. Nakahara and Miki received a four-year term, Shinotsuka a 
three-year term and Ueda a two-year term. Both had the possibility of re-appointment. 
However, when Shinotsuka’s three-year term ended on 31 March 2001, the government 
was not willing to re-appoint her. As the strongest hawk in the Policy Board, she 
persistently argued against the government’s viewpoint, but rather proposed tighter 
monetary policy and the termination of the zero interest rate policy (Section 8.6.5). 
Unsurprisingly, the BOJ argued in favour of Shinotsuka’s re-appointment, but she 
received no support in the government, and, finally only served the first three years 
(Fujii 2004: 185-186).  
 
Executive Directors also belong to the central bank’s key staff. According to Article 23, 
Paragraph 4 of the BOJ Law, the Ministry of Finance has the right to appoint Executive 
Directors based on recommendation made by the Policy Board. The task of Executive 
Directors is to manage the business of the Bank and to assist the Governor and Deputy 
Governors (BJL, Article 22, Paragraph 5). As seen in Chapter 5, one Executive Director 
was a former MOF bureaucrat under the old BOJ Law. After the new BOJ Law took 
effect on 1 April 1998, it was thought that Yonezawa Junichi who was Executive 
                                                 
306 However, Nakahara’s plan failed. In his first three Monetary Policy Meeting (17 December 1999, 17 
January 2000, 10 February 2000), Taya abstained from voting to the proposal of Nakahara towards the 
introduction of quantitative easing policy. After that Taya changed his mind and voted against Nakahara.  
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Director until 31 May 1998, was the last Executive Director with MOF origin. However, 
on 15 December 1998, Finance Minister Miyazawa appointed Nagata Shunichi as BOJ 
Executive Director. Nagata was a high-ranked MOF official, and very close to the 
government. In 1996 and 1997 he acted as a member of the BOJ’s Policy Board. In 
addition, Nagata joined Monetary Policy Meetings between 1999 and 2002 as reporting 
staff. The appointment of Nagata to Executive Director in 1998 was somewhat delicate, 
and has demonstrated that the old tradition of one Executive Director from the MOF 
was not abandoned completely. The move to appoint Nagata to Executive Director 
clearly enhanced the influence of the MOF on the BOJ (Fujii 1999). 
 
The previous subchapters have presented the appointment procedure of BOJ staff by the 
government. In general, it can be summarised that disputes over appointments of BOJ 
officials – not only the Governor and Deputy Governors – have become much 
politicized, especially in recent times. The following chapter will investigate the second 
issue of political influence, namely governmental interference in monetary policy 
decisions. First, an overview of the monetary policy developments since 1998 will be 
presented, and, afterwards, the political pressure on the BOJ will be elaborated in detail. 
 
8.6 The Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy Decisions 
8.6.1 Introduction 
Interference in monetary policy decisions is the second channel of political influence. 
This channel requires two conditions to be effective. First, central bankers must be 
office-seeking. Second, politicians need to have sanction instruments to exert pressure 
on the central bank (Mueller 2008: 6). That is, a central bank is not operating in a 
political vacuum even when it is independent from the government.307 Freytag (2002: 2) 
argues that: 
“[m]onetary policymakers do not operate in isolation from other 
politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups. On the contrary, they have to 
bear permanent pressure to increase money supply and thereby support 
the government in fulfilling its task.”  
 
In this section, the agent is the main actor, because according to the Bank of Japan Law, 
the Bank can conduct monetary policy independently (BJL, Article 3). The principal can 
                                                 
307 Goodfriend (2005: 83-84) discusses some specific examples of how independence exposes the Fed to 
external pressure that is potentially counterproductive for good monetary police. For instance, politicians 
and the public often pressure the central bank to keep interest rates low. 
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express its concern and make monetary policy suggestions in the Policy Board (BJL, 
Article 19, Paragraph 2), and exert pressure on the Bank, but the Policy Board of the 
BOJ has the final word in setting monetary policy decisions. This section analyses 
monetary policy decisions of the BOJ since 1998, and provide some case studies to 
investigate how the main actors - the BOJ, the government and Diet politicians - acted 
and interpreted the new BOJ Law. For instance, considerable attention is paid to the 
monetary policy decision to end the zero interest rate policy in August 2000. Several 
politicians expressed strong objections against that move and therefore this issue is a 
very good example upon which to study the different viewpoints of the principal and the 
agent. This section demonstrates that regardless of the new BOJ Law which granted the 
BOJ independence, political pressure on the BOJ continued as if the central bank statute 
had not been changed. 
 
This section takes stock of some key decisions in monetary policy from 1998 to 2006, 
including the decision to introduce the zero interest rate policy in February 1999. 
Second, the decision to end the zero interest rate policy and raise the interest rate in 
August 2000 is also of interest. The following issue is the introduction of the 
quantitative easing policy in March 2001, followed by the decision to end the 
quantitative easing policy in March 2006. These issues will be investigated in 
chronological order in regards of the political economy of an independent central bank.  
 
8.6.2 The Zero Interest Rate Policy 
Approximately half a year after the inauguration of the new Bank of Japan Law, the 
BOJ reacted to the problem of a deteriorating Japanese economy, and decided to cut the 
interest rates to 0.25 per cent in the Monetary Policy Meeting on 9 September 1998. 
This was the first rate cut in three years. This decision was made by means of a majority 
vote, only Policy Board member Shinotsuka opposed. In the beginning of the following 
year, confronted with strong government pressure, the BOJ Policy Board announced to 
cut the key interest rate further, to a level as low as possible, and the so-called zero 
interest rate policy (ZIRP, zero kinri seisaku) started on 12 February 1999. Generally, 
the aim of the zero interest rate policy was to rebuild the financial sector through the 
channel of “cheap credits” in order to support the aggregate demand and to stop 
deflation pressures. Deputy Governor Yamaguchi (2001) stated that: 
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“the strength of the zero rate has partly to do with the then-prevailing 
extreme fragility of Japan’s financial system and markets where liquidity 
was drying up. The banks with insufficient capital base were facing a 
serious liquidity shortage. The zero interest rate policy forcefully 
supplemented the effect of the public injection of capital by its strong 
liquidity effect.” 
 
At a press conference on 13 April 1999, Governor Hayami tried to clarify what the BOJ 
understands by zero interest rate policy. He stated that: “until we reach a situation in 
which deflationary concerns are dispelled, we will continue the current policy of 
providing necessary liquidity to guide the uncollateralized overnight call rate down to 
virtually zero per cent while paying due consideration to maintaining the proper 
functioning of the market.” 308  According to Taylor (2001: 47-48), Hayami’s 
announcement in April towards a clarification of the zero interest rate policy was a kind 
of “contingency plan”, explaining “under what circumstances interest rates will change 
in the future.” Ueda, member of the Policy Board, explained that “[b]y the commitment 
to maintain the zero rate for quite some time to come we [the Policy Board] have tried 
to minimize uncertainties about future short rates, thereby decreasing the option value 
of long-term bonds, hence putting negative pressure on long-term interest rates.” (Ueda 
2000: 1107). Simply put, the zero interest rate policy was characterized by a 
combination of a zero short-term interest rate and the commitment to maintain it until 
deflationary concerns were dispelled. In other words, two conditions were essential for 
the zero interest rate policy to be effective, namely the “quantity” of money and the 
“policy duration” (Baba et al. 2006: 106; Fujiki and Shiratsuka 2002).  
 
8.6.3 Monetary Policy Stance of Policy Board Members 
Arguably, the Governor is the key person of the central bank regarding the decision-
making of monetary policy. However, Blinder argues that: 
“[m]y experience as a member of the FOMC left me with a strong feeling 
that the theoretical fiction that monetary policy is made by a single 
individual maximizing a well-defined preference function misses 
something important. In my view, monetary theorists should start paying 
attention to the nature of decision making by committee, which is rarely 
mentioned in the academic literature” (Blinder 1998: 22).  
 
                                                 
308 Bernanke (2000: 159) argues that the phrase “until deflationary concerns are dispelled” is problematic 
since the BOJ did not give a clear answer what this exactly means.  
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Rather than focussing excessively on the Governor, the whole monetary policy decision 
body needs to be investigated to gain a deeper understanding as to why certain 
monetary policy decisions took place. It is necessary to investigate the monetary policy 
stances of all Policy Board members, for the Policy Board consisted of very different 
individuals with strongly differing opinions concerning monetary policy (shiniin ha 
koseiha zoroi) (Nikkei, 8 May 1998). Figure 8-4 demonstrates the diversity of opinions 
of the new Policy Board. 
 
Figure 8-4: Monetary Policy Preferences of Each Monetary Policy Board Member in 
1999 
     
Easy monetary policy (dovish)     Tight monetary policy (hawkish) 
 
           
           
 Nakahara         Miki        Taya  Ueda        Taketomi     Shinotsuka 
 
 
Source: Own compilation based on Oshio (2000)  
 
 
The strongest proponent of easing monetary policy (kanwa ron sha) was Nakahara 
Nobuyuki. Shinotsuka was on the other end, representing the most hawkish stance 
(hikishime ron sha) when it came to monetary policy. Interestingly, the Policy Board’s 
Executive Committee (shikkô bu iin), Governor Hayami, Deputy Governors Fujiwara 
and Yamaguchi followed the same monetary policy strategy throughout their whole 
time in office (Fujii 2004: 54-56), and the Deputy Governors never opposed Governor 
Hayami’s monetary policy proposals. Figure 8-4 shows that the members of the Policy 
Board can be distinguished into five groups. Parallel to FOMC watchers who 
distinguish between monetary hawks and doves, BOJ watchers categorize BOJ Policy 
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Board members either as “hawks” (taka ha) or “doves” (hato ha) (Oshio 2000: 192-
193).  
 
i) Monetary hawk (taka ha) (Shinotsuka)  
ii) BOJ executives (Hayami, Fujiwara, Yamaguchi) 
iii) Close to the BOJ executives (Taketomi, Ueda, Gotô [until October 1999]) 
iv) Proponents of easier money (Miki,Taya [since December 1999]) 
v) Aggressive easing (hato ha) (Nakahara) 
 
It can be argued that there was a Nakahara-pattern in the Policy Board. That is that 
Nakahara constantly dissented from the chairman’s proposal. In addition to this, he 
continuously formulated an own monetary policy proposal towards aggressive monetary 
easing. However, Nakahara rarely found supporters for his policy proposals, and was 
isolated in the Policy Board.309 In contrast, Policy Board member Shinotsuka’s policy 
stance, although also isolated in her proposals to tighten monetary policy, was closer to 
that of the BOJ executives, meaning her policy proposals found general acceptance in 
the BOJ. The zero interest rate policy was not very popular among BOJ circles, and 
Governor Hayami tried to abandon this non-traditional monetary policy measure as 
soon as possible.  
 
8.6.4 Preparation for the Termination of the Zero Interest Rate Policy 
Governor Hayami and the Policy Board were worried about undesirable side effects of 
the zero interest rate policy (zero kinri no fukusayô) and since the Monetary Policy 
Meeting on 18 May 1999, Policy Board members have discussed how to deal with side 
effects of zero interest rate policy in detail, especially the moral hazard problem. This 
indicates that members of the Policy Board were very concerned about zero interest rate 
policy. 310  Since the end of 1999, Policy Board members have started to take an 
optimistic view on the condition of the Japanese economy. In the Monetary Policy 
Meeting on 17 January 2000, some Policy Board members raised the question whether 
                                                 
309 The nomination of Nakahara – and most of other members of the Policy Board – was arranged and 
managed by then-Deputy Governor Fukui. It was known to Fukui that Nakahara had different opinions of 
monetary policy and had an uncompromising character (Fujii 2004: 17-26).  
310 For instance, Policy Board member Shinotsuka Eiko was the most hawkish member of the Policy 
Board (see, Figure 8-4). Already since May 1999 she officially suggested to end zero interest rate policy 
and to raise the interest rate to 0.25 per cent in every Monetary Policy Meeting, except the four meetings 
between September and October 1999. However, Shinotsuka’s suggestions were all voted down by one in 
favour and eight against.  
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deflation worries had been expelled (defure kenen fusshoku). A Policy Board member 
stated: 
”Japan's economy, which has stopped deteriorating, has recently started 
to improve, with exports and production increasing. The economic 
environment surrounding private demand is gradually improving, as seen 
in the continuing increase in corporate profits” (Bank of Japan, MPM 17 
January 2000).  
 
Since April 2000, based on the results of own publications (e.g., The Monthly Report), 
the BOJ believed that the Japanese economy was recovering, and started to work 
towards an end of the unpopular zero rates. Most Policy Board members were 
convinced it would be best to terminate zero interest rate policy at the soonest possible 
time. In the Monetary Policy Meeting on 12 April 2000, on basis of the April Tankan 
report, Policy Board members argued that in terms of the termination of the zero interest 
rate policy the question was not if, but rather when the time of the termination was 
approaching. When Policy Board member Nakahara told Finance Minister Miyazawa 
about the intention of the Policy Board to end zero interest rate policy soon, the 
Minister reacted very irritated (Nakahara 2006: 99-100). In a press conference on 12 
April 2000, Governor Hayami announced that the majority of the Policy Board was 
against the maintenance of the zero interest rate policy for too long. The Policy Board 
was carefully watching economic conditions, and, in case of a continuation of economic 
recovery, the BOJ would end this policy (Bank of Japan, press conference, 12 April 
2000). In preparation for ending zero interest rate policy, Hayami justified his upbeat 
view on the Japanese economy by stating: 
“What I see as good news in the economy is the ongoing structural 
restructuring in the private sector. We are seeing a creative destruction 
movement, in which corporations have been getting rid of old equipment 
and making new investments and promoting innovation in their activities. 
It is this restructuring and reengineering movement in the corporate 
sector, including the spread of information technology that I see as a 
bright sign.” [sic] (Interview with Hayami, Business Week, 12 June 
2000).  
 
Not only Hayami, but the majority of the Policy Board had an optimistic view of the 
Japanese economy. For instance, Deputy Governor Yamaguchi stated that “it is now 
pretty safe to assume this economy will record positive growth, somewhat above the 1% 
growth projected by the government” (Business Week, 12 June 2000). In an interview 
given on 14 April 2000, Yamaguchi said that the economic recovery had become clear 
 232 
(Nakahara 2006: 112). In addition, Yamaguchi emphasized an improvement of deflation 
problems: “as I [Yamaguchi] understand the situation, prices have become relatively 
stable. The wholesale price index in the last month was up half a percentage point from 
12 months ago” (Business Week, 12 June 2000). 
 
Due to the BOJ’s communication strategy, the market was fully aware of the possibility 
of a rate hike.311 There was widespread speculation that the BOJ was intending on 
raising interest rates as early as the meeting on 17 July (Iwasaki, Nikkei 28 June 2000), 
and Policy Board member Nakahara (2006: 117) believed that the BOJ’s executives had 
prepared for a termination of the zero interest rate policy. Although the BOJ wanted to 
increase interest rates at the July 2000 Monetary Policy Meeting, the Bank was 
surprised by the collapse of the department store chain Sogô and decided the monetary 
policy should remain unchanged (Itô 2006: 112; Fujii 2004: 158-159; Nakahara 2006: 
117-124).312 The financial markets were confused by this decision. Makabe Akio, chief 
economist at Dai-Ichi Kangyo Research Institute, argued that the recent collapse of the 
Sogô department store was given as a rationale for the BOJ decision to maintain interest 
rates as they were. Otake Tomoko, BOJ observer from the Japan Times, posted the 
following critical question: “If Sogô’s collapse can affect monetary policy, what else 
can?” Another critique of the BOJ decision came from Ueno Yasunari, chief market 
economist at Fuji Securities Co., who complained that the BOJ had not offered 
sufficient explanations as to why it decided to leave monetary policy unchanged this 
time, although it had sent clear signs towards a rate hike (JT, 18 July 2000).  
 
8.6.5 The Termination of the Zero Interest Rate Policy 
” […] it is the role of the central banker to take away the punch bowl, just when 
the party is getting going.“ William McChesney Martin, U.S. Federal Reserve 
Chairman 1951-1970 
 
Finally, on 11 August 2000, the Bank decided to abandon zero interest rate policy and 
raised the overnight call rate to 0.25 per cent. This was the first rate hike of the newly 
independent BOJ, and also the first in ten years. Explaining the termination of the zero 
interest rate policy, Hayami said that zero interest rate policy was promoting moral 
                                                 
311 Here, one can see the importance of transparency of a central bank. Transparency can be used to 
inform and prepare the markets of the central bank’s monetary policy moves which help to improve the 
settling of expectations.  
312 Only Policy Board member Shinotsuka voted for a rate hike (Bank of Japan, MPM 17 July 2000).  
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hazard, which decreases the motivation for Japanese companies, banks and government 
to restructure, hindering Japan's economic recovery. According to the BOJ, this change 
in monetary policy was needed due to improvements of the Japanese economy, 
especially because of a slight increase in corporate profits and fixed business investment 
(Bank of Japan, Minutes 11 August 2000). 313  Indeed, the Japanese economy did 
improve and the GDP increased by 3.3 per cent from March 1999 to March 2000 (fiscal 
year 1999). This was seen as a good chance for the BOJ to lift rates after the quarterly 
Tankan survey from July showed business confidence was to be better than expected. In 
April 2000, household spending jumped by 3.6 per cent year-on-year, and the 
unemployment rate sank to 4.8 per cent from a record 4.9 per cent in March 2000.314 
Regarding the CPI, although there was a positive trend, deflationary trends have been 
considered as not ended yet. Nakahara (2006: 96-97; 110) argues that the BOJ had 
prepared for the end of zero interest rate policy since the beginning of 2000. 
Investigating the results of the Tankan report and other publications, the BOJ took the 
first chance to put it into practice.  
 
The decision to raise rates was made by majority vote. The Board voted with seven in 
favour of and two against an interest hike. Only Nakahara Nobuyuki and Ueda Kazuo 
did not support the rate hike. The reasons for rejecting the chairman’s suggestion were 
made public in the minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on 11 August 2000. Both 
members claimed that the termination of the zero interest rate policy was too early and 
that it would be better to wait until the economy recovered entirely. Policy Board 
member Ueda, who had always voted with the majority so far, voted against Hayami’s 
proposal on the following grounds: 
“First, it would be desirable to examine developments in the stock market 
for a little while longer. Second, the optimal interest rate had at last 
reached a level around zero, but it would be desirable to wait for the rate 
to rise clearly above zero. And third, judging from trends in inflation, the 
cost of waiting would be negligible. He added that his view of the 
economic situation did not differ significantly from that of other 
members.” (Bank of Japan, MPM 11 August 2000) 
 
Policy Board member Nakahara, who dissented regularly from the chairman’s proposal, 
gave five reasons why he thought that this move was premature:  
                                                 
313 In an interview with a BOJ official conducted on 24 July 2008 this information was confirmed. 
314 Itô Takatoshi, a critic of the BOJ, admits “[t]o be fair, the economy did look good in the spring of 
2000.” (Itô 2006: 112).  
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“First, a decision to terminate the zero interest rate policy could have a 
large impact on the Bank's independence and the relationship between 
the Bank and the Government with respect to the conduct of economic 
policy. Second, the difference between the views of the Bank's staff and 
the Government on the economic outlook was especially large in areas 
such as business fixed investment and exports, and this meant that 
accountability was insufficient. Third, the decision would further reduce 
credibility of policy coordination between the Government and the Bank 
both at home and abroad, and thus it would be desirable to take time out 
to exchange views and reach a common understanding. Fourth, 
effectively ending the quantitative easing would not have a positive 
effect on financial markets, affecting stock prices and the foreign 
exchange market negatively. And fifth, the justification for raising 
interest rates when a fairly wide output gap existed could not be 
explained by orthodox economic theory.” (Bank of Japan, MPM 11 
August 2000) 
 
 
Furthermore, Nakahara argued that this decision “would go against the mainstream of 
thinking in the world of academic economists and could create a view among foreign 
countries that the Bank was a heretic.” (Bank of Japan, MPM 11 August 2000). In sum, 
the reasons for dissenting by Ueda and Nakahara were different. Ueda’s standpoint was 
close to the majority of the Policy Board, and he simply preferred to wait a little longer 
(matsu tachiba), whereas Nakahara supported a completely different strategy than the 
rest of the Policy Board with his constant proposal of quantitative easing policy.  
 
8.6.6 The Path to Quantitative Easing Policy 
In October 2000, the BOJ published projections of price and economic prospects by 
Policy Board members for the first time in its history (see, Chapter 6). The projections 
by the BOJ’s Policy Board members ranged from 1.9 to 2.3 per cent growth for the 
fiscal year 2000, and were more optimistic than the 1.5 per cent estimation made by the 
government by means of the EPA (JT, 1 November 2000). The minutes of the Monetary 
Policy Meeting demonstrate that most Policy Board members felt that the termination of 
the zero interest rate policy was the correct policy. However, since the beginning of 
2001, the Japanese economy began to deteriorate again, and the BOJ answered by 
gradually easing monetary policy. At the Monetary Policy Meeting on 9 February 2001, 
the BOJ decided to cut the official discount rate (ODR, kôtei buai) from 0.5 per cent to 
0.35 per cent, which was the first change in the ODR since 1995. In addition, the Bank 
restarted the outright purchase of short term government securities for the first time in 
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ten months. The chairman’s proposal was not unanimous. Policy Board members 
Nakahara, Taya and Ueda argued in favour of more radical policy moves. Taya made 
the following proposal: 
“The Bank of Japan will encourage the uncollateralized overnight call 
rate to move on average around 0.10 per cent. The Bank of Japan will 
reduce the official discount rate, with effect from February 13, 2001, by 
0.25 percentage point to 0.25 per cent per annum.” (Bank of Japan, MPM 
9 February 2001)   
 
However, Taya’s proposal to cut the key interest rate and the ODR was overpowered by 
the majority vote with three votes in favour (Taya, Ueda and Nakahara) and six votes 
against it. Official documents by the BOJ demonstrate that Governor Hayami refused to 
implement more drastic policy measures, and he was very critical towards the 
introduction of quantitative easing measures. In a regular press conference on 14 
February 2001, he stated that “the effectiveness [of the quantitative easing policy] is 
unclear and there are many side effects”.315 At that time, Hayami clearly refused to go 
back to zero interest rates (Bank of Japan, Press conference, 15 February 2001). 
 
Despite the BOJ’s easier monetary policy, the Japanese economy showed no signs of 
improving. At the Monetary Policy Meeting on 28 February 2001, most Policy Board 
members were concerned about the outlook of the economy, because “the pace of the 
ongoing economic recovery had been slowing further […] and uncertainty over 
economic prospects had also increased” (Bank of Japan, MPM 28 February 2001). 
Therefore, at the Monetary Policy Meeting on 28 February 2001, the BOJ decided to 
reduce both the overnight call rate target and the official discount rate by 0.1 per cent. 
The overnight call rate was cut to 0.15 per cent. Both, Nakahara, who suggested a return 
to zero rates, and Shinotsuka, who preferred to keep the interest rate at 0.25 per cent, 
opposed the chairman. The ODR was reduced to 0.25 per cent, and again Nakahara and 
Shinotsuka opposed this decision. In the subsequent press conference, Hayami stressed 
that the BOJ has to widen its policy measures. This time, Hayami did not exclude a 
return to zero interest rates and quantitative easing policy measures (Nikkei, 1 March 
2001). The BOJ’s gloomy assessment of the Japanese economy did not change,316 and 
the BOJ started to implement aggressive monetary easing measures in order to stop 
further price declines. 
                                                 
315 In Japanese: “kôka ga fukakujitsu no ue ni fukusayô mo ôkii”. 
316 The BOJ’s view can be seen in the semi annual outlook and risk assessment published in April 2001.  
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8.6.7 The Quantitative Easing Policy 
Finally, on 19 March 2001, the BOJ adopted the so-called quantitative easing policy317 
(QEP) framework 318  in which the main operational target of monetary policy was 
changed from the overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of the current account 
(CAB) held by financial institutions at the BOJ. 319  320  Immediately after the 
announcement, the Bank increased the current account balance to around five trillion 
Yen (Table 8-8) from the average outstanding of four trillion Yen in February 2001. 
Deputy Governor Yamaguchi (2001) emphasized that the raise in the amount of CAB 
was a policy measure for a limited amount of time:  
“[T]he Bank did not simply raise the target [of CAB] regardless of 
demand. The Bank decided the level of the target such as five trillion or 
six trillion based on a judgement that it was the maximum demand for the 
current account balance at the time.” 
 
Similar to the zero interest rate policy, the BOJ committed to provide bank reserves at a 
level well above the required amount until the actual and expected core CPI inflation 
turned positive on a sustainable basis.321 Baba et al. (2006: 106) view the quantitative 
easing policy “as a version of the zero interest rate policy plus the provision of reserves 
well in excess of the levels necessary to achieve a zero short-term rate”. Kimura et al. 
(2002: 3) stated that the BOJ had decided “to finally discard the orthodox framework 
and adopt a new framework”. Fukui commented the implementation of the quantitative 
easing policy as follows:  
[…] the economy faced a severe challenge, the potential risk of falling 
into a vicious cycle, or so-called deflationary spiral, in which a fall in 
demand reflecting deterioration of the economy causes a decline in prices 
and this in turn leads to a further fall in demand. To counter this situation, 
the Bank acted decisively and introduced the quantitative easing policy, 
which was unprecedented in the history of any central bank, with the aim 
                                                 
317 It should be noted, that the BOJ already in 1999 discussed the introduction of quantitative easing 
measures. In the Monetary Policy Meeting on 12 March 1999 Policy Board member Nakahara Nobuyuki 
proposed to ease monetary policy through a quantitative easing framework. Since then Nakahara 
continued to propose quantitative easing policy, but most of the time he stood alone with his effort. 
318 Bernanke et al. (2004: 17) interpret the quantitative easing policy as a revival of the zero interest rate 
policy. However, in comparison to the zero interest rate policy (0.02-0.03 per cent), the overnight call rate 
was even lower under the quantitative easing policy (0.001-0.002 per cent) (Shimizu 2004: 264-268). 
319 Buiter (2008) defines quantitative easing as “an increase in the size of the balance sheet of the central 
bank through an increase it is monetary liabilities (base money), holding constant the composition of its 
assets.” 
320 For details of the quantitative easing policy framework, see, e.g. Fukui (2003) and Shirakawa (2002). 
321 See, the “New Procedures for Money Market Operations and Monetary Easing”, Bank of Japan, 19 
March 2001.  
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of preventing a continuing fall in prices and establishing a foundation for 
achieving sustainable economic growth. (Fukui, 16 March 2006: Speech) 
 
Fujiki et al. (2004) argue that the quantitative easing policy was a “political sign” for 
the future path of monetary policy, since it stands for a high degree of reliability. In 
more detail, the quantitative easing policy was introduced to intensify the impact of zero 
interest rate policy, particularly through the commitment effect, meaning that this policy 
tool is effective until the CPI raises above zero (Bank of Japan 2001; Kanno 2009: 10). 
In sum, the quantitative easing policy consisted of three pillars:  
1. Open-market operations through the outright purchase of government bonds  
2. An increase of the current account balances by financial institution at the BOJ  
3. A commitment or policy duration effect, which is a commitment to maintain 
quantitative easing policy until deflationary concerns are dispelled.322  
 
However, Baba et al. (2005: 68-71) and Hetzel (2004: 3-4) argue that each of the pillars 
could be considered separately. The commitment to provide ample funds of liquidity is 
similar to the commitment of the zero interest rate policy. The purchase of government 
bonds can be conducted without an increase of the current account balance. However, 
conversely, an increase of the current account is connected with the purchase of the 
government bonds (Hamada 2004: 233-237). Indeed, the minutes of the Monetary 
Policy Board demonstrate that Board members were divided over the effectiveness of 
quantitative easing policy and some members were worried about potential side effects 
(Bank of Japan 2001). With the commitment to maintain the quantitative easing policy 
until deflationary concerns are dispelled, the BOJ hoped to discourage banks from 
holding excess liquidity (Yamaguchi Hirohide 2004).  
 
Five days after Fukui took the helm of the BOJ on 20 March 2003, he held an ad hoc 
Monetary Policy Meeting to explain his basic understanding of the current situation. 
Governor Fukui argued that: 
“it was necessary to discuss contingency measures for the immediate 
future at a Monetary Policy Meeting. In addition, the Bank should 
promptly examine the policy framework of monetary easing for the 
longer term, taking into account downside risks stemming from the 
                                                 
322 Hamada (2004: 233-237) argues that foreign direct interventions also belong to the concept of 
quantitative easing policy. However, since the MOF is responsible for these kinds of actions a detailed 
analysis will not conducted here.  
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situation in Iraq, considering the fact that new members had joined the 
Policy Board.” (Bank of Japan, MPM 25 March 2003) 
 
There were certain Board members who were concerned that ad hoc meetings of the 
Policy Board would harm the transparency of the Bank of Japan. As a consequence, 
Fukui emphasized that this ad hoc meeting of the Policy Board was a rare exception 
(Bank of Japan, MPM 25 March 2003). Generally, Governor Fukui was much more 
enthusiastic about raising the target amount of CAB than his predecessor Hayami. 
Between April 2003 and January 2004, the CAB was increased from 17 to 22 trillion to 
30 to 35 trillion Yen (Table 8-8 and Figure 8-5). In addition, the Fukui-led BOJ 
introduced some non-traditional monetary policies, including buying stocks, purchases 
of exchange-traded funds (ETF), real estate investment trust funds (REIT), asset-backed 
securities (ABS; shisan tanpô shôken) and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP; 
shisan tanpô komâsharu pêpâ) (MPM, 11 June 2003). The advantages of these policy 
tools are the BOJ’s commitment to fight deflation and the BOJ diversification of its 
portfolio, avoiding excessive holding of JGB’s (Hamada 2004: 237-238).  
 
Table 8-8: Development of the Balance of Current Accounts and the Outright 
Purchase of JGB’s 
 
Date Target balance of current 
accounts (CAB) (in 
trillion Yen) 
Outright purchase of long-
term JGB’s (in billion 
Yen/month) 
03/2001 5 400 
08/2001 6 600 
09/2001 >6 600 
12/2001 10-15 800 
02/2002 10-15 1000 
10/2002 15-20 1200 
04/2003 17-22 1200 
04/2003 22-27 1200 
05/2003 27-30 1200 
10/2003 27-32 1200 
01/2004 30-35 1200 
Source: Kimura and Small 2006: 37. 
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Figure 8-5: Target Reserve and Actual Balance under the Quantitative Easing Policy 
 
Source: Bank of Japan (2005): Annual review.  
 
8.6.8 The Termination of the Quantitative Easing Policy 
In 2005, the Japanese economy showed signs of revival and the termination of 
quantitative easing policy became a popular issue in the BOJ. Since April 2005, some 
Policy Board members, mainly Mizuno and Fukuma, had started to suggest decreasing 
the amount of CAB held at the BOJ. On basis of their views, since the end of 2005, 
Fukui has begun to announce that the BOJ was looking for an exit out of the 
quantitative easing policy. For instance, he expressed the following in a speech on 22 
December 2005:  
“[T]he possibility of a departure from the unprecedented framework of 
the quantitative easing policy, which was introduced to stave off a 
deflationary spiral, is likely to increase over the course of fiscal 2006.”  
 
By October 2003, the conditions for an exit of the quantitative easing policy were 
clarified by the BOJ: “until at least actual core CPI inflation and its forecast by 
monetary Policy Board members exceed zero” (Baba et al. 2006: 119). In 2005, the BOJ 
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stated that if the following three conditions were met, the quantitative easing policy 
would be abolished by the Bank of Japan (Bank of Japan 2005):  
1. The year-on-year changes in the core consumer price index must remain stable 
above zero 
2. The Policy Board must be convinced that deflation will not return  
3. There are no other economic factors that requires a continuation of loose 
monetary policy 
 
Finally, on 9 March 2006, the Policy Board decided to end the quantitative easing 
policy and implemented a new monetary policy framework (arata na kinyû seisaku unei 
no wakugumi no dônyû ni tsuite). The BOJ’s new framework of monetary policy was 
based on two pillars: First, an assessment of expected developments in economic 
growth and inflation over a one-to-two-year horizon. Whether the result of the BOJ’s 
semiannually published “Outlook and Risk Assessment” coincides with the BOJ’s 
Policy Board’s understanding of price stability is of particular interest. The agreement 
of medium- to long-term price stability of Policy Board members ranges from 0 to 2 per 
cent with a median value of 1 per cent.323 The second pillar was meant to cover the risks 
which threaten sustainable growth and price stability over a longer time period and 
which might require a higher extent of flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy 
(Assenmacher-Wesche, Gerlach and Sekine 2008: 346-348; Iwata 2008). It was argued 
that the new policy framework of the BOJ provided a clearer understanding of the 
central bank’s targets and that transparency was enhanced. Regarding the transparency 
of the new policy framework, Iwata (2008) remarks that “we [the Policy Board] make 
policy decisions by examining the plausibility of our scenario presented in the semi-
annual outlook and by assessing the various risks and the uncertainty ahead for our 
economy”. In other words, the new policy can be explained as “forecast-based policy”. 
The BOJ has implemented an approach in which each individual Policy Board member 
estimates the suitable course of future policy interest rates by providing forecasts of real 
GDP, core CPI and CGPI over a two-year time horizon, “thereby taking into account 
market expectations on the future development of policy rates” (Iwata 2008). With the 
new monetary policy framework, the main operating target changed from CAB to the 
                                                 
323 However, this framework differs from the “ECB’s numerical definition of price stability over the 
medium term (below 2%, but close to it).” The target of the BOJ is determined by the Board members. In 
other words, if Policy Board member change, the monetary policy stance can also change, and so “it is 
possible to revise the numerical target regularly” (Iwata 2008).  
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overnight call rate. Soon after the termination of the zero interest rate policy, the BOJ 
started to work towards interest rate hikes. On 13 July 2006, the BOJ raised interest 
rates to 0.25 per cent. In the press conference after the Monetary Policy Meeting, 
Governor Fukui stated that the BOJ did not intend to realize any further interest rate 
hikes (Nikkei, 16 July 2006). However, in February of 2007, there was a second rate 
hike to 0.5 per cent. This decision was made by majority vote, however, Deputy 
Governor Iwata voted against the chairman’s proposal. This was the first time in the 
BOJ’s history that a Deputy Governor opposed the Governor. The following sections 
focus on pressure exerted on the Bank of Japan by the government and politicians 
regarding monetary policy decisions.  
 
8.7 Pressure on the Bank of Japan by the Government and Politicians 
8.7.1 Introduction 
Since the beginning of Hayami’s tenure as the first Governor of the new BOJ, a scheme 
of permanent conflicts between the government and the central bank has arisen (Arita 
2007: 16). Dwyer (2007) suggests that Japanese lawmakers faced strong “incentives to 
become even more proactive participants in monetary and financial market policy 
debates than ever before.” She even goes as far as to say that “in large part this 
politicisation was intentionally encouraged by the law itself.” Dwyer’s argumentation 
strengthens this thesis’ findings from Chapter 3 and 4, namely that Japanese politicians 
never intended to make the BOJ independent in a de facto sense.   
 
When taking into account that an independent central bank is viewed as the 
international standard, it is surprising that the Japanese government pressured the BOJ 
right after the new BJL came into effect in April 1998. Indeed, the Japanese government 
tried to hide the pressure it exerted on the Bank in the Monetary Policy Meetings. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 6, the Bank of Japan Law requires the publication of complete 
transcripts of Monetary Policy Meetings (BJL, Article 20, Paragraph 2). The transcripts 
confirm that the government already exerted pressure on the new BOJ in the first 
meeting on 9 April 1998. That is, it is apparent that the government did not recognize 
that it was no longer in the position to administer orders to the BOJ in a de iure sense. 
However, in the 9 April 1998 Monetary Policy Meeting, the then-Director General of 
the EPA Omi Kôji requested a more pessimistic view from the BOJ in regards of the 
Japanese economy. The transcripts revealed that Omi pressured the Bank to refrain from 
 242 
publishing statements that hindered the government’s stimulus measures (Bank of Japan, 
MPM 9 April 1998). However, the BOJ refused to alter its standpoint on the economy 
and continued to maintain a pessimistic stance concerning future prospects of the 
Japanese economy. Afterwards, the EPA requested the Bank omit Omi’s statements 
from the summary of the minutes released on 22 May 1998 (JT, 1 August 2008). This 
demonstrates that the EPA was well aware that disproportional pressure on the BOJ 
could harm the credibility of the government and the BOJ.   
 
Another example of political pressure soon after the new BOJ Law took effect in April 
1998 occurred in July 1998. A group of LDP politicians believed that the BOJ acted too 
passively when it came to the deflation problem in the Japanese economy, and stated 
harsh critique of the central bank. A political explanation for the attacks on the BOJ 
might be that LDP lawmakers were concerned about the Upper House election on 12 
July 1998 as survey results were unfavourable for the Hashimoto Cabinet. Indeed, the 
LDP lost the majority in the Upper House and Prime Minister Hashimoto stepped down, 
taking responsibility for the defeat. Obuchi Keizô was elected to the new Prime 
Minister.  
 
One key question is whether or not political pressure influenced monetary policy 
decisions by the BOJ. Arita (2007: 19) argued that the government and MOF 
bureaucrats sharply influenced lawmakers, in particular on the subject of monetary 
easing. For instance, Policy Board member Shinotsuka believed that the reason the 
interest rate was cut in September 1998 was intense political pressure (Fujii 2004: 85). 
The following sections provide an analysis of political pressure on the Bank of Japan 
and its main monetary policy decisions, including the zero interest rate policy between 
1999 and 2000 and quantitative easing policy between 2001 and 2006.  
 
8.7.2 Political Pressure and the Zero Interest Rate Policy 
8.7.2.1 Political Pressure during the Zero Interest Rate Policy 
In February 1999, the government continued to exert intense pressure on the BOJ. For 
instance, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu and Ikeda Yukihiko, Head of the 
LDP's Policy Research Council, publicly called on the BOJ to do more against the rise 
of long-term interest rates. At a press conference on 8 February 1999, Nonaka argued 
that the BOJ is responsible for the dull development and prospects of the Japanese 
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economy. In order to overcome the deflationary problems of the Japanese economy, the 
BOJ should employ stronger monetary policy measures. Nonaka urged the BOJ to 
purchase circulating Japanese government bonds in the market (Arita 2007: 18; Asahi, 
12 August 2000; Fujii 2004: 107-108). However, Arita (2007: 18) argues that the 
statement by Nonaka was just ‘tatemae’, what Nonaka really wanted was for the BOJ to 
underwrite the government’s newly issued JGB, which the BOJ constantly refused to do. 
The issue of buying government bonds was a subject of fierce disputes between the 
government and the BOJ. In the Bank of Japan there was a broad consensus that the 
underwriting of government bonds would undermine the central bank’s 
independence.324 Concerning the underwriting of JGB, the BOJ‘s Policy Board was 
very critical, and members pointed out the risks, for example, in regards of fiscal deficit. 
For instance, the minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting of 19 January 1999 state that: 
“one member pointed out that there were good reasons for this [the 
underwriting of JGB] being prohibited by the Public Finance Law. The 
member expressed clear objection to such activity, claiming that it would 
undermine the credibility of the central bank and lead to the loss of fiscal 
discipline. This view was shared by the Board members.” […] Regarding 
JGB outright purchasing operations, many members argued against 
expanding such operations to influence long-term interest rates. Many 
members claimed unequivocally that, if the Bank actively purchased 
JGBs, market participants would interpret this as the monetization of the 
fiscal deficit.” (Bank of Japan 1999, Minutes of the MPM, 19 January 
1999). 
 
Another example is Okina Kunio, then-economist at the IMES, the research department 
of the BOJ. He argued fiercely against the BOJ underwriting JGB. Okina compared this 
policy measure with the experience of hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic: 
“The absorption of government bonds by the BOJ would be akin to 
introducing a (illegal) drug into the economy. [I]f the government came 
to accept such indulgence there is a very real risk that it would be 
difficult to end […], because it would be too painful, as is evidenced by 
historical experience, and might impair the national interest of Japan 
from a long-term perspective. In this context, it is noteworthy that there 
are some who, in the view of recent accumulation of fiscal deficit, predict 
that Japan might follow the same path as the Weimar Republic, whose 
massive budget deficit was monetized by the central bank’s underwriting 
of government bonds, only resulting in economic crisis with 
hyperinflation, capital flight and a GDP decline” (Okina 2007). 
 
                                                 
324 See, Bank of Japan, various issues of minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings. 
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The introduction of the zero interest rate policy in February 1999 was decided after a 
tough fight with the government and MOF. It can be hardly seen as coincidence that on 
the very Monetary Policy Meeting on 9 February 1999, Sakaiya Taichi, Minister of 
State for Economic Planning, joined the Monetary Policy Meeting (see, Appendix D). 
Shinotsuka reports that this meeting was characterised by a high extent of governmental 
pressure, and that many Policy Board members were extremely nervous. This Monetary 
Policy Meeting lasted almost eight hours, much longer than usual. A “system of driving 
the BOJ into a corner” (nichigin wo oikomu taisei) had started (Fujii 2004: 104-115).  
 
Fujii (2004: 110-111) argues that the BOJ’s basic standpoint of the Japanese economy, 
which is published, e.g., in the Monthly Report, did not change significantly between 
January and February of 1999. If this is true the assumptions of intense government 
pressure would be confirmed, resulting in the introduction of the zero interest rate 
policy. Governor Hayami was challenged by numerous questions regarding 
governmental and political pressure on the BOJ in the subsequent press conference of 
the Monetary Policy Meeting. Hayami patiently denied the existence of intense pressure 
coming from politicians, arguing that the BOJ decided monetary policy in accordance 
with its own beliefs (Bank of Japan 1999, Press conference, 12 February 1999). 
However, many sources demonstrate that the BOJ, including Governor Hayami, was 
highly concerned about zero interest rate policy and possible side effects. For instance, 
the Nikkei Shinbun (1 July 1999) reports that the introduction of the zero interest rate 
policy was regretted by the inner circle of the BOJ. Many BOJ officials regarded the 
introduction of the zero interest rate policy as a lost fight against the government that 
could result in a weakening of the BOJ’s independence in the long-run (Arita 2007). On 
30 June 1999, Hayami said to Suzuki Yoshio, member of the Liberal Party and former 
BOJ executive that “zero interest rates are an abnormal condition.” This and other 
statements encouraged speculation that the BOJ sought to terminate the zero interest 
rate policy as soon as possible. In September of 1999, the BOJ’s Policy Board decided 
monetary policy would remain unchanged, although there was intense pressure from 
politicians. Markets had expected a policy change which would proceed in the direction 
of a further easing of monetary policy in order to fight against the strong Yen. However, 
the BOJ left monetary policy unchanged at the Monetary Policy Meeting on the 22 
September, resisting pressures from the Japanese government and outside pressure from 
the US government. This decision was a shock to the market. The Japan Times (22 
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September 1999) commented that the BOJ’s decision “lurks a central bank struggling 
for independence”, building the impression that political reasons played a main role for 
this decision. In this case, the BOJ was successful in resisting governmental pressure.   
 
However, the BOJ was not always able to resist pressure from the government and 
politicians. For example, after Mori Yoshirô became new Prime Minister in April 2000, 
and right before the Lower House election on 25 June 2000, political pressure on the 
BOJ increased to a high extent. Prime Minister Mori had only little support in the public 
and feared that a rate hike would weaken the Japanese economy and, thus, worsen the 
LDP’s chances for the upcoming election.325 Facing a possible defeat in the election, 
Mori constantly repeated his claim that the BOJ should maintain the zero interest rate 
policy. First, this claim was rebuffed by Hayami in a press conference on 14 June 2000, 
in which the Governor emphasized the necessity of an almost immediate termination of 
the zero interest rate policy (Bank of Japan, press conference, 15 June 2000). However, 
in reality, the BOJ was reluctant. The BOJ intended to raise rates, but, suddenly 
refrained from doing so. The reason for the hesitant behaviour of the BOJ was probably 
that the government and LDP politicians, such as Kamei, Chairman of Policy Research 
Council, Aizawa, Chairman of the Financial Reconstruction Commission, and, most 
importantly, Prime Minister Mori put pressure on the BOJ to not raise interest rates. 
Nakahara (2006: 123) reports that on 14 July, Prime Minister Mori, Finance Minister 
Miyazawa and Sakaiya Taichi, Director General of the EPA, consulted and concluded 
that there was no other choice than to make use of the government’s right to request a 
postponement of a monetary policy decision if the Bank should decide to terminate the 
zero interest rate policy. Mori confidently stated on 14 July that he did not expect a 
policy change from the BOJ in the upcoming Monetary Policy Meeting on 17 July 
(Asahi, 15 July 2000). Indeed, the BOJ left monetary policy unchanged (see, Bank of 
Japan, Minutes), and many observers (e.g., Otake 2000) argued that the collapse of the 
Sogô department store chain was used as a reason for the BOJ’s decision. Yet, it is hard 
to believe that the collapse of the Sogô alone had enough influence to trigger financial 
panic, and change the intentions of the BOJ.326 It is possible, however, to argue that the 
                                                 
325 In the end, the ruling coalition of LDP, Liberal Party, and Kômeitô maintained its majority in the 
Lower House election on 25 June 2000, although the ruling coalition lost seats and power. 
326 According to some observers, it was inordinately to postpone a rate hike just because of Sogô’s failure 
(e.g., Otake 2000). 
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Sogô problem (sogô mondai) was just used as an excuse for the BOJ to not raise interest 
rates at that time, and that the true reason was the intense political pressure.  
 
8.7.2.2 Political Pressure during the Termination of the Zero Interest Rate Policy 
Political pressure on the BOJ continued, and Prime Minister Mori repeated that the bad 
condition of the Japanese economy required maintaining the zero interest rate policy for 
some time. On 9 August 2000, LDP politicians even threatened to revise the BOJ Law, 
in particular in regards of firing the Governor (Yomiuri, 12 August 2000). This was a 
direct threat towards Hayami should the Bank decide to terminate the zero interest rate 
policy. Before the Monetary Policy Meeting on 11 August 2000, many lawmakers from 
the ruling party, including Prime Minister Mori, Finance Minister Miyazawa, Kamei 
Shizuka (Chairman of the LDP policy research council), Aizawa Hideyuki (chairman of 
the Financial Reconstruction Commission), Sakaiya Taichi, and Hiranuma Takeo 
(International Trade and Industry Minister), criticised the BOJ, claiming that a 
termination of the zero interest rate policy would be realized too early. Miyazawa tried 
to split the Policy Board of the BOJ, and stated that Governor Hayami was isolated in 
the opinion that the BOJ should abandon the zero interest rate policy and raise interest 
rates (Nakahara 2006: 121-122). Critics claimed that Hayami’s view was a “special 
theory” (tokuron) and did not represent the common opinion of the BOJ. For instance, 
Hayami regarded deflation as not particularly troublesome, and believed that zero 
interest rates might hurt households’ interest income (Yoshitomi 2006: 137).  
 
However, the minutes of the BOJ’s Monetary Policy Meeting proved that Miyazaki’s 
argument that Hayami was alone in favouring and deciding to end the zero interest rate 
policy was wrong. Indeed, the opinion regarding the termination of the zero interest rate 
policy was split within the BOJ. Yamawaki (2002: 271) cited BOJ officials who 
believed that the abandonment of the zero interest rate policy was a mistake and that the 
quantitative easing measures should have been implemented earlier. Contrarily, the 
majority of the Policy Board voted in favour of a termination of the zero interest rate 
policy on the basis of a judgement that the Japanese economy showed signs of 
recovering. Only Policy Board members Nakahara and Ueda voted against the 
chairman’s proposal. This shows that Hayami’s opinion was not isolated in the BOJ.  
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The government and the vast majority of the LDP exerted strong pressure (kajô na 
kainyû) against an interest rate hike, and mobilised as much confrontation as possible. 
In the LDP, only Horiuchi Ko was in favour ending the zero interest rate policy 
(Nakahara 2006: 121-122). However, the BOJ resisted all pressure from politicians 
successfully. It can be argued that the termination of the zero interest rate policy was an 
unprecedented case in which the BOJ disregarded intense opposition and specific 
government demands (Yamawaki 2002: 266). The rationale behind the confrontation 
was a different assessment of the Japanese economy. The different views regarding the 
condition of the Japanese economy between the BOJ and the government were clearly 
demonstrated in the BOJ’s Monthly Report (kinyû keizai geppô) and the government’s 
Monthly Economic Report (getsurei keizai hôkoku). The BOJ was optimistic (tsuyoki) 
in regards of future prospects of the Japanese economy, the government, however, 
continued to maintain a cautious stance (shinchô). As a consequence, both reports 
revealed substantial differences regarding the future development of macroeconomic 
fundamentals such as consumption, employment, income, and public investment. 
 
The government’s position was supported by prominent representatives of the Japanese 
industry, for instance, Imai Takashi, chairman of the Keidanren, Okuda Hiroshi, 
chairman of the Nikkeiren, Inaba Kosaku, chairman of the JCCI (Asahi and JT, 12 
August 2000), and members from the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ, Nippon Kôgyô 
Ginkô). All argued against the termination of the zero interest rate policy. Fujiki and 
Shiratsuka (2002) declare that the BOJ’s explanation after the Policy Meeting on 17 
July 2000 seemed to have misled market participants into believing that the zero interest 
rate policy would not be terminated for a considerable amount of time. Therefore, the 
Bank’s decision on 11 August came as a surprise for some actors, and was consequently 
criticised by private-sector economists. In contrast, some support, or at least 
understanding for the BOJ came from some businessmen, e.g., Ushio Jirô, President of 
Ushio Electronics, and Kobayashi Yôtarô, President of Fuji Xerox (Satô Yamato, 
Nikkei, 9 August 2000). Senior strategist of the Daiwa Institute of Research Ltd., 
Nakano Mitsuhiro, argued that the market and the business sector were well prepared 
for an interest rate hike, and the markets responded in accordance with the BOJ’s 
calculations (JT 12 August 2000).  
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Although most economists and business leaders criticised the decision to end the zero 
interest rate policy as premature, economists regarded a raise of the interest rates by 25 
basis points as not strong enough to hinder the recovery of the Japanese economy. In 
general, the economic impact of miniscule rises in interest rates leaves room for 
discussion. According to Blinder et al. (2001: 62), a “change of 0.25% has relatively 
little effect […] on either output or inflation.” Itô (2006: 115) confirms this view that a 
raise in interest rate has little impact on investment or consumption. Based on these 
arguments and to counter critics, Hayami and other Policy Board members argued that 
the decision to end the zero interest rate policy was just a “small adjustment” to 
monetary easing, and that the BOJ would continue easy monetary conditions to support 
economic recovery (Bank of Japan, MPM 11 August 2000; Hayami 2000: Speech at 
Keizai Club, 22 December 2000). Indeed, in an economic sense, the end of the zero 
interest rate policy was just a small step, politically, however, it set a new milestone in 
the relationship between the central bank and the government.  
 
8.7.2.3 The Monetary Policy Meeting on 11 August 2000 
The transcripts of the minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on 11 August 2000 
demonstrate that the government did exercise its right to request a postponement of the 
monetary policy decision (Article 19, Paragraph 2). Yet, the request was denied by the 
Policy Board (Article 19, Paragraph 3). This was the first time that the government 
requested a postponement of the Policy Board’s decision. The participating government 
representatives were Murata Yoshitaka, Senior State Secretary for Finance, Ministry of 
Finance and Kawade Eiji, Director General of the Coordination Bureau, EPA. 
According to the BOJ Law, Article 20, Paragraph 2, the BOJ has to publish the 
complete transcripts (gijiroku) of the Monetary Policy Meeting „after an appropriate 
amount of time” (sôtô kikan keika go). In practice, the BOJ decided to publish the 
gijiroku after ten years (see, Chapter 6). The transcripts of the Monetary Policy Meeting 
held on 11 August 2000 revealed interesting details about the process of terminating the 
zero interest rate policy. Hayami, who was irritated by former statements made by 
Kamei, started a dispute with government representative Murata. In order to proceed 
with the agenda, Policy Board member Shinotsuka had to interrupt the dispute (pp. 76-
77). Policy Board member Nakahara Nobuyuki, who agreed with government’s 
demands to maintain the zero interest rate policy, criticised some of his colleagues, in 
particular Deputy Fujiwara, for not having an own opinion. He accused them of 
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preferring to follow Governor Hayami and the majority of the Policy Board (pp. 79-80). 
This is known as a typical free-rider problem. Murata repeated the position of the 
government in a statement,327 agreeing that a rate hike at this very moment would have 
been premature. However, after the majority of Policy Board members argued in favour 
of the termination of the zero interest rate policy, Murata informed Finance Minister 
Miyazawa and Kawade contacted Sakaiya, Minister of State for Economic Planning, 
about the BOJ’s intention. Both Ministers instructed Murata and Kawade to make use of 
Article 19, Paragraph 2, and to request a postponement of the decision.  
 
After the government representatives Kawade and Murata expressed their opinions 
concerning the economic condition, Hayami asked if they wished to exercise the 
government’s right to request a postponement of a decision (p. 89), which Kawade and 
Murata affirmed after consulting with their Ministries. Policy Board member Miki 
asked the government representatives to state the reason behind their request in more 
detail (pp. 96-97). Governor Hayami shortened the discussion by requesting the vote 
over the government’s request. The Policy Board voted eight in favour of and one 
against rejecting the government’s request. Unsurprisingly, only Nakahara voted in 
favour of the government’s request (pp. 107-108). After the Policy Board voted down 
the request of the government, the Policy Board voted over monetary policy, and 
decided to terminate the zero interest rate policy by majority vote.  
 
However, the employment of Article 19, Paragraph 2 was not a spontaneous decision by 
the government. The procedure of the Monetary Policy Meeting indicated that the 
government was not surprised by the BOJ’s decision, and planned to make use of its 
right to request a postponement of a monetary policy decision in advance. On 8 August, 
Hayami attended a meeting of Cabinet members (getsurei keizai hôkoku kankei kakuryô 
kaigi) and explained that the majority of Policy Board members were in favour of 
terminating zero interest rates. Almost immediately, government members such as 
Prime Minister Mori, Kamei, Sakaiya and Hiranuma stated their fierce opposition. The 
following day, LDP Diet members, including Yamamoto and Watanabe joined in 
protesting against the BOJ’s plan. Nakahara (2006: 126) argues that two days before the 
Monetary Policy Meeting, the government had already decided to make use of its right 
                                                 
327 In every Monetary Policy Meeting both government representatives present in statements the 
government’s view regarding the economy and monetary policy.  
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to request a postponement of a monetary policy decision should the Policy Board really 
decide to terminate the zero interest rate policy. However, how exactly Article 19 
should be employed was unclear to Policy Board members and the government 
representatives. Consequently, Policy Board members actively discussed the correct 
application of Article 19, Paragraph 2 in the Monetary Policy Meeting, because this is 
not clearly settled in the BJL. The “Report concerning the Revision of the Bank of 
Japan Law” by the FSRC, which was submitted to the Finance Minister on 6 February 
1997, states that: 
“It is important to give the Government an opportunity to fully explain its 
views at monetary policy meetings in order to ensure consistency 
between the policies of the Bank and the Government and secure 
transparency in the decision-making process. Therefore, since the 
framework provides a means to coordinate the differing views of the 
Government and the Bank on monetary policy, the Policy Board should 
make sure that the Government fully explain its views before taking a 
vote.” 
 
Mutô Toshiro from the MOF pointed out that the application of Article 19 is very 
unclear. Mutô acted as Deputy Vice Minister for Policy Coordination at the Ministry of 
Finance during the BJL reform process, and stated at a Diet session on 14 May 1997: 
“When a proposal put forward at a monetary policy meeting is broadly in 
line with what the Government had been expecting and the Government's 
position on that proposal has been almost decided, the Government 
representatives can immediately explain their views and the Board make 
a judgment [...] However, there might be cases where the Government's 
stance on a new proposal has not yet been decided. In such cases, the 
Government would need a certain amount of time, not too long, to 
examine the proposal and decide its stance. There also may be cases 
where Government representatives, in response to a question from a 
Policy Board member, might not be fully prepared to explain the 
Government's views. I am afraid I cannot yet give a clear answer on what 
sort of cases the Article [19] could apply to, but, the situations I have just 
mentioned, although somewhat unspecific, may give some idea of the 
circumstances under which the Government can request that a vote be 
postponed.” (Bank of Japan, MPM 11 August 2000). 
 
In sum, the right of postponement of a monetary policy decision was debated intensely 
in the Monetary Policy Meeting, and it was unclear to the Bank of Japan how to use this 
article until it was to be employed the first time in practice. Anyway, the Policy Board 
voted down the government’s request and terminated the zero interest rate policy 
despite the demand of the government. This decision was a political signal to the 
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government that the BOJ was willing and even strong enough to resist political pressure 
and could act independently.  
 
8.7.2.4 Political Implications of the Termination of the Zero Interest Rate Policy 
Regarding the termination of the zero interest rate policy, many observers (e.g., Fujii 
2004; Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006; Posen 2000; Lincoln 2001; Nakahara 2006: 
130-131) argue that the BOJ’s (in particular Hayami) primary aim was to demonstrate 
independence. Based on the experience of being dependent on the MOF and 
government for a long time, the BOJ willingly took the chance to demonstrate its 
independence. The BOJ made sure that it “would neither easily accommodate the 
Ministry of Finance’s requests nor accept MOF leadership in the coordination of macro-
economic policy” (Bertoldi 2003: 11). It can be argued that the fierce opposition of the 
government (e.g., from Prime Minister Mori, Finance Minister Miyazawa, and Kamei) 
convinced Hayami and the BOJ even more that simply following the government’s 
course of economic policy could be political costly in the future, and result in a 
reduction of the BOJ’s independence. In this case, the Bank’s primary motive was 
politically motivated, and not necessarily focussed on the economic conditions (Lincoln 
2001). However, the assessment of the economy by the BOJ hinted that a recovery took 
place and that the termination of the zero interest rate policy was economically justified. 
A justification that proved to be wrong one year later, and the BOJ had to adjust its 
monetary policy.  
 
In the press conference after the Monetary Policy Meeting on 11 August 2000, Hayami 
stressed the independence of the BOJ and that the final decision of monetary policy is in 
the hands of the BOJ. Hayami confidently stated that “it is our [the Bank of Japan’s] 
duty to demonstrate independence. We [the BOJ] must decide over monetary policy”328 
(Bank of Japan, press conference 12 August 2000). One can argue that the BOJ’s 
decision to end the zero interest rate policy absorbing overt political pressure marks a 
key point in the BOJ history. With this decision, the central bank proved that it could 
act independent from the government and politicians.  
 
                                                 
328 In Japanese: “wareware ga kimete ikaneba naranai” 
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The government and politicians from the ruling LDP have repeatedly argued that a 
termination of the zero interest rate policy would be premature. In the press, this claim 
was called “jiki shôsô” or “shôsô ron”. The government representatives from the MOF 
and EPA used this argumentation in the Monetary Policy Meetings to make their 
standpoint clear to the Bank of Japan. Lukauskas and Shimabukuro (2006: 142) 
observed that many politicians and economists considered the decision to end the zero 
interest rate policy as an affront against the government in order to gain credibility. In 
the end, the dispute between the Bank of Japan with politicians can be described as a 
political show. The termination of the zero interest rate policy triggered harsh criticism 
not only from the government and the Ministry of Finance, but also by the Economic 
Planning Agency (EPA), Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, Keizai 
Sangyô Shô), Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC, kinyû saisei iinkai) and the 
Financial Services Agency (FSA, Kinyû Chô) (Kobayashi, Spiegel, and Yamori 2006; 
Nakahara 2006: 127). After the BOJ’s made this decision, the relationship between the 
BOJ and the government became very poor (Harui 2012).  
 
In contrast, it can be argued that the pressure exerted on the BOJ by the government and 
ruling party lawmakers was too strong, and that politicians’ reactions were out of 
proportion.329 One reasonable explanation for the heavy amount of pressure exercised 
on the BOJ from the government and LDP politicians is that politicians were attempting 
to strengthen their position as leaders (principal) by controlling the BOJ and playing a 
more important part in policy planning. Referring to Chapter 6 of this thesis, the BOJ 
used enhanced transparency to explain its policy move to abandon the zero interest rate 
policy. In numerous speeches, press conferences and interviews, BOJ board members 
explained their monetary policy stance, and tried to prepare the market towards a 
change in monetary policy well in advance. Minutes of Monetary Policy Meeting 
showed that the views of the most Policy Board members became increasingly 
optimistic in regards of the condition of the Japanese economy. In publications, such as 
the Tankan, the BOJ demonstrated its view that the economy was recovering and that 
macroeconomic data was improving, which sufficiently justifies an interest rate hike.  
 
                                                 
329 Interview with a former MOF official, 2008.  
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It can be deduced that the BOJ’s “wait and see” tactic  - the BOJ refrained from raising 
interest rates immediately – contributed to causing the government and politicians to 
feel the need to exert exceeding amounts of pressure. In essence, both parties more than 
likely believed that enough pressure would make the BOJ to follow the government. 
Another possible interpretation is that government’s pressure was provoked by remarks 
of BOJ staff, in particular Governor Hayami. Hayami claimed in an appearance before 
the Diet that the economy had reached a stage in which a rate hike is an appropriate 
policy measure because risks of deflation were gone. In an Upper House committee 
Hayami admitted that the outlook of the economy was more optimistic within the BOJ 
than in the government (Japan Times, 10 August 2000).  
 
In conclusion, the termination of the zero interest rate policy brought the BOJ into 
heavy conflict with the government, Prime Minister Mori, and Diet politicians. With the 
termination of the zero interest rate policy the BOJ snubbed the Mori government. The 
government put intense pressure on Governor Hayami, so-called “Hayami bashing” 
(Hayami basshingu) (Nakahara 2006: 88). There were concerns that interventions from 
the politicians (seiji kainyû) in the BOJ were so harsh that long-term harm may result. 
The markets may begin to distrust whether the central bank can act independently 
(Nikkei, 12 August 2000). Important for the independence of the BOJ was that the Bank 
prevailed against all critiques, and resisted political pressure successfully most of the 
time. Under the old BOJ Law, a rate hike would most unlikely face heavy political 
pressure from the government. As many case studies show, it was almost impossible for 
the BOJ to raise rates if the government, e.g., via the MOF, and Diet politicians, acted 
together against the BOJ. 
 
8.7.2.5 Political Pressure after the Zero Interest Rate Policy 
Soon after the termination of the zero interest rate policy, the government and the ruling 
LDP continued to exert pressure on the BOJ. In November of 2000, facing the IT 
bubble, Aizawa and Kamei repeated their critique of the BOJ. On 1 December, the 
Director General of EPA Sakaiya again stated that the termination of the zero interest 
rate policy was implemented too early, and requested the BOJ to ease monetary policy 
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to support the economy (Nikkei, 2 December 2000).330 In contrast to Sakaiya and other 
LDP politicians who demanded a return to the zero interest rate policy, Vice Finance 
Minister Mutô Toshirô331 stated that there is no need for the BOJ to restore the zero 
interest rate policy, because it could harm the central bank’s credibility (JT, 8 December 
2000).  
 
For the Bank of Japan, the government’s counterpart for institutionalised, high-level 
cooperation is the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP, Keizai Zaisei Shimon 
Kaigi), which is a part of the Cabinet Office. In January 2001, the government 
established the CEFP with the aim to strengthen the Prime Minister’s leadership in 
policy making. The Council is a forum which supports the Prime Minister through 
research, analysis and the exchange of information in the field of economic policies. 
The Council is composed of senior ministers including the Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister, BOJ Governor, and representatives of academia and business. The Governor 
of the Bank of Japan is appointed by the Prime Minister to the Council under the ‘Law 
to Establish the Cabinet Office’ (Hosen 2007; Mulgan 2013). The fact that the BOJ 
Governor is a member of this council led to some critique, because this can make the 
BOJ a target for policy pressure. 332  In a meeting on 2 February 2001, Asô Tarô, 
Minister for Economic and Fiscal Policy, pressured Governor Hayami to ease monetary 
policy. Hayami’s viewpoint was quite different in comparison to the other members of 
the CEFP. Hamada Kôichi, President of the Cabinet’s Office’s Economic and Social 
Research Institute (ESRI, Keizei shakai sôgô kenkyû jo), proposed quantitative 
monetary easing. Hamada’s viewpoint was supported by prominent economists, such as 
Yoshikawa Hiroshi, Professor at Tôkyô University and Homma Masaaki, Ôsaka 
University (JT, 3 February 2001; Fujii 2004: 195-196; Nakahara 2006: 156-157).333  
 
                                                 
330 It should be noted that Sakaiya’s statements were contradictory. In October 2000, he stated that the 
evaluation of the Japanese economy by the government and the BOJ have become very similar (JT, 1 Nov 
2000). 
331 In 2003, Mutô was appointed Deputy Governor of the BOJ.  
332  For instance, the Central Bank Governance Group of the BIS (2009: 149) argues that “some 
accountability measures could potentially impinge on the independence of the central bank. Regular 
meetings between the Central Bank Governor and the minister of finance may serve accountability but 
could also be used to exert political pressures [on the central bank].” 
333 At this point, it has to be noted that not all politicians argued in favour of quantitative easing policy. 
Nakahara (2006: 110) reports that for instance, influential LDP lawmaker Katô Kôichi was against 
quantitative easing policy.  
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Consequently, LDP policy chief Kamei increased the pressure on the BOJ to adopt 
quantitative easing measures. In a speech at the Foreign Correspondence Club of Japan 
in Tôkyô on 19 February 2001, he argued that the termination of the zero interest rate 
policy was a mistake that hindered the Japanese economy from recovering. Kamei 
demanded a return to the zero interest rate policy and further quantitative easing of 
monetary policy (JT, 20 February 2001). The monetary policy decision of the BOJ in 
February 2001 was too small for Kamei. Kamei criticised the decision of the BOJ as 
“fooling policy” (me kuramashi saku), because it fools the public into believing the BOJ 
is doing something against deflation. He argued that this monetary policy decision had 
no positive effect on the economy (Nakahara 2006: 160). On 1 March 2001, the ESRI 
organized an Economic Policy Forum 334  (Keizai seisaku fôramu) titled “The 
Effectiveness and Possibility of Further Monetary Relaxation” (Kinyû seisaku no kadai 
– sara naru kinyû kanwa wo megutte). Some members of the panel, such as Hamada 
Kôichi and Iwata Kikuo, Professor of Economics at Gakushûin University, demanded 
further monetary easing by the BOJ (ESRI: 2001; Asahi, 2 March 2001).  
 
Direct pressure came also from the government and the MOF. At a press conference on 
26 February 2002, Minister of Finance Shiokawa Masajuro requested the BOJ to 
increase the buying operations of JGB from 800 billion Yen to 1 trillion Yen per month. 
It is a rare for a Minister of Finance to criticise and speak publicly about concrete 
demands regarding monetary policy recommendations. Taniguchi Takayoshi, Vice 
Minister of Finance, participated in various Monetary Policy Meetings as a 
representative of the government, and put the claim of Finance Minister Shiokawa into 
practice by directly requesting the Bank to widen its buying operations of JGB’s. 
Taniguchi’s request, which was expressed in Monetary Policy Meetings, persisted 
continuously from December 2002 to March 2003. This is clear evidence of the MOF’s 
determination to accomplish easier monetary policy.  
 
8.7.3 Political Pressure and the Quantitative Easing Policy 
8.7.3.1 Political Pressure during the Quantitative Easing Policy 
It can be argued that the introduction of the quantitative easing policy in March 2001 
was a personal defeat for Governor Hayami, because it was a sign that the ending of the 
                                                 
334 The Economic Policy Forum is organized as an open-panel discussion by scholars and experts in- and 
outside the government.  
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zero interest rate policy in August 2000 was a policy mistake. Facing a severe economic 
downturn and harsh political pressure, the BOJ could not simply return to zero rates, 
because this would be an admission that the termination of the zero interest rate policy 
in August was in fact a policy mistake. Hayami had to introduce a new monetary policy 
framework to keep his countenance. The introduction of the quantitative easing policy 
was the BOJ’s most difficult decision (mottomo muzukashii handan). One day before 
the Monetary Policy Meeting on 19 March 2001, the government made a clear 
statement that they expected a change in the monetary policy stance of the BOJ owing 
to the worsening economy (Nakahara 2006: 167). The BOJ had no other choice, but to 
follow the government’s demand.  
 
Lukauskas and Shimabukuro (2006: 143-144) interpreted the introduction of 
quantitative easing policy as an indicator that the BOJ had changed its mind towards 
building a closer cooperation with the government. However, this conclusion is not 
totally convincing. It is rather that the BOJ connected the decision to introduce 
quantitative easing with the request to the government to conduct structural reform 
(Fujii 2004: 234-236; 245). The BOJ stated that after they had implemented quantitative 
easing policy, it would be the turn of the government (seifu ni baton tacchi) to promote 
structural reforms in order to revive the Japanese economy (Hayami 2001, press 
conference on 19 June 2001; Yamaguchi 2001, press conference on 5 July 2001). 
Members of the Policy Board continuously emphasized that structural reforms made by 
the government were essential to overcome deflation pressures. The minutes of the 
Monetary Policy Meeting on 14-15 June 2001 declare: 
“One [Policy Board] member said that it should be noted that the scope 
for further monetary policy measures was limited. Another member 
commented that the economy could not be stimulated by monetary policy 
alone, and thus it was important to implement structural reforms.”   
 
This quote makes it clear that some members of the Policy Board believed that 
monetary policy alone was insufficient to boost the economy. Rather, the government 
must intensify their efforts and introduce structural reforms. One important feature of 
quantitative easing policy was an increasing amount of buying operations of JGB’s by 
the BOJ (see, Table 8-8). However, this policy measure was not without risks, because 
there were serious concerns about the BOJ’s capital adequacy. Higher borrowing costs 
will create a capital loss for the BOJ. The BOJ was concerned that a substantially 
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increased balance sheet via the outright purchase of JGBs might impose excessive risks 
to the central bank’s operations. The balance sheet of the BOJ has increased to a large 
extent and exceeded other major central banks such as the Federal Reserve, and the 
ECB (Hayami 2004: 300). For fiscal year 2003, the BOJ was confronted with its first 
operating loss since 1972. Both Governors, Hayami and his successor Fukui, were 
concerned about the capital structure and its side effects on central bank credibility 
(Cargill 2006). Considering that the BOJ has not sold any JGB’s in the last 30 years, 
Policy Board member Ueda Kazuo emphasizes that the risks the BOJ has taken with the 
introduction of quantitative easing policy and buying operations of JGB:  
“As the Bank has been conducting unconventional market operations, it is 
subject to the risk of incurring several types of capital loss. On its balance sheet, 
JGBs account for the largest share in the Bank's assets, and as of February 10, 
2004, had reached 66 trillion Yen. In contrast, the Bank's capital was just over 5 
trillion Yen and thus a 10-per cent fall in the value of JGB holdings due to a rise 
in interest rates would be sufficient to make it insolvent.” (Kazuo Ueda, speech, 
25 October 2003).  
 
Government officials repeatedly pressured the BOJ to buy more JGB’s. For instance, 
before the Monetary Policy Meeting on 28 February 2002, the BOJ was subject to 
intense pressure from the Cabinet to ease monetary policy. In particular, Economy 
Minister Takenaka and Finance Minister Shiokawa pressured the BOJ extremely. Their 
arguments were strengthened by the government representatives in the Monetary Policy 
Meeting, Taniguchi from the MOF and Kobayashi, from the Cabinet Office. Eventually, 
the BOJ decided to increase the purchase of JGB’s from 800 billion to 1 trillion Yen per 
month (Table 8-8). In the following press conference, Hayami was asked if statements 
made by the MOF and politicians had influence on the BOJ’s independence Hayami, 
however, avoided giving a clear answer (Fujii 2004: 261-264; Bank of Japan 2002, 
press conference, 29 February 2002).  
 
Ide (2007) analyses the relation between the Japanese government and the central bank 
from the viewpoint of fiscal sociology and finds that the political influence from the 
government was reinforced in the new Bank of Japan Law. In form of the quantitative 
easing policy in 2001, the BOJ took many risks on behalf of the government, and lost 
discretionary power over monetary policy. The rise in JGB and CAB, which were not 
supported by the majority of BOJ officials, demonstrate that the BOJ was required to 
cooperate with the government. It can be concluded that the relationship between the 
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BOJ and the government is decided by social, economic, political and historical 
contexts rather than by legal contexts.  
 
8.7.3.2 Political Pressure during the Termination of the Quantitative Easing Policy 
However, as soon as the Japanese economy showed some signs of recovery, the BOJ 
worked towards ending the quantitative easing policy in order to put an end to 
cooperation with the government. Beginning 2005, BOJ Governor Fukui has dropped 
some hints that the BOJ started to consider a termination of the quantitative easing 
policy. In March 2006, in a hearing before the Upper House of the Diet, Fukui gave a 
strong signal that the BOJ regarded economic conditions are recovering which justifies 
an immediate termination of quantitative easing policy (Hisane 2006). Similarly as in 
the case of the end of the zero interest rate policy, politicians constantly argued that a 
termination of the quantitative easing policy was premature. Prime Minister Koizumi 
and Nakagawa Hidenao, chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council (PRC) declared 
on 8 March 2006 that an end of the quantitative easing policy would be too early (sôki 
kaijo), and could possibly harm the Japanese economy 335  (Suzuki 2006: 26). The 
government was trying to exert influence on the BOJ, because it feared higher long-term 
interest rates. Some LDP politicians, including Nakagawa, exerted utmost pressure on 
the BOJ, and even threatened to amend the BJL on several occasions. Regardless of the 
strong political pressure, the BOJ was able to resist political pressure, establish a new 
monetary policy framework, and end the quantitative easing policy. Nakahara, Policy 
Board member from 1998 to 2002, was convinced that with the termination of the 
quantitative easing policy the BOJ had changed its policy stance from cooperation 
towards protecting its independence from the government (Nakahara 2006). 
 
Political pressure continued with the interest rate hike in February 2007 from 0.25 per 
cent to 0.5 per cent. Nakagawa, promoted to LDP General Secretary in the Abe Cabinet, 
put an exceptional amount of pressure on the BOJ in January 2007. Nakagawa warned 
that if the BOJ raised interest rates further the government would see itself forced to 
make use of its right to request a postponement of monetary policy decision (Oritani 
2010: 32; Otsuma 2008). However, the Fukui-led BOJ was unimpressed and raised the 
                                                 
335 Contrary to this claim is the behaviour of the government. In February, the government upgraded its 
assessment of the economy for the first time in six months. Literally, the Cabinet Office stated in its 
monthly report that "The economy is recovering", which is more optimistic than the report in January, 
which stated that the economy was "recovering at a moderate pace” (Hisane 2006).  
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interest rate to 0.5 per cent at the Monetary Policy Meeting on 21 February 2007. 
Fukui’s view regarding cooperation with the government was quite clear. At a speech in 
January 2007, Governor Fukui was asked about his stance toward fiscal-monetary 
coordination. Literally, Fukui said that “[w]e do not need any.” (Bank of Japan 2007; 
Feldman 2007). This is quite a statement and showed that Fukui was not interested in 
cooperation with the government. The BOJ’s position was unacceptable for some 
lawmakers. In response to the BOJ’s behaviour, Nakagawa threatened to curb the BOJ’s 
independence, blaming the central bank, claiming that the two interest rate hikes it made 
in July 2006 and February 2007 caused the LDP’s defeat in the Upper House election in 
July 2007 (Hock 2007: 18; Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 145-147). 
 
8.7.4 Pressure on the Bank of Japan 
This section focuses on a general analysis of political pressure on the Bank of Japan, 
and identifies measures and tools which the government and Diet politicians applied to 
enforce their demands on monetary policy.   
 
8.7.4.1 Political Pressure on Governor Hayami  
According to Article 14 of the BJL, the entire Policy Board has the authority over 
decision-making of monetary policy. However, similar to many other central banks, the 
focus is on the central bank leader.  The personal responsibility of central bank 
Governors highlights the hierarchy of power and decision-making in the central bank. 
That is the reason why mostly the Governors are the target of personal and political 
pressure. 336  BOJ Governor Hayami provides a good example of the relationship 
between the central bank and the government, and how a Central Bank Governor can 
react to political pressure. With the choice of Hayami as successor for the resigned 
Matsushita, the government aimed to appoint a Governor who could easily be 
influenced. LDP politicians did not expect that the BOJ would act independently under 
the leadership of Hayami. In practice, however, the government and politicians were 
proved wrong and Hayami acted more independently than politicians were hoping for. 
As Hall (2008: 172) argues, “[i]ndividual central bankers can [...] build up enormous 
personal authority through leadership with sanguine outcomes during difficult times”. 
Whether Hayami’s performance was “sanguine” might be debated, but he turned out to 
                                                 
336 In this context, Capie et al. (1994: 59) mentioned the personalized attacks on Bundesbank’s Dr. 
Helmut Schlesinger at international meetings between 1992 and 1993. 
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be a strong leader, and was determined to protect the independence of the Bank of Japan. 
Realising that Hayami was unwilling to follow the government’s economic policy, 
politicians from the government and Diet initiated a strategy which sought to intensify 
pressure on Hayami and the BOJ.  
 
Another reason for politicians’ intense pressure on the BOJ and Hayami was the fact 
that the new Governor distanced himself from the LDP during his entire career. During 
his tenure at the Japan Association of Executives (Keizai Dôyûkai) between 1989 and 
1998, Hayami associated himself with opposition parties’ leaders, such as Hosokawa 
Morihiro and Tanaka Shûsei (Arita 2007: 20; Fujii 2004: 41-42). Hayami’s cooperation 
with the with non-LDP lawmakers was criticised by many LDP lawmakers, including 
Mori, Prime Minister between 2000 and 2001. During his governorship at the BOJ 
between 1998 and 2003, Hayami continued to remain distant to the LDP, which partly 
explained the harsh criticism and intense pressure from the government. Hayami not 
only rebuffed political pressure, but also, on several occasions, he turned the tables and 
recommended policy measures to the government. For instance, shortly after his 
inauguration, Hayami advised the government to implement income tax cuts, lower 
corporate taxes and use more efficient public spending in order to counter the “dark 
prospects” of the Japanese economy (JT, 7 April 1998). In April 2001, at the 17th 
meeting of the CEFP, Hayami requested the government immediately realize 
emergency economic packages (JT, 19 April 2001).  
 
However, Hayami was highly criticized for his communication to financial markets by 
politicians and market participants. Indeed, Hayami repeatedly made unfavourable 
statements in press conferences and speeches, which created confusion in the market. 
For instance, regarding the introduction of quantitative easing policy, Hayami said at a 
press conference that “[t]he efficiency [of the quantitative easing policy] is far from 
clear and there are lot of side effects” (Yamawaki 2002: 270). Such a statement is 
detrimental in building credibility for BOJ’s monetary policy, because it openly 
demonstrates serious doubts on the BOJ’s own policies. In addition, Hayami’s 
statements triggered conflicts between the Japanese government and the BOJ.337  
 
                                                 
337 This is in line with Siklos and Bohl (2005) who identify the communication of a central bank as a 
main reason of conflicts between governments and central banks.  
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8.7.4.2 Pressure on Bank of Japan’s Governors to Resign 
Various politicians from the LDP were unsatisfied with Hayami’s performance, and 
seemingly constantly demanded the resignation of the Governor (sôsai jinin ron). 
Especially after the introduction of the quantitative easing policy in March 2001, 
demands for Hayami’s resignation became harsher and more frequent. Politicians 
regarded the introduction of the quantitative easing policy as evidence that the 
termination of the zero interest rate policy in August 2000 was a policy failure (seisaku 
no shippai) on Hayami’s part. There were many LDP politicians who believed that 
Hayami should take responsibility (sekinin ron) for the termination of the zero interest 
rate policy and resign. The pressure for Hayami became really intense.  
 
In April 2001, the media reported that Hayami would resign, which came as a surprise 
for all market participants (Fujii 2004, Nakahara 2006; Hamada and Noguchi 2005: 37-
38). On 26 April 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi announced his new Cabinet, and, the 
following day, Yomiuri Shinbun published an exclusive story (tokudane) that the BOJ 
Governor intended to quit.338 There are two different explanations for the resignation 
story. First, some observers argued that this was a strategy used by politicians to put 
pressure on the BOJ. Angry with the BOJ’s claim to combine quantitative easing policy 
with structural reforms, the government responded with a new strategy, and spread the 
rumour that Hayami was in bad health and would soon retire. The Financial Times (3 
May 2001) reported that BOJ officials promptly accused the MOF and politicians for 
the disclosure of the resignation narrative. Some unclear remarks from Japan’s finance 
minister and Hayami’s silence supported these rumours. In particular, Hayami’s 
continuous struggles with the ruling LDP over monetary policy gave substance to the 
rumours (Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 143-144).  
 
A second explanation is that Hayami truly intended to resign. Facing constant political 
pressure from Prime Minister Mori and other lawmakers exhausted him, and the plan to 
retire from the post of BOJ Governor arose. In April 2001, an election of the Prime 
Minister took place and former Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryûtarô was the favourite 
candidate. Hashimoto’s faction was particularly critical against Hayami. However, 
Koizumi Junichirô won the election of the LDP president (jimintô sôsai sen) and 
                                                 
338 In Japanese: “Hayami nichigin sôsai ga jii. Kenkô fuan riyû ni, kônin, Fukui gen fuku sôsai wo jiku ni” 
(Yomiuri Shinbun, 27 April 2001).  
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became Prime Minister. As a result, the situation had changed significantly for Hayami. 
Koizumi and Hayami had known each other since Hayami’s tenure at the Keizai 
Dôyûkai (Fujii 2004: 214), and both were members of a study group with Hosokawa 
Morihiro and Tanaka Shûsei. The new Prime Minister and the BOJ Governor seemed to 
share the same goal of structural reform, and it can be argued that Hayami lost his 
intention for resignation. In addition, finding a new and suitable candidate for a central 
bank’s head is a costly issue for a government, and the Koizumi administration did not 
have the time to select a new BOJ Governor (Arita 2007: 25).  
 
Hayami, who attended the G7 Finance Minister and Central Bank Governors meeting in 
Washington on 28 April waited until May to clear up the rumours. He denied all 
resignation rumours, stating that he never intended to step down from the position of 
Governor ahead of schedule. Hayami stated that “I would like to serve out my term as 
long as my health permits” (JT, 10 May 2001; Fujii 2004: 212-213; Nakahara 2006: 
182-183; 195). Hayami’s statement could be interpreted as that he never really intended 
to resign, which coincides with the first explanation. However, it is also visible that 
Hayami tried not to lose his countenance in that affair, meaning that he simply wanted 
to avoid the impression that the government’s pressure on the Governor was successful. 
In the end, it is impossible to verify which explanation is correct, but it is evident that 
Hayami’s reputation was harmed by that incident.  
 
Similar to Hayami in May 2001, Fukui experienced his own resignation ordeal in June 
2006 (Fukui sôsai taijin ron). Voices from the government, Diet politicians and in the 
public supported the view that Fukui should be fired should the BOJ decide to further 
interest rate hikes (Motoyoshi 2006: 88-89). It was astonishing that at that exact time a 
story was revealed in which Fukui was involved in a scandal regarding an investment in 
the Murakami fund. After Murakami Yoshiaki, a former Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry bureaucrat, was accused and arrested for insider trading, Fukui confessed 
that he invested ten million Yen in Murakami’s fund in 1999 during his tenure at Fujitsu 
Research, and kept it even after becoming BOJ Governor in 2003. The Japanese media 
was surprisingly quiet in reporting critically about Fukui’s financial scandal. However, 
the general public was not so patient with the Governor. A survey by the Asahi Shinbun 
showed that the majority of the public, namely 67 per cent, called for Fukui’s 
resignation. Most interestingly, Fukui was supported by Prime Minister Koizumi, the 
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government, and leading ruling party politicians, who arguably saved his skin. How can 
the strategy of Koizumi and the government to support Fukui be explained, although 
Fukui started to end the silent cooperation with the government and terminated 
quantitative easing policy in March 2006? 
 
It can be argued that the Murakami fund scandal weakened the position of the Fukui-led 
BOJ against the government. Arguably, the Koizumi administration could have 
intended to force Fukui to return to a cooperative stance with the government after they 
had saved him from resignation. After the scandal, it was difficult for Fukui to exert 
leadership in the BOJ. Following the government’s demands would have raised the 
assumption that Fukui was indebted to Koizumi. The whole scenario afterwards made it 
difficult for the BOJ to act independently. The decision to raise the interest rate in July 
2006 can be understood as an attempt made by Fukui and the BOJ to demonstrate 
independence. Due to the scandal with the Murakami fund, the BOJ was caught in an 
unsure state of dependence and subject to external pressure and control. In the end, 
Policy Board members believed that they would lose the market’s trust if they did not 
raise rates at this time.339 In other words, Fukui was trapped in a serious dilemma. Any 
policy measure he made could have been interpreted as having been influenced by the 
government. If he supported government policy, it was easy to argue that Fukui had to 
follow government’s demands. In case of a different monetary policy, it would have 
been possible to state that the BOJ needed to prove that it could still act independently 
after the scandal (Harui 2006; Kajimoto 2006; Takita 2006).  
 
8.7.4.3 The Bank of Japan’s Parliamentary Hearings  
As previously demonstrated, the new BJL requires the BOJ to report and to justify its 
policy decisions before the Diet on a regular basis (Article 54, Paragraph 3). Regular 
appearances before parliament are an essential factor of a central bank’s accountability 
(see, Chapter 6). Sterne (2000: 100) argues that “accountability is sometimes achieved 
through very frequent parliamentary monitoring.” This section focuses on the question 
how the Japanese government interpreted and employed Article 54 that requires the 
BOJ to report before the Diet.  
 
                                                 
339 In Japanese: “kaijo shinakereba nichgin ni tai suru shijô no shinrai ga ushinawarete shimau.” 
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In practice, it turned out that the government frequently requested a Governor’s 
appearance before the Diet, especially in the case of Hayami. It can be argued that this 
right was abused by politicians since the beginning of the new BOJ. In comparison to 
the procedure under the old law, there was a major change. Before the Bank of Japan 
Law revision, the BOJ Governor only had to appear before the Diet approximately ten 
times a year (Nakao and Horii 1991: 18). In his first year as Governor, in fiscal year 
1998, Hayami had to appear before the Diet a total of 106 times (Sterne 2000: 75), 
although the BOJ had eased monetary policy with interest rate cuts and the introduction 
of zero interest rate policy. Both policy measures were claimed by the government. It is 
possible to say that there was no urgent need for the government to force the BOJ to 
report before the Diet so often just to confer on monetary policy operations. Thus, the 
government’s behaviour can be interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate its authority by 
refusing to allow the Bank to act independently.  
 
Nakahara (2006: 125-126) reports that around August 2000, when the BOJ planned and 
finally decided to terminate the zero interest rate policy, Hayami was called before Diet 
exceptionally often. Hayami had to explain his view on the condition of the Japanese 
economy and deflation pressures. Needless to say, the government had a different view, 
and used the Diet hearings to exert pressure on Hayami. In a speech at the Keizai Club 
in Tôkyô on 25 February 2003, Hayami stated that “the number of times I appeared in 
the Diet to answer questions during my term of office up to January was 382” (Hayami 
2003). The Asahi Shinbun (9 April 2008) reported that Hayami was called before the 
Diet 450 times during his five-year term. Notably, during some periods he was 
requested to appear more than once a day. 
 
Most of the time, Hayami endured the permanent hearings and questionnaires before the 
Diet very patiently. One time he was grilled by one of his main critics, LDP lawmaker 
Masuzoe Yôichi. When asked about the economic failure to end zero interest rate policy 
in August 2000, Hayami insisted that the end of zero interest rate policy was not a 
mistake, and that the economic conditions had simply changed. After that hearing, it 
was reported that Masuzoe lost his motivation to criticise and attack the BOJ, arguing 
that Hayami was particularly obstinate, and always gave poor answers (o somatsu) 
(Nakahara 2006: 205). Like Masuzoe, an increasing number of Diet members regarded 
the questionings of the Governor as ineffective. Indeed, requests of the government to 
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Hayami became less frequent, reducing to only 36 times in fiscal year 2002 (Table 8-9). 
After Fukui became Governor in 2003, the government’s request of the Governor’s and 
other Board members’ attendance before Diet sank noticeably, averaging between 30 
times a year in 2005 and 2007 and 39 times a year in 2003 (Table 8-9). Nevertheless, it 
is evident that Bank of Japan officials had to appear before the Diet more often than 
officials of other major central banks such as the US Federal Reserve or the European 
Central Bank (Table 8-10).  
 
Table 8-9: Testimony of BOJ officials before Diet  
Fiscal 
Year 
Frequency of 
Appearance before 
the Diet 
2002 59 (36) 
2003 39 (23) 
2004 35 (27) 
2005 30 (17) 
2006 31 (23) 
2007 30 (17) 
2008 45 (28) 
2009 29 (15) 
2010 30 (20) 
2011  41 (30) 
2012 31 (23) 
Source: BOJ, Annual Review 2002-2012 and BOJ website340  
Note: The number in parenthesis is the number the Governor appeared before Diet 
 
 
Table 8-10: Comparison of Testimony before Diet341 between the BOJ, ECB, and the 
US Federal Reserve  
 
Year BOJ ECB Fed 
2005 33 (20) 5 (5) 21 (13) 
2006 35 (25) 5 (5) 15 (6) 
Source: Shirakawa (2008: 243) 
Note: The number in parenthesis is the number of the Governor (President, Chairman 
respectively) appeared before Diet (European Parliament, Congress respectively) 
 
 
Between 1998 and 2001 Hayami’s attendance was repeatedly requested by the 
government even during Monetary Policy Meetings. On several occasions, Hayami 
                                                 
340 (http://www.boj.or.jp/announcements/kokkai). 
341 Respectively, the European Parliament and Congress.  
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missed the beginning of the Board’s meetings, because his presence was required at a 
meeting of the Ministerial Council, which discussed the Economic Planning Agency’s 
Monthly Economic Report (getsurei keizai hôkoku) (Table 8-11). On several other 
occasions, e.g., on 16 July 1999, Hayami was absent in order to attend a session of the 
Diet. In case of Hayami’s absence, Deputy Governor Fujiwara performed the duties of 
the chairman in accordance with Article 16, Paragraph 5 of the Bank of Japan Law. Due 
to the intense demand by Diet members to question Governor Hayami, Hayami was 
forced to shorten several Monetary Policy Meetings. Not only the Governor, but, on 
some occasions, a Deputy Governor was also called to report before the government or 
Diet. Table 8-12 lists all other Policy Board members, who were requested by the 
government to attend Monetary Policy Meetings. Interesting to note is the fact that they 
were all Deputy Governors. 342 After Hayami’s retirement in 2003, the government’s 
requests for the attendance of leading figures of the BOJ or others during Monetary 
Policy Meetings became less frequent. Altogether, they only demanded appearances 
four times.  
 
 
Table 8-11: Absence of Governor Hayami from Monetary Policy Meetings 
Date Missing time  Reason for absence  
11 August 1998 9:00 to 9:22  Meeting of the Ministerial Council which 
discussed issues including the Economic Planning 
Agency's Monthly Economic Report. 
9 September 1998  The MPM was recessed due to Hayami’s 
attendance at a Diet session 
19 January 1999 9:01 to 9:17 Meeting of the Ministerial Council  
16 July 1999 9:42 to 10:54  Diet session  
17 December 1999  9:00 to 9:09 Meeting of the Ministerial Council 
14 September 2000 9:01 to 10:20  Meeting of the Ministerial Council  
15 December 2000 9:00 to 10:14  Meeting of the Ministerial Council  
19 January 2001 9:00 to 10:38 Meeting of the Ministerial Council  
Source: Own compilation on basis of Minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings, Bank of 
Japan.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
342 Here, it is not totally clear if the government requested that very Deputy Governor, or, if the Deputy 
Governor just replaced the Governor.  
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Table 8-12:  Absence of Policy Board Members from Monetary Policy Meetings 
Date PB Member  Reason for Absence 
25 February 1999 Fujiwara Diet session 
19 March 2001 Fujiwara Diet session 
5 March 2003 Fujiwara Diet session 
19 January 2006 Iwata Meeting of the Ministerial Council 
19 December 2006 Iwata Ministerial meeting on economic measures 
8 April 2008 Shirakawa House of Councillors  
15 November 2011 Yamaguchi House of Councillors, Budget Committee  
Source: Own compilation on basis of Minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings, Bank of 
Japan.   
 
 
In sum, the empirical data shows that the Japanese Government employed its right to 
make BOJ Policy Board members, in particular the Governor, appear before the Diet 
extensively to put pressure on the BOJ. Especially, Governor Hayami was called before 
the Diet extremely often, which can be explained by two reasons. First, the government 
wanted to make clear that it still had power over the BOJ and that the central bank could 
not act entirely independent from the government. Second, Governor Hayami turned out 
to be a central banker whose own idea of monetary policy differed strongly from that of 
the government, and, thus, he was forced to explain his monetary policy before the Diet 
more often than usual. We observe a shift in the frequency of Diet hearings after Fukui 
took over the helm of the BOJ in 2003. The same can be said for Shirakawa, who 
assumed the position in 2008. However, it turned out that the government’s strategy had 
only limited success in influencing monetary policy. Only in combination with other 
pressure, was it sometimes possible for the government to force the BOJ to act more in 
line with its demands. The following section analyses government representatives in the 
Monetary Policy Meetings of the Bank of Japan.  
 
8.7.4.4 Government Representatives in Monetary Policy Meetings 
According to Article 19 of the Bank of Japan Law, the government has the right to send 
two representatives to attend Monetary Policy Meetings of the BOJ; one from the MOF 
and the other one from the Economic Planning Agency (since 2001 from the Cabinet 
Office) (see, Chapter 5). These two representatives may express views and submit 
proposals regarding monetary policy (BJL, Article 19, Paragraph 2).   
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It is most interesting that Finance Minister Matsunaga attended the first Monetary 
Policy Meeting of the BOJ under the new BJL on 9 April 1998. Why should the Finance 
Minister attend a Monetary Policy Meeting of an independent central bank? The reason 
for this was made clear in a statement by Matsunaga, before the start of the meeting in 
which he declared how the government expected the BOJ to act:  
“As stated in the new Bank of Japan Law, […] it was important for the 
Bank's monetary policy and the basic stance of the government's 
economic policy to be mutually harmonious. In this regard, the Monetary 
Policy Meeting would be a useful opportunity for the Bank of Japan and 
the government to exchange views. […] It was important that the Bank 
of Japan, for its part, should reduce financial institutions' anxiety about 
financing difficulties by supplying ample funds to the money market.” 
[sic] (Bank of Japan, Minutes of MPM, 9 April 1998, italics added).  
 
The Finance Minister’s claims were repeated by the second government representative 
Omi Kôji, Director General of the Economic Planning Agency (Bank of Japan, Minutes 
of MPM, 9 April 1998). The government had planned in advance that the Finance 
Minister and the Director General of the EPA should attend the very first Monetary 
Policy Meeting in order to express what is expected of the BOJ, namely to keep close 
contact to the government, and, in more detail, to provide ample funds to the financial 
market. Of course, this put intense pressure on the central bank, and weakened its 
independence, especially because this statement was formulated by the Finance Minister. 
If studying the Minutes of the Monetary Policy Board Meetings it becomes evident that 
even incumbent Cabinet Ministers joined the meetings on several occasions, although 
this practice was highly uncommon under the old BOJ Law. In addition, on some 
occasions, government representatives took the chance to make remarks before the 
Monetary Policy Meeting had started, which can be interpreted as another form of 
exercising pressure on the central bank. Another measure of the government to put 
pressure on the BOJ was to send more than two representatives, who appeared 
alternately, arguably disturbing a smooth procedure of the Monetary Policy Meeting.  
 
At the Monetary Policy Meeting on 12 June 1998, approximately two months after the 
new BJL took effect, the government reduced BJL Article 19 to the absurd. The MOF 
sent Deputy Vice Minister for Policy Coordination Mutô Toshirô to the Monetary 
Policy Meeting. The EPA was represented by three different officials who came one 
after another alternately. Kurimoto Seiichirô, Parliamentary Vice Minister, joined from 
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9:00 a.m. to 10:46 a.m., followed by Omi Kôji, Director General, from 10:50 a.m. to 
11:17 a.m.. Finally, Shioya Takahide, Director General of the Coordination Bureau, 
attended from 12:17 p.m. to 5:56 p.m. (Bank of Japan, MPM 12 June 1998). Policy 
Board member Nakahara (2006: 39-40) was quite irritated by the government’s 
harassment, presuming that the government disregarded the seriousness of the BOJ’s 
Monetary Policy Meetings. This procedure was repeated at the Monetary Policy 
Meeting on 12 February 1999, at which the zero interest rate policy was decided upon. 
Here, both the MOF and the EPA sent two representatives who alternated when they 
were present. This behaviour can yet again be interpreted as a deliberate move of the 
government to strengthen its authoritative position, and to maintain ongoing pressure on 
the BOJ.  
 
The Japanese Government continued this strategy until 2001, and requested the BOJ 
implement strong easing monetary policies. The minutes of the Monetary Policy 
Meetings show that before the introduction of the quantitative easing policy (19 January 
2001; 9 February 2001), the government sent four government representatives. During 
the period of quantitative easing policy, the government continuously put pressure on 
the BOJ to ease monetary policy further. For instance, Deputy Minister of Finance 
Taniguchi Takayoshi attended the Monetary Policy Meetings from December 2002 to 
March 2003, and permanently requested the BOJ increase its outright purchases of JGB.  
 
Takenaka Heizô can be identified as a source of strong political pressure during the 
period of the quantitative easing policy. Takenaka was the Minister in charge of 
economic and fiscal policy (keizai zaisei seisaku tantô; short: Economy Minister) from 
2001 to 2005. He was known for advocating structural reforms and privatization. In 
addition, he was a strong supporter of the implementation of an inflation target (IT, 
infure tâgetto), and tried to convince BOJ officials and politicians of the advantages of 
this strategy.343 Especially after Takenaka was appointed to head the FSA in September 
2002, he tried to increase the coordination of the FSA with the BOJ (Hoshi 2004). 
Takenaka exerted intense pressure on the BOJ to further ease monetary policy. For 
instance, Takenaka joined several Monetary Policy Meetings of the BOJ in order to 
                                                 
343 In 2001, there was a heavy public debate of Economy Minister Takenaka and Finance Minister 
Shiokawa over inflation targeting. Takenaka supported the idea of an inflation target, whereas Shiokawa 
argued that inflation targeting bear the risk of uncontrollable inflation. Governor Hayami clearly opposed 
the idea, commenting that “I’ve never hared of a more stupid policy [than IT]” (JT, 15 August 2000).  
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express his opinions on monetary policy. Usually, incumbent members of the Cabinet 
refrained from participating in Monetary Policy Meetings, and preferred to send 
representatives instead. It can be argued that there a strong reasons for a Cabinet 
minister to attend a Monetary Policy Meeting, all of which aim to strengthen the 
position of the government. Takenaka participated in Monetary Policy Meetings a total 
of 14 times; nine times in 2001 (continuously from 15 June 2001 to the end of 2001, 
except 29 October), four times in 2002, and one time in 2003.344 This is ample evidence 
that Takenaka was especially determined to pressure the BOJ towards easing monetary 
policy. The first meeting Takenaka participated was on the 15 June 2001. Here, he 
emphasised the necessity of cooperation between the BOJ and the government. 
Takenaka demanded a “harmonization” of the fiscal and monetary policy and requested 
the BOJ increase the amount of CAB. At the same time, he pointed out that the 
government was willing to implement structural reforms. Takenaka made following 
remarks in the Monetary Policy Meeting on 15 June 2001: 
“When advancing structural reforms, it would be important to minimize 
the deflationary pressure to the greatest possible extent within the severe 
fiscal constraints. The Government would make efforts to establish a 
concrete program of structural reforms. Therefore, the Government 
would like to ask the Bank to conduct monetary policy in harmony with 
other policy actions from the standpoint of utilizing all possible policy 
measures […] the Government would like to ask the Bank to conduct 
monetary policy in a flexible manner, taking into account the 
deflationary pressure during the adjustment period.” (Bank of Japan, 
MPM, 14-15 June 2001).  
 
In the subsequent Monetary Policy Meeting on the 12 and 13 July 2001, Takenaka 
requested the BOJ to take additional measures in order to influence the expectations of 
the markets and the public, aiming to dispel deflationary concern. Furthermore, the 
Economy Minister wanted the Bank to discuss the issue of real interest rates. BOJ 
Governor Hayami took Takenaka’s demands as an affront to the BOJ’s independence. 
He rebuffed the requests with the following four reasons (Bank of Japan 2001, MPM, 
12-13 July 2001):    
1. The points mentioned by the Government representatives above 
[Takenaka and Fujii] had been continuously discussed by the Board. The 
Board bore the Government's remarks in mind, and continued to have 
                                                 
344 See, minutes of the Monetary Policy Board meetings (Bank of Japan). 
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thorough discussions regarding which monetary policy decisions were 
appropriate to make.    
2. As there was hardly any room left for conventional monetary policy 
measures, the effects, including side effects, and the feasibility of 
possible monetary policy measures should be examined carefully.   
3. The Bank hoped that the Government understood the Bank was doing 
its utmost to explore every avenue in discussing the best monetary policy 
based on its view that the economic situation was severe, and would 
welcome constructive suggestions by the Government at Monetary 
Policy Meetings.   
4. The Bank would continue to make efforts to conduct appropriate 
monetary policy as a central bank, and, at the same time, strongly hoped 
that the Government would push ahead with its efforts to advance its 
concrete plans for structural reforms. 
 
Hayami’s statement was clear evidence that the BOJ was not willing to cooperate with 
the government. Takenaka was upset about Hayami’s and the Policy Board’s reluctance 
to further ease monetary policy, and continued to exert intense pressure on the BOJ. He 
announced in advance that he intended to participate at the upcoming Monetary Policy 
Meeting on 14 August 2001, stating that “I will attend [the MPM] and will say what I 
have been saying till now”. Indeed, this time the Policy Board decided to further ease 
monetary policy, and increased the targeted reserves from five to six trillion Yen. The 
outright purchase of long-term government bonds increased from 400 billion Yen to 
600 billion Yen (Bank of Japan, MPM 14 August 2001). In the subsequent press 
conference, even Hayami did not exclude further easing in the near future. This was an 
important moment for the relationship between the government and the BOJ. One might 
assume that government pressure was successful, because one month earlier Governor 
Hayami’s rhetoric was the opposite, and the Governor said that further easing is not 
necessary.  
 
Evidence for the success of government pressure was a statement made by Takenaka. 
He said that if the BOJ had not consented to monetary easing, the government would 
have eventually forced the BOJ to obey (JT 15 August 2001). This strongly indicates 
that the government would have used Article 19, Paragraph 2 of the BOJ Law, namely 
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the request of a postponement of a monetary policy decision with the submission of an 
own proposal. After the circumstances of the termination of the zero interest rate policy, 
this would have been a strong threat to the BOJ as the BOJ’s decision to abandon the 
zero interest rate policy was commonly viewed as a policy mistake by the majority of 
observers (Itô 2004, 2006). Another overrule of the government by the BOJ would have 
done enormous harm to the BOJ in case of a policy mistake. In sum, it can be argued 
that governmental pressure, especially that exercised by Economy Minister Takenaka 
was successful this time. 
 
As already demonstrated, after Fukui was appointed Governor in March 2003, the BOJ 
adopted a more cooperative stance with the government. As a result, pressure from 
government representatives in Monetary Policy Meetings became less frequent and less 
intense after Hayami’s term ended. Thus, it can be argued that the government’s 
strategy to exert direct pressure in Monetary Policy Meetings was particularly 
prominent during the governorship of Hayami. The following section briefly compares 
the government’s attitude towards Governors Hayami, Fukui and Shirakawa.  
 
8.7.4.5 Comparisons between Governor Hayami, Fukui and Shirakawa 
As already discussed, Fukui replaced Hayami as BOJ Governor in 2003. After 
approximately one year in office, Fukui gained a high reputation in the media, and with 
analysts and economists. The Economist (12 February 2004) even went as far as to refer 
to Fukui as the best central banker in the world, whereas, his predecessor Hayami was 
labelled quite the opposite, namely as “quite possibly the world’s worst central banker”. 
These very different evaluations deserve a clarification.   
 
Once in office, Fukui adopted a less confrontational approach and was determined to 
develop good relationships with the government and politicians. On various occasions, 
Fukui demonstrated that he was very skilful in communicating with politicians and the 
public. He was able to make politicians and the public believe that he fully intended to 
combat deflation pressures. Especially in the beginning of his tenure, Governor Fukui 
was willing to take more risks in using unorthodox monetary policy tools. Indeed, it is 
evident that under the leadership of Fukui the BOJ aggressively fought deflation, and 
printed much more money (Table 8-8) (Fukui 2003; Pascha 2005a; Hamada and 
Noguchi 2005; Itô 2004, 2006). Regarding the introduction of an inflation target, Fukui 
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skilfully announced that he was not against inflation targeting in principal, but that it 
would be a rather inappropriate move at that time (Fukui 2003). With these kinds of 
statements, Fukui successfully stayed away from conflicts with supporters of inflation 
targeting, including Economy Minister Takenaka. This example showed that he was 
able to placate politicians in order to avoid unnecessary confrontations with politicians 
that could have been unfavourable for the BOJ in the long-run. The change in the 
Bank’s communication with the public was of even higher significance. Hayami’s 
rhetoric was criticised to a high extent by many observers, and caused confusion in the 
financial market on some occasions (Itô 2004, 2006). For instance, in September 1998, 
when the Policy Board decided to cut the key interest rate to 0.25 per cent, explanations 
regarding the duration and the future path of lower interest rates lacked clarity. 
Observers argued that policy explanations by the BOJ were not sufficient for a 
transparent central bank (Fujii 2004: 88-89). Another example is the quantitative easing 
policy. When quantitative easing policy was implemented in March 2001, Hayami’s 
statements indicated that he was not convinced that the new policy measure could be 
successful in overcoming deflation. Since expectations played a major role in regards of 
future inflation, Hayami’s public speaking did not help to enhance the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the new monetary policy framework. 
 
In contrast to Hayami, Fukui’s communication strategy was much more optimistic in 
terms of the efficiency of the BOJ’s monetary policy. Fukui stressed the effectiveness of 
the quantitative easing policy, and he made credible commitments, stating that the BOJ 
would continue easy money conditions until the CPI became positive, or at least 
reached zero. In the beginning of his tenure, Fukui credibly convinced the public that 
the BOJ was determined to fight inflation, and continue zero interest rates until 
deflation concerns were dispelled (Itô 2004: 4; 2006). Fukui was aspired to maintain 
quantitative easing policy as long as necessary (Fukui 2003). Observers agreed that 
Fukui’s statements were much more credible than Hayami’s (Fujii 2004: 292). 
Moreover, Fukui acted much more diplomatic than his predecessor, and “the 
confrontational style with the government [under Hayami] has melted away.” The new 
Governor anticipated that cooperation with the government did not automatically mean 
bowing to political influence. In sum, the new chairman preferred a looser monetary 
policy, and, under his regime, the BOJ injected much more liquidity in the financial 
market than before, which gained support from the political side (Pascha 2005a).  
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However, one has to find out to what extent and during which period Governor Fukui 
cooperated with the government and politicians. Hamada and Noguchi (2005: 41) found 
that “[i]n addition, the BOJ under Fukui’s direction cooperated with Ministry of Finance 
in supporting numerous exchange rate interventions that intended to minimize the 
abrupt appreciation of the Yen in the fall of 2003. The BOJ implemented the expansion 
of quantitative easing, in order to assure that exchange market interventions would be de 
facto unsterilized interventions.” In this case, it can be argued that the Fukui-led BOJ 
cooperated with the MOF like in former times, i.e., before the BJL revision. Taking 
these examples into consideration, it can be argued that the policy stance by the BOJ 
and the government was similar. However, Fukui was not permanently supportive 
towards easing measures such as quantitative easing policy. Nakahara (2006: 183) 
reports that Fukui’s standpoint towards quantitative easing policy changed after he 
became BOJ Governor. Still in 2001, Fukui argued against easing measures, and 
published a paper which harshly criticised quantitative easing policy. However, after 
becoming Governor in 2003, Fukui soon started to raise the amount of CAB (Table 8-8). 
How can this change of the Governor’s mind be explained? Prime Minister Koizumi 
and the government made their standpoint clear, and, before appointing a new Governor 
in 2003, they unmistakeably expressed that they expected easing monetary policy 
measures from the new Governor. In other words, they demanded the Governor make 
what they regarded as the utmost effort to stop deflationary pressures. Politicians 
threatened that they would extend pressure on Fukui and the BOJ should he not be 
willing to follow government demands. Thus, in order to be promoted to BOJ Governor, 
Fukui was forced to change his beliefs towards the government’s economic policy. In 
addition, in order to control Fukui, the Koizumi Cabinet appointed two Deputy 
Governors who were very close to the government. With the appointment of two 
Deputy Governors, one from the MOF and the other from the Cabinet Office, Fukui’s 
independence was limited to a high extent.  
 
Are the above-mentioned reasons sufficient to explain how a career BOJ man like Fukui 
could act in line with the government’s ideas and policy preferences? Pascha (2005a: 
20) argues that “the very label of a BOJ old boy [of Fukui] may have enabled him 
[Fukui] to switch to a more pro-government policy without a loss of face.” However, a 
study of the minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings demonstrate that the Fukui-led BOJ 
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had already worked towards the termination of quantitative easing policy (ryôteki 
kanwa seisaku no deguchi ron) since the summer of 2003, which was shortly after 
Fukui’s inauguration (Fujii 2004: 295-296). This means that the cooperative stance of 
Fukui to the government was only temporary and due to pressure at the beginning of his 
appointment. Indeed, in 2005 Fukui stopped cooperating with the government, 
announcing that the BOJ would abandon quantitative easing policy as soon as the 
economic conditions improved. The Fukui-led BOJ terminated quantitative easing 
policy in 2006, and raised interest rates in 2006 and 2007. As a result, the government’s 
positive assessment of Fukui radically changed, especially after the second interest rate 
hike in February 2007. They criticised his willingness to tighten monetary policy too 
prematurely. As a consequence, many financial experts and BOJ watchers argued that 
the overall difference in monetary policy between Hayami and Fukui was not as big as 
observed in the beginning of Fukui’s term.345  
 
Analysing government pressure from 2008 on, after Shirakawa became Governor of the 
BOJ, Dwyer (2012) argues that under Governor Shirakawa political pressure had been 
most intense. One reason was that economic conditions had worsened due to the 
Lehman Shock in September 2008, and the subsequent global financial crisis. Although 
Shirakawa has introduced a wide range of unorthodox monetary policies, including the 
outright purchase of commercial papers (December 2008), outright purchase of 
corporate bonds (January 2009), and purchases of stocks held by financial institutions 
(February 2009), economic conditions did not improve notably. However, many 
Japanese politicians argued that the central bank’s response to the crisis was too small, 
and pressured the BOJ to do more against the deflation and the high Yen. However, like 
Fukui, Shirakawa was able to build relatively good contacts with key political figures, 
i.e., he had regular meetings with the Prime Ministers. The government insisted on 
regular meetings with the central bank Governor in which Cabinet members formulated 
their viewpoint on monetary policy. For example, soon after becoming Prime Minister, 
Hatoyama met with Shirakawa on 1 September 2012, even before meeting top 
bureaucrats from the Ministry of Finance (Tango Yasutake) and the FSA. This clearly 
demonstrated how important the BOJ was for Prime Minister Hatoyama.346 However, 
political pressure was not only exercised by the government. Based on the analysis of a 
                                                 
345 Interviews with monetary experts between 2007 and 2009.  
346 The Yomiuri Shinbun viewed the story so important that they published this story on page one.  
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principal-agent framework with multiple principals at the beginning of this chapter, the 
following sections focus on the analysis of political pressure implemented by the 
legislative branch, namely certain Diet politicians. 
 
8.7.4.6 Political Pressure by Diet Politicians  
There is plenty of evidence that Japanese Diet politicians mobilized an extraordinary 
amount of pressure on the BOJ. Arita (2007: 25) argues that political pressure increased 
the moment a power shift from the government to ruling party politicians took place. 
Lawmakers found it much easier to blame and put pressure on the BOJ if they were not 
members of the Cabinet. How did it come to a power shift and stronger party politicians 
from the Diet? 
 
After Prime Minister Obuchi was suddenly hospitalised in April 2000, LDP leaders 
decided in a secret meeting that Mori Yoshirô would be appointed as the following 
Prime Minister. However, Mori and his Cabinet turned out to be particularly unpopular 
among the electorate. One important reason for this was that Mori was not 
democratically elected by the voters, and they felt blindsided by politicians. In addition, 
the contents of a series of speeches by Mori before the election were viewed as critical 
by the electorate, which significantly affected his popularity negatively (Kabashima and 
Imai 2002). This unpopularity was dangerous for the Mori Cabinet, and made the Prime 
Minister highly dependent on party legislators. As a consequence, Mori found himself 
forced to accept requests from lawmakers in the Diet. One key figure of the Mori 
administration was Kamei Shizuka, Chairman of the LDP’s Policy Research Council 
(jimintô seimu chôsa kaichô). It was astonishing that Kamei was assigned the 
management of economic policy, and not Finance Minister Miyazawa. Kamei was 
known to advocate both large public spending and easy monetary policy. As a fierce 
supporter of quantitative easing policy, he constantly put pressure on the BOJ to 
introduce quantitative easing policy, and, after it was implemented, urged the BOJ to 
increase the amount of CAB (Arita 2007). 
 
However, pressure from LDP Diet members was common already before Mori became 
Prime Minister. On 27 January 2000, the LDP’s “Committee for Investigation of 
Financial Problems” (jimintô kinyû mondai chôsa kai) decided to establish a working 
group that would investigate inflation targeting, and pressure the BOJ to introduce 
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inflation targeting. In response to the committee’s claim, the BOJ’s Policy Board 
discussed inflation targeting at the Monetary Policy Meeting on 10 February 2000. 
However, most Policy Board members argued against the introduction of an inflation 
target, and showed no intention to adopt it in the near future (Bank of Japan, MPM 10 
February 2000). The Committee maintained its pressure on the BOJ, and, on 13 July 
2000, LDP lawmakers from the Committee fiercely opposed the termination of the zero 
interest rate policy, and tried to hinder an interest rate hike, which the BOJ was planning 
to decide upon in the upcoming Monetary Policy Meeting on 17 July 2000. In more 
detail, pressure was especially focused on certain central bankers, including Masubuchi 
Minoru, BOJ Executive Director, and Maehara Yasuhiro, Advisor to the Governor, 
Secretariat of the Policy Board (seisaku iinkai shitsu shingiyaku). Both were requested 
to attend a meeting of the Committee. After the meeting, Masubuchi and Maehara 
communicated the demands of the group for an enhanced easing monetary policy to 
Hayami (Nakahara 2006: 123; Nikkei, 14 July 2000). It can be argued that the 
Committee’s pressure had an impact on the BOJ’s decision to postpone its intention to 
end the zero interest rate policy in August 2000. However, one month later, the pressure 
of the Committee was not successful, and, this time, the BOJ decided to end the zero 
interest rate policy. The pressure was strong, and members of the Committee did their 
best to impede the decision of the BOJ to raise interest rates. On 9 August 2000, Diet 
members, including Yamamoto Kôzô and Watanabe Yoshimi of the LDP together with 
some businessmen and economics Professors, published a report called “The BOJ 
Should Not Hasten to Terminate the Zero Interest Rate Policy” (Nichigin ha, zero kinri 
kaijo wo isogu beki de nai!). This report claimed that a termination of the zero interest 
rate policy was too early, because the economy had not fully recovered. Yamamoto 
argued that “the economy is at a very delicate stage and not necessarily on a full-fledged 
recovery track […] To abandon the zero interest rate policy at this point would do 
enormous harm” (JT, 10 August 2000; Yamamoto 2010: 159-162). However, regardless 
of heavy pressure by Diet politicians to continue the zero interest rate policy, the Bank 
remained strong and independent, and decided to raise the key interest rate to 0.25 per 
cent in August of 2000. 
 
From this point on, the Committee changed its strategy, and even intensified pressure. 
Unsatisfied with the BOJ’s monetary policy, some influential LDP Diet members 
started to request the resignation of Hayami. On 30 November 2000, a member of the 
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Committee raised the question whether Hayami had to be fired in case the economy 
worsened so much that the zero interest rate policy had to be reinstalled (Fujii 2004: 
184). In February 2001, Yamamoto, the chair of the Committee, publicly requested the 
resignation of Governor Hayami (Nakahara 2006: 157-158). Another issue was 
monetary policy, and various Diet politicians actively proposed their views towards a 
less strict monetary policy. On 5 March 2001, Kamei requested BOJ official Horii 
Akinari to inform Hayami that many politicians wanted the BOJ to implement 
quantitative easing policy347 through the purchase of JGB in order to fight deflationary 
pressures (Arita 2007: 24; Nikkei, 5 March 2001).  
 
In sum, it can be argued that political pressure urged the BOJ to implement quantitative 
easing policies. However, even after the BOJ’s implementation of the quantitative 
easing policy in March 2001, pressure from Diet politicians remained high. In particular 
Yamamoto, Watanabe and Masuzoe, who were at the forefront of criticising the BOJ, 
increased the pressure, and the situation became increasingly unpleasant for the BOJ 
(Nakahara 2006: 190). In July 2001, Masuzoe demanded Prime Minister Koizumi, who 
had just achieved an overwhelming victory in the July 2001 Upper House election, to 
urge the BOJ to introduce an inflation target. Finally, on 14 August 2001, the BOJ eased 
its monetary policy, although it had continuously resisted further easing measures since 
the introduction of quantitative easing policy. The Bank announced that it would 
increase its monthly purchases of JGB to 600 billion Yen, and increase the CAB from 
five to six trillion Yen (Table 8-8). However, pressure on the BOJ to influence 
monetary policy decisions was not enough. More and more LDP politicians intensified 
their pressure, and threatened to revise the BOJ Law to cut off the BOJ’s independence. 
This is a very strong tool which can be used against the central bank, and make it more 
dependent on the government. Japanese Diet politicians used this tool, which will be the 
subject of the following section.  
 
8.7.4.7 Threats to Revise the Bank of Japan Law 
Threats to revise the Bank of Japan Law had been made since 1999. However, after the 
BOJ made the decision to abandon zero interest rate policy in August 2000, the demand 
became more concrete, and LDP lawmaker Watanabe Yoshimi stressed the need to 
                                                 
347 Literally, Kamei stated that “I realize you are struggling, but I would ask you to do quantitative 
monetary easing. Please consider that.” [sic] 
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“open the discussion for revising the BOJ Law again” (nichgin hô saikaisei mo shiya ni 
irenakereba naranai) in order to strengthen the position of the government and the 
Prime Minister over the central bank, and so as to restrict the BOJ’s independence 
(Watanabe 2000; Nikkei, 12 August 2000). In 2001, political pressure towards law 
revision was exceptionally intense. In February 2001, the Treasury and Finance 
Division under the Policy Research Council (PRC) decided to establish a project team 
which had the task to investigate the current BJL. After the implementation of the 
quantitative easing policy in March 2001, demands to revise the current BOJ Law again 
(nichgin hô saikaisei no giron) became even stronger. Key figures of the PRC were 
Yamamoto and Watanabe. Basically, this group requested following five amendments 
of the BOJ Law (Fujii 2004: 215-216; Arita 2007: 24).  
1. The right of postponement of a monetary policy decision348 (Article 19) 
2. The introduction of an inflation target (Article 15) 
3. A clear definition of cooperation between government and BOJ (Article 
4) 
4. The revision of the process for selecting the Governor, Deputy 
Governors, and Policy Board members (Article 23) 
5. The Prime Minister should have the power to dismiss the Governor 
(Article 23) 
  
Regarding the introduction of an inflation target, the opinion was split between 
politicians. Proponents of inflation targeting were Economy Minister Takenaka Heizô, 
Finance Minister Shiokawa Masajûrô, Yamazaki Taku, LDP General Secretary, and 
Yamamoto Kôzô. In contrast, Prime Minister Koizumi, LDP Policy Chief Asô Tarô, 
Katô Kôichi, former General Secretary LDP, and Noda Takeshi, General Secretary of 
the New Conservative Party (NCP, Hoshutô) were politicians with a more cautious 
stance towards the introduction of an inflation target (Yoshizaki 2001). Owing to this 
disunity, it was much easier for the BOJ to reject the implementation of inflation 
targeting.  
 
In August 2001, another task force of the ruling LDP was formed to investigate the 
Bank of Japan Law (nichigin hô kenkyû kai). This group strengthened the demand to cut 
                                                 
348 Regarding this claim, the Bundesbank Act was cited as role model 
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the BOJ’s independence on basis of the argument that the revised BOJ Law of 1998 had 
formed an overly independent central bank. The group consisted of 26 politicians, 
including Yamamoto Kôzô, who acted as president, Aizawa Hideyuki (both former 
MOF bureaucrats), Watanabe Yoshimi and Masuzoe Yôichi. Basically, the group 
repeated the demands of the PRC, which is no surprise as both groups were organized 
by the same leading figures. Again, one important item of the agenda was the promotion 
of a formal inflation target. When Hayami explained in a press conference on 21 August 
2001 that the BOJ was clearly against the implementation of an inflation target, 
members of the group heavily criticised the BOJ. Another strong demand was the claim 
to provide the Prime Minister with the right to fire the Governor in case the BOJ does 
not cooperate with the government (Nakahara 2006: 87; Arita 2007; Yajima and Okada 
2001; Yamamoto 2010: 168-169). Yamamoto requested the BOJ Governor Hayami to 
appear in a meeting of the group before the Monetary Policy Meeting on 18 September 
2001 in order to discuss the group’s agenda face to face (JT, 18 August 2001). 
Unsurprisingly, Hayami declared that the BOJ was already obliged to report its views 
regarding monetary policy before the Diet on a regular basis, and, therefore, firmly 
rejected the demand (Mainichi Shinbun, 23 August 2001).  
 
In sum, pressure was not strong enough to urge the BOJ to implement bold monetary 
policy changes, but the pressure had influence on the BOJ to further ease the conditions 
of the quantitative easing policy. Arita (2007: 24) argues that “their activities [Diet 
politicians, such as Yamamoto] certainly made BOJ officials nervous”. One can argue 
about how much influence pressure from Diet politicians actually had on the BOJ’s 
decision to ease monetary policy in August and September 2001. Pressure from the 
Legislative (Diet) had contributed to the BOJ’s decision to ease monetary policy. In 
August 2001, the BOJ increased the targeted reserves from five to six trillion Yen,349 
and, in September 2001, increased the CAB to over 6 trillion Yen. Simultaneously, the 
BOJ cut the ODR from 0.25 to 0.1 per cent. Pressure from legislative politicians became 
too strong to simply ignore, and the BOJ had no other opinion than to make some small 
adjustments. However, these small adjustments could be also explained as a result of the 
deterioration of economic conditions, and not just as the mere result of political pressure.   
                                                 
349 However, at the press conference after the Monetary Policy Meeting, Hayami denied intense pressure 
from the group that influenced the Bank’s decision (Bank of Japan 2001, Press conference 15 August 
2001). 
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However, these small adjustments were not enough for the Yamamoto-group. Pulling 
their final trump card, the group decided to submit a bill to the Diet which proposed the 
revision of the BOJ Law. Bottom line, its aim was to weaken the independence of the 
BOJ in November 2001. 350  However, this bill was opposed by the Cabinet, most 
importantly Prime Minister Koizumi. Here, it becomes clear that the two principals – 
the legislative and the executive branch – followed different strategies. Prime Minister 
Koizumi and his Cabinet realised that public conflicts with the BOJ are very costly on a 
political level, and, in the worst case could destroy the confidence of the financial 
markets. In particular, revising the BJL again after such a short time would be 
detrimental to the government’s credibility. Consequently, the government refrained 
from endorsing such a bold measure. For the Yamamoto-group, the serious attempt to 
re-revise the BJL was just the consequence of its efforts to obtain an easier monetary 
policy.  
 
Regarding the pressure placed on the BOJ by the executive branch of the government in 
form of the threat to revise the BJL, it is interesting to note that the behaviour of the 
Prime Ministers was different. Thus, so far no Japanese Prime Minister had actively 
supported the BJL revision. It can be argued that Prime Ministers were aware of the 
political costs of conflicts between the central bank and the government, let alone a re-
revision of the Bank of Japan Law. Mori repeatedly pressured the BOJ, but avoided 
further steps. Koizumi, although sometimes very critical towards Governor Hayami, 
opposed a bill to revise the BOJ Law in 2001.  
 
As a result of the debate between the executive and legislative branches of the 
government, the threat to revise the BJL lost some of its danger for the BOJ. 
Nonetheless, the Yamamoto-group remained strong and continued to exert a high 
amount of pressure on the BOJ (JT, 3 November 2001; Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 
2006: 144). Threats to revise BOJ Law were repeated in 2005. Especially, Nakagawa 
Hidenao, Chairman of the LDP’s Policy Research Council (PRC) put extraordinary 
pressure on the BOJ. In November 2005, Nakagawa stated that “the central bank needs 
                                                 
350 Ironically, Yamamoto informed Policy Board member Nakahara of the group’s aim to submit a bill to 
revise the BOJ Law. As Nakahara was the only proponent of inflation targeting in the Policy Board, 
Yamamoto regarded him as an important ally in the fight for easy monetary policy (Nakahara 2006: 87). 
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to constantly coordinate its policy target with that of the administration. If the bank 
doesn't understand that, we ought to consider revising the Bank of Japan Law.” 
However, similar to incidences in 2001, Nakagawa was not able to organize a bigger 
group which supported his claims, and, thus, the threat to revise the BJL remained an 
empty threat.  
 
A very strong threat for an amendment of the Bank of Japan Law came from the so-
called “Anti-Deflation League” (ADL, defure dakkyaku giren). In August 2009, the 
Democratic Party of Japan won the general election, and became the largest party in the 
Lower House. The DPJ supported central bank independence during the BJL reform 
process, but the attitude of the DPJ changed significantly, and many DPJ politicians 
became active proponents of BOJ Law revision, to minder or even destroy the BOJ’s 
independence. In 2010, many new DPJ lawmakers established the ADL together with 
other influential politicians. Gradually, the ideas of the initiative also became popular in 
other parties, growing to a cross-party movement. The league became larger and later 
consisted of around 200 parliamentarians from the DPJ, LDP and smaller parties. With 
around 140 politicians most of the ADL’s members came from the DPJ. This was more 
than one third of its 393 Parliament members. The ADL aggressively put pressure on 
the BOJ, including the demand to revise the Bank of Japan Law. In July 2010, the ADL 
published a report which consisted of their ideas for monetary policy, and the claim to 
revise the BJL. The report addressed three issues: First, the implementation of an 
inflation target of two per cent. Second, similar to the U.S. Federal Reserve, it suggested 
a maximum employment mandate (koyô saidai ka). Third, it claimed a new appointment 
procedure for the BOJ’s key staff.  
 
Next to the ADL, there was pressure on the BOJ from the oppositional Your Party 
(Minna no tô);351 a small conservative party, which was founded by Watanabe Yoshimi. 
In November 2010, Your Party submitted a bill352 to the Diet to revise the BOJ Law. 
The bill consisted of a demand to increase the role of the government in monetary 
policy making. However, this bill was rejected in the Diet (Dwyer 2012).  
 
                                                 
351 Your Party was formed in 2009 and became the third largest party in the Upper House elections in July 
2010.  
352 Your Party had not sufficient seats in the Lower House to bring in a bill on its own, and, as a 
consequence, it sought support from other parties, including the ruling DPJ. 
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Even if the government and politicians had not decided to revise the BOJ Law thus far, 
advocating and pressing towards a law revision alone could have made a difference for 
the Bank of Japan. For example, the BOJ may have felt forced to conduct easier 
monetary policy, including the increase of JGB purchases. As a consequence, although 
this thesis does not find that political pressure managed to change the Bank of Japan’s 
basic monetary policy, it surely did have an effect on the central bank and its 
independence.  
 
8.7.4.8 Conclusion 
This subchapter showed that both the government (executive) and Diet politicians 
(legislative) almost constantly exerted intense pressure on the BOJ, especially on 
Governor Hayami. In regards of Diet hearings and government representatives in 
Monetary Policy Meetings, it can be argued that political pressure was increased after 
the revision of the Bank of Japan Law. The government exhausted every legal right it 
was provided with in the BJL to the fullest extent to pressure the BOJ. However, 
regardless of the intense pressure, the BOJ was successful in resisting political pressure 
most of the time, and built a remarkably independent status. It can be concluded that 
pressure on the BOJ worked best if both the legislative and executive branch of the 
government exerted pressure cooperatively. In case there was pressure only from one 
principal, the BOJ resisted pressure more successfully. Or, similarly, in cases in which 
both principals were not united, the BOJ was able to remain independent, and avoided 
an exaggerated easing of monetary policy. This thesis demonstrated that the efforts of a 
group of certain Diet politicians to re-revise the BJL again in 2001 failed to gain support 
from the Cabinet. The following chapter tries to explain the behaviour of the Bank of 
Japan in view of its monetary policy decisions and political pressure.  
 
8.8 Explanations of the Bank of Japan’s Behaviour: Independence, Risk Aversion 
and Structural Reforms 
The case studies from the previous chapter lead to the question how monetary policy 
decisions of the BOJ can be explained. It is obvious that in many cases the economic 
condition of a nation is one basic factor that explains a central bank’s choice of 
monetary policy. In Japan, the economic conditions were rather discouraging with 
deflationary tendencies as a prevailing problem since the new BOJ Law took effect in 
1998. This means that the BOJ’s choice of monetary policy was rather limited, and that 
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monetary easing policies, such as low interest rates, could not have been avoided. That 
is, the BOJ was not free to choose between different levels of interest rates. However, 
there is a certain range of discretion as to how far monetary easing could be conducted. 
The introduction of zero interest rates in 1999 or quantitative easing policy in 2001 did 
not necessarily mean that the BOJ was in support of excessive easing policies in order 
to support the government by all means, according to BJL, Article 4. This thesis has 
demonstrated that even during the quantitative easing policy period between 2001 and 
2006 the BOJ did not use easing policies to the full extent to fulfil the government’s 
demands. In contrast, Hayami and Fukui since 2005 were both reluctant to further ease 
monetary policy, and, therefore, actively disregarded the demands made by the 
government and politicians. Thus, in this section, explanations will be pieced together 
with the aim of understanding the BOJ’s monetary policy in more detail. More precisely, 
two important questions remain unanswered: 1) Why did the BOJ refuse to follow the 
government’s demand for more excessive easing policies? 2) Why was the BOJ able to 
overcome political pressure, and conduct independent monetary policies in many cases? 
This thesis finds three explanations for the BOJ’s behaviour which will be elaborated in 
the following:353 
1) The BOJ’s fight to protect central bank independence 
2) Risk aversion and blame avoidance 
3) The BOJ’s economic theory and the promotion of structural reforms  
 
8.8.1 The BOJ’s Fight to Protect Central Bank Independence 
During his term in office, Governor Hayami invested a high amount of effort in 
protecting and guaranteeing the BOJ’s hard-won independence from the very beginning. 
One measure to reach this aim was to increase the Bank’s accountability and 
transparency. Hayami was devoted to building an independent BOJ, which would be 
strong enough to resist political pressure. The fight of the Hayami-led BOJ for 
independence as central bank helps to explain why the BOJ was reluctant to follow 
government’s demands to ease monetary policy further in many cases. Thus, it can be 
argued that the BOJ’s reluctance to conduct loose monetary policy has its roots in the 
BOJ’s concern for its long-term independence. One reason for the BOJ’s avoidance of 
excessive easing was that an increased balance sheet is connected to the risk of having 
                                                 
353 For a similar view of arguments, see Lukauskas and Shimabukuro (2006: 147-151). 
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to increase the government’s dependence on the central bank (Ide 2007; Jeanne and 
Svensson 2007). A government which enjoys a lot of lending from the central bank may 
get used to having a budget without constraint. It is difficult for a central bank to escape 
such a vicious circle. The BOJ wanted to demonstrate that it was independent from 
outside forces, and built a strategy to resist demands and threats from the government 
and politicians.  
 
Thus, the BOJ’s behaviour can be explained using a political economy approach. After 
having been granted independence, a standpoint to resist cooperation with the 
government or the MOF emerged within the majority of BOJ officials. BOJ officials 
regarded advice from the Ministry or private economists as interference in the central 
bank’s independence (Cargill, Hutchison, and Itô 2000). After the BJL revision, the 
BOJ developed a new identity, and tried to build a new image of an independent agency. 
This argument coincides with that of Willem H. Buiter, who was an external member of 
the Bank of England monetary policy committee from 1997 to 2000. Buiter (2004) 
argues that newly operationally independent central banks tend to avoid 
recommendations made by the Finance Ministry. Rather, newly independent central 
banks are highly concerned about a loss of reputation if they do not act independently.  
 
This observation matches the findings of this thesis in regards of the BOJ. Indeed, the 
BOJ almost consistently resisted many monetary policy demands from government 
officials and Diet politicians in order to demonstrate independence. Assuming that the 
government or the Finance Minister does make beneficial suggestions from time to time, 
the central bank’s constant refusal of such proposals is not economically optimal. 
Rather, central bank independence can be sustained and allow cooperation with politics 
when the situation requires it (Buiter 2004). Similarly, Posen (2002) argues that “[t]he 
point of central bank independence is to be able to refuse unreasonable or politically 
motivated government requests – the point of independence is not to refuse any and all 
requests.” Grimes (2003: 77-79) stated that the resistance of the Hayami-led BOJ to 
excessively increase quantitative easing measures can be in part interpreted as “pure 
bloody-minded” and a as “short-sighted assertion of its autonomy”. In other words, it 
can be argued that the BOJ had become a prisoner of its own independence, and fell into 
a so-called “independence trap” (Cargill, Hutchsion and Itô 2000; Harui 2006; Kajimoto 
2006; Takita 2006). 
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This thesis argues that an important aspect of the BOJ was Hayami’s strong leadership. 
This aspect stresses the importance of individual leadership. Marcussen (2009: 379) 
argues that “[t]he history of central banking has typically been written with a particular 
focus on strong decisive men, who created, consolidated, and defended the integrity and 
autonomy of the institution.” Kettl (1986: 193) also finds that the power of the US 
Federal Reserve had depended on its chairman to a high extent. In Japan, it turned out 
that the personality of the central bank’s key figure, namely the Governor, is also 
particularly significant for the independence of the Bank of Japan.  
 
Wilson (2000), in his attempt to explain the behaviour of government agencies in the 
U.S., found that the initial leader of newly founded, or altered institutions, plays a 
crucial role in defining the mission and future stance. That means that the best 
opportunity for a new organisation to achieve independence and the formulation of own 
goals is at the very first beginning of its creation (Wilson 2000: 188-189). Accordingly, 
Hayami’s era as the first Governor of the newly created BOJ can be regarded as most 
crucial for the BOJ’s future identity. Indeed, with Hayami the BOJ had a strong 
character, who with great effort, took the mission to protect and maintain an 
independent central bank even to the point of “religious overtones” (Lukauskas and 
Shimabukuro 2006: 147).  In a book about his time as Central Bank Governor, Hayami 
interpreted his task to secure the BOJ’s independence from governmental influence as a 
“calling from god” (kami no shômei) (Hayami 2004: iv). The new Governor stated that 
“the central bank must be the conscience of a country’s economy” (chûô ginkô ha 
ikkoku keizai no ryôshin) (Nikkei, 21 March 1998; Fujii 2004: 53). Considering the 
German Bundesbank as the “ideal” central bank, Hayami was determined to protect the 
BOJ’s independence, and to avoid serving the interests of the government, politicians, 
or specific interest groups (JT, 21 March 1998). For instance, regarding underwriting of 
JGBs, Hayami made it very clear that he was not willing to make any compromises, and 
stated that “[u]nderwriting cannot be an option that the BOJ adopts. Even if people hate 
the BOJ, we will do what we believe is right.” (Arita 2007: 20). Hayami explained his 
motivation by revealing that he perceived himself as the “guardian of the integrity of 
money” (tsûka no songen no bannin) (Hayami 2004: iv).  
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It can be argued that Hayami’s determination to protect the BOJ’s independence seemed 
to be obstinate. For instance, he consistently disagreed with the majority of observers, 
saying that the termination of the zero interest rate policy was no mistake. 354 
Unsurprisingly, some analysts and politicians argued that Hayami worked against the 
government and politicians out of principle.355 Using the words of Wilson (2000: 370), 
one can argue that Hayami was like a zealot, and determined by “mission madness” for 
central bank independence. However, this critical allegory goes too far when judging 
Hayami. Rather, it can be argued that Hayami was determined to fill the central bank 
with value, namely the value of central bank independence that is most important for the 
BOJ’s survival in the future as an independent central bank. In this sense, it is possible 
to say that Hayami’s persistent way of protecting the BOJ’s independence was very 
important for the Bank in the long run. Reviewing the case studies of this thesis, it is 
evident that Hayami successfully protected the BOJ’s independence in spite of difficult 
conditions. He constantly absorbed intense political pressure, remained true to his ideals, 
and extremely rarely agreed to compromises with the government. For instance, the old 
tradition of the BOJ views a rate hike as a victory over the MOF and the government. 
Hayami “won” an intense battle against politicians by raising the interest rate in August 
2000.356 From 2001 to 2002, Hayami remained firm and avoided extreme moves to ease 
the amount of CAB, although Economy Minister Takenaka was frequently present in 
BOJ’s Monetary Policy Meetings, and put intense pressure on Hayami.  
 
Hayami’s resistance of cooperation with political authorities turned out to be a 
miscalculation for political leaders (Pascha 2005b: 53), who paid the high price of 
losing a high extent of influence over monetary policy. If Hayami had bowed to 
political pressure easily, it would have been very difficult for the following Governors 
to fight back political pressure. His strong resistance against government pressure made 
it easier for succeeding Governors to conduct monetary policy independently. As a 
                                                 
354 On his last press conference as BOJ Governor on 7 March 2003, Hayami stated that the termination of 
the zero interest rate policy was the appropriate choice –even when considered today. Hayami even stated 
that “possibly the termination was a little late” (sukoshi osoreta kamo shirenai) (Bank of Japan 2003, 
press conference 10 March 2003; Fujii 2004: 289).  
355 Interview with former MOF official, July 2008.  
356 It has to be noted that this thesis does not judge whether monetary policy decisions by the Bank of 
Japan were the best choice or if it proved to be wrong afterwards. Rather, the relationship between the 
Bank as an agent of politicians is of interest. Taking this into account, the governorship of Hayami was a 
success for the Bank of Japan.  
 288 
result, Hayami’s appointment can be considered a success for the Bank of Japan when it 
came to protecting its newly won independence. 
 
8.8.2 Risk Aversion and Blame Avoidance 
The second explanation of the BOJ’s behaviour was the attempt of the Bank to avoid 
unnecessary risks. The BOJ was afraid to implement non-traditional monetary policy 
after having been granted independence by the government. By sticking to traditional 
monetary policy as much as possible, the BOJ tried to avoid risks, and being blamed in 
case of unexpected side effects of risky monetary policy measures. Many Policy Board 
members warned against toxic side effects of strong easing monetary policies, such as 
the reduction of interest rates, an increase in the purchase of government bonds, and an 
overly expanded balance sheet.357 The BOJ was very cautious about moral hazard, and 
repeatedly argued that it wanted to avoid moral hazard with its policies (e.g., Bank of 
Japan 1999, Minutes 28 June 1999; 9 September 1999). Thus, it can be argued that 
BOJ’s monetary policies were a strategy of blame avoidance and risk aversion. Sticking 
to traditional monetary policy as much as possible was regarded as the safer and better 
strategy to combat the deflationary tendencies in the Japanese economy. Resisting 
political pressure was just a logical consequence of this view.  
 
Due to the BJL revision in 1998, central bankers were forced to enter the political field, 
and became political actors themselves. Before the revision, the MOF protected the BOJ 
from political intervention. As a consequence of the need to deal directly with 
politicians, the BOJ strengthened the responsibility of offices, such as the secretariat of 
the Policy Board, which was assigned the task of preparing Policy Board members for 
interaction with the government, the Diet, and the media. In addition, in order to find 
support for its independence, the Bank set up a strategy to enlarge its publications, 
research activities, and their distribution. In other words, the transparency of the BOJ 
was increased to a high extent. This helped the BOJ to defend its stance, and explain its 
monetary policy decisions to the public. In addition to detailed information of the 
Monetary Policy Meetings, the Bank publishes detailed data on economic and financial 
data, and economic research via, e.g., the IMES. As a result of the enhanced research 
and publication activity, the improved transparency of monetary policy decisions and 
                                                 
357 See, Bank of Japan, Minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings 1998-2005. 
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the decision-making process allowed the BOJ actively to promote its purposes in the 
media; thus, it had a means to explain its policy decisions, and eventually gain public 
support for its policies. In regards of public lectures, during his time in office, Hayami 
held nearly one hundred press conferences, and repeatedly denounced the government’s 
interference with the BOJ’s monetary policy. Politicians repeatedly argued that the BOJ 
was to blame for the Japanese economy suffering from deflation for such a long time. In 
response to those critics, the BOJ employed a strategy to defend its policies, while 
simultaneously returning the pressure and critique to the government, e.g., by promoting 
structural reforms. 
 
8.8.3 The Bank of Japan’s Economic Theory and the Promotion of Structural 
Reforms  
Some of the BOJ’s policy decisions can be explained with an economics approach that 
critics of the BOJ considered as unusual in comparison to mainstream economic theory. 
In order to stress the differences, critics called the BOJ’s approach the “BOJ theory” 
(nichigin ryû riron) (Fujii 2004: 23-26; Hamada 2012; Iwata 2009; Yamamoto 2010). 
That is, the third explanation of the BOJ’s monetary policy is the promotion of 
structural reforms (kôzô kaikaku) of the Japanese economy. 
 
One main representative of the BOJ-theory was Okina Kunio, who entered the BOJ in 
1974, and was Director of the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES, 
Nippon ginkô kinyû kenkyû jo), the BOJ’s research institute, from 1998 to 2006. Apart 
from Okina, the Bank of Japan’s view was also represented by other staff from the 
IMES and some of these economists fiercely defended the monetary policies of the 
Bank of Japan. Some publications emphasized the risks and side effects that could have 
affected the central bank in case of zero interest rates and aggressive monetary easing 
(e.g., Fujiki, Okina and Shiratsuka 2001; Fukao 2006; Oda and Okina 2001; Shirakawa 
2001; Shiratsuka 2010). Papers by IMES staff had influence on the content of speeches 
and press conferences given by the Governors, Deputy Governors, and other Policy 
Board members.  
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One of the BOJ’s and Okina’s main rivals was Iwata Kikuo, Professor of economics at 
Gakushûin University.358 The disputes between the two were known as “Okina theory” 
(Okina riron) versus “Iwata theory” (Iwata riron), or the “Iwata-Okina controversy” 
(Iwata-Okina ronsô) (Fujii 2004: 23-24, 58). One example of disputes between the two 
was about the causality between money stock and aggregate demand (see, Okina 1993 
and Iwata 1993). Hamada and Noguchi (2005) commented the heated discussion with 
the following statement, taking the position of BOJ critics: 
“During this critical period of the early 1990s, there was a sharp division 
of opinions between the BOJ economists represented by Kunio Okina 
and some other economists, notably Kikuo Iwata, Seiji Shinpo, Takahiro 
Miyao, and Yutaka Harada, who criticized the BOJ’s sluggish move 
toward monetary easing.  In retrospect, those who criticized the BOJ 
seemed to have had far more valid points.” 
 
The BOJ and private economists, including foreign economists, evaluated the economic 
condition and the appropriate monetary policy differently. For instance, papers by 
Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000), Ahearne et al. (2002), and McCallum (2001) state 
that the BOJ’s unwillingness to ease monetary policy from 1993 to 1994 was the 
ultimate reason for Japan’s deflation and prolonged recession. Numerous other studies 
recommended bolder action by the BOJ, e.g., buying assets other than short-term bills 
or to announce targets for the inflation rate or price level (e.g., Cargill and Guerrero 
2007; Goodfriend 2001: Krugman 1998; Meltzer 1999a; 1999b; Svensson 2000; Taylor 
2001). The BOJ was also criticised by Japanese scholars. Besides Iwata Kikuo and 
Harada Kôichi, the Director of the ESRI Institute, Japanese economists who argued 
critically against the BOJ included Yoshikawa Hiroshi, Itô Takatoshi, and Noguchi 
Asahi.  
 
Regardless of the critique, BOJ officials continued to promote their views of economics 
and monetary policy, for instance regarding zero interest rates and quantitative easing 
policy. Until the implementation of quantitative easing policy in March 2001, the BOJ 
constantly declared that excessive quantitative easing had absolutely no effect (dôse 
kikanai) on the economy (Fujii 2004: 116; 232). Rather, BOJ economists pointed out 
negative side effects of strong monetary expansion (see, for instance, Okina 1999 and 
Oda and Okina 2001). Similarly, regarding the introduction of an inflation target, the 
                                                 
358 It is noteworthy that Iwata Kikuo is one of the BOJ’s Deputy Governors since 2013.  
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BOJ was in opposition, and argued that inflation targeting is ineffective and is even 
damaging to the economy. In sum, the BOJ’s responses to their critics can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
1. Policy measures such as inflation targeting and stronger easing do not help to 
boost the economy 
2. There is no necessity to implement stronger easing policies and the economy 
will recover by itself  
3. Stronger easing monetary policies are risky, and dangerous long-term 
consequences may occur  
 
One key subject was the debate about deflation, which some economists divided 
between good deflation (yoi defure ron or yoi bukka geraku ron) and bad deflation 
(warui defure ron). 359 360  Since 1999, Japan has experienced deflation that is 
unprecedented in other developed countries. However, the necessity of overcoming the 
deflation problem was viewed differently in Japan. In particular in the early stage of the 
recession, the Japanese media tended to view deflation as a positive phenomenon (good 
deflation).361 This perception of good deflation was well postulated in the BOJ (e.g., 
Fujii 2004: 123; 147-148). 362  Policy Board member Miki (2000) welcomed the 
deflationary tendencies in the Japanese economy as good deflation in a speech he gave 
on 20 April 2000. BOJ officials argued that deflation pressures had its origin in 
technological change, and the increasing import of cheap products from low-wage 
countries, most notably China (Itô 2004; Miyagawa et al. 2008: 47). Gyôten (2003: 3) 
generalizes the argument that not only the BOJ, but also the government and academics 
were reluctant to fight deflation: 
“It was an intriguing phenomenon that in spite of the forceful academic 
arguments and also the evidence of a progressing deflation there was no 
broad consensus in Japan to support bold anti-deflationary measures. 
                                                 
359 For a general discussion of the historical perspective of good versus bad deflation, see see Bordo et al. 
(2004) and Bordo and Filardo (2005). For Japan, a good summary can be found in Saxonhouse (2005). 
360 Hamada and Noguchi (2005) distinguish the good deflation theory into following four aspects: 1. 
Deflation is a good phenomenon; 2. Deflation is not a monetary phenomenon but a structural, that is, 
microeconomic phenomenon; 3. The causes of current deflation are globalization, deregulation, and 
technological innovation; 4. The depreciation of the Yen harms both Japan and the rest of the world. 
361 Genda (2011) refers to the term “Uniqlo phenomenon” that lower prices have often been welcomed by 
the general public.  
362 See, e.g., an interview with Murayama Shôsaku, Head of BOJ statistics department (Nikkei, 7 
February 2001).  
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Government, the central bank, political parties, the mainstream academia 
and the business were all sceptical about the effectiveness of drastic anti-
deflationary policies.” 
 
Critics of the BOJ argued that the BOJ’s attitude towards deflation may have increased 
the deflationary tendencies in the Japanese economy.363 In several official documents, 
the BOJ warned against high risks of quantitative easing policy, above all future 
inflation. The fear of inflation helps to explain why the BOJ was reluctant to introduce 
strong easing monetary policies. Instead, a number of top level BOJ officials supported 
the idea of long-term structural reform, rather than offering short-term measures of 
monetary easing to help the economy to recover (Pascha 2005a: 15-17; Posen 2000). 
The Bank of Japan “has continually argued that the economy cannot recover without 
restructuring and has worried that expansionary monetary policy was seen as an 
alternative to the needed restructuring and thus may be counterproductive” (Itô and 
Mishkin 2004). The claim to promote structural reforms can be found in various 
speeches and lectures by BOJ officials, and is also recorded in official BOJ documents 
(e.g. Bank of Japan, Monetary Policy Meeting, 8 March 2000, 24 March 2000; Hayami 
2000, Hayami 2004: 189-199; Shirakawa 2001).  
 
Various Policy Board members argued in favour of structural reforms in the Monetary 
Policy Meetings soon after the new BOJ Law took effect. 364 For instance, Taketomi 
Susumu, Policy Board member from 1997 to 2001, stated in a speech on 31 May 1999 
that “the Japanese economy will not recover until the problems of structural reforms 
will be solved.” The BOJ`s approach to structural reforms included a growing efficiency 
of government spending and a more flexible employment system. In the February 2001 
Monetary Policy Meeting, some members raised the issue of structural reform, and 
demanded a more detailed discussion. In the end, the Policy Board stressed the role of 
the government, but regarded its own role to encourage structural reform in various 
sectors, for instance regarding nonperforming loans. 
                                                 
363 Regardless of the discussion between good and bad deflation, a recent BOJ study by Nishizaki, Sekine 
and Ueno (2012) offer a deep analysis of the phenomenon of prolonged period of deflation and its 
structural features in Japan. They list hypotheses but conclude that it is too early to find a dominant 
explanation for the chronic deflation in Japan.  
364 Freedman (2006: 52) argues that even before the new Law took effect the BOJ`s monetary policy 
“seemed determined to push their agenda of structural reform without regard of the short term economic 
fall out”. However, this thesis focuses on the new BJL.  
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”Members also discussed the necessity of structural reform. Some 
members pointed out that even if the Bank, as the central bank, adopted 
necessary measures, this alone would not solve the fundamental 
problems of the Japanese economy. They stressed that structural reform 
in the financial system as well as in the economy and industry was 
essential to ensure a sustainable economic recovery. […] First, structural 
reform should be undertaken by the private sector itself according to 
market principles. Second, the role of the Government was to create the 
environment for such structural reform and to provide a clear picture of 
the future economy. And third, with regard to fiscal policy, quality, not 
quantity, of fiscal spending was important. These members said that the 
Bank should encourage various sectors to further accelerate structural 
reform by, for example, solving financial system problems through the 
disposal of nonperforming loans.” (Bank of Japan 2001, MPM on 28 
February 2001; italics added) 
 
This quote demonstrates that the Policy Board assumed an active role in the promotion 
of structural reforms, at least in certain areas. However, the main role was still reserved 
for the government. Owing the fact that the BOJ viewed monetary policy as insufficient 
to solve the problem, the BOJ regarded itself in a position to promote structural reforms. 
In addition, with the promotion of structural reforms, the BOJ could send back pressure 
to the government. Since the introduction of the quantitative easing policy in March 
2001, the BOJ repeatedly stated that it had done all it could and claimed that it was now 
the government’s turn (kondo koso seifu no ban) to overcome the sluggish economy and 
deflation pressures through structural reforms (Fujii 2004: 274-278).  
 
The BOJ’s third Governor Shirakawa also requested the government promote structural 
reform on various occasions, and repeatedly argued against extensive monetary easing. 
The following quote shows that Shirakawa tried to resist political pressure for monetary 
easing by putting pressure on the government to do more for structural reform. In one 
occasion, he provided an international political economy reasoning:   
“Shirakawa warned that enhanced monetary easing in developed countries could 
create a bubble in emerging economies by triggering a shift in capital flows. 
Structural reform is indispensable, Shirakawa suggesting that the reform can 
help boost productivity growth. The move came as the government and both 
ruling and opposition lawmakers exerted pressure on the central bank to do more 
in fighting the country's persistent deflation and the impact of the recent sharp 
rise of the Yen, which has adversely impacted Japan's export-led recovery.” [sic] 
(JT, 12 October 2010). 
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Another interpretation suggests that the BOJ avoided more drastic easing policies in 
order to force the government into action towards structural reforms. This strategy 
implies that the BOJ deliberately chose a monetary policy that accepted painful side 
effects, such as a sluggish economy in order to promote long-term structural reforms. In 
this case, a deteriorated economy can even support the central bank’s strategy. A 
weakening economy obliges lawmakers to enforce structural reforms without hesitation. 
Easy monetary policy would give lawmakers the incentive to suspend necessary 
structural reforms, because of the positive short-term effects of easy money to boost the 
economy. In contrast to that strategy, the BOJ, having considered the limits of monetary 
policy, selected a broader and long-term approach for improving the economy. The 
BOJ’s plan was to force lawmakers to build an environment that secures long-term 
growth of the Japanese economy. Economic historians call this strategy 
“liquidationism”,365 or creative destruction366 (Lukauskas and Shimabukuro 2006: 142-
143; Hamada and Noguchi 2005). Applying this approach of “liquidationism” to the 
BOJ means that the Japanese central bank (in its position as agent of the government) 
misinterpreted its role with the promotion of structural reforms. In fact, structural 
reforms are not mentioned in the BJL, and, therefore, do not belong to the duties of the 
BOJ. Although structural reforms seemed necessary in Japan, a central bank should 
never use the promotion of reforms in order to avoid proper policies against deflation 
(Hamada 2004: 229-230). If structural reforms were a serious attempt of the BOJ to 
achieve long-term economic development, then Rogoff’s (1985) concept of a central 
bank as a benevolent social planner is applicable to the BOJ. The BOJ took on a new 
role, and showed that it cared about the development of the Japanese economy beyond 
the mere scope of monetary policy and the maintenance of price stability. 
 
When applying the principal-agent theory, it can be argued that the agent (BOJ) acted 
too independently and antagonistic towards the government. Such behaviour is a kind of 
agency shirking or agency slippage as a type of non-cooperation by the agent, and can 
lead to agency losses (McNamara 2002: 55-56; Elgie 2002; Pollack 1997: 108-110; 
                                                 
365 For a “liquidationist” view of the Federal Reserve’s response to the Great Depression between 1929 
and 1933, see De Long (1990) and Eichengreen (2002). For a broader application of this approach, see 
Caballero and Hammour (1999).  
366 Many economists argued that too many weak companies had survived the bubble economy. The BOJ 
avoided extreme monetary easing, which would help weak companies and banks continuing to survive. In 
contrast, if only the strong companies survive, a healthier economic environment is emerging (Pascha 
2005a: 15-16).   
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Kassim and Menon 2003: 122-124). This means that the agent does not follow the 
principal’s goals. In a principal-agent framework, this is the problem of adverse 
selection (McNamara 2002: 55). That means that the principal (government) has chosen 
an agent (BOJ) with different policy preferences, which conducted monetary policies 
that are at odds with the goals of the principals. Following this line of reasoning, the 
government’s right to choose the Central Bank Governor can lead to the conclusion that 
principals might be able to limit agency shirking or slippage by the agent (Gilardi 2001: 
12). However, governments certainly cannot avoid (ex post) moral hazard by Central 
Bank Governors, even if the Cabinet tries to influence the Governor’s behaviour before 
and after the appointment. In the case of Hayami, the government was shocked to see 
the Governor acting so differently from what they had expected. In the government’s 
opinion, the behaviour of the Hayami-led BOJ was classifiable as moral hazard. From 
the perspective of the Bank of Japan, it can be argued that Hayami simply tried to 
protect the BOJ’s independence. In practice, the BOJ acted more independent than 
many LDP lawmakers intended, which resulted in a loss of power over the BOJ.  
 
Shirakawa commented a Cargill paper (2001: 141-142), and noted that the BOJ’s 
monetary policy, such as the zero interest rate policy and the quantitative easing policy 
might not have been necessary if the government had conducted adequate structural 
policies, in particular regarding the nonperforming-loan problem. Shirakawa 
characterises the BOJ’s monetary policy as “responsibility without authority”,367 which 
means that the BOJ had to take responsibility for structural problems such as the non-
performing loans problem and the deflationary tendencies in the Japanese economy 
without having the authority over measures to solve these problems. 
 
In addition, there are further approaches that can be used to understand the rationale 
behind the conduct of monetary policy by the BOJ. One can argue that cultural aspects 
play an important role when attempting to explain the behaviour of the Bank of Japan. 
One example is the relationship to the Ministry of Finance (Ide 2007). Being tied to and 
controlled by the MOF for such a long time, the BOJ was longing to end this close 
                                                 
367 With the term “responsibility without authority” Shirakawa referred to Marvin Goodfriend. 
Goodfriend argued that it is quite difficult for a central bank “to play a proactive role in issues over which 
it is not given authority but only responsibility”. As a consequence, a clear arrangement between the 
government and the central bank is needed in order to secure the reliability of decision-making on 
monetary policy (Cargill 2001: 141).  
 296 
relationship, and become an independent agency. Once it was independent in a de iure 
sense, the BOJ acted independently and implemented independent monetary policy. 
Moreover, it reacted with a combination of strong resistance and tactical cleverness 
against too much interference of the government and politicians. Posen (2000) stresses 
the importance of cultural aspects, and the role of ideas in explaining the BOJ’s 
monetary policy. 
“Explaining why the BOJ has been able to sustain its self-appointment as 
‘enforcer’ is a matter of political science, not even political economy […] 
neither benevolent welfare optimisation nor institutional design is 
sufficient to explain policy choices by central banks. Ideas, even 
economically misguide ones, also play a role” (Posen 2000: 207; italics 
added)  
 
These kinds of ideas include the promotion of structural reforms, the view of “good 
deflation”, or the view that monetary policy is ineffective in a deflationary environment. 
Various sources assume that the central bank has taken its own approach to 
macroeconomic theory, which is somewhat different to mainstream textbook 
macroeconomics (Iwata 2009; Hamada and Noguchi 2005).  
 
8.9 Conclusion 
Regarding the subject of appointment, this thesis showed that two Governors out of 
three (Hayami and Shirakawa) were appointed BOJ Governor by default. The selection 
of the third one, Fukui, was a natural choice, but not necessarily the government’s first 
choice. In all three cases, the government had hoped to appoint a Governor with whom 
it would be possible to implement a mutually harmonious economic policy. After 
analysing the appointment procedure of the three Governors, it can be argued that up 
until now, the appointment procedure under the revised BOJ Law from 1998 works in 
favour of the BOJ, in comparison to the old BJL, in which Governors switched 
alternately from the BOJ and MOF. According to the new BJL, the Governor cannot be 
dismissed by the government, and, thus, a BOJ Governor can act much more 
independently than under the old BOJ Law. The appointment procedure of the Governor, 
the two Deputy Governors, and the deliberative members of the Policy Board requires 
the approval of both houses of the Diet. In sum, the selected BOJ Governors were 
compromise candidates, and all of them were former officials of the BOJ.  
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The section about monetary policy demonstrated that the government put intense 
pressure on the BOJ right after the BOJ was granted independence. This thesis 
demonstrated that the government still possesses strong tools to exert pressure on the 
BOJ, including the right sending two government representatives to Monetary Policy 
Meetings (Article 19), or the right to demand the Governor to appear before the Diet 
(Article 54, Paragraph 3). In addition, some supplementary measures, such as sending 
incumbent Cabinet Ministers, sending more than two representatives, who change 
alternately, or giving remarks at the beginning of the Monetary Policy Meeting, are used 
by the government to give their standpoint more strength.  
 
This thesis, therefore, concludes that the assumption that central bank independence 
eases the conflict over monetary policy (Goodman 1991) is not supported by the Bank 
of Japan case study. The change in the institutional design of the BOJ in 1998 towards a 
more independent central bank did not change the situation fundamentally for the better. 
Rather, political pressure strengthened after the implementation of the BOJ Law reform. 
Conflicts between the government and Diet politicians with the BOJ increased, in 
particular under the leadership of Governor Hayami. Thus, the conclusion of this thesis 
is that monetary policy in Japan is very much politicised.   
 
During Hayami’s period in office, the BOJ focused on independence and accountability. 
Hayami successfully resisted strong pressure from the government and politicians. 
Reviewing the case studies of this thesis, one can argue that Hayami successfully 
protected the BOJ’s independence under difficult circumstances. He constantly 
absorbed intense political pressure, stuck to his ideals and extremely rarely agreed to 
compromises with the government. For instance, Hayami successfully resisted political 
pressure, and implemented the termination of the zero interest rate policy in August 
2000. When Fukui took the helm of the BOJ in 2003, it was a time of major policy 
change, as Fukui was willing to adopt more easing and unorthodox monetary policies. 
In the beginning of the leadership of Fukui, there was a good relationship between the 
BOJ and the government and politicians. However, in 2006 Fukui stopped of being 
cooperative to the government, and terminated the quantitative easing policy in 2006, 
and raised the interest rate in 2007. 
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It is most intriguing that the Japanese government or politicians rarely gave statements 
which aim to protect the independence of the BOJ after the law revision. In order for 
central bank independence to be perceived as credible among the public, political 
support is an important prerequisite. Without political support, it is difficult to achieve 
institutional independence. In Japan, it was rather the case that the government 
constantly used the BOJ as a scapegoat to deflect from its own policy mistakes. Thus, 
this thesis argues that Japanese politicians never intended to have a de facto independent 
BOJ. In fact, the BOJ turned out to be very different from the central bank envisioned 
by the majority of Japanese politicians. Moreover, the BOJ has developed into a 
significantly more independent and powerful actor than would have been predicted by 
most observers.  
 
This thesis concludes that the BOJ was successful in resisting political pressure most of 
the time. The case studies demonstrated that the behaviour of the BOJ can be explained 
by three factors, namely the BOJ’s determination to gain central bank independence, its 
attempt to avoid being blamed, and the promotion of structural reforms. 
 
In a theoretical framework with two principals, the agent needs to “satisfy” only one 
principal. In other words, the agent has low-powered incentives to follow the principal`s 
goals (Dixit 1996). Indeed, the executive and legislative branch of the government did 
not follow the same goals all the time. For example, threats made by the legislative in 
2001 to revise the BOJ Law in order to cut off the Bank’s independence were not 
supported by the government. The existence of multiple principals made it arguably 
easier for the Bank of Japan to follow its own policy goals such as the promotion of 
structural reforms. However, if both principals united their power, political pressure had 
a higher probability of success. For instance, when the legislative and executive 
combined their claim for easier monetary policy on 14 August 2001, it was difficult for 
the BOJ to resist.  
 
One conclusion of the BOJ case studies is that central bank independence is a 
continuous and not a dichotomous variable (independent vs. dependent), meaning that 
there are various levels of central bank independence (Eijffinger and Hoeberichts 2000; 
Gilardi 2001; Goodman 2001). When key acting figures change, the monetary policies 
and the relationship between the central bank and politicians change as well. Although 
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the legal framework of the BOJ (the central bank’s statute) was consistent, the case 
studies of this chapter demonstrated that the BOJ’s de facto independence fluctuated 
over time. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
The main goal of this thesis was to empirically investigate why the Bank of Japan Law 
was revised in 1998, and how the BOJ’s institutional status regarding central bank 
independence and monetary policy has been affected. This thesis focused on both the de 
iure and de facto independence of the Bank of Japan. The new Bank of Japan Law of 
1998 was the basic source for the analysis of the de iure central bank independence. 
Regarding de facto central bank independence, this dissertation set two foci: the 
appointment procedure of the BOJ’s key staff, and monetary policy decisions. In 
particular, as described in the introduction, this study attempted to answer the following 
research questions:  
1. What were the motivations of Japanese lawmakers to change the central bank 
law and to delegate independence to the Bank of Japan? 
2. What were the changes in the new Bank of Japan Law, and how did these 
changes affect central bank independence? (de iure analysis) 
3. How did the Bank of Japan’s independence change regarding the appointment 
procedure and monetary policy, and how did the BOJ react to pressure imposed 
by the government and politicians? (de facto analysis) 
 
In order to find answers to these questions, various types of sources were used in a two-
method approach. For instance, many primary sources, such as official Bank of Japan 
documents, were employed. One crucial contribution in this study is the application of 
many original sources in Japanese, and the completion of 23 expert interviews, 
including interviews with Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance officials. In the 
following section, final conclusions are drawn for each single chapter.   
  
Chapter 1 introduced and Chapter 2 provided the theoretical framework for the 
analysis and interpretation of the Bank of Japan’s independence in the subsequent 
chapters. This thesis is an in-depth case study of the Bank of Japan. The methodology 
used in this dissertation was two-fold. A principal-agent framework was combined with 
a historical institutionalism approach in order to examine the institutional design and 
independence of the Bank of Japan. This thesis analysed the delegation to an 
independent Bank of Japan, the de facto appointment procedure, and monetary policy 
decisions made by the BOJ by employing principal-agent theory with multiple 
principals. Both the executive (Government/Cabinet) and the legislative (Diet 
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politicians) branches of the government were identified as principals which exert 
influence on the agent, the Bank of Japan. 
 
Chapter 3 concentrated on the reform process of the Bank of Japan. Before the revision 
of the Bank of Japan took place in 1998, former attempts in the 1950s and 1960s failed. 
Finally in 1996, the Hashimoto government put central bank reform on the agenda. 
Only two years later, a new Bank of Japan Law came into effect. However, the process 
of the BJL reform, and the result were criticised. Most importantly, the speed of the 
reform process, and that the very same people and the MOF were responsible for the 
process and the contents of the new law were identified as the main points of critique. 
The high influence of the Ministry of Finance concerning the contents of the BJL was 
clearly visible. Important in this chapter is the role of various actors in the reform 
process. This thesis found that the leading party, the LDP, was not really interested in 
central bank reform and independence, but primarily aimed at reducing the power of the 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
Chapter 4 reviewed the existing literature on the delegation to an independent central 
bank, and tested the most relevant theories on the Bank of Japan. It demonstrated that 
central bank reform in Japan cannot be explained by a single delegation theory, but 
rather has multifaceted reasons. In Japan’s case, most of the “common” delegation 
hypotheses do not work. Rather, this thesis attributed the motive to decidedly political 
factors. Extraordinary political events and bureaucratic scandals led to high uncertainty 
among the electorate. The collapse of the LDP hegemony in 1993 is regarded as a 
landmark event that led to a changing relationship between the LDP and MOF. This was 
an important factor for financial reform, including the revision of the Bank of Japan 
Law. The examination of the Bank of Japan Law revision process demonstrated that 
political factors had indeed played a key role. The most important motive for the ruling 
parties in the Hashimoto Cabinet to support reform was the struggle for political 
survival, namely their attempt to remain in power for the forthcoming election.   
 
This chapter dealt with the strategy of blame avoidance, which explained how political 
key actors were able to shift the blame for the deteriorating Japanese economy to the 
MOF. Finding a scapegoat in the MOF resulted in reforms and changes in the Ministry, 
including the revision of the Bank of Japan Law in 1998. The central bank reform was 
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embedded in a greater reform of the MOF. Political actors used the Ministry as a 
scapegoat, and basically tried to protect themselves against political distress, while 
simultaneously trying to increase their re-election prospects. As a result, the 
independence of the new Bank of Japan was not something the BOJ had successfully 
fought for and won, but rather BJL reform came by default, arriving as a consequence 
of the failures and scandals in the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Chapter 5 showed that the Bank of Japan Law revision of 1998 improved the BOJ’s 
legal independence significantly, and provided the Bank with operational independence 
to pursue its objectives. However, regardless of some essential improvements 
concerning central bank independence, the principal finding of this chapter is that the 
overall result of the new law was unsatisfactory. Some important articles of the Bank of 
Japan Law are deficient, and have ambiguous formulations in both the Japanese and 
English versions. For instance, the new Bank of Japan Law provided the BOJ with 
multiple objectives – price stability and the maintenance of an orderly financial system. 
Other articles, especially Articles 4 (relationship with the government) and 19 
(attendance of government representatives) are critical to central bank independence, 
and might be an obstruction to the proper conduct of monetary policy. In addition, 
regarding a central bank’s financial independence, the Bank of Japan continues to lag 
behind other major central banks.  
 
Another important issue of this chapter were central bank independence indices. The 
result from the analysis of the 1998 BJL was confirmed, and the BOJ improved its score 
of independence for most major central bank indices in comparison to before the law 
revision (e.g., the Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti Index). In the last part of this chapter, 
the index by Laurens et al. (2009) was updated, and verified that the political 
independence of the BOJ is higher than suggested in the original index. The overall 
conclusion of this chapter is that the BOJ’s de iure independence increased with the BJL 
revision, but still remains lower than that of other major central banks, such as the 
European Central Bank, the US Federal Reserve, and the Bank of England.  
 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that the Bank of Japan has increased its accountability and 
transparency by a substantial amount owing to the new BJL. Regarding central bank 
accountability, the BOJ publishes minutes of its Monetary Policy Board Meetings, and 
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submits a report to the Diet on a semi-annually basis. Upon request, the Governor or a 
representative has to testify before the Diet. It is crucial to distinguish between 
transparency to the public, to the government, and to the Diet. In all three aspects the 
BOJ’s transparency was enhanced.  
 
As a result of these changes, the BOJ gained higher values in leading central bank 
accountability and transparency indices. This view was confirmed by an update of the 
central bank accountability index by Laurens et al. (2009) and the central bank 
transparency index by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). However, the assessment of the 
BOJ’s transparency and accountability in indices depended on the structure of the index. 
Generally speaking, the BOJ scored well if an index concentrates on publications of 
minutes and the voting structure, or the disclosure of information. In contrast, if the 
indices focused on the prioritisation of objectives of monetary policy, the BOJ scored 
relatively poor. A second conclusion of this chapter was that the transparency of the 
Bank of Japan has increased to a remarkable extent over time; especially since 2000, the 
year when Policy Board members started to publish projections of the economy, and 
2007, when the BOJ started to publish individual voting records of its Policy Board 
Meetings. These findings were confirmed by means of updates of the central bank 
transparency indices by Dincer and Eichengreen (2010) and Minegishi and Cournede 
(2009).  
 
Chapter 7 demonstrated that a simple distinction between dependent and independent 
central banks is insufficient when attempting to understand central banking in Japan. 
The political and economic system in Japan is characterized by peculiar features. First, 
it was characterised by a remarkable political stability after the Second World War; a 
stability that was based on the LDP’s commitment to seek rapid economic growth. 
Second, the bureaucratic decision-making in the Bank of Japan is too complex to be 
explained by a simple dependent-independent Anglo-Saxon framework. As a result, this 
chapter offered an analysis of the de facto environment of the Bank of Japan’s 
independence by concentrating on the old Bank of Japan. This chapter demonstrated 
that the old Bank of Japan was characterized by a system of alternating Governors and 
Deputy Governors, meaning a Governor from the BOJ was always replaced by a 
Governor from the MOF, and vice versa. The Deputy Governor was always from the 
other organisation, and became the following Governor. Another finding of the chapter 
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is the fact that the MOF acted as safeguard for the BOJ from time to time, protecting the 
central bank from politicians’ pressure, but increasing the BOJ`s dependence on the 
MOF. Regardless of these limitations of central bank independence, it was shown that 
the BOJ was able to gain a remarkable amount of de facto independence.  
 
Chapter 8 presented an in-depth analysis of the Bank of Japan concerning both the 
appointment process of the central bank’s key staff and monetary policy decision-
making. Regarding appointments, it was shown that the Japanese government tried to 
appoint Governors and Deputy Governors who share similar stances on monetary policy, 
or persons who were viewed as easy to influence. As a result, appointments of BOJ 
Board members became highly politicised after the implementation of the new Bank of 
Japan Law.  
 
The same result was found with regards to monetary policy. A high amount of political 
pressure on the BOJ emerged after the law revision. This thesis divided political 
pressure between two principals, the executive and the legislative branch of the 
government. Both principals, the government and Diet politicians, did their utmost 
effort to force the Bank of Japan to cooperate with the aim to overcome the deflationary 
problem of the Japanese economy. The Bank of Japan was unwilling to follow the 
government and politicians’ wishes, and preferred to protect its independence by 
conducting independent monetary policy as much as possible. This behaviour resulted 
in many conflicts with the government and politicians. Consequently, this thesis argued 
that monetary policy under the new BOJ Law was highly politicised regardless of the 
BOJ’s de iure independence. One important channel of pressure was the threat to re-
revise the BJL, and to make the BOJ dependent on the government again. These threats 
were formulated by certain Diet politicians and the Anti-Deflation League. The 
government did not support this movement, and, as a result, the BOJ Law is still intact.   
 
In sum, this thesis showed that the BOJ turned out to be extremely different from the 
central bank envisioned by the majority of Japanese politicians. The BOJ has developed 
into a significantly more independent and powerful actor than would have been 
predicted by most observers. One important conclusion is that the relationship between 
the BOJ and the government is determined by social, economic, political and historical 
contexts rather than by legal contexts. More precisely, this thesis’ conclusion is that the 
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BOJ was able to gain a fair amount of de facto independence. That is, the de iure status 
of the BJL is not so important in Japan. Instead, informal institutions shaped, and 
continue to shape the extent of de facto independence of the Bank of Japan.  
 
Recent Developments and Future Implications  
This thesis focused on the period between 1996 and 2012, and argued that the BOJ was 
successful in protecting its central bank independence after the BJL revision. However, 
where the BOJ is heading is entirely unclear, and is an interesting question for future 
studies.  
 
Based on the findings in this dissertation, it is possible to argue that it is promising that 
the BOJ will enjoy full independence as an organisation in the long-run. From this 
perspective, politicians will find it difficult to change the central bank law again, 
because of the political high costs. Although threats to cut off the BOJ’s independence 
have a certain impact on the BOJ, a realisation is most difficult, because a change in the 
BOJ’s legislation requires a high extent of agreement between political actors. In a de 
facto sense, the BOJ has shown that it was able to conduct independent monetary policy 
until 2012. 
 
Regardless of these considerations, there is a global trend regarding a changing stance 
of central banks. Since the global financial crisis, an urgent need to revive and sustain 
economic growth, and to avoid financial collapse in many countries worldwide exists. 
In response to financial crises, many central banks, most prominently the US Federal 
Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of England, conducted very 
aggressive monetary policies, and adopted very low interest rates. Quantitative easing 
became the norm. A development towards greater economic uncertainty led to situations 
demanding changes in the tasks of central banks. Discussions concerning whether a 
high amount of central bank independence is still the preferable institutional set-up in 
these times of large economic shocks were initiated.     
 
Japan is no exception to this trend. In 2012, Abe Shinzô became Prime Minister, and 
introduced the so-called “Abenomics”. This economic policy programme aims at 
reviving the Japanese economy, and overcoming deflation. Besides fiscal policy and 
structural reforms, monetary policy is a central component. The Abe administration 
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believes that the Bank of Japan should print much more money, and should purchase a 
higher amount of Japanese government bonds. That is, the government expects the 
Bank of Japan to support the Cabinet’s effort to help the Japanese economy out of the 
deflation. This is nothing new for the Bank of Japan, as was demonstrated in this 
dissertation. However, Abe is much more determined than his predecessors. One 
indicator is that Shirakawa, who never really bowed to government’s wishes, and, 
therefore, was strongly criticised by Abe and Finance Minister Asô, resigned before his 
official term ended. It can be doubted whether the official statement that Shirakawa did 
not want to disturb the implementation of a new Governor and two Deputy Governors, 
is the only reason behind Shirakawa’s resignation.  
 
After Shirakawa’s resignation, Abe appointed Kuroda Haruhiko as the new Governor of 
the Bank of Japan. Kuroda, a former president of the Asian Development Bank, is 
known as a person who supports quantitative easing, and the introduction of an inflation 
target. In addition to Kuroda, Iwata Kikuo and Nakasô Hiroshi were appointed Deputy 
Governors. The appointment of Iwata is especially critcal, because he has been a 
constant and harsh opponent of the BOJ’s monetary policies throughout his academic 
career.  
 
Soon after Kuroda came into office, the BOJ introduced the “Quantitative and 
Qualitative Monetary Easing” framework. This new policy framework consists of the 
introduction of a price stability target of 2 per cent. The BOJ aims at reaching this target 
in about two years. The Bank decided to increase the monetary base, so as to reach 270 
trillion Yen in two years. This means that the monetary base will be doubled until the 
end of 2014. In comparison to other major central banks, such as the US Federal 
Reserve, or the Bank of England, this was a very strong measure. In order to achieve 
this target, the BOJ planned to extraordinarily increase its holdings of Japanese 
government bonds. It is interesting to note that the fashion towards inflation-targeting 
decreased in response of the financial crisis, and central banks were obliged by 
governments to keep their hands off inflation targeting. Instead, they were to remain in a 
flexible position, in order to support the national economy with bold monetary stimulus. 
It is intriguing that Japan introduced an inflation targeting framework at a point in time 
when the efficiency of this tool was doubted.  
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With the appointment of Kuroda and the introduction of the new policy framework, the 
debate concerning the BOJ’s independence continues. With the implementation of a 
Governor and a Deputy Governor who are very close to the government, the BOJ’s 
independence is in danger. It seems that with the introduction of “Quantitative and 
Qualitative Monetary Easing” and a price stability target the BOJ might have violated 
“holy principles” made by former Governors Hayami, Fukui, and Shirakawa. It is clear 
that the current developments are an infringement to central bank independence, for 
which the BOJ had strongly fought for. If the government decides to undermine the 
BOJ’s independence permanently, long-term harm cannot be ruled out. However, it is 
too early to judge whether or not the current changes are temporary, or if they will have 
stronger effects on the Bank of Japan’s independence in the future. In case 
“Abenomics” turns out to be a success, demands to protect the Bank of Japan’s 
independence will probably fade away, and become obsolete.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A:  
 
Construction and Coding of the Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) Central 
Bank Independence Index   
 
 
1. Governor/CEO (Weight in overall index = 20%) 
  a) Length of term in office    (weighted 25%) 
      More than 8 years  1.00    
      6 to 8 years  0.75    
      5 years  0.50    
      4 years  0.25    
      Less than 4 years or at discretion of appointer  0.00    
          
  b) Who appoints?    (weighted 25%)  
      CB Board  1.00    
      CB board, executive branch, legislative branch jointly  0.75    
      Parliament or legislative branch  0.50    
      Executive branch  0.25    
      One or two members of executive branch  0.00    
   
  c) Dismissal    (weighted 25%) 
      No provision  1.00    
      Possible only for reasons not related to policy  0.83    
      At the discretion of the CB board  0.67    
      At the discretion of the parliament or legislature  0.50    
      Unconditional dismissal at discretion of parliament or legislature  0.33    
      At the discretion of the executive  0.17    
      Unconditional dismissal at discretion of the executive  0.00    
   
  d) May CEO hold other offices in government simultaneously?    (weighted 25%)  
      No  1.00    
      Only with permission of executive branch  0.50    
      No rule against holding another office  0.00    
  
 
2. Policy formulation (Weight in overall index = 15%) 
  a) Who formulates monetary policy?    (weighted 25%)  
      CB alone  1.00    
      CB participates but has little influence  0.67    
      CB advises government  0.33    
      CB has no say  0.00    
   
  b) Who has final word in resolution of conflict?    (weighted 50%)  
    CB on issues clearly defined in the law as its objectives  1.00 
    Government on policy issues not clearly defined as CB goals  
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    or in case of conflict within CB 0.80    
      CB board, executive branch, legislative branch jointly  0.60    
      Legislature or parliament on policy issues  0.40    
      Executive branch on policy issues, subject to due process and possible CB protest 
0.20    
      Executive branch  0.00    
  
  c) Role in government budgetary process    (weighted 25%)  
      CB active  1.00    
      CB has no influence  0.00    
 
 
3. Policy objective (Weight in overall index = 15%) 
      Price stability is the major or only objective, and CB has final word in event of 
conflict       
      with other government objectives 1.00    
      Price stability is the only objective  0.80    
      Price stability is one objective among multiple compatible objectives 0.60    
      Price stability is one objective among multiple, potentially conflicting, objectives 
0.40    
      No objectives stated  0.20    
      Stated objectives do not include price stability  0.00    
  
 
4. Lending to government (Weight in overall index = 50%) 
  a) Advances    (weighted 15%) 
      No advances  1.00    
      Permitted, with strict limits  0.67    
      Permitted, with loose limits  0.33    
      No legal limits on lending  0.00    
   
  b) Securitized lending    (weighted 10%) 
      Not permitted  1.00    
      Permitted, with strict limits  0.67    
      Permitted, with loose limits  0.33    
      No legal limits on lending  0.00    
   
  c) Terms of lending    (weighted 10%) 
      Controlled by CB  1.00    
      Specified in CB law  0.67    
      Agreed between CB and executive branch  0.33    
      Decided by executive branch alone  0.00    
  
  d) Potential borrowers from CB    (weighted 5%)  
      Only the central government  1.00    
      All levels of government  0.67    
      All levels of government plus public enterprises  0.33    
      Public and private sector  0.00    
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  e) Limits on CB lending defined in   (weighted 2.5%) 
      Specific currency amounts  1.00    
      Shares of CB demand liabilities or capital  0.67    
      Shares of government revenue  0.33    
      Shares of government expenditures  0.00    
    
  f) Maturity of loans    (weighted 2.5%)  
      Within 6 months  1.00    
      Within 1 year  0.67    
      More than 1 year  0.33    
      CB law does not specify maturity  0.00    
   
  g) Interest rate of loans must be    (weighted 2.5%) 
      Above minimum rates  1.00    
      At market rates  0.75    
      Below maximum rates  0.50    
      Interest rate not mentioned in law  0.25    
      No interest charged on government borrowing from CB  0.00    
   
  h) CB prohibited from buying/selling government securities in primary market?         
      (weighted 2.5%) 
      Yes  1.00    
      No  0.00    
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Appendix B: 
 
The Laurens et al. (2009) Central Bank Accountability Index  
 
Responsibility:  maximum score =2 
1. Who sets objectives of monetary policy?  
a) only central bank 1 
b) central bank and government 0.66 
c) by statute 0.33 
d) none/government 0 
2. Is central bank subject to possible interference in monetary 
policy? yes=0; no=1 
Objectives: maximum score =3 
3. Clarity on final objectives of monetary policy (de iure)  
a) single and clearly defined =1 
b) clear prioritisation of multiple objectives =0.5 
c) no priority =0 
4. Quantification of target (de facto) yes=1; no=0 
5. Publication of economic outlook  
a) in the form of explicit forecasts =1 
b) forecasts with assessment of risks =0.66 
c) only general statement =0.33 
d) no economic outlook =0 
Ex post accountability: maximum score =3 
6. Reporting mechanisms and procedures 
a) to minister (0.33) 
b) to legislature (0.33) 
c) other (for example, board) (0.33) 
7. Regular appearance before parliament (de iure – de facto) 
yes=1; no =0 
8. Conflict resolution procedures 
a) definition of conflict (0.33) 
b) procedures to resolve conflict (0.33) 
c) clear outcomes in case of failure to resolve conflict (0.33) 
Governance responsibility: maximum score =2 
9. Decision-making structure 
a) by committee =1 
b) CEO only (one person)  =0.5 
10. clear and detailed explanation of appointment 
procedures; yes =1; no =0 
Total maximum score =10 
 
Source: Laurens et al. (2009: 137) 
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Appendix C: 
 
The Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) Central Bank Transparency Index  
 
 
This appendix contains the exact formulation of the central bank transparency index. 
The index is the sum of the scores for the answers to the fifteen questions below 
(min=0,max=15). 
 
 
(1) Political transparency 
 (a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit 
      prioritisation in case of multiple objectives? 
      No formal objective(s) =0. 
      Multiple objectives without prioritisation =1/2. 
      One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority=1. 
 (b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)? 
      No=0. 
      Yes=1. 
 (c) Are there explicit institutional arrangements or contracts between the monetary 
      authorities and the government? 
      No central bank, contracts or other institutional arrangements=0. 
      Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract=1/2. 
      Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract  
      (although possibly subject to an explicit override procedure)=1. 
 
 
(2) Economic transparency 
 (a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly 
      available? The focus is on the release of data for the following five variables:   
      money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilization. 
      Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables=0. 
      Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables=1/2. 
      Quarterly time series for all five variables=1. 
(b) Does the central bank disclose the formal macroeconomic model(s) it uses for     
      policy analysis? 
      No=0. 
      Yes=1.   
(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts? 
      No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output=0. 
      Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than     
      quarterly frequency=1/2. 
      Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the medium      
      Term (one to two years ahead),  
      specifying the assumptions about the policy instrument 
      (conditional or unconditional forecasts)=1. 
 
 
(3) Procedural transparency 
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(a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its 
      monetary policy framework? 
      No=0. 
      Yes=1. 
(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or 
      explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of 
      time? 
      No, or only after a substantial lag (more than 8 weeks)=0. 
      Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed)  
      or explanations (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of         
      backward- and forward-looking arguments=1. 
 (c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main    
      operating instrument or target was reached? 
      No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks)=0. 
      Non-attributed voting records=1/2. 
      Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker=1. 
 
 
(4) Policy transparency 
 (a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target    
      promptly announced? 
      No, or after a significant lag=0. 
      Yes, at the latest on the day of implementation=1. 
 (b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy   
      decisions? 
      No=0. 
      Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially=1/2. 
      Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments=1. 
 (c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy    
      meeting or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least   
      quarterly)? 
      No=0. 
      Yes=1. 
 
 
(5) Operational transparency 
(a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating       
      targets (if any) have been achieved? 
      No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency)=0. 
      Yes, but without providing explanations for significant deviations=1/2. 
      Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any);or, (nearly) perfect    
      control over main operating instrument/target=1. 
(b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated)    
      macroeconomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission process? 
      No, or not very often=0. 
      Yes, but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic    
      developments (at least quarterly)=1/2. 
      Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually)=1. 
 (c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in      
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      light of its macroeconomic objectives? 
      No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency)=0. 
      Yes, but superficially=1/2. 
      Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting  
      the objectives=1. 
 
 
Source: Eijffinger and Geraats (2006: 18-20) 
 
 
